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THE CONTROL OF BRITISH RAW MATERIAL SUPPLIES, 1919-1939

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THE dominant feature of British commercial life on the eve of the first World War was free trade. In attempting, therefore, to plan the supply and distribution of raw materials after the outbreak of hostilities, the government was obliged to create piece-meal, and under the stress of war, control policy and control machinery diametrically opposed to the traditional methods and organization of British trade. In the holocaust of controls during the post-war years a brief attempt was made to return broadly to the unregulated distribution of supplies, an attempt which was quickly abandoned under the impact of the economic depressions of the period. For this reason the interval between the two wars did not, in general, witness the resuscitation of free-trade principles and methods, but the constantly renewed efforts and experiments on the part of the trades themselves to regulate the production and sale of their commodities. It is too often forgotten in the present controversy concerning the removal of controls that trade at the end of the inter-war period was not conducted on a 'free' basis but was the subject of the most extensive, though not always co-ordinated, control instituted by the producers, distributors and consumers. The growth of this policy and machinery vastly influenced our preparedness and power to wage war. It is proposed in this paper first, to examine the character of the raw materials controls which were built up between the wars, and secondly, to estimate their effects upon the renewed attempts at governmental control necessitated by the outbreak of the second World War.

I

The measures of control imposed during the first World War were, naturally, not the results of any general plan of requirements and supply, but were born of scarcity and improvisation. The progressive tightening up of control was, therefore, the direct result of shortages which in the first place were met by the treatment of isolated difficulties, but which

ultimately called for the general direction of supply, distribution and use. The earliest measure in most instances was the restriction of export which, in the case of certain materials for explosives, was imposed within the first week of war.¹ From this simple and crude attempt to conserve supplies it was a logical step to requisition stocks, the government assuming the necessary powers in respect of tuluol as early as November 1914,² and from that to official purchase overseas. Government purchases, however, could not seriously modify either supply or price difficulties abroad while they were in competition with purchases by British nationals, but this uneasy partnership was allowed to continue until 1916 and later before it gave way to centralized purchasing by government authority and the establishment of an import licensing system. The government was thus obliged willy-nilly to assume responsibility for supply both at home and abroad and to control prices through the various stages of production, since the danger of inflation threatened not only the supply structure but the war effort as a whole. Many of these principles had been partially or fully worked out between the outbreak of war and the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions in May 1915, but the setting up of that body, and the increased powers obtained by the Army Contracts Department of the War Office, gave an impetus to the expansion of control.

The final step (in the words of the official historian) was to assume responsibility for all visible supplies, to control all private importation and distribute material to non-munitions as well as munitions trades, thereby virtually bringing all the industries connected with munitions supply, and all the industries using munition materials, including private as well as munitions trading, under the control of the Department.³

Viewed in perspective, the irresistible logic of the supply situation made this national direction over the supply and distribution of raw materials inevitable, but its application was, in fact, disputed and delayed until urgent individual problems called for immediate action, or until, as Mr E. M. H. Lloyd has pointed out, it was made psychologically acceptable by some disaster or impending danger.⁴ In all cases general policy and administration lagged behind the pragmatic treatment of particular issues. In other words, practice was always several stages ahead of theory. The counterpart of the *laissez-faire* outlook in peace was the 'business as usual' concept in war, which inhibited until the final stages of the conflict the centralized planning of supply, with the result that the priority machinery, when it was set up, was cumbersome and only partially effective.⁵ These and other defects of the supply organization made it an easy target for destructive criticism, and it was generally argued that, in the new age of plenty,

¹ *History of Ministry of Munitions* (1922), VII, part I, p. 5.

² *Ibid. loc. cit.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 11.

⁴ E. M. H. Lloyd, *Experiments in State Control* (Oxford, 1924), p. 268.

⁵ 'It is not surprising that the necessity for State intervention was only gradually admitted by Ministers who had spent the greater part of their political careers in exploding the fallacies of Protectionism on the one hand and Socialism on the other' (*ibid.* p. 22).

economic forces should be emancipated from the restrictive influence of governmental organization.

The history of the changing character of British control of raw materials in the inter-war period falls into three main periods, coinciding roughly with the main economic trends of the age. There was, first, the period which extended from the Armistice until 1922 when commercial and industrial developments were dominated by post-war dislocations in which the effects of boom and slump combined to overthrow what was left of the wartime structure of state control. There followed the period from 1922 until 1931 when the effects of two serious depressions, separated only by a minor and comparatively brief improvement of trade, stimulated serious though largely abortive efforts on the part of British trade to reorganize and strengthen itself to meet the combined effects of over-capitalization and world competition. This period ended with the establishment of the National Government in 1931, when the state once again collaborated with industry in a manner unparalleled in peacetime to meet the effects of the depression, and introduced thereby major modifications in Britain's industrial and commercial framework. A concluding section of the paper will endeavour to assess the effects of these important changes upon Britain's preparedness for war in 1939. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized, however, that none of the three periods possessed economic features exclusively its own and that the landmarks are chosen for reasons of convenience rather than on the basis of chronological exactitude.

II

The first phase, lasting from the Armistice until 1922, saw the withdrawal, with certain exceptions, of the government's emergency powers over raw materials and, by the close of the period, attempts at the revival of commercial control to meet the first consequences of over-production. In the early post-war years the political approach to the economic problems of reconstruction was limited in two ways: first, there was no historic parallel or signpost which could indicate the real nature of the problems facing a world recovering from the greatest upheaval it had experienced for centuries; and secondly, the belief survived that nothing which had happened in the special conditions of war could be said to lessen the validity of free-trade principles as the basis for Britain's commercial relations with the rest of the world. Against this background of innocence tempered with optimism the newly liberated leaders of industry and trade proceeded to re-establish the pre-war framework of economic society, in so far as its nature had been revealed to them. The general causes of this policy have been set out by Professor Tawney and others.¹ Many wartime controls had been created for the duration of the war and a limited period thereafter: to have pleaded for their extension would have required prophetic

¹ R. H. Tawney, 'The Abolition of Economic Controls, 1918-1921', *Economic History Review*, XIII, 1-30; A. C. Pigou, *The Transition from Peace to War* (Oxford Pamphlets on Home Affairs, No. H. 3, 1943); H. D. Henderson, *The Cotton Control Board* (Oxford, 1922); J. A. Salter, *Allied Shipping Control* (Oxford, 1921), etc.

powers and a political outlook entirely out of keeping with the easy hopes of the time. Apart from this, the unemployment problem loomed large as the demands of war and war industry receded, and it was held that an industrial control based upon scarcity was wholly inadequate to create and meet the anticipated expansion of civilian demand. It was regarded as axiomatic that if the unemployed were to be absorbed trade must be free.¹

The first reaction to the expansion of demand was the perhaps not unnatural assumption that that expansion would go unchecked for a very considerable period. Both in the renewal and extension of capital equipment and in the fulfilment of long-suppressed civilian demand it was felt that the call for raw materials would be enormous. In the case of a few materials such as wool and tin anxiety was felt because of the danger of under-consumption on account of the accumulated wartime stocks. The fear that the wool surplus which the British government had been unable to ship might on its release have a devastating effect upon the market produced the proposal that a million bales should be dumped into the sea.² The fear proved in fact quite ill-founded: the organized release of the stock in a period of slightly over three years was completed without any deleterious effect upon the price level except during the year 1922, when, in any case, other causes were operative. Yet even during the period of low prices a warning was uttered against the prospect of a serious wool *shortage* rather than glut.³ In the case of tin, lead and copper, however, the accumulated stocks presented greater difficulties.

It followed also that if trade should be free in time of boom it was even more necessary in time of slump, since it was felt that freedom to compete both in the home and the world market could alone ensure that the fittest should survive. Hence freedom from control was just as insistently demanded during the post-war slump which lasted from the Armistice to the spring of 1919, during the boom which extended over the next twelve months and during the slump which followed. Finally, the rapid disintegration of the various international schemes of government control seemed to emphasize the anachronistic character of centralized control on a national basis.

The belief that freedom from control would introduce a golden age of full employment proved, in fact, too shallow a thesis. British raw materials policy from 1921 or earlier, and almost until the end of the inter-war period, was faced with the problem of over-production: recession in total demand and fundamental changes in demand. An analysis of the first of these problems lies outside the purview of this paper and is bound up with general economic causes such as the growth of tariff walls, the

¹ The oft-quoted Lord Inchcape declared categorically: 'given freedom from Government control, and its irritating and wasteful interference, the energy, the industry, the resource and the initiative of the people will enable us to recover' (*The Economist*, 28 December 1918, p. 875).

² *The Times*, 4 September 1943.

³ League of Nations, *Report on the Problem of Raw Materials and Foodstuffs* (Geneva, 1922), by C. Gini, p. 129.

restriction of credit facilities and the development by certain countries of productive capacity of their own during the war period or their diversion to alternative sources of supply to overcome their dependence upon the British Empire. This is particularly true of steel manufactures and textiles. The difficulties of over-capacity at home, built up to fulfil increased war demands, were, therefore, exacerbated by declining demands from abroad. Changes in demand were widespread, of which the increasing reduction in the consumption of pig-iron in favour of scrap in steel making, the general decline in the use of forge and foundry iron in favour of steel, and the decreased overseas demand for the better, as against the cheaper, textiles are outstanding examples. The solution which was advocated with consistent fervour was restriction.

There were two instances, however, in which restrictionist policies were applied for strategic rather than economic reasons: oil, to which further reference will be made, and certain colonial supplies. The memories of wartime shortages of critical materials were still fresh. The discriminatory export duty on palm kernels from British West Africa to monopolize their export to this country, the influence of which began to be felt in 1919, was thus designed to ensure adequate supplies to the United Kingdom; but this duty was dropped in 1922. The export duty on tin ore from the Straits Settlements, which had been introduced in 1903 to safeguard the virtual monopoly in smelting enjoyed by the British, was now extended to tin ore exports from Nigeria.¹ But in their general effect these duties were of slight significance and compare favourably with the similar ones imposed by Portugal and France.² A League of Nations committee came to the conclusion in 1937 that there were only three raw materials which colonial territories *alone* produce or are in a position to produce, namely rubber, palm oil and copra, and that these territories provided only 3 % of world production of all commercially important materials.³ It was admitted, of course, that certain materials such as rubber and tin might have an international importance far in excess of their value or percentage of total output of raw materials. Into this new strategic emphasis in British imperial relations there fits also the beginning of imperial preference, introduced in 1919, by which countries in the British Empire were given tariff preferences to the extent of one-sixth of all revenue duties, except those on wines and spirits, and on one-third of the McKenna duties.⁴ The special question of tariffs did not, however, play any prominent part in raw materials relations at this stage. The Dyestuffs Act of 1920 and the Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921 were concerned with the restriction

¹ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Department Paper No. 18A, *Raw Materials* (1939), p. 53.

² B. B. Wallace and L. R. Edminster, *International Control of Raw Materials* (Washington, 1930), p. 238.

³ League of Nations, *Report of the Committee for the Study of the Problem of Raw Materials* (Geneva, 1937) (A. 27, 1937 IIB), p. 10.

⁴ For proposing such a measure the Prime Minister had already been sternly taken to task during the first week of peace by the *Economist* for dancing on a political tightrope (16 November 1918, p. 675).

of imports of finished products, not raw materials, and Britain as a consumer was, like most industrial countries, concerned with ensuring the availability of raw materials rather than restricting their import.¹

While these matters were being settled on an internal and imperial basis, they were also being considered internationally through the Economic Section of the League of Nations. The American, British and French delegations to the Versailles conference had considered informally during the war suggestions for the equalization of access to raw materials, but they were not raised officially at the Peace Conference.² A proposal for allied control of the exportable surpluses of raw materials as a means of enforcing the fulfilment of the peace terms by the Central Powers likewise failed to receive serious consideration.³ The recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council that 'artificial economic barriers' should be removed proved little more than the formulation of a pious hope and the stimulus for similar expressions of piety on the part of the various international conferences in the years which followed.⁴ The reluctance of the United States to permit what would have amounted to an inter-allied supervision of her indigenous sources of supply, and the general unwillingness of other nations to tolerate what they regarded as infringements of their sovereign rights, prevented the emergence of any effective measure to continue wartime collaboration beyond the peace. As Mr Bernard M. Baruch, one of the chief protagonists in this post-war debate, has euphemistically observed, the world trade in raw materials reverted, in the main, 'to the system of automatic distribution under the principle of relative economic attractive power'.⁵ The special provisions made by the League to prevent the selfish exploitation by mandatory powers of their newly acquired territories affected only a very small proportion of the total raw materials supply.

But as the control of raw materials passed from the combined organizations of the allies and felt increasingly the impact of the 'principle of relative economic attractive power' it did not leave behind a complete vacuum as far as control machinery was concerned. The relinquishment by the allied governments of their central directing authority was followed by the return of the commercial organizations to assume some of these discarded functions and, if necessary, create specific machinery for new needs,

¹ In the case of dyestuffs, the government gave its support to the establishment of the British Dyestuffs Corporation in the hope that it would be able, amongst other things, to compete successfully in the home and world markets with the powerful organizations of Germany, Switzerland and the U.S. (W. S. Culbertson, *International Economic Policies* (New York, 1929), p. 424).

² C. K. Leith, *Minerals in the Peace Settlement* (Geological Society of America, 1940), p. 3.

³ *Ibid.* p. 7; F. E. Lawley, *The Growth of Collective Economy* (1928), II, 19-20.

⁴ See Wallace and Edminster, *op. cit.* Chapter XII.

⁵ Article on 'Raw Materials' in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th ed.), XVIII, p. 1002. Mr Baruch was of the opinion, however, that 'If the war had continued, a system of international control of many of the principal war industries might have resulted' (*American Industry in the War*, quoted in F. E. Lawley, *op. cit.* vol. II, p. xv).

with or without the help of their governments. Within a short space of time after the Armistice, control was being applied in numerous cases, including camphor, coffee, sisal, silk, cotton, quebracho, Chile nitrate, potash and quinine.¹ But the United Kingdom has never been more or less dependent for its economic welfare upon a single material, and there has never been any direct governmental intervention comparable to the actions of the Brazilian, Chilean and Egyptian governments in the case of coffee, nitrates and cotton respectively. To exemplify the general control tendency as it affected British interests it is necessary briefly to consider three materials: rubber, tin and oil.

Rubber in the first World War did not occupy the significant and critical position it has occupied in the second, and even in 1918 supplies were more than adequate for essential needs. The severe drop in prices which began in 1920 was due to over-production, which the rubber growers tried to tackle first by voluntary restriction and, after failure, by enlisting government support. In response to the request from the rubber growers the Secretary of Staté for the Colonies appointed the Stevenson Committee, on whose recommendation the first official restriction scheme of November 1922 was introduced. As far as tin was concerned the suppliers were not faced with long-term problems of production but simply with that of the organized release of stocks. The government in this case intervened directly and, by an agreement between the Malayan and the Netherlands East Indies governments, supplies were withheld sufficiently long to overcome the effects of the post-war slump.² But while, in general, the renewal of commercial control was the product of spontaneous and largely haphazard action by individual trades, the story of oil presents the important and exceptional case of planned control by the trade and governmental intervention at an early stage for military reasons. British, Dutch and American interests had already by 1914 built up powerful integrated concerns experienced in the methods of regulating markets and prices. By that date also an intimate relationship had grown up between the British government and importers based on the increasing dependence of the Navy upon oil for fuel, with the result that the government itself had bought more than 50 % of the shares of the Anglo-Persian Company in 1914.³ In the post-war period the British government, whose direct intervention in the oil industry was much greater than that of either the American or Dutch governments,⁴ became involved in diplomatic negotiations with the United States, France, Rumania and Near Eastern and other countries in furtherance of this; in the case of no other material were political and commercial needs so closely interwoven and so consistently pressed. The story of oil in the inter-war period provides the classic instance of the nation-state, whether it be England, the United

¹ There is a useful, though necessarily incomplete, 'Chronology of the development of control of exports of raw materials' in Wallace and Edminster, *op. cit.* pp. 347-64.

² P. Lamartine Yates, *Commodity Control* (1943), p. 145.

³ *Ibid.* p. 198.

⁴ See W. S. Culbertson, *op. cit.* pp. 326-7.

States or Germany, striving to acquire effective control of the most critical war material for strategic ends.

The period 1918-22 was, then, a formative period in the new economic age in Britain. Commercial interests were beginning to establish their control powers which had been suspended or modified during the world conflict. The state was on the whole gladly renouncing the authority it had been obliged to assume, but at the same time was retaining certain vestiges of this economic power for specific reasons, largely of strategy. In general the period did not conform to or reveal the basic conditions of the new era. By the latter date, however, the world had emerged from the abnormal conditions of the reconstruction period to feel the full effects of an intensified trade cycle. In the two main periods which followed drastic changes were made in the whole concept of the object and structure of control whether by the state or the trade.

III

The nine years 1922-31 might be described as the experimental period in control history, when the existence side by side of the habits of free trade and the practices of control resulted in confused and sometimes mis-directed attempts to change the basis of our trade policy. During the eighty years which had elapsed since the repeal of the Corn Laws free trade had been accepted, although with diminishing enthusiasm, as the way of life most suited to British needs; but the almost unrelieved depression which marked these concluding years settled the fate of the whole free-trade system. Britain was suffering from major defects in her industrial and commercial machinery, accentuated by financial conditions arising from the high value at which sterling had been stabilized. This is confirmed not solely by her record unemployment figures but by the fact that while she felt the depression as intensely as other countries she failed to share to any appreciable extent in the trade revival between 1924 and 1929.

The general position of the world supply of raw materials was maldistribution, over-production at the source with the concomitant effect of a falling price level, and under-consumption in the industrial countries for a variety of general and individual reasons. The word over-production, however, necessarily masks its fundamental cause: under-consumption. For most materials, including cotton, rubber and steel, the world could have easily consumed all the available supply if it had had the power to purchase it. In the case of timber, on the other hand, in spite of the supply crisis of this period, the world was in fact consuming more than the natural growth.¹

The response to the general economic crisis was the time-honoured panacea, restriction, and the attempted rationalization of supply. The most controversial story is provided by rubber. The Stevenson Scheme was devised to balance supply with demand in such a manner as to prevent further disastrous falls in price, and the Act embodying it, which came

¹ H. R. G. Greaves, *Raw Materials and International Control* (1936), p. 97.

into force in November 1922, determined colonial exports according to variations in the price of rubber in London. The policy of the Stevenson Scheme, which lasted from 1922 until 1928, was a price policy pure and simple. If its object was to raise prices it succeeded, at least for a while; if it aimed at stabilizing prices, it failed. The annual average quarterly prices for the period 1923-30 were as follows:

*The price of rubber per pound (standard ribbed sheet in London)*¹

		1923				1924			
Quarter ending ...		Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.	Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.
Average price ...		14·3d.	16·9d.	14·2d.	15·0d.	14·2d.	12·9d.	11·0d.	14·6d.
		1925				1926			
Quarter ending ...		Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.	Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.
Average price ...		18·0d.	19·4d.	38·5d.	43·3d.	46·7d.	28·0d.	21·0d.	20·2d.
		1927				1928			
Quarter ending ...		Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.	Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.
Average price ...		19·3d.	19·7d.	18·2d.	16·6d.	19·0d.	12·6d.	9·2d.	8·9d.
		1929				1930			
Quarter ending ...		Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.	Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.
Average price ...		9·0d.	11·4d.	10·8d.	10·1d.	7·9d.	7·6d.	6·2d.	4·3d.

It is not necessary here to enter into a detailed estimate of what might have happened in the face of increased world demand for rubber had no control scheme been introduced, while it is no less important to avoid the pitfalls of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* conclusions. The facts were that prices rose rapidly, as the table shows, until once again the diminution of demand coupled with expanded supply from the non-restricted areas wrecked the scheme. This first attempt at restriction proved in the end a disaster. The Achilles heel of all restriction schemes is the expansion of production by non-members, the development of new sources, or the provision of alternative materials. The scheme had been built on a purely local basis; it failed to bring in the non-British producers who, therefore, expanded their production and gained a larger proportion of the total trade at the expense of the British, as is shown by the table on p. 10.² A final criticism of the scheme is that it was a purely producers' instrument, with no representation whatsoever of the consumer interests. One consequence of this last characteristic was the bitter hostility of the American consumers and their immediate attempt to obtain alternative supplies, mainly through the use of reclaim rubber (of which the percentage

¹ *London and Cambridge Economic Service*, Special Memorandum No. 34 (Studies in the Artificial Control of Raw Material Supplies, No. 2, Rubber, 1931), by J. W. F. Rowe, Tables 5 and 6.

² Based on the latest available figures in the League of Nations, *Statistical Year Books*.

consumption of the total rose in the United States from 19.1 % in 1922 to 51 % in 1928),¹ and partly through the development and expansion of Liberian and Brazilian sources.² Meanwhile, one further development arising out of the control of rubber should be noted. The need to administer such a scheme, crude and shortsighted as it was, stimulated closer collaboration amongst the suppliers themselves; not the producers in Malaya, but the distributors in London, closely knit together in the British Rubber Growers Association.

Compared with these developments, the growth of the control of non-ferrous metals, especially tin, was more effective and extensive.³ These industries started with the initial advantage of being more concentrated from the time of the Armistice. The British Metals Corporation, a British cartel with direct government representation, was created primarily to

Rubber exports, 1920-30, in metric tons (ooo's omitted)

Country	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930
Africa	6	4	3	6	5	8	10	9	8	6	5
Mexico	—	—	—	—	2	4	4	5	3	1	1
South America	33	22	24	22	24	31	27	31	22	22	15
British Borneo	6	5	8	10	11	15	16	18	18	19	18
Ceylon	40	39	47	38	38	46	60	56	59	82	77
British Malaya	174	151	216	204	186	213	291	246	304	464	450
British India and Burma	6	5	5	7	8	11	12	13	12	14	12
Netherlands East Indies	79	68	89	118	151	192	207	233	233	259	245
Indo China	3	4	5	6	6	8	8	9	9	10	10
Siam, etc.	—	—	—	2	3	5	4	5	4	4	5
Oceania and Philippines	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total ...	347	298	397	413	434	534	640	626	673	882	839

eliminate German influence over imperial sources of supply, but its functions soon shifted in emphasis from political to commercial objects, i.e. a co-ordinated price policy. By 1926 it had joined a loosely organized though none the less effective international copper cartel, in association with American, Belgian and other producers. Here, too, it is instructive to recall that this organization tried to pursue the same policy internationally that the rubber committee had applied during the period 1922-8, and stabilized prices at much too high a level, with the result that other sources, especially in Rhodesia, were expanded and the association itself broke up in 1930.⁴ Meanwhile in 1929 a new British concern,

¹ G. Rae, 'The Statistics of the Rubber Industry', *J. Roy. Statist. Soc.* 1938, CI, p. 364.

² An American attempt to gain concessions in Sarawak was, apparently, discountenanced by the British government (J. C. Lawrence, *The World's Struggle with Rubber*, p. 63, quoted in E. V. Francis, *Britain's Economic Strategy* (1939), p. 129).

³ For a useful discussion of the relationship between national and international regulation, as revealed in the non-ferrous metals cartels, see *International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals* (New York, 1937), chs. 1 and 2 (by W. Y. Elliott) and ch. 3 (by J. W. F. Rowe).

⁴ J. W. F. Rowe, *Markets and Men* (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 192-3.

Amalgamated Metals Corporation Ltd., had absorbed the copper and lead sections of the British Metals Corporation and had acquired interests also in German and Belgian firms.¹ In the case of nickel a greater measure of centralization occurred in the growth of two large monopoly organizations, one in England and the other in the United States, which were amalgamated in 1928 and obtained virtual control of world sources. In the case of tin, as in the case of rubber, concentration of smelters made considerable progress soon after the Armistice, and by 1929 three major groups had emerged, controlled mainly by British, South American and Dutch finance. In 1931 representatives of the countries interested joined to form a syndicate, in which their governments directly participated, with the specific object of maintaining a stable price level. The lessons of the Stevenson rubber scheme had been learned and could be more easily applied, namely that restriction to be successful must be international and must not openly flaunt the interests of consumers.² The price level showed none of the startling features of the rubber price level of the period, but it nevertheless stimulated a marked expansion of production in those non-restricted areas which could not be brought within the scheme.

In the domestic field it was the producers of the 'new' raw materials, unencumbered with traditional methods of production and distribution, who were most able to reorganize themselves to endure the vicissitudes of the period. The contrast between the new and the old is perhaps most clearly borne out in a comparison between the home production of chemicals on the one hand and iron and steel on the other.

The central position in the development of the modern chemical industry was occupied by Brunner Mond and Company, which had increased its power enormously during the war and had used the period from 1918 to 1926 to strengthen and extend its interests throughout and beyond the alkali industry. By 1926 this firm and the United Alkali Company were in virtual control of the industry as a whole.³ Meanwhile, sheltered by the protective Dyestuffs Act of 1920, that industry had progressed along similar lines to pass very largely under the monopoly control of the British Dyestuffs Corporation; and in a comparable fashion Nobel Industries had built up its paramouncy in the field of explosives.⁴ The consummation of these developments was the merging of these four vast concerns at the end of 1926 into one even vaster organization, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., which inherited also the important understanding between Brunner Mond and the only great British combine comparable with it, Lever Brothers.⁵ One of the objects of the creation of I.C.I. was, in the words of its principal architect, Sir Alfred Mond, to obtain the power 'to deal with similar large groups in other countries on terms of equality'.⁶ In

¹ Greaves, *op. cit.* p. 132.

² It has been pointed out that the tin *consuming* interests were in any case not sufficiently concentrated (as in the case of the tyre industry) to oppose the Pool (Greaves, *op. cit.* p. 121).

³ P. Fitzgerald, *Industrial Combination in England* (1927), p. 80.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 90, 93.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 81.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 99.

furtherance of this an international agreement was negotiated with I.G. Farbenindustrie and other European concerns early in 1932.¹ The consequences of these arrangements cannot be examined here, but the words of the *Economist* in 1927 in another connexion form a fitting comment upon them: 'Chemical production (it claimed) is gradually making the economic system independent of the natural distribution of raw materials'.² If the statement had been made ten years later, to the words 'economic system' there might have been added 'and military and economic strategy'.

In steel the United Kingdom suffered all the consequences of the general shrinkage in the export trade of iron and steel materials and finished products, and at the same time was unable fully to introduce the necessary large-scale technical modifications and general integration which in this industry have an enormous influence on costs. The result was that the effects of the European depression in the industry were felt with added emphasis in this country; in addition, the rising world tariffs against the exports of heavy industry turned Britain into a dumping ground for the products of her competitors. The request by the steel-makers for a protective tariff in 1925 came too soon after the expression of the electorate on the subject of free trade to be granted, and the industry could not, therefore, afford to engage in large-scale technical re-equipment in view of the uncertainty of its markets. Nor was it sufficiently unified to negotiate with its continental competitors a *voluntary* division of the market by methods comparable to those of I.C.I. The combination movement both vertical and horizontal had been at work for some decades, while the rate of combination had been greatly accelerated in the post-war period. But as late as 1928 the average weekly output of British blast furnaces was less than 1000 tons, while nearly all American and many continental furnaces could produce that amount in a day; in the same year the twelve largest firms controlled only about 47 % of the pig-iron capacity and about 60 % of the steel capacity,³ while in Germany a single concern, the *Vereinigte Stahlwerke*, founded in 1926, controlled about 50 % of pig-iron and steel production.⁴ It has been said of cotton, and it is equally true of the iron and steel and other old-established industries, that one of the chief obstacles to reorganization schemes came from 'the implacability of small but belligerent minorities who have, to a degree far in excess of their importance, been able to delay the process'.⁵ The work of combination and absorption gathered momentum, but the acquisition of over-capitalized firms and obsolescent plant prevented the realization of the full fruits of these activities. At the same time trade associations, which had also been in existence for a considerable period, remained extremely imperfect organizations with

¹ A. Plummer, *International Combines in Modern Industry* (1928), p. 117.

² Economic Conference Supplement (30 April 1927), p. 10.

³ A. F. Lucas, *Industrial Reconstruction and the Control of Competition* (1937), p. 36.

⁴ S. B. Clough and C. W. Cole, *Economic History of Europe* (Boston, 1941), p. 771.

⁵ H. Levy, *The New Industrial System* (1936), p. 188.

limited powers, while the National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers itself lacked the powers and functions to give a forceful and unifying directive to industry or to speak on its behalf to the government. The iron and steel industry, on which so much of Britain's commercial prosperity in time of peace and industrial power in time of war depended, presented in the year 1931 a disquieting picture of confusion and decay.

In the international sphere attempts to use the League machinery for ensuring freedom of access to raw materials were renewed but without effect. The problem was recognized, solutions were expounded, but all proposals foundered on the rocks of national sovereignty and unfulfilled promises. For example, the World Economic Conference of 1927 was unable to accept a proposal for a new interstate control of supplies or the supervision of international monopolistic schemes.¹ The Conference of 1927 may hold an important place in the history of free-trade theory as a major occasion on which about fifty nations solemnly reaffirmed their faith in the free interchange of commodities, and it did exercise temporarily a limiting effect upon the heightening of tariff walls, but the economic crisis which began with the Wall Street crash of 1929 obliterated all but the faintest memories of its deliberations.² Indeed, the disastrous effects of the acute crisis which began with that event finally destroyed the hope of the international control of trade on an equitable basis with full consideration of all consumers' needs. It is not without significance, however, that, concurrently with the failure of the League machinery, we find increasing tendencies towards international cartelization of which the chemical combine and the non-ferrous metals agreements, already referred to, and the European steel cartel of 1926 are prominent examples. By 1928 'restriction schemes were being freely hatched';³ and by 1930 international organizations had been established or were being organized in twenty-two branches of industry.⁴ The logical development of this tendency is revealed in the international commercial developments of the period 1932-9, the transitional phase from peace to war.

IV

The world depression, the effects of which began to be felt in England in 1930, shocked the people and government of the country into the reassumption of some of their controlling powers. When, however, the effect of the depression began to wane the need for control was reinforced by a new and powerful influence, the threat of war. It is possible to trace the growing impact of governmental intervention both in international and internal industry and trade; of this intervention the most important symbol in the international field was the Ottawa agreement of 1932.

¹ F. E. Lawley, *op. cit.* II, 37.

² See H. Liepmann, *Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of Europe* (1938), Chapter VII.

³ J. W. F. Rowe, *op. cit.* p. 16.

⁴ F. E. Lawley, *op. cit.* II, 38 (quoting Mr H. B. Butler's address to the Manchester Statistical Society, 12 March 1930).

The cabinet which assumed office in the late summer of 1931 felt itself authorized to apply drastic means to deal with a critical situation. It therefore took immediate steps to introduce as temporary protective measures the Abnormal Importations and the Horticultural Products Acts and the more permanent Import Duties Act of 1932. Equipped with these measures, and with the implied threat of more severe ones, it felt itself strong enough to meet other nations as equals, with its own competitive powers heightened by the depreciation of sterling. First, however, attention was directed to the Empire with a view to consolidating it as an economic unit. This was not an isolated incident in the political and economic history of Europe. It was begotten of the despair at the failure of the World Economic Conference of 1927 and the depression which followed; it was foreshadowed by the beginnings in 1931 of the preferential treaties between Germany and the states of south-eastern Europe and by the unsuccessful attempt at an Austro-German customs union.¹ It is, in fact, part and parcel of the new world policy of 'bilateralism', i.e. special preferential treaties between two countries, recommended by the Economic Conference of 1930 and designed, at least in theory, to achieve in a limited field what had proved impossible in the world as a whole. In effect, however, 'bilateralism' succeeded in aggravating the condition it was designed to alleviate, since it subordinated the interests of all the other countries to those of the two contracting parties, especially as 'most favoured nation' treaties tended to become dead letters.² The logical culmination of 'bilateralism' was barter which, particularly in south-eastern Europe, tended to drive trade into artificial channels and ultimately to establish a system of economic servitude so far as the smaller states were concerned. Whereas in 1929 there were no barter or clearing agreements at all, by 1937 about 12 % of the total trade of the world was governed by them.³

The countries of the Empire were primarily producers of raw materials and food and, inevitably, every preferential treatment accorded to them would be to the immediate cost of foreign exporters of these commodities and to the ultimate charge of the United Kingdom consumer and the United Kingdom exporter of finished products. It was assumed that this charge would be partly counterbalanced by increased British exports of finished products to the Empire; but it is significant that, in general, tariffs against non-imperial imports of food and raw materials did not normally exceed 10 % while those on imports of finished products were as much as 33½ % and in certain cases more than that.⁴ One inescapable indirect consequence of the elevation of this new tariff wall must be recorded. The efforts of the dominions and the colonies to reciprocate the United King-

¹ H. Liepmann, *op. cit.* p. 353.

² League of Nations, *Commercial Policy in the Inter-war Period*, (Geneva, II, Economic and Financial, 1942, II, A. 6), pp. 48-9.

³ S. B. Clough and C. W. Cole, *op. cit.* p. 797.

⁴ National Institute of Economic and Social Research, *Trade Regulations and Commercial Policy of the United Kingdom* (Cambridge, 1943), p. 8.

dom preference by their own preferential treatment of United Kingdom manufactures necessarily restricted the exports of non-British manufactured articles to the Empire. It therefore restricted the purchasing powers of foreign countries for imperial raw materials, and this in its turn necessitated restriction upon the output of these materials. From the purely commercial point of view the imperial circle quite early started to develop vicious tendencies! The following table sets out imports of raw materials from both imperial and other sources during the last ten years before the outbreak of war:

Imports of raw materials into the United Kingdom, 1929-38¹

Year	Raw material imports from British Empire		Raw material imports from foreign countries		Total raw material imports. Value in £ sterling
	Value in £ sterling	% of total	Value in £ sterling	% of total	
1929	127,263,135	37.5	212,313,857	62.5	339,576,992
1930	88,801,688	35.5	161,657,127	64.5	250,458,815
1931	58,715,020	33.9	114,323,190	66.1	173,038,210
1932	58,326,608	35.4	106,278,819	64.6	164,605,427
1933	66,280,092	36.8	114,118,044	63.2	180,398,136
1934	80,771,643	38.5	129,220,105	61.5	209,991,748
1935	81,746,379	38.5	130,534,948	61.5	212,281,327
1936	95,617,220	38.6	152,323,455	61.4	247,940,675
1937	124,084,361	39.4	191,151,401	60.6	315,235,762
1938	103,089,333	41.6	144,834,334	58.4	247,923,667

It is clear from these figures that imports of raw materials from the Empire were increased at the expense of other countries, but this transfer had not been achieved without difficulties, particularly in the case of timber. British importers showed a marked preference for Russian and Baltic timber as compared with that from Canada, and Canadian proposals, made in 1933, that Russian imports into the United Kingdom should be prohibited on the grounds that they were 'dumped' goods were strenuously resisted by the British merchants.² In spite of this the percentage of the timber imports from Canada of total timber imports rose from 5.2 % in 1929 to 16 % in 1938.³ Similar difficulties were encountered over the Wabana iron ore from Newfoundland, which was not accepted by British steel works as a suitable substitute for other ores. While in general this diversion was taking place, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the diversion was economic not strategic. It was an attempt to prevent the worst effects of a new economic blizzard as far as the British Empire was concerned; it was not an effort to increase the supply of strategic materials from the

¹ The figures for the years 1929-33 are obtained from the *Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom* (H.M.S.O., 1933), vol. iv, class II, while those for the years 1934-8 are obtained from the same publication for 1938, vol. iv, Class II.

² H. R. G. Greaves, *op. cit.* pp. 95-6.

³ *The Trade of the United Kingdom* (1929 and 1938), vols. II and IV.

Empire as a political unit. But its indirect effect was undoubtedly to increase the authority of the government in the general control of raw materials and to help re-mould the Empire as an economic entity.¹

In its international relations the British government showed itself no less reluctant to intervene with decisive effect. In the last years of peace the United Kingdom made a number of bilateral treaties of which the most important was that concluded with the United States in November 1938. By March 1939, also, virtual agreement had been reached between British and German industrialists, supported by their governments, for the allocation of markets for coal and other industrial products, but as the result of the German entry into Prague in that month the agreement was never ratified.² The last serious attempt at international collaboration made at the World Economic Conference in 1933 failed. The raw materials enquiry undertaken by a League committee in 1936-7 established the truism that the only real solution to 'the problem of commercial access to raw materials is to be found in a restoration of international exchanges on the widest basis', but the League was itself impotent to convert this conclusion into reality.³ Henceforth it was recognized that if the problems of industry and trade were to be tackled at all they would have to be dealt with on a piece-meal basis. Meanwhile the failures themselves had contributed towards the growth of neo-mercantilism in many countries, of which Germany and Italy provided the archetypes and of which the beginnings began to appear in most states, including the democracies. The developments of great significance from the point of view of the United Kingdom were the direct participation of the government in some international trade cartels and its indirect intervention in others.

The changed character of the cartel system is perhaps best brought out in connexion with rubber and tin. The first serious attempt at rubber control, the Stevenson Plan, broke down in 1928 partly because it failed to be fully international in character and was, therefore, ineffective in control, and partly because it was flagrantly in defiance of the interests of consumers. The withdrawal of control unloosed the worst effects of unplanned production, as is reflected in the violent fluctuations in rubber prices which swung from 4s. 8d. per pound in 1925 to 11½d. per pound in 1932.⁴ The Netherlands East Indies producers, who had benefited under the original British restriction scheme, now found themselves as hard hit in the new depression as their rivals, and in April 1933, at their suggestion, new proposals for restriction were considered. A year later an agreement was reached between producers from all areas except South America and Liberia, which provided only a negligible proportion of world output. This agreement was reinforced by a direct agreement on the part of the

¹ For a full discussion of the effects of the Ottawa Conference and its influence upon Britain's international economic relations see W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* (Oxford, 1940), vol. II, Part I, pp. 230-67.

² League of Nations, *Commercial Policy in the Inter-war Period* (Geneva, II, Economic and Financial, 1942, II, A. 6), p. 89.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 77-8.

⁴ G. Rae, *op. cit.* p. 357.

eight governments involved, who undertook to prevent the accumulation of excessive stocks.¹ It was thus possible to bring 98 % of the total production of rubber under control and, by intergovernmental support, to endow this control with a more permanent character. The average quarterly prices for the period 1932-8 were as follows:

*The prices of rubber per pound (standard ribbed sheet in London)*²

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
1st quarter ...	2.6d.	2.2d.	4.8d.	6.2d.	7.2d.	11.0d.	7.0d.
2nd quarter ...	1.8d.	2.9d.	6.2d.	5.9d.	7.4d.	10.6d.	5.9d.
3rd quarter ...	2.4d.	3.8d.	7.3d.	5.7d.	7.7d.	9.0d.	7.8d.
4th quarter ...	2.5d.	4.0d.	6.5d.	6.3d.	8.7d.	7.4d.	8.2d.

The scheme, which determined exports on a quota basis under the direction of the Inter-Governmental Rubber Regulation Committee, remained in force until the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941.³ The Committee itself remained in existence until April 1944, after which plans were made for the creation of a new Committee on a much wider basis.⁴

The rubber scheme, in spite of the setting up of a consumers' consultative committee, retained in their eyes some of the stigma of its predecessor, whereas the tin scheme represented, at least from the consumers' point of view, an attempted improvement on it. Early efforts to build up an international tin cartel had, apart from the Bandoeing Pool of 1921, failed on account of conflicts between high cost and low cost producers and had in any case been rendered for a time superfluous because of the rapid increase of demand. But in 1929, when prices began to fall again, renewed attempts were made to adopt a restrictive policy on a voluntary basis. This attempt proved fruitless and was, therefore, followed by the intervention of the governments of Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Bolivia and Nigeria, who created a quota scheme, already noted, for production and export to be enforced by the governments themselves. To support the activities of the Committee a buffer tin pool was created by private interests but with the official support of the signatory governments. The scheme started with membership covering 90 % of total production, and by stages the independent producers were brought into it, with a few

¹ H. R. G. Greaves, *op. cit.* p. 127; F. E. Lawley, *op. cit.* II, 208-12.

² Based on I.R.R.C. Statistical Bulletins. The prices are the average of the monthly averages.

³ In attempting to evaluate the new plan it is of interest to recall that no less an authority than Mr F. D. Ascoli said in February, 1938: 'The Stevenson Scheme was based on entirely different principles, and in his opinion it was bad, whereas the present one was good, but the effect of both schemes on price was identical. Starting with a temporary rise, this was followed by a fall, then came stagnation, then a sudden rise, a sudden fall, a little stagnation, and then a further rise' (G. Rae, *op. cit.* p. 371). This comment, however, fails to take into full consideration the effects of changed demand as well as the differences in price fluctuation.

⁴ *The Economist, Commercial History and Review of 1943*, p. 12. See also *The Economist* for 13 May 1944, p. 657.

exceptions, of which the most important was China.¹ Meanwhile, two progressive features were introduced into the scheme: a Research and Development Council, taken over from the producers, was made responsible for assisting both the producing and consuming sides of the industry;² and a Consumers' Advisory Panel was created to assist the International Committee, although it was given no voting powers. The Council is of special interest as a pointer to changing policy. One of its functions was that of developing new uses for tin: this involved the recognition on the part of the producers that profits could be maintained not solely by maintaining prices through supply restrictions but by expanding supply through increased consumption. The scheme had been favourably considered by a subcommittee of the World Economic Conference of 1933;³ but its restrictionist policy was the subject of considerable public criticism in this country and the United States in 1935, criticism which contributed to an early increase in the production quotas. The scheme remained inadequately representative of both manufacturing and final consumers,⁴ but its general tendency in the years immediately before 1939 was to increase production to satisfy increased demand rather than penalize consumers through scarcity prices. This relaxation of restriction has been taken to represent 'a better appreciation among consumers that policies of pure depredation are as injurious to producing interests in the long period as they are to consumers in the first instance'.⁵ A similar policy was applied in the case of copper, nickel and rayon.⁶ It is noteworthy also that restriction policies tended more and more to impose restriction on exports rather than production, aiming thereby at avoiding sudden distress amongst producers and workers, or unnecessary intervention in the home market. It was hoped also, through the creation of buffer stocks, to make it easier to even out wide and sudden variations in demand. As far as the initial *raison d'être* for control schemes is concerned, namely the maintenance of stable prices, the efforts, apart from specific cases like aluminium, were not fully successful. As has been shown by Lord Keynes, the average annual price range during the ten years 1928-38 in the case of four selected commodities, rubber, cotton, wheat and lead, was 67 %. The average excess between the year's highest and lowest rubber prices during the period amounted to 96 %.⁷

The British government's relations with the International Steel Cartel represent a special approach to a special problem. Here we have the unusual situation of the government pressing the industry to collaborate

¹ P. Lamartine Yates, *op. cit.* pp. 145-50.

² F. E. Lawley, *op. cit.* II, 227.

³ *Ibid.* p. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 239.

⁵ P.E.P., *Report on International Trade* (1937), p. 95.

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 95-7; see also A. Plummer, *Raw Materials or War Materials?* (1937), Chapter IV.

⁷ J. M. Keynes, "The Policy of Government Storage of Foodstuffs and Raw Materials," *Economic Journal*, XLVIII (1938), pp. 450-1. For further examples see League of Nations, *The Transition from War to Peace Economy* (Geneva, II, Economic and Financial, 1943, II. A. 3), part I, pp. 23-4.

with an international cartel with the object of eliminating competition between continental and British producers and of making effective the planning of supplies. The agreement which was reached in 1935 was for the orderly arrangement of imports rather than purely for their restriction, as was shown in 1937 when the British finishing industry sought imports in excess of the cartel quota. One further special feature in connexion with international cartels should be noted. Certain monopoly producers or groups of producers were able to exercise a considerable control over production and distribution by the very nature of their industrial structure, without needing to build up complicated and often transitory international cartels. This applied particularly to platinum, nickel, whale oil, wolfram, manganese ore, asbestos, camphor, quinine¹ and, to a certain extent, oil. On the other hand, a number of important materials such as timber, wool and cotton were never brought under any effective international control, either commercial or governmental.

The further growth of large-scale industry in this country had important effects also upon its commercial structure, on which considerable research remains to be done. The inter-war period witnessed the transfer of many of the functions of the merchanting organizations to trading branches of industrial firms, combines or associations. The merchant with his knowledge of overseas markets and his experience of the different grades and qualities of particular commodities had acted as the unofficial co-ordinator of a whole group of small suppliers. When the suppliers merged they naturally tended to absorb these functions rather than have them performed through intermediaries. The most outstanding case during the period was that of the Iron and Steel Corporation, set up as a subsidiary to the Federation to handle the bulk purchase of imports and their distribution, as well as to provide centralized export where necessary.² It was established in 1935 with the government's blessing, since it provided an essential instrument for the fulfilment of its policy *vis-à-vis* the continental cartel as well as for the general rationalization of sales. It was hoped, however, that the merchants would co-operate with the Federation and that the industry would in that case be prepared to use their services 'so far as economically justifiable'.³ The merchants were, for their part, not greatly satisfied with this qualified approval and viewed with alarm the government's plans for the reorganization of the cotton industry, published in 1939.⁴ The defence of their part in the economic life of the United Kingdom, as prepared by the London Chamber of Commerce, while it brought out some of their useful contributions, tended to ignore the effects which industrial concentration must have upon commerce and particularly upon the small merchant.⁵

The merchants were, at the same time, losing a great deal of their influence in Britain's foreign trade. The general reduction in world trade necessarily reduced their scope and numbers, while the growth of bilateral

¹ P.E.P., *op. cit.* p. 123.

² Cmd. 5507, paras. 113-23.

³ *Ibid.* para. 123.

⁴ Cmd. 5935.

⁵ See *The Times, Trade and Engineering Supplement*, September 1939, p. 12.

trading, which required that at least the preliminary trading negotiations should be undertaken by government departments, made some of their work unnecessary. Barter and other causes greatly affected Britain's entrepôt trade, which fell from £110 millions in 1913 to £62 millions in 1938; the proportions of these totals which consisted of raw materials fell also from 58 % in 1913 to 48 % in 1938.¹ The expansion of integrated industrial organizations also tended to supersede the activities of the merchant class internationally as in the domestic sphere.

The third important feature of this period is the development of control at home. When the British government was finally converted to a tariff policy in 1931 as a means of safeguarding British industry it proposed to charge British industry a price for its tariffs. The price was re-organization and modernization; the instrument the Import Duties Advisory Committee. By the creation of such a body to advise it on tariff modifications the government revealed that its gifts were conditional gifts. Its guiding principle was that if an industry wanted protection it must show itself worthy of protection. The relationship between I.D.A.C. and the iron and steel industry provides a useful illustration of its policy and procedure. The introduction of protective measures in 1932 had been coupled with the requirement that the industry should undertake 'a considerable measure of reorganization';² but plans to do so were handicapped by the inherited structure of the industry. Various trade associations had been in existence for decades, and these had been partially and loosely held together by the National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers; but the industry was, in general, characterized by 'the lack of organization, the almost casual development and the competition largely unrestricted at home and almost wholly unrestricted from abroad'.³ Dilatoriness and resistance were encountered from individual members and sections of the industry, but by 1935 the first stage of the reorganization was complete. The British Iron and Steel Federation had been set up under a Chairman (Sir Andrew Duncan) drawn from outside the industry, and the various trade associations affiliated to it had themselves been made stronger and more fully representative of their particular branches. The B.I.S.F. was given power 'to support and co-ordinate the activities of the associations and to give effect to the will of the industry in matters of general policy'.⁴ Gradually more trade associations were brought within the framework of the Federation, and by 1939 only two important groups, the Foundry Pig Iron and the Tube branches, remained outside, although they worked in close co-operation with the Federation. In the period from 1935 onwards these functions were extended and defined and on the eve of the war elaborate machinery had been devised for many aspects of the industry, including

¹ See A. Shenfield, 'A Note on the Entrepôt Trade of the United Kingdom', *London and Cambridge Economic Service* (1939), xvii, 373-5. It is of interest that the principal commodities in the entrepôt trade in 1938 were wool, hides and skins, which were not the subject of any powerful restrictions scheme. Non-ferrous metals, which came next on the list, were controlled but not severely restricted.

² Cmd. 4181.

³ Cmd. 5507, para. 143.

⁴ *Ibid.* para. 27.

the control of production, prices, wages and foreign trade. All these duties were to be performed under the direct supervision of I.D.A.C., which felt itself empowered to safeguard alike the interests of producers, consumers and the nation as a whole.¹ By 1937 I.D.A.C. was claiming that the industry was advancing 'from the purely individualist standpoint to the conception of an ordered and co-operative industry acting with a full sense of its responsibility to the community'.² But compared with its competitors abroad, and particularly with the steel industries of Germany and the United States, the British iron and steel industry had still a long way to go both in the integration of its structure and in the application of the results of technical progress.

The iron and steel industry occupied a peculiar position in relation to the government. It was an industry which had suffered much during the inter-war depressions and shared only slightly in improvements in trade; the unemployment question in heavy industry presented a serious social problem which called for intervention; while it was no less clear that a degenerate steel industry would prove a severe incubus to the national effort in any future war. The government could, therefore, hardly resist the demand of the industry for a protective tariff, while the industry could hardly resist the demand of the government that it should modernize its methods and organization. In certain other industries the process of organization and centralized control made less progress. In the case of coal, in spite of a series of government measures, the industry remained technically backward in many spheres and controlled and organized according to local interests rather than national plans. The cotton industry also successfully resisted any fundamental modifications of its traditional organization. On the other hand, as we have seen reflected in international relations, some industries, which had in any case become virtual monopolies or had passed under the control of two or three giant concerns, developed the full mechanism of integrated control and planned output, although with varying emphasis as far as individual and national welfare were concerned. These developments occurred particularly in the 'new' industries, as is witnessed by the growth of firms like Unilevers, Imperial Chemical Industries and the British Aluminium Company.

But whatever the nature of the industry or the measure of success which accompanied these reformist measures, the very fact that I.D.A.C. was obliged to negotiate with industries on the subject of tariffs tended to stimulate the growth of some sort of national organization. The government could not negotiate on these matters with individual firms, but only with the leaders of industry as elected through trade associations. These associations, therefore, became less and less debating societies of minor importance and acquired a dignity and sense of responsibility which went a long way towards preparing for industrial self-discipline and self-government. It was known also that, during the last years before the war, the Board of Trade

¹ Cmd. 4851, para. 9.

² Cmd. 5507, para. 144. For a more critical estimate of the Federation see D. L. Burn, *Economic History of Steel Making* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 495-515.

was confidentially consulting responsible members of each industry concerning the methods and machinery of control in time of war. The growth at the same time of technical and research bodies attached to individual industries further developed national as against parochial qualities. According to an American observer, the position at the end of the first decade of peace was that 'industry after industry had revealed an almost total incapacity to meet the existing crisis under its existing organization'.¹ The second decade was the transitional phase when British industry under the combined pressure of economic depression and government intervention began to shed some of its traditional characteristics and unify and reform its whole fabric.² The third decade brought war, and control in a fuller sense than had ever been experienced in this country.

The story of control in the inter-war period is, then, the story first of the abolition of wartime direction; then, after this first victory, the struggle of the trade to restore control by its own means and, to a considerable extent, in its own interests; and finally the emergence of collaboration between the government and the trade to generalize control, originally in order to deal with the depression and ultimately to fulfil the demands of war. It remains to enquire what were the effects of these developments during the twenty years of peace upon the national capacity to wage war.

V

At the very end of the period a new consideration and an additional ground for the control of industry as well as for government intervention in the market were provided by the gathering dangers of a world war. The importance of raw materials in the last war was remembered and Britain's preparedness for another war was perforce discussed in the light of her supplies of the most essential raw materials and their management in wartime. By now, however, the position both from the point of view of supplies and from that of controls was markedly different from the position in 1914.

What are the raw material conditions called for by a state to enable it to deploy fully its military and industrial forces in time of war? It needs first of all reasonable stocks to help tide over the initial dislocation of supply, and, in the longer run, perhaps to replace valuable sources lost to it. It needs, secondly, adequate supplies from its usual sources, which may be abroad; if these are inadequate or for any special reason diminish, alternative, although possibly more expensive, supplies at home; and, if these too fail, substitute materials. It needs, thirdly, control machinery by which it can acquire, distribute and generally direct materials in the most efficient manner in the interests of war. Before examining this three-

¹ A. F. Lucas, *op. cit.* p. 42.

² The estimate of control policies in general, made in 1934, remained, however, to a large extent true, namely that they 'are not co-ordinated with other parts of the nation's economic life... they are not policies at all, but crude compromises between vested group-interests' (W. L. Holland (ed.), *Commodity Control in the Pacific Area* (1935), p. 7).

fold problem, however, it is necessary briefly to note one general issue which faces all nations in their efforts to prepare for and wage war.

Without wishing to over-simplify the political determinants, it is necessary to emphasize that a fundamental matter which overshadows all the preparatory work is the strategic hypothesis of a future war. To put the problem in its crudest terms: if a nation feels that it cannot continue to play a useful part in the world in its current political form, it may decide that it has no alternative but to go to war. Once that decision has been taken it will naturally choose the *optimum* moment for the initial act of war, i.e. a time when it and its allies will be best prepared and its adversaries or potential adversaries least prepared. The aggressor, therefore, possesses a fairly clear military hypothesis, although he may be in some doubt concerning the number of allies which his victim may call to his aid. On the basis of this hypothesis he can, therefore, roughly calculate what his total needs will be, including his needs for raw materials; what alternate sources he must develop; what stocks he will require and what control policy and machinery will suit him best. He cannot, of course, make any firm plans for a lengthy period because, once he has committed his fortunes to war, he is at the mercy of uncertain elements which may reduce his early plans to meaningless academic exercises. But if, on the other hand, a nation does not regard the existing world order as irremediable except by war, it will lack the type of information available to the aggressor. It will not know when war will come and by whom the attack will be launched, although its military and diplomatic advisers may be able to make some shrewd guesses. It will not know what its demands are likely to be or how its supplies will be affected. In general, it must work on an hypothesis or a series of hypotheses which will depend on so many imponderables that much of the work will be vitiated.

In Germany, soon after the advent of the Nazi Party to power, it became clear that her aspirations, legitimate or otherwise, would probably not be fulfilled without some drastic modification in the whole European framework. We witnessed, therefore, the rapid, almost frantic, accumulation of reserves, the development of substitute materials at home and the redirection of the industrial machine upon a war basis. In other words: if you want a totalitarian war you can only efficiently prepare for it by a totalitarian peace structure. The United States, by contrast, was a 'satisfied' power with no need or desire to embark upon an act of war. In its plans, therefore, it could work on numerous assumptions or their permutations but it had no firm programme similar to that on which the Germans could work. As a general precaution, the War Department was instructed to make plans 'on the basis that the U.S. has lost control of the sea'.¹ The instructions continued: 'The consequence of this would be the development of shortages of certain raw materials which are known as strategic.'² This estimate was then to be co-ordinated with estimates

¹ Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933 (quoted in Brooks Emeny, *The Strategy of Raw Materials* (New York, 1936), p. 10).

² *Ibid. loc. cit.*

of Service requirements in time of war (which would likewise be handicapped by the same uncertainties which hampered supply estimates); and, where a disparity emerged between requirements and supply, special measures such as the development of alternate sources were to be instituted. This work, which was the responsibility of the Commodities Division of the Planning Branch in the War Department, was necessarily of a highly secret nature, but part of it was made available to Mr Brooks Emeny in the preparation of his book, the *Strategy of Raw Materials*, published in 1936. He felt, however, that a useful rough basis to work on as far as requirements were concerned was the annual average for the years 1925-9, the period of highest consumption.¹ No comparable work has appeared about the United Kingdom, but similar duties were performed by the Principal Supply Officers Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, assisted by the Board of Trade. The uncertainties of the date and character of a future war were roughly similar to those encountered by the United States. In the absence, however, of any published data similar to those incorporated in Mr Emeny's book it is not possible to examine here the requirements basis upon which the British planners were at work.

It is proposed now to examine the structure of the British war machine with special reference to strategic reserves, arrangements for supply and the nature of the existing control organization. The growth of trade control schemes with their restrictionist tendencies exercised a definite effect upon the accumulation of reserves. It had been recognized from the inception of these schemes that stocks provided a sensitive barometer of changing demand; that the existence of large stocks exercised a depressing effect upon prices; and that a rapid turn-over of supplies both demonstrated and ensured a healthy demand situation. In the case of the rubber scheme we have seen that both the government and the trade undertook to prevent the growth of stocks above a certain level. Even where buffer pools were instituted, as in the case of tin, these too were to be kept down to certain levels, and if they showed signs of rising above those maxima the next step would inevitably be restriction of output. In any case, the psychological effect of the creation of a buffer stock would be to reduce the need for maintaining trade stocks and, therefore, might not fundamentally alter the position as a whole. There was, also, a legitimate reluctance on the part of manufacturers to hold large stocks of raw materials on account of the tying up of capital and in view of the dangers of deterioration as well as depreciation. The professed aim of the control schemes to maintain stable prices could not be expected to do more than partially counteract this reluctance. Various estimates have been made of the total commercial cost of storage and loss of interest on capital; one such estimate has put storage costs as high as 13½ % of their value per annum, exclusive of interest.² In addition, during the last months of the pre-war crisis importers felt some alarm at the possibility of aerial bombardment of the ports and warehouses. It was thus generally known that the trade itself was not

¹ Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933, p. 9.

² B. Graham, *Storage and Capacity*, p. 108, quoted in J. M. Keynes, *op. cit.*

carrying large stocks and the government, therefore, was obliged to undertake at least part of this responsibility.

The Service departments, and especially the Admiralty, had for a considerable time been building up stocks of 'critical' materials such as bauxite and calcium carbide, but neither the amounts nor the materials have ever been publicly revealed. In 1938, however, the government assumed additional powers, under the Essential Commodities Reserves Act,¹ to purchase reserves of food, fodder, fertilizers and petroleum. In July 1939, with the setting up of the Ministry of Supply, these powers were extended to other materials. But what quantities of reserves should be purchased? The reply to this question was inevitably bound up with the current notion concerning the supply and shipping situation under war conditions. In only a few cases were fears expressed of a serious diminution in supplies. On the shipping side there was, naturally enough, no published estimate of the likely position in the event of war; but on the basis of the quantities of reserves aimed at it is reasonable to deduce that no grave consequences were anticipated, a view which found some justification in the comparatively small shipping losses in the period from the outbreak of war until the German occupation of northern France, September 1939-June 1940. The position in July 1939 was that the government had spent, apart from the direct Service purchases, about £8½ millions on reserves of food and raw materials in the year ended March 1939, and proposed to spend a further £5 millions in the year ending March 1940.² It was against this that the *Economist* protested that 'the accumulation of reserves against an emergency has not yet been taken very seriously'.³ But the *Economist*, like Sir Arthur Salter and a handful of others, believed that 'it would be the height of folly to assume that it [shipping wastage] will be smaller or even the same'⁴ as in the last war. The belief that reserves 'can be acquired fairly quickly now' was, however, a little optimistic in view of the expanded eve-of-war demands. In the case of iron ore, for example, great difficulty was experienced in a last-minute effort to purchase a million tons. As far as trade stocks of raw materials were concerned the *Economist* in July 1939 experienced great difficulties in producing reliable figures, but on the available estimates came to the conclusion that 'stocks are very small compared with annual consumption'.⁵ In a statement in the House of Commons at about the same time, the government spokesman (Mr W. S. Morrison) stated that trade and government reserves of most raw materials were more than adequate for three months' consumption, and in a few cases where this was not so, steps were being taken to bring them up to that figure.⁶

¹ 1 and 2 Geo. VI, C. 51.

² *The Economist*, 22 July 1939, p. 170. See also the interesting suggestion in Keynes, *op. cit.*, that the government at a cost of £20 million annually could have stored in this country on behalf of imperial suppliers foodstuffs and raw materials to the value of £500 million.

³ *Ibid. loc. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid. p.* 171.

⁵ *Ibid. loc. cit.*

⁶ H. of C., *Official Report*, vol. 349, col. 2239. Cf. Sir Arthur Salter, *Security* (1939), pp. 227-30 and *passim* and his article on "Food Storage for Defence," (*The Economist*, 2 October 1937, pp. 12-16).

The tenour of the reply indicated that the government regarded the three months' basis as a reasonable one to work upon; but in answer to a supplementary question, Mr Morrison did not confirm or deny that this was the case.¹ He was unwilling to state what proportion of these reserves was held by members of the trade, who were being encouraged by the government to accumulate stocks, and what proportion by the government itself. In this connexion, however, one special item deserves mention. Imports of American cotton had been diminishing in 1939, and the government was hampered in its desire to build a reserve of this material because of its anxiety to conserve dollars. A solution was found in June 1939 in the cotton-rubber barter agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States governments, by which the United Kingdom was to receive 600,000 bales of American cotton in return for a quantity of rubber equivalent in value to the total value of the cotton.² In general, however, the accumulation of strategic reserves was not encouraged either by the nature of the control exercised by the trade or the strategic assumptions held by the government. The accumulation of stocks was seen largely as a means of alleviating initial dislocations and not as a long-distance security measure.

As far as the supply situation was concerned, Great Britain occupied an almost unique position in its control of a large number of essential materials. The table on p. 27 sets out the percentages of world output produced in the British Empire, the United States, the Soviet Union and Germany in 1937, except where otherwise stated.³ In the case of petroleum, of which the Empire was not a large producer, British interests had, as already indicated, taken the precaution of obtaining control of foreign sources. In 1936 it was estimated that of the twenty-five minerals and commodities 'essential for modern life' the British Empire had adequate supplies of eighteen, some supplies of two and none of the remaining five, whereas Germany had adequate supplies of four, some supplies of two and no supplies at all of nineteen.⁴ Only two states were at all comparable to the British Empire: the United States and the Soviet Union. The British Empire and the United States exercised between them a dominant control of the total raw material supplies.⁵

¹ He had, however, declared on a previous occasion, in respect of food, that stocks were not being accumulated 'with the object of enabling our country to withstand a prolonged siege, but merely for the purpose of enabling any temporary dislocation in the early period of a war to occur, if it does occur, without causing suffering through lack of food to the inhabitants of the country' (H. of C., *Official Report*, vol. 344, col. 1033, 27 February 1939).

² Cmd. 6048.

³ Based on Appendices to *Raw Materials* (1939).

⁴ H. of L., *Official Report*, vol. 100, col. 234.

⁵ In 1930 it was said that the 'British Commonwealth and the U.S. together possess about two-thirds and control three-quarters of the world's reserves of economic minerals' (F. E. Lawley, *op. cit.* II, 160, quoting C. K. Leith). On the completion of the bilateral agreement between the two countries in 1938 a declaration was made which was of greater significance than either party could at the time have realized, namely, each government undertook to 'give

It was clear then that reserves were plentiful. But restriction schemes, as such, could restrict potential supplies in their control of productive capacity. We have seen, for example, how the Stevenson Scheme led to a diminution in the proportionate output of rubber in the British Empire.

Percentages of world production¹ (1937)

Material	British Empire	U.S.A. ²	U.S.S.R.	Germany ³
Antimony ore (metal content)	1.7	2.8	—	3.4
Bauxite	10.0	10.7	6.2	2.3
Chrome ore (metal content)	41.2	6.0	15.3	—
Copper ore (metal content)	24.8	32.4	4.0	1.3
Iron ore (metal content)	10.3	38.3	14.3	4.1
Lead ore (metal content)	35.1	24.7	3.3	5.4
Manganese ore (metal content)	36.6	0.8	40.5	8.4
Mercury	—	11.6	5.5?	2.0
Nickel ore (metal content)	90.6	0.2	1.8	—
Tin ore (metal content)	40.4 ⁴	—	—	0.1 ⁴
Tungsten ore (metal content)	22.8	8.8	?	—
Zinc ore (metal content)	28.3	30.6	3.8	9.4
Coal	23.6	34.2	9.3	15.3
Petroleum	2.0 ⁴	60.4 ⁴	10.6 ⁴	0.2 ⁴
Asbestos	70.9 ⁵	2.0 ⁵	24.9 ⁵	0.5 ⁵
Magnesite	6.0 ⁵	10.6 ⁵	27.2 ⁵	27.9 ⁵
Phosphates	8.7	29.8	24.5	—
Potash	0.6	8.1	7.3	61.5
Pyrites	9.2	5.6	5.8?	4.2
Sulphur	—	81.9	—	—
Vanadium	42.2	25.4?	—	—
Molybdenum	0.2	92.5	—	—
Rubber (shipments)	52.2? ⁴	0.1? ⁴	—	—
Cotton (ginned)	14.4 ⁶	49.5 ⁶	9.9 ⁶	—
Wool	46.4	11.6	6.6	1.2
Silk (raw)	0.1	—	3.1	—
Flax (fibre)	0.6	—	70.0	5.7
Hemp (fibre)	—	?	34.2	2.9
Jute	98.7	—	—	—
Copra (nett exports)	32.8	29.4	—	—
Cotton (seed)	16.5 ⁶	45.1 ⁶	10.2 ⁶	—
Linseed	13.6	5.5	22.5?	1.5
Palm and palm kernel oil	45.6	—	—	—

¹ In certain cases where no reliable production figure is available the export figure has been used.

² Including the Philippines.

³ Including Austria and Czecho-Slovakia.

⁴ The figure for 1938.

⁵ The figure for 1936.

⁶ The figure for 1937-8.

Apart, however, from the effects of direct or total restriction, the general restrictionist policy, which to a large extent is concerned with maintaining the *status quo*, tends to safeguard the output of the high cost producer

sympathetic consideration to any representations which the other may make with respect to questions concerning access to raw materials' (*Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey* (Oxford, 1938), 1, 25).

while holding up the legitimate expansion of the low cost producer. The nett effect is first, that the average cost of production will be held at a higher level than it would have reached under freedom of output; secondly, the elimination of uneconomic producers is delayed or postponed indefinitely; and, thirdly, it is not easy to expand production during an emergency because of the absence of a reserve of low cost capacity. These consequences of restriction and control must inevitably levy a charge upon the national effort in time of war. It has been argued that the later schemes in restricting exports rather than output left the home market free and did not exercise the same stringent control as production schemes, but demands in the home markets, particularly in colonial areas, are not highly elastic and the ultimate effects of export restriction must be output reductions. Where, on the other hand, supply is inelastic (e.g. it takes five years before a rubber tree is in production and two years before steel works, such as those in Corby, reach full output) restriction necessarily limits productive capacity as well as easy expansion in war. Finally, it can be shown that in general restriction and control were exercised by the trade for the trade and that, apart from cases such as oil and steel, the control had no direct relevance to the military and strategic needs of the nation. Against this, however, it has been urged that, in the absence of control, producing industries like rubber would have more or less perished under the devastating effects of wide variations in demand and price, and that the very existence of adequate supplies in time of war depends upon the maintenance of the general welfare of the trade in peace. It must be added also that, apart from any limitations imposed upon output by these schemes, further severe limitations were begotten of the autarkic tendencies of the second decade of the inter-war period which resulted in the serious decline in world trade. But the development of imperial sources was of considerable importance to the economic strategy of war when, after Dunkirk, Britain had to rely to a much greater extent upon her imperial allies. Timber is particularly important in this connexion.

Great Britain could, on the whole, feel legitimately secure in the availability of her raw material resources, which she could only lose as the result of a major defeat in a theatre of operations affecting the chief sources, or through heavy losses at sea. Neither situation was seriously envisaged, as is reflected in the absence of large raw material stocks, already referred to, and in the failure to develop alternative sources at home. Here the contrast between Great Britain and Germany was most striking. Germany knew that on the outbreak of a war with the Western Powers she would lose the large bulk of her sea-borne supplies. Therefore, she adopted the twofold policy of building up close relations with her neighbouring states which in due course led to full control; and, secondly, of establishing an important series of industries for the production of substitutes.¹ While pursuing the latter course, Germany was obliged to reorientate funda-

¹ It was claimed by the German Chancellor that this search was not 'a question of "substitute products" but of entirely new materials' (F. E. Lawley, *op. cit.* II, 161).

mentally her whole economic outlook, to control import and consumption and to manufacture uneconomic and highly expensive alternative materials. These basic changes could only be achieved in an autocratic state which had assumed the fullest powers over the control of industry, finance, trade and, indeed, the social life of the nation. Britain, on the other hand, had large reserves of the natural materials within the Empire or in 'controlled' areas. Her problem throughout the twenty years had been a problem of plenty not scarcity; it would have been difficult, for example, to justify the building up of a synthetic rubber industry at a time when the rubber industry was wrestling with the problem of surpluses. Her shipping industry was an integral but long-suffering feature of her economic existence, and to have developed substitute industries in the United Kingdom would have been, apart from its general wastefulness, a further blow at the shipping industry, already suffering the effects of Ottawa and the decline of world trade. It would have reduced the return on overseas investments, so important a part of our invisible exports, and would have required also the adoption of a semi-totalitarian policy, unthinkable save as the result of a political revolution or war.

In the United States a government investigation under the Secretary of Commerce (Mr Herbert Hoover) had listed in 1924 a number of raw materials which were believed to be controlled by foreign combinations in restraint of trade, namely, sisal, nitrates, iodine, potash, rubber, quinine, tin, mercury, coffee and quebracho.¹ To safeguard supplies Mr Hoover recommended conservation, the production of these, or substitute, materials at home and the search for other sources abroad.² A special example of this policy was the expansion by American users of reclaim rubber production during the first restriction scheme and the development of synthetic during the second. Similarly, British fear of too great reliance upon American cotton led to its increased growth in Egypt and the British Empire. In neither case did the governments instigate these policies, but they were introduced with their full support.

The British government's attitude to the steel industry was much more clearly an example of its desire to ensure a healthy, stable industry at home capable of meeting the full impact of war; but time was short and circumstances unpropitious for a thorough reconstitution of the industry to lessen its reliance upon overseas sources. Efforts were made, such as the building of the Corby works, to increase the proportion of home ore consumed, but the industry was still very heavily dependent upon overseas sources for the richer ores, which in metal content represented about half the total consumption. It also lacked the 'balanced' structure of the German and American steel industries: its steelworks consumed more pig iron than its blast furnaces could produce, which meant that, to keep up its steel output, it would be necessary to continue, and perhaps increase, pig iron imports from abroad, which had amounted to 650,000 tons in 1937.³

¹ W. S. Culbertson, *op. cit.* footnote to pp. 316-17.

² Wallace and Edminster, *op. cit.* footnote to pp. 298-9.

³ *Statistics of the Iron and Steel Industry* (1937), Table 58.

Government efforts to stimulate home-grown timber production were more directly applied, since the state was itself the largest landowner. Its policy during the first decade of the peace was largely governed by the desire to replace the losses arising from the heavy cutting during the war; in the second decade its efforts were increased mainly as an alleviatory measure for unemployment. By subsidy to private owners, by land purchase, by assistance in providing forest workers' holdings and by the encouragement of education and research, the government hoped to improve the available resources.¹ Timber policy, if it is to be effective, must inevitably be a long-term policy, and it was not to be expected that the results would be immediately evident. By the end of 1939 the Forestry Commission had acquired 714,000 acres of plantable land of which 434,000 acres were under woodlands, while a further 126,000 acres had been planted on private land with the Commission's assistance. But of the total United Kingdom consumption of timber only about 4 % was obtained from indigenous sources.² The government encouragement of the dyestuffs industry through the restriction of imports was consistently maintained throughout the whole period. Apart from these, and other measures of minor importance, the general supply position of the British Empire, as well as the political and economic conditions of the time, were not conducive to the large-scale development of native or substitute supplies. It is not without significance that the word *ersatz* as currently used acquired an entirely derisory connotation. Similar considerations reduced measures for salvaging, reclaiming and the general conservation of raw materials to small proportions.

The final question concerns the building of a control machine for war purposes. Reference has already been made to the sudden demands for such an organization during the first World War and the efforts of the government to create one *ab initio*. By 1939 the position was profoundly different. The majority of the raw materials trades had representative organizations of varying qualities, responsible leaders and the beginnings of a tradition of self-government. The Board of Trade, I.D.A.C., the Department of Overseas Trade and other departments had likewise gained experience in negotiating with these bodies in a spirit of mutual confidence, and there existed in the Civil Service a select body of experts, or at least experienced administrators, for this and other purposes. Nor must it be forgotten that the trade research bodies had developed close contacts with official and quasi-official bodies such as the Imperial Institute, the Department of Scientific Research and the British Standards Institution, organizations which were to help considerably in the exploration, adaptation and economy of materials in war.³ When the time came for setting up a control organization and selecting control personnel it was reasonable to assume

¹ *Trade Regulations and Commercial Policy of the United Kingdom*, pp. 132-5 and Appendix 1.

² Cmd. 6447, p. 7.

³ A note on the government machinery for the promotion of scientific research and development is given in Cmd. 6514, published in April 1944.

that the government would turn to the trade organizations for guidance or, if circumstances justified it, might invite the whole or part of the trade association to form the basis of the control itself. It is not yet possible to assess fully the advantages and disadvantages of adopting this policy as a means of effecting a speedy and smooth transfer from peace to war conditions. On the one hand, it could be urged that the government was drawing upon men and organizations who had gained their experience in trying to restrict output and increase demand, while war called for expanded output and the restriction of inessential civilian demands; that they would find it difficult to see beyond their vested and post-war interests to the wider interests of the state. Against this it could be shown that the trade associations could provide the only people with a thorough knowledge of their trade and enjoying the full confidence of its members,¹ and that the patriotism of the control staff and the supervision of government officials would ensure the satisfaction of national rather than sectional needs. On the whole, the government in the second World War decided to use extensively members of the trade for the highest as well as the lowest duties in the control organization; but much depended upon who controlled the controllers. Thus, the controls as they had grown up in the interval of peace merged, under the threat of hostilities, into the war controls as we know them now.

To sum up: during the twenty years between the wars control policy and structure had changed in form and emphasis from isolated efforts by the trade to regulate markets and prices to the fuller control of supply, distribution and use. The methods and machinery which had been devised were still open to criticism on the grounds of their ultimate objectives as well as their immediate activities; and the question whether control should be applied by restriction of output or expansion of consumption had not yet been brought to final issue. While it cannot be said that the British control system of the first World War was established in a moment of absence of mind it was certainly set up with a complete absence of plan. When the second World War came there existed control machinery and programmes which the government might accept or redirect, but whose character and effects it could not ignore. The last important control measure in the inter-war period was the setting up of the Ministry of Supply in July 1939, by which the government announced its reassumption of some of the powers it had discarded twenty years before. But this was by nature a war measure which finally closed the account of the peacetime direction of raw materials.

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¹ But a member of the trade might be somewhat reluctant to see his competitor appointed controller.

THE ENGLISH CLOTH INDUSTRY IN THE LATE TWELFTH AND EARLY THIRTEENTH CENTURIES¹

By E. M. CARUS-WILSON

THE late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries saw the zenith of the urban cloth industry in England. The 'great industry' for export was then centred in the towns, as never again, and the cloth, when marketed, took its name from a city, not from a district. Very different was the state of affairs by the fifteenth century, when the revolution brought about by the introduction of the fulling mill, as described in a previous article,² had caused the industry as a whole to migrate from the urban centres into the country districts and to shift from the East Anglian plain to the upland valleys of the west; then the trade names in vogue were such as 'Mendips', 'West of Englands', 'Cotswolds', 'Essex Straits' or 'West Ridings'.

Pre-eminent among these urban industrial centres were four clothing towns not far apart on the East Anglian plain, specializing in fine-quality cloths, and then at the height of their fame and prosperity: Beverley, Lincoln, Stamford and Northampton. Not far off were York, Louth and Leicester, dealing more often in slightly cheaper cloths. These were the towns above all which provided fine cloth to replenish the royal wardrobe,³ in so far as this was not purchased from abroad, and in each there was a large-scale industry supplying not only the home but also the foreign market. In 1204, for instance, John of Beverley loaded 'scarlet of Stamford' in a London ship,⁴ and in the mid-thirteenth century it is evident that clothmakers of Stamford must have had constant dealings with Italy. For when certain Lucca merchants carried away Stamford cloths worth £102 without paying for them, the matter was considered so serious for the reputation of other Lucca merchants that they agreed that the Stamford citizens might recoup themselves by taking 1½*d.* in the mark on the goods

¹ As this article was compiled while the writer was on war service without ready access to sources, it has proved impossible to check and complete all the references. In almost every case, however, the source is given, if not the precise reference.

² 'An Industrial Revolution of the Thirteenth Century', *Economic History Review*, xi, 39-60.

³ See, e.g., *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1232-47, p. 23; *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1234-7, pp. 73, 301, 375; 1247-51, pp. 154, 157; *Cal. Liberate Rolls*, II, 1245-51, p. 194 and I, 1226-40, p. 493 (scarlets of Lincoln purchased as a present for the Queen of Norway).

⁴ W. Wheater, 'The Ancient Cloth Trade' in *Old Yorkshire* (2nd Series, 1885), p. 262.

of all Lucca merchants until the whole had been paid.¹ Later in the century we read of cloths of a Lincoln man on a ship chartered by Lucca merchants,² and of certain Spanish merchants who, when robbed by pirates off the coast of Norfolk, had on board 'cloths of scarlet and other cloths from Stamford, Beverley, York, Lincoln, Northampton and Louth'.³

The reputation of Lincoln, Stamford and Beverley as cloth-making centres is borne out by a metrical list of English towns and their characteristic products, compiled almost certainly in the mid-thirteenth century.⁴ 'Escarlet de Nichole' is the entry descriptive of Lincoln,⁵ and Beverley too is characterized by its cloth—burnet of Beverley.⁶ 'Hauberger de Estamford' tells equally of Stamford's skill in cloth-making for, though this has usually been translated 'inns of Stamford', it clearly refers to the cloth known as 'hauberger', 'haubergett' or 'halbergett'; indeed, King Henry III himself once ordered three good 'haubergettos' to be made and dyed in grain for him at Stamford.⁷

Beyond this group of cities on the eastern plain lay others also notable for their cloth industry, but producing mainly cheap varieties, the russets and burels that were purchased by the king not for his own apparel but as alms for the poor. Most famous of these was Colchester. The king bought 'russet of Colchester' in 1252 and ordered russets there also in 1249 and 1254,⁸ and 'Russet de Colcestr' is the one mention of the cheaper cloths in the list which signalized Lincoln, Stamford and Beverley for the more

¹ *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1247-58, p. 309 (1254).

² *Cal. of Letter Books of the City of London, Letter Book A*, ed. R. R. Sharpe (1899), p. 138.

³ *Newcastle Record Series. II. Pleas from Curia Regis and Assize Rolls*, p. 307.

⁴ Bodleian, Douce MS. 98, f. 194, see *Notes and Queries*, IVth Series, viii, 223 (1883) and J. Thorold Rogers, *Six Centuries of Work and Wages* (1884), p. 105. Rogers here considers the list to have been drawn up 'a little after the middle of the century' but the MS. to be of the close of the century, though the Bodleian Catalogue of Western MSS. dates the MS. 1320-30. Cf. *English Historical Review*, xvi, 501.

⁵ 'Lincoln scarlets' are the only ones to be specially listed in the royal wardrobe accounts of the thirteenth century.

⁶ Cf. purchases of burnets at Beverley by Henry III, e.g. *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1234-7, p. 301; 1253-4, p. 46. Henry III also ordered burnets from Northampton and Stamford (*ibid.* and 1247-51, p. 154).

⁷ *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1234-7, p. 73. No satisfactory explanation has yet been found of the meaning of this term. It is used only in the first half of the thirteenth century. Magna Carta lays down a particular width (2 yards between the lists) for *pannorum tinctorum et russetorum et halbergettorum*. The word evidently refers to texture rather than colour. We read, for instance, in the Northamptonshire Assize Rolls (1202-3) of a *pallium hauberget' tinctum in burneto*; King John ordered many yards of white 'halberg' together with a large quantity of dyed cloth and scarlet (M. Bateson, *Medieval England* (1903), p. 147); and Henry III, as shown above, ordered three haubergets to be made and dyed in grain for him. The 'Stamforts' so popular on the continent in the thirteenth century have been thought to be either cloths made at Stamford or imitations of them, but it seems very probable that this word is actually derived from *stamen forte* ('of strong warp thread', i.e. a species of worsted). See the *Drapers' Dictionary*.

⁸ Exchequer K.R. Accounts Various, Wardrobe, 349/18; *Cal. Liberate Rolls*, ii, 1245-51, p. 254; *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1247-51, p. 198; 1251-3, p. 135; 1254-6, p. 8.

expensive ones. With Colchester may be grouped Oxford, London and Winchester. The king ordered 'russet of Oxford and burel of London' in 1232 and sent to Oxford for more cheap cloth for a Christmas gift to the poor in 1233.¹ In London he was constantly purchasing burel or other cheap cloth for his almsgiving,² often from the London burellers, to some of whom he was in debt to the extent of £155 in 1250,³ and from the early thirteenth century there are frequent references to burel manufacture in London, as, for example, in special concessions by the crown to those who 'cause burels to be made', or to the 'weavers of burels'.⁴ Similarly the mid-thirteenth century records of Winchester have much to say about the makers of burels and the looms for weaving burels.⁵ While Colchester, London, Winchester and Oxford were clearly the most important sources for the cheaper cloths, other lesser centres of manufacture can be distinguished, such as Marlborough and Bedwyn, whose burels are included with those made at London in the special concession of 1218 with regard to the Assize.⁶

Thus in all these towns there was a large-scale industry, supplying London and probably the export market as well as local customers. But scattered all over England there were other towns with organized groups of craftsmen engaged in cloth-making, even if their cloth had not yet, so far as we know, acquired a wide reputation outside its own district. In the north country there were groups of dyers, for instance, at Newcastle⁷ and Darlington⁸ in the twelfth century, and of weavers, fullers and dyers at Egremont.⁹ In the midlands and eastern counties there were weavers' guilds at Nottingham and Huntingdon.¹⁰ In the west country we know of weavers at Gloucester,¹¹ dyers at Worcester,¹² a 'Fullers' Street' at Tewkesbury¹³ and a 'Dyers' Street' at Ciren-

¹ *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1231-4, p. 41; *Cal. Liberate Rolls*, I, 1226-40, pp. 191, 208.

² E.g. *Cal. Liberate Rolls*, I, 1226-40, pp. 259, 233, 159; II, 1245-51, pp. 39, 318. It is impossible to be certain of the precise meaning of 'burel' in the thirteenth century or of the origin of the term; several derivations seem all equally probable.

³ *Cal. Liberate Rolls*, II, 1245-51, quoted in L. F. Salzman, *English Industries of the Middle Ages* (1913), p. 198.

⁴ *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1216-25, p. 155; *ibid.* p. 523; *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1251-3, p. 206.

⁵ *Victoria County History, Hampshire*, v, 478 (quoting rent roll of the Bishop of Winchester of 1251); *Archaeol. J.* ix, 69 ff.

⁶ *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1216-25, p. 155.

⁷ C. Gross, *The Gild Merchant* (Oxford, 1890), II, 182, quoting charter of Henry I.

⁸ *Victoria County History, Durham*, I, 338. The dyers paid a separate rent of 6s. 8d. when the borough as a whole paid £5.

⁹ 'assessum tinctorii, textorii, fullonii.' *Cumberland and Westmorland Archaeol. Soc. Trans.* I, 284.

¹⁰ Pipe Roll 31 Henry I.

¹¹ *Cal. Charter Rolls*, III, p. 378; cf. *Bailiffs Accounts No. 1356* (at Gloucester) temp. Edward I: *de textoribus eiusdem ville* 20s.

¹² Pipe Roll 19 Henry II.

¹³ *Victoria County History, Gloucester*, II, 154 (1257).

cester,¹ and of a russet manufacture at Totnes which provided a cover for the king's bed in 1253.²

The raw materials for England's cloth industry at this time were drawn from all parts of Europe. Wool came principally from the extensive local supplies, unrivalled elsewhere in Europe, which not only fostered the native industry but also fed those of Italy and the Low Countries, then at the height of their prosperity, thus providing England's principal export. There was also, however, some import from Spain of both wool and yarn, at any rate by the mid-thirteenth century. These were amongst the goods for which tolls were fixed at London in 1257 and 1279,³ at Winchester in 1264⁴ and at Southampton about 1300, and in London there was a special ordinance of the weavers prohibiting the mixing of Spanish and English wool.⁵ Fuller's earth also was in abundant supply in this country,⁶ and there is no trace of any import. Nor is there any evidence that teasles for the use of the cloth finishers were brought from abroad at this period to supplement those grown in this country. Rather it seems likely that there may have been an export trade in these, as in wool. At any rate early in the fourteenth century the Flemings were said to be buying up all the *cardones qui Tasles vulgariter nuncupantur*, so that there was a shortage in this country and Edward II was persuaded to prohibit their export.⁷ With dyestuffs, however, the case was very different. Though many of the dyes then used were produced in England, local supplies were insufficient in quantity and variety to meet the growing demand. Even those native to this country were supplemented by additional supplies from other parts of north-western Europe, while other different varieties of dyes were imported from the north of Europe, the Mediterranean and even tropical lands.

Woad (*waida*, *gaida*, was the most important of all dyestuffs. It was used not only for blue cloth, but as a foundation for other colours too. The best deep blue, *perse*, was properly dyed in woad alone, on white wool, mordanted with ashes, though some dyers, not succeeding in this way, tried to achieve the correct shade by putting 'wool dyed in woad into madder and *bultura* to make the colour darker of the likeness of *perse* colour', and others used 'black and grey wool or madder and alum'.

¹ *vicus tinctorius*, E. A. Fuller, *Ancient Cirencester*, quoting deeds in the Abbey Registers.

² *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1253-4, p. 176.

³ Public Record Office, *Close Rolls*; grants of murage to London in these years. The printed *Cal. Close Rolls* in almost every case omit the detailed lists of goods on which tolls were to be taken, but these lists throw a most interesting light on the trade and industry of the towns at this time, and are well worth study.

⁴ *Ibid.*; grant to Winchester of 1264.

⁵ F. Consitt, *The London Weavers' Company* (1933), pp. 11, 12, quoting Letter Book C, f. 42, and *Liber Custumarum*, I, 122-6.

⁶ Cf. *Economic History Review*, xi, 39-60.

⁷ W. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce* (5th ed. 1927), p. 656. Customs Accounts show that by the fifteenth century, at any rate, they were being imported into this country.

Both practices were condemned at Leicester.¹ The woad plant was cultivated extensively in this country in the Middle Ages, as it continued to be until recent times, and eleventh-century instructions for its planting are still extant.² But by the twelfth century at least there were very considerable imports from other parts of western Europe, more especially of Picardy woad from Amiens, Corby, Nesle and the whole Somme region.³ Here the importance of the medieval industry is still commemorated in Amiens cathedral by the thirteenth-century inscriptions to two 'banières des waidiers' and by the life-like sculpture of two woadmen standing with a bulging sack of woad balls between them.⁴ FitzStephen speaks of the import of 'woad for dyeing' in the time of Henry II,⁵ and in 1194-6 the Chamberlain of London accounted for £96. 6s. 8d. in fines paid by merchants for leave to import woad into England.⁶ In the early thirteenth century there were evidently extensive imports all round the south and east coasts, for the duties paid on woad there in 1213 amounted to nearly £600.⁷ The importance of the early thirteenth-century trade is again shown by the agreement made in 1237 between the Picardy merchants and the City of London. At this time foreigners bringing woad to London were not allowed to stow it in houses or cellars or to trade through the country with it, but only to land it on the quay, enclose it with hurdles and hatches, and sell it on the spot. In 1237, however, the Picardy merchants secured a convention with the City giving them liberty to warehouse within the City, to sell in the City to citizens or strangers, and to carry their woad out of the City to such parts of the country as they pleased. In return for this concession they agreed to pay the Sheriffs fifty marks sterling a year at the times of the great fairs of St Ives, Winchester and Boston.⁸ Later this sum was commuted to $\frac{1}{2}d.$ for each quarter of woad imported.⁹ To confirm the compact the Picardy merchants paid a round sum of £100 towards the cost of the conduit for bringing water into the city from Tyburn spring; from the size of this sum it is clear that the business must have been a very considerable one. A later agreement made between the woad merchants of Amiens and Corby and the town

¹ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, ed. Mary Bateson, 1 (1899), 84, 102 (1259, 1264). Perse was a high-quality cloth, fetching up to 6s. a yard in the late thirteenth century; see, e.g., P.R.O. Exchequer K.R. Accounts Various, Wardrobe, 353/8. For the mixing of madder and woad cf. the London ordinance of 1300 (F. Cossitt, *op. cit.* p. 12).

² J. B. Hurry, *The Woad Plant and its Dye* (1930), p. 54; W. H. R. Curtler, *Short History of English Agriculture* (Oxford, 1909), p. 17. Hurry gives a very full account of the cultivation of the plant and the making of the dye.

³ The Toulouse district became more important as a source of supply for England in the later Middle Ages.

⁴ See Hurry, *op. cit.* Plate xvii. ⁵ *Ibid.* p. 55.

⁶ F. Madox, *History of the Exchequer* (1769), 1, 775.

⁷ Hurry, *op. cit.* p. 55; see Madox, *op. cit.* Hurry seems incorrect in stating that this sum included only the duties on imports entering by a certain number of ports.

⁸ *Liber Custumarum*, ed. H. T. Riley, ii (i), pp. xlii, 64, 68-9.

⁹ In 1286 they paid the Sheriffs accordingly £11. 6s. 8d.; Madox, *op. cit.* c. 18, para. 4.

of Norwich in 1286 fixed the duties which were to be paid there and permitted the merchants to stay as long as they pleased.¹ How widespread the trade in woad was throughout the country at this time is incidentally shown by the grants of murage enrolled on the Close Rolls.² In the grant to London of 1233 dues are fixed for every frail of woad brought in by foreign merchants. In 1251 they were payable on woad sold at York, and in 1253 at Lincoln. Later on they appear in grants of murage in all parts of England.

While woad was, so far as we know, the only blue dye, a number of different dyes were used for red shades. The commonest of these was madder (*garancia*, *warancia*) which, when mordanted with alum, gives a kind of tomato red. Like woad it was grown in this country as well as in many other parts of western and southern Europe, and it too is mentioned in eleventh-century planting instructions.³ Besides being used for red cloth it was also sometimes used with woad, as shown above, to give different shades of blue. It, too, appears in the murage grants,⁴ but there is no definite trace of its import from abroad at this time, so that home-grown supplies may have proved sufficient.

The rarer red dyes, brasil, vermilion and grain, must have been wholly imported. The terms 'brasil' and 'vermilion' were used in the Middle Ages both for the dyestuffs themselves and for the bright red colour they yielded, but by the sixteenth century the second usage tended to disappear and the term scarlet, which originally implied a particularly fine type of cloth but was then coming to be used for a colour only, was used for any brilliant red, though especially for that yielded by grain.⁵ Brasil and

¹ W. Hudson and J. C. Tingey, *Records of the City of Norwich* (Norwich, 1910), II, 209 ff.

² See *supra*, p. 35, note 3.

³ See *supra*, p. 36, note 2; cf. J. S. Furley, *The Ancient Usages of the City of Winchester* (Oxford, 1927), p. 41, para. 56, where there is mention of tolls on madder brought to Winchester in carts.

⁴ E.g. for Stamford in 1267.

⁵ For a full discussion of the meaning of the term 'scarlet' in the Middle Ages see J. B. Weckerlin, *Le Drap Escarlate au moyen âge* (Lyons, 1905). That scarlet did not at first denote a colour is shown by such passages as Froissart's description of the King of Portugal dressed in a white scarlet with a vermilion cross of St George. Scarlet was very much more costly than any other cloth, commanding a price unknown to the tailors of to-day. King John, for instance, paid 8s. a yard, and Edward I also paid 8s. or 7s. 6d. for Lincoln scarlets a century later, spending on them sometimes as much as £30 or £40 a year (P.R.O. Exchequer Accounts Various, Wardrobe, 359/18, 360/22, 363/21; *Cal. Close Rolls*, Record Commission, I, p. 104). Presents of it went from Henry III's court to his wife's French relations, to the King and Queen of Norway and to the Sultan of Damascus (*Cal. Liberate Rolls*, I, 1226-40, pp. 341, 493, 71; *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1242-7, p. 145). It would seem that since scarlets were most often dyed red with the most costly of all dyes, grain, it gradually became the custom to apply the name scarlet to fine cloths dyed in grain to the exclusion of all others, and finally to the colour alone. This change of usage may be illustrated by comparing the Authorised Version (1611) of Exodus xxxv, 25, 'that which they had spun of blue, purple and scarlet', with the version of Wyclif, who uses 'vermilion' in place of scarlet. See also the two versions of Rev. xviii, 16.

vermilion are both mentioned in thirteenth-century dyeing regulations, such as those of Northampton, which prohibit the use of either brasil or vermilion in the dyeing of 'cloth imperial'.¹ The Leicester records of the same period, using the word for a colour, speak of 'vermilion' cloths being made at Leicester and sold at Lynn.² Both dyes must have been imported from long distances. Brasil (*brasillum*, *bresil*, *brisell*) may have come from the East Indies, for it was derived from the red wood of the East Indian tree *Caesalpinia Sappau*, much used for its dye by the Indians and Persians. Vermilion (*vermilio*, *verme*, or *worme*), though popularly supposed to be the blood of a little worm, was actually a mineral dye derived from a crystalline substance said to have been found on the shores of the Red Sea. Brasil, imported by aliens, is mentioned in the London murage grant of 1233, and both brasil and vermilion appear in the London grant of 1257 and in Ipswich and Fordwich grants of about the same time.

Most rare and costly of all red dyes was grain (*granum*), which yields a peculiarly brilliant and lasting scarlet colour. It acquired its name from the fact that it was derived from the dried bodies of the grain-like insect *Coccus Ilicis*, found on a species of oak which flourishes in Mediterranean lands, particularly in Portugal. The first distinct reference to its import into this country is in the murage grants where, in that to London of 1233, there is mention of tolls on *grana* imported by aliens. It was clearly used for dyeing cloth at this time in England, since we read in 1235 of cloth which was to be made for the king at Stamford and well dyed in grain,³ in 1251-2 of Irish mantles for the royal wardrobe which were to be dyed in grain,⁴ and again in 1249 of the payment of £7. 10s. to one Bernard Curuzan for *grana* for dyeing cloth.⁵

Little evidence has survived as to the yellow dyes used at this period. Saffron, much grown in England, particularly in East Anglia, may have been used in the cloth industry as well as for culinary purposes; so also, no doubt, were other native plants such as woadwaxen or 'dyer's weed' (*Genista Tinctoria*), commonly used for many centuries in the Lake District, together with woad, for the dyeing of 'Kendal green'. Weld (*gualda*, *waald*), though a native of southern Europe, has been naturalized in the north, and in the Middle Ages may have been imported.⁶ Sumach (*symak*, *cymak*) was certainly imported in the thirteenth century,⁷ but there is no clear evidence of its having been used for cloth dyeing.

Many varieties of lichens and barks were probably used, and it seems likely that there was already an import of these from northern Europe. At any rate orchil or archil (also called 'cork'), a lichen dye which gave a purplish red, was being imported from Norway by the early fourteenth century.

¹ *Records of the Borough of Northampton* (1898), I, 229.

² *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, 68-9, 86.

³ *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1234-7, p. 73, in *grana*.

⁴ P.R.O. Wardrobe Accounts, 349/18, *mantell' hibernici tingendis in grana*.

⁵ *Cal. Liberate Rolls*, II, 1245-51, p. 216.

⁶ Tolls were paid on it at Dunwich in the fifteenth century.

⁷ Tolls were paid on it at London in 1279.

Almost more important than the import of the actual dyes was the import of the mordants for fixing them. For scarcely any of these dyes will take satisfactorily without a mordant, and the colour ultimately produced varies according to the particular mordant used.

Potash (*cineres* or 'woad-ashen'), produced from wood ashes by leaching, was the commonest of these and the easiest to apply. It formed part of the stock in trade of most dyers and was so generally used with woad that the term 'woad ashes' or 'ashes which pertain to woad' was frequently applied to it.¹ Thirteenth-century regulations at Leicester stipulated that ashes only, and not alum, should be used for dyeing perse.² Tolls were levied at Northampton on casks of ashes in 1251. Though these ashes could be produced in England, both from wood fires and from the burning of whole trees, they were also imported from abroad, especially from the Baltic, by the mid-thirteenth century.³

Alum was the mordant most used after potash. This was imported from southern Europe in bags. The finest quality was said to come from the shores of the Black Sea. An almost equally fine quality came from the coasts of Asia Minor, and in 1275 a Genoese obtained from the Emperor Michael Palaeologus the lease of a mountain in the Gulf of Smyrna where were alum mines already exploited by the Greeks. Here he built and fortified the town of New Phocaea, secured also a monopoly of importing alum from the Black Sea, and made a large fortune. The mines remained in Genoese hands until 1459. It is just possible that English merchants may themselves have visited New Phocaea in the thirteenth century.⁴ At any rate the Genoese were importing alum into England at the opening of the fourteenth century.⁵ From early in the thirteenth century tolls were being paid on alum at the ports,⁶ and amongst several cargoes loaded by a Dunwich merchant at Bordeaux in 1275 there were 50 bales of alum claimed by a Barcelona merchant.⁷

Verdigris and copperas also appear in many of the murage grants, as for instance at London in 1257 and 1279 and at York in 1284, and it is probable that both were used as mordants, though they were certainly also in demand for sheep-dressing.⁸ Verdigris is most often used after dyeing to fix the colour, while copperas tends to deepen the colour as well as fixing it. Argol (crude cream of tartar), not strictly a mordant but

¹ E.g. ashes 'ke afferte a weide' in a thirteenth-century list of tolls at Winchester. J. S. Furley, *op. cit.* p. 58. Ashes were also used for soap making.

² *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, 102.

³ E.g. the ship of a Hamburg merchant, attacked off Dunwich in 1260, was laden with ashes, pitch, etc.

⁴ If Gibbon's conjecture is correct in thus interpreting Ducas's mention of Ἰγγλῆνοι as visiting New Phocaea. Alum was produced to some extent in this country, e.g. in the Isle of Wight, but this may have been an inferior quality. See references in *The Little Red Book of Bristol*, ed. F. B. Bickley (Bristol, 1900).

⁵ N. S. B. Gras, *Early English Customs System* (Cambridge, Mass., 1918), p. 269.

⁶ E.g. at Torksey (1228), London (1233, 1257), Gloucester (1260).

⁷ *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1272-81, p. 117.

⁸ *Victoria County History, Essex*, II, 330, note 4.

useful with other mordants for brightening the colour, appears later in the century amongst the goods for which tolls were to be paid at London and York.¹ Since this is prepared from the hard crust on the sides of vessels in which wine has fermented, most of it, at any rate, must have been imported.

It is clear from this brief survey of raw materials that the dyers were dependent upon imports as was no other branch of the cloth industry. The weavers had abundant supplies of home-grown wool, unsurpassed anywhere in Europe, to draw upon. For the fullers, England was rich in fuller's earth, and to this and to her fine pastures and clear streams she was largely to owe her supremacy in the industry. For the cloth finishers, again, there were as yet ample supplies of home-grown teasles. Only in dyestuffs was there any considerable trade with other lands. Thus dyeing involved not only much technical skill and scientific knowledge but dealings with foreign markets, and it is not surprising to find that those responsible for this stage of the cloth-making industry were men of substance and influence, closely in touch with foreign merchants, buying dyes from them, selling cloth to them, and often organizing the whole production of the finished material. They were in fact merchants and entrepreneurs rather than artisans, leaving the actual labour of dyeing to their own hired servants.

The dyers of Worcester, for instance, were evidently dealing with Flemish merchants in the time of Henry II, possibly purchasing woad from them, for we read that on one occasion they owed £12 to 'the King's enemies of Flanders'.² Thus closely concerned with foreign trade, inevitably in each city the dyers drew together with others who were buying and selling, in order to protect and regulate their trade, and from the earliest times of which we have record we find dyers as members of the merchant gilds.

One of the earliest gild merchant membership rolls still extant is that of Leicester for 1196. Here the first admission is that of a dyer, 'Nicholas Tinctor', and later on in the same year another dyer is admitted—'Galfridus de Eitona, teintor', with a dyer, 'Radulfus francus, tinctor', as one of his pledges.³ A number of dyers occur on subsequent rolls of the thirteenth century, and it is probable that there were many others not specifically mentioned as such. For occupations are not invariably given. They seem only to be added for greater precision where the gild member would otherwise be designated merely by a Christian name or by a Christian name and a place-name. Those with sufficiently distinctive surnames needed no further description.

Now it is significant that among the many different trades which do appear on the gild merchant membership rolls, those of weaver and fuller are conspicuous by their absence. Miss Bateson, indeed, finds a weaver

¹ London, 1279; York, 1284.

² *Pipe Roll 19 Henry II* (1172-3) (Pipe Roll Society, xix (1895), 165, *de xii li. quas tinctores de Wirec. debuerant inimicis Regis de Flandr.*).

³ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, 12, 13.

on the Leicester gild roll in the early thirteenth century,¹ but in fact he appears only as the father of a new member who is described as 'Ricardus filius Adam' Tixtoris'.² Gross, too, when urging that 'craftsmen as a rule were freely allowed to enter the gild merchant and to enjoy the other burghal franchises', states that rolls of gild merchant members mention weavers and fullers as well as dyers. The bulk of his evidence, however, refers to dyers, whom he finds as members of gild merchants at Leicester, Barnstaple and Andover. Those few weavers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries whom he quotes as evidence actually appear in the records not as gild merchant members, but merely as paying a tax.³ Cunningham, again, though arguing that the gild merchant of Shrewsbury 'must have had nearly every householder, poor or rich, as a member', finds dyers upon its roll of 1209, but not weavers or fullers.⁴ Thus while there were many dyers in the merchant guilds of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there seems at present no evidence of weavers and fullers being members. Craftsmen as such were not necessarily excluded, but it is important to differentiate among craftsmen, and not to generalize that all were admitted.

But not only have we negative evidence of the lack of weavers and fullers on the gild merchant membership rolls. There is also positive evidence that they were deliberately excluded. At Leicester, for instance, Nicholas the Chaloner was attainted and expelled from the gild in 1276 because he kept weaver's work in his house after entering the gild.⁵ It is interesting to compare with this the early thirteenth-century charters to Aberdeen and Perth. William the Lion's charter to Perth in 1210 permitted the citizens to have their merchant gild, 'with the exception

¹ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, xxix.

² *Ibid.* 28.

³ Gross, *op. cit.* I, 108, note 3. The references here to vol. II, pp. 14, 313, 378, and to Rep. MSS. Com. 1881, p. 404 (Leicester), all concern dyers; those to Thompson's *Leicester*, p. 87 and vol. II, p. 246 are to *assessment rolls* of Leicester and Wallingford; those to vol. II, pp. 60, 210, concern other craftsmen unconnected with the cloth industry. It is rash to assume that in 1305 'Walter le Webbe' is necessarily a weaver himself and not taking his surname from his forbears, though 'Willelmus Scot, tinctor' is certainly a dyer (R. Hoare, *Modern Wilts*, VI (1844), VI, 142). Even if, as seems doubtful, the Andover ordinance of 1338 implies that weavers and fullers could be members of Andover's merchant gild in 1338, it does not imply that such was the rule throughout England a century and a half earlier. The Wycombe ordinance of 1316 does not necessarily mean that weavers were members of its gild merchant, for it says only that weavers wishing to work within the liberty of the borough must give the *gildam* yearly 1s. for each *argoy*s (? loom) and that they should thereby be quit of all things touching the gild of merchants except stallage, etc. (*quietus quilibet eorum de omnibus rebus Gildam mercator' tangentibus tanquam stallagius etc.*), thus implying only that the gild merchant exercised the right to tax them and that they each compounded for the tax by a single payment. See the original Leger Book No. I at High Wycombe; the rendering of *quietus* as 'free' in the Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission has perhaps led to a misconception of the meaning of the ordinance.

⁴ W. Cunningham, 'The Gild Merchant of Shrewsbury', *Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc. New Series*, IX (1895).

⁵ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, 169.

of the fullers and weavers', and so did that of Alexander II to Aberdeen in 1222.¹

The difference between the position of the dyers and of the weavers and fullers is further emphasized by the fact that the dyers, bound together in the merchant guilds with other traders, had apparently no guilds of their own, as had the weavers and fullers. It is remarkable that no mention of any dyers' guild seems to have survived for the twelfth or thirteenth centuries. Weavers and fullers, on the other hand, while entirely outside the merchant guilds, were closely united in guilds of their own, and had been from the earliest days of which records survive. Neither weavers' nor fullers' guilds can be traced back with certainty beyond the reign of Henry I, but both existed in this reign and both may have existed earlier. Five weavers' guilds and one fullers' guild were certainly in being at the time of the first extant Pipe Roll in 1130. The most important of them was the London weavers' guild (*Gilda Telariorum*), which paid £16 into the Exchequer that year. Next in importance came the weavers' guilds of Winchester, Lincoln and Oxford and the fullers' guild of Winchester, which each paid £6. The weavers' guild of Huntingdon was probably smaller and had perhaps only recently come into existence, since its payment of £2 was recorded under the heading 'New Agreements' (*Novae Conventiones*).² That of Nottingham is recorded as having paid nothing, so that it had probably been in existence earlier and failed to pay up this year; later it was paying £2 a year. The York weavers' guild, later on a very important one, first appears on the Pipe Rolls in 1165, paying £10. Other such guilds existed which, since they were not in towns on royal demesne, had no occasion to seek the sanction of the crown and (therefore) made no payments direct into the Exchequer and do not appear on the Pipe Rolls. The weavers of Gloucester, for instance, owed 20s. annually to the king, but since this was granted by charter in the time of Stephen to the Abbot and Convent of St Augustine's at Bristol, it is not mentioned on the Pipe Rolls.³ Yet others again existed which, since they were not in towns on royal demesne, had no need to seek royal sanction.

The first distinct references to the merchant guilds are almost contemporary with those to the weavers' and fullers' guilds. The two earliest date probably from the early years of the reign of Henry I and 'soon after', as Gross says, 'during the reign of Henry I, the Gild Merchant appears in various municipal charters and, as the latter multiply, under Henry II, Richard I and John, it is mentioned more frequently among the burghal franchises'.⁴ The first mention of Lincoln's weavers' guild is in 1130, of its merchant guild in 1157.⁵ Winchester's weavers' and fullers' guilds are

¹ Scottish *Leges Burgorum*, quoted in Gross, *op. cit.* II, 213, note 4: *ut habeant gildam suam mercatoriam exceptis fullonibus et telariis*; W. Kennedy, *Annals of Aberdeen*, I (1818), 11.

² *Pipe Roll 31 Henry I.*

³ *Cal. Charter Rolls*, III, 378; cf. *Bailiffs Accounts*, no. 1356 (at Gloucester) temp. Edward I: *de textoribus eiusdem ville* 20s.

⁴ Gross, *op. cit.* I, 5.

⁵ W. de G. Birch, *The Royal Charters of the City of Lincoln* (Cambridge, 1911), p. 1.

first heard of in 1130, its merchant gild in 1155-8.¹ At York the merchant gild appears on the Pipe Roll of 1130, the weavers' gild not till 1165. At Nottingham the weavers' gild first appears on the Pipe Roll of 1155, but there is no mention of the merchant gild in the charter of this year and it first appears in the charter of 1189.²

Thus in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries we find the weavers and fullers each united in gilds of their own, while the dyers have no gilds of their own but are united together in the merchant gilds. And while the weavers and fullers were actively securing privileges from the crown for themselves, the dyers, with other members of the merchant gilds, were securing charters of wider scope for their town as a whole. That the dyers with other members of the merchant gilds, where such existed, were largely instrumental in obtaining these civic charters is very clear from the many grants of privileges in the charters themselves concerning dyeing as well as the merchant gilds. Those who drew up the charters were eager to exploit every opportunity for monopoly, and amongst the monopolies they coveted were those of dyeing cloth and of buying cloth for dyeing. Henry II's charter to Lincoln restricted the dyeing of cloth to burgesses and members of the merchant gild,³ and his charter to Newcastle decreed that only burgesses might purchase webs for dyeing (*telas ad tingendas*),⁴ while Nottingham's charter of 1200 restricted the dyeing of cloth within ten leagues' radius of Nottingham entirely to the borough.⁵ Similarly, later on in the thirteenth century the burgesses of Shrewsbury secured by their charter of 1227 that they alone might buy raw cloth (*pannum crudum*), thus keeping for themselves control over the dyeing and finishing processes,⁶ while in Chesterfield by the charter of Edward I only burgesses might be dyers.⁷

The dyers, in fact, unlike the weavers and fullers, were among the ruling class of the rapidly growing towns at this time, assisting in directing civic policy as a whole and in protecting and regulating the trade of the towns. Not only, however, did they restrict the dyeing industry within each town to those who were burgesses. So great was their influence that the crown was prevailed upon to confine the making of dyed cloth to the towns, prohibiting any dyeing in the country except such as was done for people's own use and not for sale. Richard I's famous Assize of Measures (1197), in addition to fixing a uniform width of two yards for all woollen cloth, decreed that no dyeing for sale, except only in black, should be carried on anywhere in the kingdom except in the cities and capital

¹ J. S. Furley, *op. cit.*

² *Nottingham Records*, I (1882), pp. 3, 7.

³ *Cal. Charter Rolls*, III, 7.

⁴ W. Stubbs, *Select Charters*, ed. H. W. C. Davis (Oxford, 1913), p. 134. W. J. Ashley (*Econ. Hist.* I, 74) renders this 'could buy, make (i.e. finish) or cut cloth for dyeing', but the Latin clearly has could *buy* for dyeing (*Nullus nisi burgensis poterit emere telas ad tingendas nec facere nec secare*).

⁵ *Nottingham Records*, I, 11.

⁶ Gross, *op. cit.* II, 211.

⁷ *Records of the Borough of Chesterfield*, ed. P. Yeatman (1884), p. 36.

boroughs.¹ Thus it extended to all cities and boroughs the monopoly that Nottingham had achieved over her immediate neighbourhood.

What then was the relationship between the dyers and the weavers and fullers? Evidence for the early and mid-thirteenth century is slight, but for one at any rate of the towns specializing in cloth-making, Leicester, some court rolls of great interest have survived from the year 1253. These tend clearly to show that by then there had emerged, probably from among the dyers, a class of entrepreneurs employing weavers and fullers, controlling the whole production of the cloth, and selling it at the great East Anglian fairs.

Let us take, for example, two important Leicester citizens, Henry Houhil and Richard of Shilton, whose names frequently appear upon the rolls between 1253 and 1263. Henry Houhil was a burgess with considerable property in Leicester and was one of thirty-five gildsmen bound under a heavier penalty than others to come at all summonses of the Alderman to all councils of the community of the gild.² He was himself concerned in the dyeing of wool, for in 1259 he was fined for putting wool dyed in woad into madder to make it darker like perse colour.³ He must also have been responsible for the making of the wool into cloth, for in the same year he was fined for putting black wool into woad to make it blacker and for using this wool later on in perse cloth (*quod posuit nigram lanam in wayda ad eam faciendam nigriorem et postea eam posuit ad pannum persum*).⁴ From this it would seem clear that he was employing weavers to make up his own wool into cloth. He was also employing fullers for scouring and felting the raw web. In 1256, for instance, he brought a suit against one of these fullers, Roger of Ketton, who was convicted of 'fulling the coloured cloths of Henry Houhil' by a prohibited method.⁵ Finally, we know that he was trading at Boston Fair, for he complained in 1259 that Peter Blund' and Richard of Shilton refused him entrance to the shop there which ought to have been his by lot.⁶ A special row was assigned to Leicester at this fair. The cloth merchants (described as *Draparii*) had their stalls on the south side of it, and the wool merchants (*Lanarii*) on the north. At night, if they wished, they might take the cloth to their lodgings both for safe keeping and to fold and dress it, but it might only be sold in the row.⁷

Richard of Shilton who, like Houhil, was one of Leicester's leading citizens,⁸ was also producing as well as selling cloth. Like Houhil he was fined for dipping wool dyed in woad into madder,⁹ and he too sued a fuller for defective fulling of a blue cloth of his.¹⁰ He was evidently trading at Boston. Peter Blund', reeve of Leicester, who was concerned with him

¹ Roger of Hovenden, *Chronica*, ed. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1871), iv, 33: *Nulla tinctura vendenda, nisi solummodo nigra, fiat alicubi in regno nisi in civitatibus aut capitalibus burgis*. This clause of the Assize seems to have received little, if any, attention.

² *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, 76.

³ *Ibid.* p. 84.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 85. The list of those fined is not given in the printed version but is to be found in the MS. at Leicester.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 71: *quod fullavit pannos coloratos Henrici Houhil* . . .

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 83.

⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 84, 95.

⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 45, 77.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 85 (MS. version).

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 101.

in the dispute over Houhil's stall at Boston, was also engaged in dyeing, for he was amongst those fined in 1259 for using illegal processes. That he was dealing in cloth is also shown by the purchase from him of russet worth £6 on the occasion of the Earl of Leicester's visit to the town in (?) 1270.¹ The lists of those fined for contravention of the dyeing regulations also include² 'Adam de Welton, dyer', who entered the gild merchant in 1254, and Henry of Ruddington who was mayor of Leicester from 1259 to 1270.

The extent to which capitalist employers such as Houhil and Shilton organized the industry under their control is further revealed by such ordinances concerning the industry as have been preserved on the Leicester gild rolls. Ordinances for the weavers and fullers, including the fixing of wage rates, were made by the merchant gild on which, as we have seen, the dyers were represented but not the weavers and fullers. Such were the customs agreed to in the gild of merchants with the consent of the weavers and fullers in 1260.³ The weavers swore that they would not weave at night, that they would use three shuttles, and that they would conceal no infidelity in their work. In 1264 it was 'provided and agreed' in the merchant gild that the weavers should be paid at the rate of $\frac{3}{4}$ d. a yard for russets and $\frac{1}{2}$ d. a yard for all other cloth, and they were allowed to work at night so long as their work was not defective. At the same time they were forbidden to weave for the country villages while the men of Leicester had sufficient work for them. If they were short of work this was to be pointed out to two specially appointed members of the gild who might then, if they thought fit, permit weaving to be done for the villages.⁴ Defective weaving was punished by the merchant gild.⁵

The fullers' ordinances of 1260, like those of the weavers, are partly concerned with technical regulations. Imperfect cloths must not be fullled without reference to the mayor and bailiffs; certain detergents must not be used for coloured cloths;⁶ backhandles⁷ must not be put on to dry cloth.

¹ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, p. 127.

² As shown in the MS. version.

³ *Ibid.* p. 89: *constitute fuerunt hee consuetudines in Gilda mercatorum cum consensu mercatorum et textorum et fullonum*. Cf. the reference on p. 106 to certain weavers and fullers who made an ordinance by themselves against the community of the gild merchant.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 105. The weaver was thus not yet wholly dependent upon the entrepreneur.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 105: *Rog. de Kildesby textor pro defectu texture unius panni Marie le Stabler*.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 89: *in arzilio et fecibus*; cf. the conviction of Roger of Ketton in 1256 for fulling *in glire et fecibus* (p. 71); the meaning is uncertain.

⁷ *quod non ponent Bachandle super siccum pannum*. The Editor prints *Bathandle*, adding a note to the effect that 'Bac' not 'Bat' is clearly written, but that the reading must be *Bat*, i.e. a small mallet for beating the cloth. The word has not been met with elsewhere than in the Leicester records, but taking this reference in conjunction with that of 1343 it seems clear that the instrument referred to is not that used for pounding the cloth in the stocks, but that for raising the nap. The 1343 ordinance forbids the use of iron 'bachandles', 'cardes' or 'skrattes' instead of teasles. The substitution of metal hooks for teasles may be connected with the shortage of teasles mentioned above (p. 35). It was strenuously resisted throughout the Middle Ages (see, e.g., Stat. 4 Ed. IV).

This last prohibition shows that the fullers were also engaged in the raising of the nap on the cloth in preparation for the final process of shearing. The backhandle was a wooden frame consisting of a handle and central upright about a foot long in all, with two cross-pieces, one about a foot long between handle and upright and a second shorter one higher up, on which teasles were set; when this was passed over the cloth the sharp hooks of the teasles fluffed up the surface, drawing out the fibres. It was important that the cloth should be wet during this process, or the hooks would scratch away the fibres altogether, robbing the surface. For this reason raising was often carried out while the cloth was still wet from the fuller's hands,¹ and references to it frequently appear in the ordinances of fullers' guilds. The only fullers' ordinances we have for the thirteenth century are those of Leicester, but the first extant ordinances of the fullers' guild at Bristol, enrolled in the Little Red Book in 1346, clearly distinguish between two classes of craftsmen, prescribing different wages for those who work in the stocks at the actual labour of fulling and for those who work on dry land at the perch, i.e. the wooden bar or frame, over which the cloth was hung during the raising.² The earliest extant ordinances of the fullers' guild at Lincoln, made probably in 1337, also refer to this process, forbidding any member of the guild to work at the perch (*ad perticam*) with a woman, except with his own wife or her servant.³ We read elsewhere of cloth being 'drawn on the perch' and the process itself is sometimes called 'perching'. It is vividly depicted in the early fourteenth-century clothworkers' window at Semur cathedral where the backhandle itself, set with teasles, is clearly shown, and we see the craftsman drawing it down over the cloth, which is hung for the purpose on a horizontal bar rather longer than the width of the cloth.

The Leicester fullers were forbidden to fix their own rates of pay, nor might they hold any meeting among themselves unless two members of the merchant guild, nominated for the purpose, were present.⁴ It was also laid down that if the owners found any defect in the cloths after they had been raised,⁵ they should show them to four members of the merchant guild who should present the defects to the mayor and commonalty. Two of the leading cloth entrepreneurs were among those chosen for this purpose. Defective fulling was punished by the guild.⁶

There is a very significant difference between the procedure for making

¹ See M. Postlethwayt, *Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce* (4th edition, 1774), under 'Cloth', and *A Visit to Hunt and Company's Lodgemore and Frome Hall Cloth Mills*, ed. H. Mayhew (n.d.), p. 21.

² *Little Red Book of Bristol*, II, 12: *en le Stokkes al overagne qest appelee fullyng and sur terre cest a savoyr a la perche*. For a description of the actual fulling process at this time see previous article, *Economic History Review*, XI.

³ J. Toulmin Smith, *English Guilds* (1870), p. 179. These ordinances are first recorded in 1389, but are stated to have been made in 1337. Salzman would not seem to be justified in identifying the perch (*pertica*) with the wooden rod with which the cloth was beaten (*Medieval English Industries*, pp. 221-2).

⁴ In 1275 the fullers were fined for contravening this order.

⁵ *Brochiati et cotunati*.

⁶ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, 109, William Pennyfoot, fuller (1269), p. 71, Roger of Ketton (1256); p. 101, William of Shilton, fuller (1264).

ordinances for the weavers and fullers and for the dyers. Whereas in the former case rules were made by the merchant gild and imposed upon the weavers and fullers, who then agreed to them by oath, in the latter case they were made by the members of the merchant gild *for themselves*. Thus in 1263, 'on the Thursday next before Candlemas, in full morning speech, it was provided and agreed in common by the community of the Gild of Merchants of Leicester that henceforth none of them shall make any perse coloured cloth except with white wool and woad and ashes,¹ and without any admixture of black wool or grey wool, or madder or alum'.² Anyone contravening this rule was to forfeit both his cloth and his wool and to lose the liberties of the gild for a year and a day. This seems to have been a reiteration of an earlier rule which, as we have seen above, a number of important members of the merchant gild were fined for breaking.

The Leicester records throw no light on the preliminary processes of carding and spinning, carried on no doubt by women throughout Leicester and beyond, nor on the final process of shearing after the raising of the nap. Nevertheless, they give us a vivid picture, if not complete in all its details, of an industry highly organized on a capitalist basis in a town specializing in cloth-making. Many of the leading citizens are capitalist entrepreneurs, purchasing wool, having it washed and dyed in blue, vermilion or other colours, probably on their own premises, giving it out to carders and spinners, employing weavers and fullers throughout the town,³ under stringent supervision, at piece-work rates fixed by themselves, and marketing the finished cloth from their own stalls at the great East Anglian fairs of Boston, St Ives⁴ or Stamford.⁵ Alongside of this great industry for export there must have remained a small industry working for purely local demand. Weavers, no doubt, were not wholly dependent upon the large entrepreneurs, and must have continued to weave cloth for their customers' own personal use.

It would be unwise to assume that in every case it was from among the dyers that this capitalist class emerged. Weavers and other craftsmen may by skill or good fortune have grown richer than their fellows, abjured the practice of their craft with their own hands, like Nicholas the Chaloner,⁶ and entered the merchant gild to organize the production of cloth. So also woolmongers and other traders who had acquired even a small amount of capital may have invested it in what was becoming an increasingly profitable enterprise. But that dyers very often became responsible for organizing the whole process elsewhere than at Leicester is borne out by

¹ Translated 'crude tartar' in the printed volume.

² *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, 101-2: *In pleno morspechio, per communitatem Gilde mercatorum Leycestrie communiter fuit provisum et concessum quod de cetero nullus eorum faciet pannos persos nisi de Lana alba et Wayda et Cineribus et sine aliqua admixtione Lane nigre seu grise lane, seu Warancie seu alume.*

³ When the process of fulling became mechanized by the invention of the fulling mill, fulling, like dyeing, was often carried on by the entrepreneur himself, who invested some of his capital in a mill.

⁴ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, I, 95.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 79.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 104. Nicholas the Chaloner (coverlet maker) was fined 'because he wove fullable cloth against the liberty of the Gild and against his oath made when he entered the Gild'.

the wealth and importance of dyers in many places¹ and also by the list of fines paid in Yorkshire by those making cloth of the wrong width, as given on the Hundred Rolls. Here almost the only trade name by which any of the makers are designated is that of dyer.²

No records comparable to those of Leicester are known still to exist for the other great cloth-making cities for the mid-thirteenth century, so that we cannot trace with any certainty the organization of their industry. Stray indications of its capitalist nature appear, however, here and there. In London, which produced mainly coarse burel rather than fine dyed cloth, control of the industry was in the hands of entrepreneurs who were called 'burellers'. Thus in 1225 we read of the 'men of London who cause burels to be made',³ who were evidently employing workers under them. From the middle of the century we find 'burellers' selling cloth to the king, and from 1275, when the Letter Books begin, there are frequent references to other activities of theirs, such as the buying of yarn and the control of the assay of woad. The disputes between burellers and weavers at the close of the century⁴ clearly reveal a capitalist organization in which the burellers are putting out yarn to the weavers. They would seem to indicate, however, that in London the weavers had so far retained a somewhat more independent position than at Leicester. They were not allowed, for instance, to fix their own rates of pay, but neither were these to be fixed by the burellers; they were to be a matter of agreement between the weaver and the entrepreneur who 'caused the cloth to be made'. At Winchester, as at London, we find references to those who 'cause burels to be made'. In its thirteenth-century Consuetudinary, for instance, it is laid down that only burgesses could *fere uwerer bureaus ne chaluns*. This has been erroneously quoted as showing that *weavers* were allowed to enjoy the municipal franchise. It shows rather that the control of cloth production was in the hands of entrepreneurs and that it could be undertaken only by burgesses. The making of cloth, indeed, did not imply simply its weaving, but a whole series of successive processes, and the very variety of these processes, and the many different craftsmen involved, led inevitably to its early organization on a capitalist basis.

Once it has been accepted that capitalism in the English cloth industry dates not, as is often supposed, from the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries but that it was in existence two centuries earlier, a flood of light is thrown on many records which have hitherto puzzled historians, particularly on the laws of the weavers and fullers of Beverley, Winchester, Oxford and Marlborough. These laws are said to have been derived from similar laws of London. The earliest extant version of them is to be found in a collection of documents on the laws and customs of London dating, apparently, from the end of the twelfth century,⁵ and they are also re-

¹ E.g. Philip' Tinctur who was mayor of Exeter in 1259. See also *Victoria County History, Hants*, for references to several wealthy dyers in the thirteenth century.

² Hundred Rolls for 1275.

³ See above, p. 34.

⁴ Fully related in Consitt, *op. cit.*

⁵ British Museum Add. MSS. 14252, f. 111. The writing is late twelfth century and none of the dates mentioned are later than 9 John. The MS. concludes with 'E ceste lai unt il en la franchise de Lundres, si cum il dient'.

corded in the London *Liber Custumarum* of the fourteenth century.¹ First and fullest comes the law of the weavers and fullers of Winchester, then that of Marlborough, and finally those of Oxford and Beverley. Hitherto commentators have been almost entirely preoccupied with the legal and constitutional aspect of these laws. Attention has been directed principally to the provision that weavers and fullers might not attain a freeman nor bear witness against him, and discussion has centred mainly on the reason for this prohibition, which has been explained by supposing that all weavers and fullers in these towns were foreigners or that they were all aliens, or, more logically, by pointing out that the feudal immunities they had won by their charters set up rival jurisdictions to those of the towns.²

A close analysis of these laws shows, however, that the majority of the clauses (six out of seven in the case of Winchester) refer not to the legal but to the industrial status of the weavers and fullers, and that they are primarily concerned with the economic organization of the industry and reflect the subservience of the wage-earning craftsman to the capitalistic entrepreneur.

One group of clauses, restricting the business dealings of the weavers and fullers, shows clearly that they could not take their own cloth to the fairs and that they were virtually dependent upon the entrepreneur, at any rate so far as cloth for a wide market was concerned, though they might weave individual pieces for other citizens. At Winchester they might not go out of the town to do any business, nor might they sell their cloth to any outsider but only to merchants of the city. At Beverley likewise they might not go out of the town to do any business. At Marlborough they might not weave³ nor work except for the townsmen, and at Oxford they might not weave nor full any cloth of their own without permission.

A second group of clauses limits the weavers and fullers entirely to their own crafts and prevents them from usurping the privileges of members of the merchant gild by venturing either to dye or to cut cloth. At Winchester they might not dye nor cut⁴ cloth, and at Beverley they might not cut cloth. Further, at Marlborough they might have nothing pertaining to the making of cloth worth a penny except 5 ells a year to clothe themselves.⁵ Very similar to this last clause is one at Winchester, prohibiting

¹ *Liber Custumarum*, ed. Riley (Rolls Series), p. 130. Printed also in A. F. Leach, *Beverley Town Documents*, Selden Society, xiv, 134.

² For the most recent discussion of this question see E. Lipson, *Economic History of England* (7th ed. 1937), I, 367 ff. Lipson follows Leach in rejecting the suggestion of Riley, followed by Gross and Cunningham, that the weavers and fullers were all aliens, but he disposes of Leach's suggestion that they were landless.

³ *tistre*, erroneously translated *dye* in Leach, *Beverley Town Documents*, p. xlv. Cf. the similar prohibition at Leicester, *supra*, p. 45.

⁴ *sechir*. This should probably be translated *cut* rather than *dry*; cf. charters to Chesterfield and Newcastle stating that no one is to be a dyer or to cut (*secare*) cloth unless he is a burgess. At Leicester also only members of the merchant gild could cut cloth. (See *Records of the Borough of Leicester* I (1240).)

⁵ *ne avoir rien del suen ke aprendre a dras faire vaillant un denier, fors a tant cum amunte a cinc alnes de drap a soi vestir par an.*

the weavers and fullers from buying anything pertaining to their craft unless they made agreement with the sheriff each year.¹

Further, the laws confirm that weavers and fullers generally were excluded from the ranks of the burgesses, and thus sharply differentiated from the class of entrepreneurs whose employees they were² though, should they become rich, they might abjure their craft and themselves become burgesses and producers of cloth. At Winchester it is laid down that if one of them enriches himself and wishes to give up his craft he must forswear it, put out of his house the instruments of his craft, and pay for the freedom of the city. The Beverley provision was almost exactly similar. That of Marlborough was stricter still; if a weaver or fuller so enriched himself that he coveted the franchise of the town, two years must pass during which he must see if he could live without his craft, and the third year he must forswear his craft and turn all his tools out of his house. The law of Oxford adds that if a weaver dies and his widow still wishes to follow the craft, she can be married only to a weaver. The Leicester records, as we have seen, provide actual illustrations of the working out of such a law in practice. Nicholas the Chaloner, for instance, though he had forsworn his craft when he entered the gild merchant, continued to practise weaving and as a result was first fined and later expelled from the gild.³

Our evidence for the English cloth industry in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries is slight. Both central and local records are scanty compared with those for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. We have neither aulnagers' nor customs' accounts from which to make any quantitative or qualitative analysis of the cloth produced in different parts of the country or exported abroad, nor can we tell to what extent it had yet ousted foreign cloth from the English market. Few court rolls survive to record particular transactions which might throw light on the technique and structure of the industry, while neither the houses, wills nor tombstones of the great cloth-makers, much less any of their letters, still exist to show us what manner of men they were. Nevertheless, from such evidence as we have we can catch a glimpse of the long-departed glory of the great East Anglian cloth-making towns, Beverley, Lincoln, Stamford and others, a glory still reflected in the wealth of Early English building that has there survived, reflecting the days when their cloth was sought by merchants of Italy and Spain and rivalled the fine cloths of Flanders for the king's own use.

Colwyn Bay

¹ *Ne le teler ne fulun ne poet achater neis ceo ke apent a sun mester, kil ne face le gre al viconte chascuntan.*

² Cf. also the case at Lincoln in 1200 in which it was stated that the fullers had no community with the citizens. This case would seem to refer to dyers working as craftsmen for entrepreneurs who were trying to prevent them from trading on their own. With this may be compared the ruling in the Scottish *Leges Burgorum* that no dyer could be in the merchant gild unless he abjured the exercise of his craft by his own hand (Gross, *op. cit.* 1, 213). See W. J. Ashley, *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory* (1901), 1, 83.

³ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, 1, 104, 169.

SHORT ARTICLES AND MEMORANDA

THE ORIGIN OF THE FISCAL CARUCATE

By REGINALD LENNARD

THERE has for a long time been a pretty general agreement among historians about the origin of fiscal carucation. The fact that in Domesday Book the geld assessments are in a number of northern and north midland counties expressed in carucates and bovates, and in East Anglia in carucates and acres, is usually, and I think rightly, explained as due to Scandinavian influence.¹ Round maintained this view as long ago as 1888: according to him, the Domesday scribes employed the system of assessment in carucates where they did because these districts 'had been settled by the Danish invaders'.² In *Feudal England*, published in 1895, he pointed out that the carucated districts were not co-extensive with the Danelaw, which, for example, included Cambridgeshire (a county assessed in hides), and he reached the conclusion that 'the district in which men measured by carucates, and counted by twelves and sixes, was not the district which the Danes *conquered*, but the district which the Danes *settled*, the district of "the Five Boroughs"'.³ Maitland was more cautious, but inclined to the same opinion. Speaking of the terms carucate and bovate (in themselves Latin terms which are not apparently found in any genuine Old English document and were, it would seem, introduced from the continent by the Normans) he says: 'We may infer ... that they translated some English, or rather perhaps some Scandinavian terms, for only in Danish counties do we find them used to describe the geldable units', and he adds: 'It is exceedingly doubtful whether we ought to treat this method of reckoning as older than the Danish invasions'.⁴ Vinogradoff also connected carucation with the Scandinavian background of these regions; and Mawer was of the same opinion.⁵ A particularly careful and detailed examination of the problem led Rhamm to a similar conclusion.⁶ More recently Professor Stenton has endorsed these views. Speaking of the carucates and bovates of Lincolnshire, he says: 'There is reason to believe that this terminology represents a system of land division introduced by the Danish settlers'; and he adds: 'It is probable that the Lincolnshire jurors spoke of "plogslands" when the clerks of the Domesday commissioners wrote "carucatæ"', and points out that the word 'plogsland' (which occurs in a Yorkshire document of the eleventh century and a Lincolnshire document of the twelfth century) 'from its form must be of Scandinavian origin', while he describes the word 'oxgang' as 'the English equivalent of "bovata"'.⁷ In a footnote to his Raleigh

¹ It is, of course, open to doubt whether the carucates of the East Anglian section of Domesday Book were assessment units or estimates of potential arable like the *Terra x carucis* of other districts; but I think the evidence in favour of the former sense has the greater weight.

² *Domesday Studies* (ed. P. E. Dove), I, 199.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 71.

⁴ *Domesday Book and Beyond* (Cambridge, 1897), p. 395.

⁵ P. Vinogradoff, *English Society in the Eleventh Century* (Oxford, 1908), p. 147; A. Mawer, *The Vikings* (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 131-2.

⁶ K. Rhamm, *Die Grosshofen der Nordgermanen* (Brunswick, 1905), pp. 277-93, cp. pp. 445-6.

⁷ *The Lincolnshire Domesday and The Lindsey Survey* (ed. C. W. Foster and T. Longley), Lincoln Record Society (1924), p. x. For the Yorkshire example (*ploges land*) see W. Farrer, *Early Yorkshire Charters*, Vol. I (Edinburgh, 1914), no. 7; for that from Lincolnshire (*ploxland*) see Stenton, *Documents Illustrative of the Social and Economic History of the Danelaw* (1920), no. 496.

Lecture, which was delivered in 1927, he says, more generally, 'That the Danes brought to England their own distinctive forms of agricultural tenement, the ploughland and oxgang,¹ seems certain'. And in his great work *Anglo-Saxon England*, published last autumn, he reaffirms the orthodox doctrine that the ploughland-oxgang system is of Scandinavian origin, though he suggests that the change from the earlier system of hides and yardlands 'was only carried out by slow degrees' and that the original Danish colonists of the northern Danelaw may at first have divided the land in 'manslots' rather than in oxgangs.²

Yet the Scandinavian origin of the carucate system is not undisputed. Some doubts were raised by Professor Tait in 1916. In his Introduction to the *Domesday of Cheshire*, published in that year, he pointed out that though Cheshire is in general assessed in hides, the Domesday of this county contains 'a few cases of carucates and bovates that are distinctly described as geldable units', and that their presence here 'on Mercian ground' is in conflict with Maitland's doctrine that these terms are used to describe the geldable units 'only in Danish counties'. Further, while admitting that the occurrence of some bovates in hidated Northamptonshire 'might on this view be regarded as due to the influence which the Danes had in that county, though it was not strong enough to bring about its re-assessment in carucates', he urged that 'such an extensive Danish influence has never been suspected in the case of Cheshire'. On the whole, however, his final verdict with regard to the *bovates* was that 'there seems no obvious escape from the conclusion that we have in them, as in those of Northamptonshire, evidence of Scandinavian influence upon the subdivision of the fiscal hide'. The Cheshire *carucates*, on the other hand, he judged to 'stand on a different footing'. There are only three of them (at Handbridge on the south side of the Dee at Chester) and since they appeared to be 'reckoned together as one hide' in the assessment of the city, and were 'accompanied by no estimate of possible ploughlands', he suggested that they might 'simply represent this estimate expressed as a fraction of the hide at which the three Handbridge manors were jointly assessed'.³

Eighteen years after Professor Tait had expressed these tentative doubts, Mr Jolliffe in an essay on 'The Era of the Folk in English History', published in 1934 in the volume of *Oxford Essays in Medieval History presented to H. E. Salter*, boldly rejected the orthodox theory and propounded the startling doctrine that carucation is of pre-Danish origin and belongs essentially to the Anglian kingdom of Deira. This doctrine was re-asserted by Mr Jolliffe in his article 'A Survey of Fiscal Tenements', which was published in this *Review* in April 1936. There can be no doubt as to the far-reaching consequence of the theory. If it could be established, it would necessitate a profound alteration in the perspective of early English history, for it would give an importance hitherto unsuspected to the political divisions of the Heptarchy and to the influences proceeding from them, and it would greatly reduce the permanent significance of the Scandinavian settlements. For the reasons which follow I believe that Mr Jolliffe's contention is unsound. At the same time it should be recognized that his 'Survey of Fiscal Tenements' has in one respect made an important contribution to knowledge. He argues, and I think convincingly, that the true boundary between the two systems of reckoning—the hide system based on the family holding on

¹ *The Danes in England* (Raleigh Lecture, 1927), p. 27, cp. pp. 38–41.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 506–7, 639. Professor Stenton says that the manslot 'might be equivalent to an oxgang, but was generally smaller'.

³ *The Domesday Survey of Cheshire*, Chetham Society (Manchester, 1916), New Series, LXXV, 8–13. The occurrence of geld bovates in Cheshire along with geld virgates had already been noticed by Rhamm, who cites them as an example of the mingling of Anglo-Saxon and Danish reckonings in a border region (*op. cit.* p. 282 n.).

the one hand and the carucate or ploughland system based on the plough and its team of oxen on the other—cannot be determined by the nomenclature of Domesday Book, because its compilers tended to take the county as their unit and to treat each county as belonging to one system only, though the boundary between the systems in fact may cut cross it.¹ Further, there is much to be said for the method employed by Mr Jolliffe for getting behind this administrative over-simplification. He seeks for evidence of genuine local usage in manorial and other local documents of post-Domesday date; and he takes the occurrence in these sources of the words *bovate* and *virgate*, not of the words *carucate* and *hide*, as the basis of the map which indicates the geographical range of the two systems, because it is the smaller units that stand closest to the actual peasant holdings and are mentioned most frequently in manorial documents, while the terms *carucate* and *hide* were more liable to be used by non-local officials and so to be carried beyond the regions to which they properly belonged. The value of Mr Jolliffe's map does not in the least depend upon the validity of his theory that the system of reckoning in carucates and bovates, or rather in ploughlands and oxgangs, is of Deiran origin. The reasons for rejecting this latter theory seem to me to be of compelling force.

In his earlier essay Mr Jolliffe bases his case upon a novel interpretation of a section of the Tribal Hidage. That mysterious document is unquestionably of pre-Danish date; and, among the districts it mentions, those which can be most certainly identified include the region of Elmet in Yorkshire, *Lindesarona* (the land of the *Lindisfari* or Lindsey) and a district in the neighbourhood of the Peak in Derbyshire. At first sight it might seem fatal to Mr Jolliffe's theory that each of these districts is assessed in hides by the Tribal Hidage, though they are all assessed in carucates in Domesday Book and lie within the carucated area of Mr Jolliffe's map. But, Mr Jolliffe is fully justified in rejecting such a facile conclusion, for the Tribal Hidage also assigns hides to Kent, where we know that ancient local usage, like Domesday, employed the Kentish ploughland (the *sulung*), and not the hide. As it thus applies hidation to one region where the hide was not native, its hidation of Elmet, Lindsey and the Derbyshire Peak cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence that hidation prevailed there in the pre-Danish period. Being in all probability a monument of Mercian supremacy, its use of the hide for the assessment of subject regions in Deira and Lincolnshire may, on the face of things, be simply the protrusion of a southern usage beyond its proper frontier.² But though this possibility must be recognized (so far as the evidence of the Tribal Hidage itself is concerned) the ingenious arguments by which Mr Jolliffe attempts to show that the 'hides' of these regions were in fact ploughlands and should be identified with the *carucatae* of Domesday will not, I think, bear examination. In the first place, following up a hint of Round's, he points to the tendency of the Lindsey Survey to group the wapentakes in trithings of approximately 600 carucates and relates this phenomenon to the 600 hides assigned by the Tribal Hidage to the South *Gyrwe*, the

¹ It is only a tendency, of course, a 'rough general rule', as Mr Jolliffe says, but it seems to have been sufficiently strong to obscure the true frontier of the systems in some cases.

² The Tribal Hidage could only be regarded as being *prima facie* irreconcilable with Mr Jolliffe's hypothesis if it were itself a tribute list of some Northumbrian Bretwalda (as Corbett suggested in 1900) and, therefore, proved that assessment in hides was employed by a Northumbrian ruler (perhaps Edwin of Deira) both for Deira and for tributary states. But this view was subsequently abandoned by Corbett himself, who in 1913 described the Tribal Hidage as of Mercian origin; and Mr J. Brownbill has also maintained that it is Mercian. Professor Stenton describes it as 'almost certainly compiled in Mercia' (see *Anglo-Saxon England*, p. 292). For Corbett's original hypothesis see *Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc.*, New Series, xiv: his later opinion is stated in the *Cambridge Medieval History*, II, 544. Mr Brownbill's discussion of the Tribal Hidage will be found in the *English Historical Review*, xxvii, 625-48, and xl, 497-503.

North Gyrwe and the *Spalde* respectively. Secondly, he contends that nine of the entries in the Tribal Hidage refer to Deira (including those lands between the Ribble and the Duddon which are classed with Yorkshire in Domesday Book) and points out (a) that the total number of hides in these nine entries is very nearly the same as the total number of carucates in this region in Domesday as summed by Farrer; and (b) that both sets of figures fall into two groups, one consisting of multiples or fractions of a 600 hide (or carucate) unit and the other based on a decimal notation (Noxgaga, 5000; Ohtgaga, 2000), and further that the balance between these two groups in the two documents 'differs little'.¹

I find these arguments unconvincing for the following reasons:

(1) The Tribal Hidage assigns 7000 hides to *Lindesfarona* with *Haethfeldland*. This figure bears no apparent relation to the 600 hide unit.² As Professor Stenton points out, there is 'no discernible connexion' between it and 'the sum of roughly 2000 carucates at which Lindsey was assessed to gelds in 1066'.³ It is in fact greatly in excess of the number of carucates assigned by Domesday to the whole of Lincolnshire. Even if we were to suppose, with Mr Brownbill, that *Haethfeldland* (Hatfield Chase?) included all the West Riding of Yorkshire south of the Aire, and were to make the improbable assumption that all Nottinghamshire as well as all Lincolnshire formed part of the region assessed at 7000 hides, and, further, reckoned that for Nottinghamshire the Domesday 'teamlands' rather than the Domesday carucates should be taken as the old assessment, we should still be left with a grand total of carucates less than 7000.⁴ Moreover, the inclusion of a large block of Yorkshire as belonging to *Haethfeldland* would spoil Mr Jolliffe's figures for what he takes to be Deira. And if Lindsey, though included in the area to which the Tribal Hidage assigns 7000 hides, was in fact, as Mr Jolliffe suggests, assessed in 600 carucate units, what becomes of the contrast between areas of decimal and duodecimal assessment to which he attaches so much significance? There is an obvious parallel between the 7000 hides of 'Lindisfarona with Haethfeldland' and the 5000 + 2000 hides of Noxgaga and Ohtgaga.

(2) Groups of 600 hides occur in regions where there can be no possibility of any connexion with the duodecimal notation of the Danelaw or with the system of twelve-carucate hundreds that lies at the base of the 600 carucate groups which Round thought he could discern in the Lindsey Survey.⁵ In the second section of the Tribal Hidage, which seems to relate to more southern regions than the first section, five groups of 600 hides are to be found. And though Bede's allocation of 600 hides to Thanet might be regarded as irrelevant to my argument (on the ground that Thanet belongs to the area of the *sulung*) such an objection cannot be urged in the case of the 600 hides at which Langport (Somerset) is assessed in the Burghal Hidage. Of figures that are fractions or multiples of 600 there are, of course, abundance in hidated England, from the 300 hides of Oswaldslaw to the 1200 hides of Worcestershire, the 2400 hides of Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire and Shropshire and the 4800 hides of Wiltshire in the County Hidage. But since figures such as these occur in hidated regions using a decimal notation, the occurrence of the 600 hide unit in the case of the Gyrwe and Spalde in the Tribal Hidage is no evidence that the duodecimality

¹ *Oxford Essays in Medieval History*, pp. 22-5.

² Professor Chadwick, however, has suggested that 7000 may have been by 'very rough' arithmetic regarded as a multiple of 600 (*Studies in Anglo-Saxon Institutions* (Cambridge, 1905), pp. 264-5).

³ *Anglo-Saxon England*, p. 640.

⁴ For Mr Brownbill's discussion of these matters see *English Historical Review*, xxvi, 634.

⁵ Professor Stenton tells me that the symmetry of these groups is in fact by no means so clear as Round supposed.

of carucated regions which is revealed in Domesday and the Lindsey Survey is of pre-Danish origin.

(3) Mr Jolliffe's assumption that nine of the districts of the Tribal Hidage should be assigned to Deira and its western dependencies upsets the geographical order of that document, for in it Elmet, the location of which is not in dispute, is separated from the other districts that Mr Jolliffe regards as Deiran by the six entries which he treats as referring to the Lindeswara. Moreover, while Mr Jolliffe cites no place-name evidence in support of his view, he ignores the weighty consensus of expert opinion which connects the names of four of the districts in question with place-names in a part of England that would quite naturally continue the geographical order suggested by the sequence *Pec saetna*, *Elmedsaetna*, *Lindesfarona*. A trace of the name *Herefinna* (in one version *Heresinna*) has been recognized in the name of Hurstingstone Hundred in Huntingdonshire, while the names *Sweordora* and *Gifla* have been discerned in Sword Point on the south of Whittlesea Mere in the same county and the Hertfordshire-Bedfordshire river Ivel, and the name of Hitchin is believed to incorporate that of the *Hicce*. It is to be noted that the four names *Herefinna*, *Sweordora*, *Gifla* and *Hicca* follow one another in that order in the Tribal Hidage; and that all the above identifications are endorsed by the editors of the *Survey of English Place-Names*.¹

(4) At first sight it seems impressive that the total number of hides assigned by the Tribal Hidage to the regions Mr Jolliffe takes to be Deira (11,200) comes so close to the total number of hides in the Yorkshire Domesday as summed by Farrer (11,100). But mere coincidence can easily account for 'near misses' with figures of this kind. If we take, for example, a belt of contiguous counties which no one could seriously regard as identifiable with the area rated at 11,200 hides in the Tribal Hidage (the counties of Middlesex, Hertford, Buckingham, Oxford, Gloucester, Worcester and Hereford) we find that the total number of hides in the Domesday of these seven counties, as summed by Maitland, comes to 11,305, which is within five hides of being as near a miss as that which Mr Jolliffe regards as a striking 'equivalence'. The other numerical approximations to which he calls attention are much less close than this: 4200 hides in the Tribal Hidage as compared with 5021 Domesday carucates for 'the area of the 600 carucate unit'; and 7000 hides in the Tribal Hidage as compared with 6089 Domesday carucates for 'that of the decimal notation'.²

Apart from a strong assertion to the effect that what we know of medieval Denmark precludes the possibility of the carucate-bovate system being derived from that country (an assertion which I shall consider later) it is upon the arguments just examined that Mr Jolliffe relies in his earlier essay. In his later discussion of the problem, published in this *Review*, he adds the further contention that, when the true frontier between the bovate and the virgate is ascertained, we find that it corresponds not to any frontier between the English and the Danes but to 'the older lines of the Heptarchy'.³ 'The Danish boundaries are ignored', he says, 'the natural features, the hills, the rivers and the fens, and, it is legitimate to suppose, the older boundary of the nations, are faithfully observed'.⁴ He finds that from the Staffordshire hills to the border of

¹ See A. Mawer and F. M. Stenton, *The Place-Names of Bedfordshire and Huntingdonshire* (Cambridge, 1926), pp. xviii-xix; J. E. B. Gover, A. Mawer and F. M. Stenton, *The Place-Names of Hertfordshire* (Cambridge, 1938), p. xvii. The identifications of the first two names are due to Mr Goodall: those of the last two were mentioned as possibilities by Mr Brownbill in 1912 (*English Historical Review*, xxvii, 639, note 63; cp. for *Gifla*, E. McClure *British Place-Names in their Historical Setting* (1910), p. 221, note 4) and were endorsed in 1924 by Professor E. Ekwall (*Introduction to the Survey of English Place-Names* (Cambridge, 1924), Part I, p. 22). See also Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England*, p. 293.

² *Oxford Essays in Medieval History*, p. 24.

³ *Economic History Review*, vi, 160.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 165.

Nottinghamshire the river Trent forms 'the southern boundary of carucation' and that the carucated area includes 'all Nottinghamshire except for the immediate course of the Trent'; and he speaks of this river boundary as 'the line between Mercia and Deira', and as 'the line of demarcation between the two great civilizations of England, the North and South Humbrenses'.¹ This is surprising because Bede states precisely that the Trent was the boundary, not between these peoples, but between the North Mercians and the South Mercians and actually suggests that the majority of the Mercians lived to the north of the river.² But then Mr Jolliffe explains that 'the Deira of the carucation is the kingdom at its furthest extension'.³

It has, of course, long been recognized that the frontier of carucation does not correspond with the frontier of Danish rule: the non-coincidence of the two is patent in Domesday Book and is not something newly revealed by Mr Jolliffe's rectification of the carucate frontier. But this fact cannot seriously be supposed to stand in the way of the orthodox theory that carucation is of Danish origin. As Round suggested nearly half a century ago, carucation may well correspond with the area of Danish settlements as distinct from the area of Danish conquests. There is, indeed, scarcely more reason to dispute the Danish origin of the carucate-bovate system on this ground than there would be to dispute the Danish origin of the *by* suffix in place-names. On the other hand, Mr Jolliffe's alternative theory has to face the most serious objections.

In the first place, the theory presupposes a far-reaching difference between the Angles of Deira and the Angles of Mercia; and of such a difference (apart from the matter in dispute) there seems to be no evidence.

Secondly, the area that Mr Jolliffe considers to be the true area of carucation includes Lincolnshire, Cheshire, Lancashire and 'the southern fringe of Westmorland' with 'the northern peak of the Staffordshire hill country', all Derbyshire north of Trent, part of Framland Wapentake in Leicestershire, the eastern half of Rutland and 'all Nottinghamshire except for the immediate course of the Trent'. Mr Jolliffe, as we have seen, maintains that 'the Deira of the carucation is the kingdom at its furthest extension'. But while the evidence for the geographical extent of the Deiran kingdom at its largest is very flimsy, it is certain that it did not retain its hold on this greater Deira for very long. It is surely very unlikely that in this short period in the seventh century it could have made so lasting an impression on conquests which it failed to maintain. The long-continued and more recent impress of the Danes seems, on the face of things, much more likely to have done this. Further, if Mr Jolliffe is right in regarding Bernicia as lying outside the carucated area (a point on which I express no opinion) this makes an additional difficulty for his theory. If Deiran rule imposed carucation upon all the Southumbrian regions which he suggests, it is hard to account for its failure to introduce it into Bernicia. But absence of carucation in Bernicia would fit in well with the hypothesis of Scandinavian origin, for north of Tees Scandinavian place-names only occur in considerable numbers in the southern part of the county of Durham.⁴

Thirdly, it is impossible to reconcile Mr Jolliffe's theory with the considerable mass of evidence which points to an early employment of the hide unit in the north of England, and indeed in those very regions of the north that he regards as devoted from the days of the Heptarchy to the system of ploughlands and

¹ *Economic History Review*, vi, pp. 169, 165.

² Bede speaks of the *regnum Australium Merciorum, qui sunt, ut dicunt, familiarum quinque milium, discreti fluvio Treanta, ab Aquilonaribus Mercis, quorum terra est familiarum vij milium* (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, ed. Plummer (Oxford, 1896), iii, 24, (1, 180).

³ *Op. cit.* p. 169.

⁴ E. Ekwall in *Introduction to the Survey of English Place-Names*, Part I, p. 75.

oxgangs.¹ The documentary evidence, though suggestive, is perhaps inconclusive. As we have seen, that is certainly the case with the Tribal Hidage; and we cannot, I think, make much of the fact that hides are mentioned in three documents of the tenth and early eleventh centuries relating to Yorkshire estates of the see of York. One of them is a charter of King Edgar, and such a charter might well employ West Saxon terms though they were not really appropriate to the district.² Another is a statement by Archbishop Oswald about lands of which the church of York had been robbed: it mentions hides at Stainley near Ripon, at Poppleton near York and at Bracken near Beverley; but we cannot forget that Oswald still retained the see of Worcester in the hidated south.³ The use of the term hide (as well as the terms ploughland and oxgang) in the third document may be more significant, for this is a description of certain Yorkshire estates written (apparently in a hand of the early eleventh century) in a York Gospel Book, and W. H. Stevenson regarded it as 'obviously written down by a Northumbrian in Yorkshire'. Yet he judged the language to be predominantly West Saxon, so that even here an element of doubt remains.⁴ It is perhaps more difficult to get round the reference to hides at three places in Yorkshire in a note of the lands given to the church of Durham by Earl Thored, who lived in the reign of Ethelred II, for this note occurs in the *Liber Vitae* of Durham and seems to have no obvious connexion with southern England.⁵ For Lincolnshire which, like Yorkshire, is not only a carucated county in Domesday Book but is wholly included by Mr Jolliffe in his area of 'Deiran' carucation, we have evidence of hidation in a document much older than the earliest documents that refer to hides in Yorkshire. This is the agreement made in 852 between Abbot Ceolfrid of *Medeshamstede* (Peterborough) and Wulfred.⁶ In it we read of twelve hides of land '*aet Forde 7 aet Cegle*' and of two hides of land '*aet Lehcotum*'. Where *Forde* was is unknown; but Miss Robertson identifies *Cegle* with Cheal in Gosberton, which is in Lincolnshire, and she suggests that *Lehcotum* may be either Nun Coton or Great Cotes, both places in the north riding of Lindsey.⁷ Yet even here it may perhaps be objected that the document comes from Peterborough, which lies just outside the carucated

¹ Mr Jolliffe accepts the identification of the carucate and bovaté with the ploughgang or ploughland and oxgang (*Economic History Review*, vi, 165, 168).

² Farrer, *op. cit.* no. 6.

³ A. J. Robertson, *Anglo-Saxon Charters* (Cambridge, 1939), no. LIV.

⁴ Farrer, *op. cit.* no. 7; Robertson, *op. cit.* no. LXXXIV; *English Historical Review*, xxvii, 14-21. Stevenson himself felt no doubt: he argues that 'the mention of oxgangs as the constituents of the hide dissipates any lingering possibility that the latter word may be due to the use of West Saxon instead of Northumbrian'.

⁵ Farrer, *op. cit.* Vol. II (1915), no. 921; Robertson, *op. cit.* no. LX. In a note Farrer seems to imply that the hides were those of the beneficial post-Danish assessment which reckoned 6 carucates to the hide as in Lancashire. In that case this text is no evidence of hidation in the pre-Danish period. But would this artificial fiscal concept have been used in a brief schedule of property? Further, as Farrer dates the text c. 1000, this view is inconsistent with his suggestion (in the Preface of Vol. I, p. x) that the new assessment was made after the 'harrying of the North' in 1069. Was he reverting to his earlier opinion (expressed in 1912 in the V.C.H. for Yorkshire) that it was the price of Danish submission to Edward the Elder? Or can it be that the note was written before the corrective Preface of 1914 and was printed, without alteration, in 1915 by an oversight?

⁶ Robertson, *op. cit.* no. VII.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 272. I am inclined to suggest that perhaps *Forde* may be identified with Greatford in Ness Wapentake, Lincolnshire. The property dealt with in the agreement of 852 included land at Sempringham; and in 1086 Robert de Todeni and Gilbert de Gand each held land both at Sempringham and at Greatford. There is no need to attach any significance to the fact that the number of hides at *Forde* and Cheal was twelve: 'twenty hides' are also mentioned in the document; and estates of twelve hides occur, for example, in Wiltshire and Gloucestershire, and one of twelve *cassati* at Ombersley in Worcestershire (Robertson, *op. cit.* nos. LIII and CIX; Birch, *Cartularium Saxonicum*, no. 116).

area, in hidated Northamptonshire, and that it is written in a Mercian dialect.¹

But if we judge all this documentary evidence to be inconclusive, the same cannot be said about the frequent measurement of estates in terms of family holdings that we find in early Northumbrian literature. This evidence, to which Mr Jolliffe makes no reference, must be briefly examined.

The practice of Bede in this matter is well known.² He tells us, for example, that of the twelve small properties which King Oswy gave for religious purposes when his daughter Aelfed became a nun, six were in *provincia Derorum*, six in Bernicia, and that each was of ten families—*singulae vero possessiones x erant familiarum*.³ He says that the Abbess Hild obtained a *possessio* of ten families at Streanaeshalch (traditionally identified with Whitby).⁴ He says that King Alchfrid gave Wilfred *terram x familiarum in loco qui dicitur Stamford* (a place which may be either Stamford in Lincolnshire or Stamford on the Yorkshire Derwent) as well as a *monasterium xxx familiarum* at Ripon.⁵ It is true that Bede also applies the same method of measurement in regions where it cannot have been indigenous. He applies it to Thanet, to Anglesey and the Isle of Man and to Iona.⁶ But, since Bede was a Northumbrian, this stands on quite a different footing from the application of hidation to Kent by the Mercian Tribal Hidage. It shows that, although he was writing after that period of Northumbrian greatness which according to Mr Jolliffe's theory imposed the ploughland-oxgang system upon the greater Deira and imposed it so strongly that it survived the Danish settlements, it was so natural to Bede as a Northumbrian to employ the family-land unit that he employed it even when speaking of districts where we know that it was not at home. It is, further, a remarkable fact that, alike in Thanet, Anglesey, Man and Iona, the statement about their extent is accompanied by the qualification *juxta consuetudinem aestimationis Anglorum* or *juxta aestimationem Anglorum*, which is absent in the statements about the Northumbrian estates cited above. The same qualification occurs in the measurement of the Isle of Wight; but then we remember that Wight was Jutish like Kent. Perhaps all this is accidental; but it cannot be explained away as due simply to the distinction between statements about the donation of definite properties and estimates of area, for Bede does not refer to the *aestimatio Anglorum* when he tells us that the province of the South Saxons contains the land of 7000 families, or describes Ely as a *regio familiarum circiter sexcentarum*, or speaks of the South Mercians *qui sunt, ut dicunt, familiarum quinque milium* and of the North Mercians *quorum terra est familiarum vij milium*.⁷

Before Bede, the measurement of estates in family holdings appears in the anonymous *Historia Abbatum*, which was clearly written by a monk of Wearmouth or of Jarrow. In that work we read that the monastery at Wearmouth at first received from King Egfrid the land of 50 families (*accepta ab eo terra primo familiarum quinquaginta*); that this was subsequently increased, and that eight

¹ Robertson, *op. cit.* p. 271.

² Rhamm, as long ago as 1905, cited Bede's terminology against the hypothesis that the ploughland-oxgang system is of Anglian origin. He says: 'Auch gebraucht Beda, der selbst aus dem englischen Northumbrien stammt, für die Hufe stets *familia*, dessen Beziehung zu *hid* als Familiengut vor Augen liegt, nicht etwa *aratrum*, was einem Pflugland entsprechen würde': *op. cit.* p. 288. Cp. Maitland, *op. cit.* pp. 395-6.

³ *Historia Ecclesiastica*, III, 24 (vol. I, p. 178).

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 179.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 25 (p. 45); II, 9 (p. 97); III, 4 (p. 133).

⁶ *Ibid.* v, 19 (p. 325).

⁷ *Ibid.* IV, 14 (p. 237); IV, 13 (p. 230); IV, 17 (p. 246); III, 24 (p. 180). On the other hand, the expression *juxta supputationem consuetudinis Anglorum* is used in the anonymous *Historia Abbatum* in connexion with the author's estimate of the property of the monasteries of Jarrow and Wearmouth as the land of about 150 families at the time of Ceolfrid's death (c. 33).

years later the same king gave another estate of 40 families (*aliam xl familiarum terram*) for the foundation of Jarrow.¹ Again, in the Life of Wilfred by Eddius, which was probably written at Ripon in 710 or soon after, land is also measured in terms that are related to the holdings of households; and this is particularly remarkable because Eddius had come to Northumbria from Kent, where land measures were based, not on the family holding, but on the plough.² It was probably from Eddius that Bede derived his information about Alchfrid's gifts to Wilfred at Stanford and Ripon. The account of the earlier writer runs thus: *Alchfrithus dedit primum Sancto Wilfritho confessori terram decem tribulariorum Æt-Stanforda; et post paululum coenobium in Hrypis cum terra triginta mansionum*.³

That the Latin terms employed in this early Northumbrian literature are equivalents of the vernacular hide can hardly be disputed. It is generally accepted that the essential difference between the hide and the carucate lies in the fact that the former has reference to the needs of a family and not to the capacity of a plough; and the word *hid*, like the word *hiwisc* which is often used as its synonym, is believed to be derived from the same root as *hiwan* = 'family'.⁴ These two words are used indifferently in the Old English version of Bede to translate his references to family lands.⁵ Thus the *monasterium xxx familiarum* of Bede, which corresponds to the *terra xxx mansionum* of Eddius, is rendered *mynster þritiges hiwisca* in most MSS. of the Old English version, but in the MS. at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, appears as *mynster 7 þrittig hida*, while apparently all the MSS. use the word *hide* in the passage describing the extent of Oswy's gift of twelve estates in Deira and Bernicia.⁶ In another direction the equivalence of Bede's family lands and hides is suggested by the fact that the Tribal Hidage assigns 7000 hides to the South Saxons, while Bede says that the province of the South Saxons contained the land of 7000 families. From the south abundant confirmation of these identifications is supplied by the synonyms employed in charters and in boundary clauses, endorsements and other references to the estates dealt with in the charters; and, of course, for such glossarial purposes an early forgery may be scarcely less valuable than a document which is in fact all that it claims to be. A few examples may be given. A Sussex charter, which is cited by Liebermann and professes to belong to the age of Bede himself, describes the estates it deals with as *xx tributarios*: it is endorsed in the vernacular with a sentence referring to the land as 'twenty hides'.⁷ Another ostensibly

¹ *Op. cit.* 7, 11 (in Plummer, *Baedae Opera Historica*, 1, 390, 391). The facts are reproduced in Bede's *Historia Abbatum*, 4, 7 (*ibid.* pp. 367, 370); but he makes the Wearmouth endowment the land of 70 families, no doubt including the later additions mentioned in the anonymous work.

² Bede says that Eddius was *invitatus de Cantia a ... Uilfrido* (*H.E.* iv, 2): Eddius himself implies as much, telling us that Wilfrid, after a sojourn in Kent, returned to his own country *cum cantoribus* *Ædde et Eonan* (*Vita Wilfridi*, c. 14, in Raine, *Historians of the Church of York* (Rolls Series), 1, 22).

³ Eddius, *op. cit.* c. 8 (p. 12).

Liebermann, *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, II (2) (1912), pp. 513-15; cp. Rhamm, *op. cit.* pp. 173-4; A. S. Napier and W. H. Stevenson, *The Crawford Charters* (Oxford, 1895), p. 127; A. Mawer, 'Chief Elements in English Place-Names', *Introduction to the Survey of English Place-Names*, Part II, p. 36; Robertson, *op. cit.* pp. 292, 455.

⁵ Vinogradoff says that 'in one case the familiae of the Latin text is rendered by *folc* in the Old English Version'; but, as Liebermann points out, this is not really a case of translation, but of paraphrasing: the 5000 families of the South Mercians mentioned in the original are paraphrased as 5000 'in population' (Vinogradoff, *Growth of the Manor* (1905), p. 258; Liebermann, *op. cit.* p. 513).

⁶ *The Old English Version of Bede's Ecclesiastical History* (ed. T. Miller), Early English Text Society, Part I (1890), pp. 456, 236; *ibid.* Part II (1898), p. 573.

⁷ Birch, *op. cit.* no. 144. Ethelred's charter of 998 granting land in Warwickshire to Leofwine (Crawford Charters, no. 8) supplies further evidence as to the meaning of the term *terra tributariarum* employed by Eddius: the estate *est vij tributariarum et dimidium*, but is made up of three *mansae* in Southam, four *manentes* at Ladbroke and Radburn, and *inter illos* the half of one *mansa*. The vernacular statement which is appended seems to identify these units with hides.

eighth-century document cited by the same authority is one of a series of Charters relating to Clere in Hampshire: it grants *aliquantulum portionem juxta mensuram scilicet x familiarum* and the boundary clause indicates that this is the same property dealt with in another charter, which is headed *Dis is para x hida boc aet Cleran*, and describes the land as *rusis quondam particulam bis quinis mansiunculis estimatam*. Two other charters refer to what seems to be the same estate as *quoddam rus x videlicet mansarum quantitate taxatum*, and as *x manentium* one of these has a heading referring to the ten 'hides' at Clere. And in Domesday Book we read that the Bishop of Winchester holds Clere and that it defended itself for ten hides in the time of King Edward.¹ Yet another Winchester charter, which claims to belong to the year 749, grants land 'of seven families' and then tells us that this comprises *mansas* in three different places.² Then, in the document in which Edgar is stated to have renewed the freedom of Taunton, the *sexaginta terrae manse* of the Latin text appear as *sýxtig hide landes* in the English version, while a charter of Eadred granting *bis denas mansas quod Anglice dicitur twentig hida* is introduced by the Abingdon chronicler with the statement that Eadred *concessit ... Wasingetune xx cassatorum*.³ It is true that four tenth-century charters equate 'manses' with 'sulungs'; but against these we may set a deed of A.D. 812 which makes the land of two *manentes* equal to one 'sulung', and the half of one *mansiuncula* equal to one 'yoke'; and in any case it is clear that the terms 'sulung' and 'yoke' are themselves related to the plough and the plough-team, while *mansa* and *manentes* are related to a dwelling and its occupants and thus approximate to the conceptions implied by the terms *terra familiae* and 'hide'.⁴

¹ Birch, *op. cit.* nos. 179, 905, 1151, 628; Domesday Book, f. 41.

² Birch, no. 180.

³ Birch, nos. 1219, 1220; Robertson, *op. cit.* no. xlv *Abingdon Chronicle* (Rolls Series), I, 141-2. The latter charter is quoted by Rhamm, *op. cit.* p. 174 and by Ballard, *The Domesday Inquest* (1906), p. 33, where, however, it is wrongly assigned to Edward the Elder. The Taunton document is a kind of memorandum rather than a regular charter: in its dating clause the date and the regnal year of Edgar do not agree, and Kemble marked it as suspect, so it must not be assumed that it was drawn up in Edgar's reign. I am indebted for this information to Miss F. E. Harmer.

⁴ See D. Whitelock, *Anglo-Saxon Wills* (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 108, 130; Vinogradoff, *English Historical Review*, xix, 282-6. Among the charters in the first volume of the *Cartularium Saxonicum* that profess to be anterior to the ninth century I find none of Kentish provenance which contains either of the terms employed by Eddius, or the term *mansa*, though those from the hidated regions of England provide, for the same period, eleven examples of *mansio* and sixteen examples of *tributarius* or *tributarium*, three of the last being from documents the original of which has been preserved: viz. Birch, no. 144 of c. A.D. 725 (Sussex), no. 203 of A.D. 770 (Worcestershire) and no. 265 of A.D. 793 (Middlesex). *Manentes* and *cassati* occur in some professedly early Kentish charters, but, of those assigned by Birch to dates earlier than 800, the charters employing these terms number I think eight (none being originals except one issued by Æthilbald of Mercia) as compared with over thirty (including ten originals) that use the term *aratrum*, which, according to Mr G. J. Turner, 'is not to be noticed in other counties' (Introduction to the *Black Book of St Augustine*, Part I (1915), p. xlv). In view of these facts it is surely significant that Eddius describes estates in Yorkshire, or in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire, as consisting of the lands *decem tributarium* and *triginta mansionum* respectively. If the north had been in his day a land of ploughlands like Kent and not a land of hides, is it likely that, coming from Kent as he did, he would have eschewed the Kentish term *aratrum* and employed terms which are not found in early Kentish charters, but are common in early charters of hidated regions? With later Kentish documents we have increasingly to reckon with the possible intrusion of non-Kentish terms; but even in Kentish charters of the ninth century *aratrum* is by far the most common term; and I have found in them no example of *tributarius* and only three examples of *mansio*, in each of which the sense seems to be that of house, urban tenement or 'manor', rather than of a measure of land. On the other hand, the use of *terra tributarium* and *terra mansionum* as synonyms by Eddius has a fairly close Northumbrian parallel in the expressions *tributarii* and *manentes* employed for apparently the same class of persons in Archbishop Egbert's Dialogue which belongs to the middle of the eighth century. In the same section of the Dialogue, indeed, we find the actual expression *terram videlicet unius tributarii* (Haddan and Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents* (Oxford, 1871), III, 404; cp. Maitland, *op. cit.* p. 360, n. 1; F. Seebohm, *Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon Law* (1911), pp. 378-81).

One further point should be noticed in these Northumbrian texts. The numbers of the units mentioned show no trace of the duodecimal reckoning that characterizes the grouping of geld carucates in Domesday, but on the contrary fall into line with the groups of five and its multiples which are so frequent a concomitant of hidation. The land of eight families is mentioned once in Bede's *Historia Abbatum* (c. 15) and an estate of a single family occurs once in the *Ecclesiastical History* (IV, 21); but all the other Northumbrian estates that he refers to, as well as those in the anonymous *Historia Abbatum* and in Eddius, are groups divisible by five. The one apparent exception to this rule, Oswy's gift of six estates in Deira and six in Bernicia, really conforms to it, for each estate consisted of ten families; and hidated Somerset can provide something like a parallel to this in the estate of 60 hides, consisting of two properties of 10 hides each and two of 20 hides each, which were given, or were said by the monks of the Old Minster at Winchester to have been given, to Edward the Elder as the price of privileges granted to Taunton.¹ We find too what seem like survivals of the decimal reckoning in Northumbrian documents subsequent to the age of Danish settlements. Thored's gifts to Durham consisted of three properties which add up to five hides; and in the early eleventh-century description of the estates of the church of York, the schedule of what are described as 'the priests' lands' comprises properties in six places totalling exactly ten hides (4 hides + 4 hides + 1 hide + 3 oxgangs + 3 oxgangs + 2 oxgangs).²

A more general objection can be urged against Mr Jolliffe's theory. If ploughlands and oxgangs were Deiran, not Danish, why did the compilers of Domesday Book translate them into the Norman terms carucate and bovate? Why did they not take them over untranslated as they took over the *sulungs* (solins) of Kent and the hides of the hidated counties? On Mr Jolliffe's hypothesis, the ploughlands and oxgangs of the north would be just as foreign to the Normans as the *sulungs* and yokes of Kent. But if they were Scandinavian, the procedure followed is just what we might expect, for the Normans might recognize in the ploughlands and oxgangs of Danish England units similar to those which their own ancestors had brought to Normandy and which they were already accustomed to Latinize as *carucatae* and *bovatae*. Mr Jolliffe is, however, convinced that the measures in question cannot be of Danish origin. 'It is probable', he says, 'that if it were required to choose one area from all northern Europe from which the carucate and bovate could not possibly be derived, our choice would fall on Denmark'; and he maintains that the Danish *ból* and its divisions were not defined by their share in a joint plough.³ Mr Jolliffe gives no evidence in support of these statements; and ignorance of the Danish material disqualifies me for any attempt to examine their validity. I will merely point out that a contrary opinion is confidently asserted by Erik Arup. 'Die dänischen Dörfer', he says, 'würden somit ursprünglich Pfluggemeinschaften gewesen sein, in denen die Mitglieder sich um einen oder so viel Pflüge scharten, wie Bol in den Dorfmark gepflügt wurden: jeder stellte einen oder mehrere Ochsen zum Vorspann und erhielt einen dem entsprechend abgemessenen Teil des gemeinschaftlichen Feldes.'⁴

¹ Birch, nos. 612, 1219, 1220; cp. Robertson, *op. cit.* (no. XLV, p. 94).

² Robertson, *op. cit.* nos. LX, LXXXIV (p. 166). I assume that in this mingling of systems 8 oxgangs were reckoned to the hide. In itself, the mingling in this and other York documents could be interpreted either as a West Saxon intrusion of hidation upon a Deiran system of ploughlands (in accordance with Mr Jolliffe's theory) or as due to remnants of early Northumbrian ploughland surviving into the age of Scandinavian carucation.

³ *Oxford Essays in Medieval History*, p. 20.

⁴ Erik Arup in Axel Nielsen, *Dänische Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Jena, 1933), p. 11. Stevenson cites Steenstrup as maintaining 'that the original unit in Denmark was the ploughland', (*English Historical Review*, xxvii, 22.)

It is, of course, the outstanding difficulty of the orthodox doctrine that no precise correspondence can apparently be traced between the terminology of carucated England and that of Scandinavia. The Danish terms *ból* and *otting* are lacking on this side the North Sea: the words *ploughland* and *oxgang* do not seem to occur in Scandinavia. This was recognized by Rhamm; and when Professor Stenton gave his Raleigh Lecture in 1927 no new discovery had supplied this missing link in the evidence. So far as I know that is still the position. But it is at least conceivable that of two terms for the same thing one should have survived in England and Normandy, and the other in Denmark. Of the words *otting* and *oxgang*, Professor Stenton says: 'It is probable, as Rhamm suggests, that the Danes of the ninth century were familiar with both forms of expression, but that the term *oxgang* disappeared in Denmark when the original system based on the *ból* fell into decay, but persisted in England, where its meaning was always understood'; and he cites the East Anglian practice of reckoning subdivisions of the carucate in acres rather than in bovates as 'an excellent illustration of the way in which ancient terms of land-measurement could be abandoned when the irregular division of tenements had deprived them of obvious meaning'.¹ In any case, even in relation to these matters of nomenclature, Mr Jolliffe's alternative theory has greater difficulties to meet. It has to meet not only the fact that the word *ploughland* 'first appears in England in a definitely Scandinavian form' and as *plógs-land* occurs at an early date in the Orkneys,² but also the fact that carucates and bovates are found in Normandy.³ Further, the Danish *ból* was divided into eight *ottings*, just as the *ploughland* was divided into eight *oxgangs*, in contrast to the hide with its four yardlands or virgates and the Kentish *sulung* with its four *juga*.

A word should be added about the special case of Cheshire. Mr Jolliffe's researches into the geographical distribution of bovates in later medieval records have, I think, made it easier to regard the appearance of carucates and bovates in the Cheshire Domesday as due to Scandinavian influence, for they have led him to the conclusion that Cheshire was 'a county in fact wholly carucated'.⁴ Thus the carucates and bovates of the Cheshire Domesday no longer present the puzzling appearance of something isolated from the main regions of carucation and surrounded by a belt of hidation to which carucation is wholly foreign, but on the contrary are made contiguous to carucated Derbyshire and the carucated land between the Mersey and the Ribble. In general too the strength of

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 40 n.

² Stenton, *op. cit.* pp. 40-1; *Orkneyinga Saga*, c. 80; Vigfusson: *Icelandic Sagas* (Rolls Series), vol. I (1887), p. 132, in connexion with events of 1136 or 1137.

³ L. Delisle, *Études sur la condition de la classe agricole en Normandie* (Évreux, 1851), pp. 299, 538. The eleventh- and twelfth-century texts quoted by Delisle indicate that the Norman carucate contained 60 acres. Seebohm states that the customary acre of Normandy was double the English statute acre, but gives no authority for this (*Customary Acres* (1914), p. 132). Stevenson, citing Moisy, says the Norman acre is 'a little more than two English acres' (*English Historical Review*, xxvii, 23). I have not noticed any instance of the word *carucata* in Norman documents anterior to the Conquest of England; but a *terra unius carruce* at Trémauville (Seine-Inférieure) is mentioned as early as 1017-25(?) in a charter by which Richard II, Duke of Normandy, granted lands to the Abbey of Fécamp (see C. H. Haskins: *Norman Institutions* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1925), pp. 255-6); and W. H. Stevenson cites the expression *terra ad tres bovatas* as employed in a charter of William the Conqueror to Coutances of the year 1061 (*op. cit.* p. 23, n. 166). In the Cartulary of the Abbaye aux Dames at Caen (Bibl. Nat. MS. Lat. 5656) the term *terra unius aratri* is used in one place (f. 12, v.) for the same continental property which is described elsewhere (f. 30) as *terra unius carruce*. For the possible survival of the word *bol* in Normandy (e.g. *Campus de longo boello*, A.D. 1180) see Delisle, *op. cit.* p. 396 and cp. Marc Bloch, *La Société féodale* (Paris, 1939), I, 82-3; but the etymology of 'boel' is not undisputed (see *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, t. vi (Paris, 1934), p. 259). According to Koebner the word *ból* is found in Norman dialect (*Cambridge Economic History* (1941), I, 55).

⁴ *Economic History Review*, vi, 66.

Scandinavian influence in Cheshire is becoming more apparent.¹ The delusiveness of the Domesday evidence in regard to carucates and bovates is paralleled in the matter of place-names. Round could find only one place with the 'by' termination in the Domesday of the Wirral peninsula, but Professor Ekwall, taking later evidence into account, gives a list of eight 'by' names in this district.² Further, Cheshire is one of those counties where the evidence of Scandinavian influence becomes stronger if one turns from the names of villages to the field-names. Mr F. T. Wainwright has recently shown that Wirral villages with such Saxon-looking names as Oxtan, Prenton and Bidston have fields bearing Scandinavian or partly Scandinavian names.³ And though he tells us that 'Scandinavian field-names grow less and less frequent as one advances eastwards from Wirral towards central Cheshire', the presence of Scandinavians can be traced in one way or another over most of the county. More than thirty of the pre-conquest landholders mentioned in Domesday bore names which Professor Tait considers to be Scandinavian; and I find that they are represented in each of the twelve hundreds into which Cheshire was divided. Further, Professor Tait called attention to the 'frequent appearance', in the Domesday 'valets' and 'renders' of Cheshire manors, of such sums as 1s. 4d., 2s. 8d., 5s. 4d., 10s. 8d., which 'clearly shows the prevalence, alongside the old English reckoning by pounds, of the Danish reckoning by the ounce (*ora*) of 16^d and the mark of 10s. 8d.'⁴ Here again I have looked into the geographical distribution of this phenomenon; and find clear indications of it in nine hundreds, while the other three afford examples of valuations of eight shillings, which, as Professor Tait suggests, may well represent six ives of 16^d. Nor must we forget the 12 *judices* of Chester, parallel to the 12 *lagemen* of Lincoln and Stamford, or the *sacraher*, an official with a Scandinavian title, whom we meet both in the Magna Carta of Cheshire and in various Lincolnshire documents.⁵

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¹ In 1936 Professor Tait speaks more strongly in this sense than he had done in 1920. He says: 'Chester and Cheshire, though in English Mercia, came very strongly under Scandinavian influence' (*The Medieval English Borough* (Manchester), p. 44).

² *Feudal England*, p. 86; *Introduction to the Survey of English Place-Names*, Part 1, p. 78. For Danish (as distinct from Norse) names in east Cheshire see Ekwall in *An Historical Geography of England*, ed. H. C. Darby (Cambridge, 1936), p. 150.

³ *Antiquity*, June 1943.

⁴ *The Domesday Survey of Cheshire*, pp. 43-4.

⁵ Stenton, *op. cit.* pp. 34-6.

CLEMENT ARMSTRONG AND HIS TREATISES OF THE COMMONWEAL

By S. T. BINDOFF

STUDENTS of sixteenth-century economic history associate the name of Clement Armstrong with two well-known tracts, *A Treatise concerning the Staple and the Commodities of this Realm* and *How to reform the Realm in setting them to work and to restore Tillage*.¹ The credit for making these two treatises so widely known belongs, first, to Reinhold Pauli, who published them, with another, in 1878;² and secondly, to Professor R. H. Tawney and the late Professor Eileen Power, who reprinted them from Pauli's edition in their *Tudor Economic Documents* in 1924.³ To Pauli is also due the suggestion, followed by Tawney and Power and repeated elsewhere, that they were probably written by Clement Armstrong. But neither Pauli nor any later editor or commentator appears to have discovered anything about the putative author, so that until recently³ his name signified little or nothing. It is now possible, however, not only to sketch Clement Armstrong's career but also to remove the long-standing doubt attaching to his authorship of these treatises.⁴

Pauli found them among the papers of Thomas Cromwell at the Public Record Office a good many years before they were calendared in the *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII*. In his introduction he observes that the first of them, the 'Treatise concerning the Staple',

although anonymous and, to judge from the 'etc.' with which it ends, unfinished, is certainly [*mit Bestimmtheit*] to be attributed to one Clement Armstrong, from whom there is also forthcoming in the Cromwell collection a stout volume entitled 'Clement Armestrong' sermons and declarations againste Popishe ceremonies', written in the same hand and similar in its style and line of argument, and presumably an original.⁵

In support of this attribution Pauli appended to the treatise an extract from the fifth sermon in this volume and an unsigned letter in the same hand, which he believed was addressed to Cromwell. Of the writer all that Pauli could find to say was that

the name Armstrong, then as now common in Scotland, occurs quite frequently in documents of the period, although not in conjunction with the Christian name Clement, so that the author can hardly have occupied an official post.⁶

The second treatise, *How the Comen People may be set to worke: an Order of a Comen Welth* (not reprinted in *Tudor Economic Documents*), appeared to Pauli to differ so materially in style and subject-matter from the first as not to be attributable to Armstrong,⁷ but the third, *How to reform the Realm*, showed a marked resemblance, especially in point of style, to the first and might thus be regarded as his work.⁸

¹ R. Pauli, *Drei volkswirtschaftliche Denkschriften aus der Zeit Heinrichs VIII. von England* (Göttingen, 1878).

² III, 90-129.

⁴ I gratefully acknowledge the kindness of Dr A. F. Pollard and of Professor R. H. Tawney in reading this article in typescript.

⁵ Pauli, *op. cit.* p. 7. I quote the title of the volume from the original, Mr R. L. Atkinson of the Public Record Office having kindly verified it for me.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 11.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 12.

The calendaring of these documents¹ has brought to light an important piece of evidence unaccountably overlooked by Pauli, namely that the third treatise bears on its fly-leaf the words 'A devise of Clement Ormyston'. Written in a contemporary hand, possibly that of the treatise itself,² these words are all but decisive in favour of Armstrong's or Ormyston's (they are the same name) authorship of this treatise. Moreover, bearing in mind the family likeness which Pauli remarked, and which is certainly striking,³ between this and the first treatise, we can hardly doubt that the first is his also, especially as this is in a hand which is almost certainly his own.

The second treatise presents a more difficult problem which the Calendar does not help us to solve. To Pauli it revealed differences of interest and treatment from the others which told against a common authorship. With respect to the first Pauli must have had in mind the discussion of printing which occupies the last third of the treatise, for the subjects handled in the preceding part all lie within the known range of Armstrong's interests. Moreover, this first part includes a proposal for a new enclosure commission, as does the third treatise;⁴ and its concluding sentence 'And of artificialitie shall I shew more at large by it selfe here after in the order of artificers'⁵, which led Pauli to believe that it was unfinished, may surely refer, not to a projected continuation, but to the third treatise itself, which is largely concerned with 'artificiality'. Pauli's objection appears hardly more valid when applied to the concluding section. This treats of the printing trade, a subject which would naturally appear to Pauli, who did not know of Armstrong's long association with John Rastell, to lie outside his limited range and thus to reveal a different author; whereas in the light of that association it is not surprising that Armstrong should have included printing within his purview. It is not, therefore, the change of subject, nor any marked difference of outlook or style, which casts doubt on his authorship of these pages. It is their opening sentence which is the stumbling-block:

Where as there was a commawndement came downe from the kynges most honorable counsell 10 or 12 wekes past to all prynters, that they should prynt no maner of new thyng, onlesse it be sene of those, which know what is necessary to be comen among the kynges subiectes, the which is nedfull to be observeyde.⁶

If this is an allusion to the proclamation of 16 November 1538,⁷ which appears to be the only known example of the imposition of such a censorship during the 1530's, this passage must have been written about the end of January 1539 and cannot be by Clement Armstrong, who died in 1536.⁸ Unfortunately, this part of

¹ Pauli gives no references, but the documents in question are readily identified. The 'stout volume' is the volume of 363 pages calendared as a 'volume containing a number of treatises of Clement Ormstrong or Urmostrong on matters relating to the common weal', and the anonymous letter precedes it in the Calendar, which confirms Pauli's view that it was addressed by Armstrong to Cromwell (*L.P.* vii, 1689, 1690). Of the three treatises, the first is briefly noticed, and the second and third are fully epitomized, in the two *Addenda* volumes (i, 975; ii, 470, 471).

² I have to thank Mr Charles Drew of the Public Record Office for this information.

³ The resemblance between the passages in the two treatises about the stretching of cloth (Pauli, *op. cit.* pp. 42, 65; *Tudor Economic Documents*, iii, 114, 118-19) and about the Hanse (Pauli, *op. cit.* pp. 36, 77; *Tudor Economic Documents*, iii, 108, 129) seem almost conclusive on this point.

⁴ Pauli, *op. cit.* pp. 54, 62-3.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 57.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 58.

⁷ *L.P.* xiii, ii, 848. The proclamation is discussed in Dr A. W. Pollard's *Shakespeare's Fight with the Pirates* (1920), pp. 5-7, and in Professor A. W. Reed's 'The Regulation of the Book Trade before the Proclamation of 1538', in *Trans. Bibliog. Soc.* xv, 177 ff.

⁸ It was probably for this reason that the editor of *L.P. Addenda* assigned this and the third treatise to 1538, by which year he knew from *L.P.* xiii, ii, 734 (13) that Armstrong was dead.

the treatise contains no other allusion precise enough to furnish a check on its date.¹ The difficulty of attributing the later part of this treatise to Armstrong, coupled with the strong probability that he did write the remainder, suggests that the whole may not be a homogeneous production, a suggestion which is supported by the perceptible break in continuity between the two parts. In this view the document as it stands might be the work of someone who copied all or part of one of Armstrong's treatises within two or three years of his death, and added to it some remarks of his own on the printing-trade. Pending a re-examination of all Armstrong's work, which might yield a simpler solution, this suggestion seems to put the least strain upon the evidence.

If the first and third treatises present no similar problem of authorship, their dating raises questions which Pauli was not wholly successful in solving. The first he was unable to date more precisely than between 1519 and 1536,² but the third he confidently ascribed to 1535 or 1536 on the ground that its opening clause, 'Our sovereign lorde the king of Englonde, firste considering, in what welth the body of his realme was abought 27 yeres passed', must refer to the accession of Henry VIII.³ These suggestions were followed by Tawney and Power,⁴ and so far as I know have never been questioned.

Pauli thought that the first treatise might have been written as early as 1519 by reason of its allusions to Sir John Crosby, to Charles V and to Evil May Day, 1517. The first of these must be dismissed outright, since Pauli's deduction from it rested upon an obvious misconstruction of the passage,⁵ and neither of the two references to the Emperor can be made to prove more than that the treatise was written between 1519 and 1555.⁶ Lastly, Pauli's inference from the description of Evil May Day that this was a recent event does not carry much weight, for the memory of that day must long have remained fresh in the minds of Londoners,⁷ among them probably Armstrong himself. Had he not been misled by these allusions, Pauli would undoubtedly have assigned this treatise to the 1530's; but beyond the suggestion that the omission of any reference to the Pilgrimage of Grace argues for a date earlier than the autumn of 1536, he could not give more precise indication within that decade.⁸ With regard to the third treatise, if the convenient '27' used in the opening sentence be taken for granted, it is hardly possible to dispute Pauli's inference from it, although the contrast between the wealth of the country at Henry VIII's accession and its 'feble, week and power' condition after twenty-seven years of his government seems rather tactless. But in truth our author was guilty of no such solecism. It was not with the England of 27 but of 140 years before that his

¹ The writer's remark that he understands the Bible is to be printed abroad (Pauli, *op. cit.* p. 59), if it refers to Whitchurch and Grafton's Paris enterprise, would favour the later date (although it is strange that anyone discussing the matter in January 1539 should appear ignorant of the interruption of the work in Paris in December 1538 and its hasty transference to England); but such a remark might have been made at almost any time during the 1530's, as could the statement that books printed abroad during the last eight or ten years had done much to enlighten the people (*ibid.* p. 58).

² *Ibid.* p. 8.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 12, 60 n. 2.

⁴ They date the first treatise c. 1519-35 and the third c. 1535-6.

⁵ Pauli read it as follows: 'Crosby, that bilded his howse at Seynt Elens, was ane of the first that adventurid into Spayn so as upon a fourty four yere ago. Spayn was callid a farre adventure...'; and since his accompanying footnote mentions that Crosby died in 1475, he presumably arrived at 1519 by adding 44 to 1475. But it is clear that the passage should read: 'Crosby... was ane of the first that adventurid into Spayn, so as upon a fourty four yere ago Spayn was callid a farre adventure...', as it appears in *Tudor Economic Documents*, III, 92, and this makes Pauli's addition meaningless.

⁶ Pauli, *op. cit.* pp. 17, 18.

⁷ For illustration of this, see R. R. Sharpe, *London and the Kingdom* (1894), I, 359-60.

⁸ Pauli, *op. cit.* p. 8.

opening sentence invited comparison.¹ What Armstrong actually wrote was ^{xx}_{vij}, a common form of multiple which Pauli, adding instead of multiplying, converted into 27. (Later on in the treatise he read ^{xx}_{iiij} as 124 instead of 180.)² Pauli's deduction that the treatise dates from 1535 or 1536 therefore falls to the ground, although, as we shall see, it had given him very nearly the right answer.

In attempting a more accurate dating of both treatises we may notice at the outset that they must date from before 4 May 1536, the day on which Armstrong's will was proved,³ although this does little more than confirm the conclusion reached by Pauli upon other grounds. But a much more important clue is furnished by the following passage in the unsigned letter which Pauli and the Calendar agree was addressed by Armstrong to Cromwell:

And wher I delyvered two boke to your Mastership before Alhalloutide last past, in which apperith somewhat of the destruction of the comen weale of the realme and somewhat of the remedy, and wher I profered my servyce to your Mastership to be in your howse with the help of a faire writer to sett forthe the knowledge of all thynges, apperteynyng to the right order of comen weale, whan your mastershipp provysed [promysed⁴] I shuld so doo. And for not so doying I desired of yow three daies before Cristymes to have the said two boke, that I myght have wroten in theym many moo thynges apperteynyng to the right order of comen weale, which ye yitt know not. And the last yere in the meane tyme, whan I occupied my mynde abowt such thynges, I have been robbid by a false felow, whome I toke to be my servaunt and putt hym in speciall trust to overseer the werkmanshipp of a wode sale, which I bought of the busshopp of Wynchester beyend Wyndsores, and delyvered to hym at dyvers tymes the some of 363 L. to pay all the charges therof, wheras after the Cristymes I callid hym sodenly to make his accownt. And so he hath made a boke of his accownt, wherin he confessith hym self, he hath receyvid the seid 363 L. and chargith hymself with all the stuff, which he hath made therwith.

The Calendar assigns this letter to 1534; but since it can be established that Armstrong's servant delivered the account here mentioned shortly after Christmas 1535,⁵ the letter must in fact date from the beginning of 1536.

Thus it was shortly before 1 November 1535 that Armstrong delivered to Cromwell his two books on the commonweal and offered his services as economic adviser. (It is probable that this took place at Stepney, where Cromwell spent

¹ *L.P. Addenda*, I, ii, 471.

² Pauli, *op. cit.* pp. 60, 64; *Tudor Economic Documents*, III, 115, 117. I am indebted to Mr Charles Drew for the information how these figures appear in the MS.

³ See below, p. 73.

⁴ 'Promised' in *L.P.*

This statement rests on the identification of the 'boke of his accownt' which Armstrong in the letter mentions having received from his servant (whose name he gives as Weders) with the following item appearing in *L.P.* ix, 495: '30 Sept. 1535. A statement of expense by John Wethers, servant to Mr Clement Armyston of London, grocer, in felling and cutting timber and carrying it from Pyllingbery Wood to Water Okeley between 25 Hen. VIII and 30 Sept. 27 Hen. VIII'. The identity of the servant's name, coupled with the fact that Pyllingbery (modern Billingbear), lying some eight miles west of Windsor, had long formed part of the estates of the Bishop of Winchester (see *Rot. Hund.* I, 10, 12; *Registrum Johannis de Pontissara Episcopi Wyntoniensis*, ed. C. Deedes, Cant. and York Soc. (1915-24), p. 421; and A. E. Levett, *The Black Death on the Estates of the See of Winchester* (Oxford, 1916), pp. 27, 48, 86 n. 2. Billingbear was one of the manors granted by Bishop John Ponet to the Crown on 4 June 1551, and regranted by the Crown to Bishop John White on 3 June 1558. (*Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1550-3, p. 178; 1557-8, p. 147) leaves no room for doubt that this is the timber-deal mentioned in the letter, or that Wethers's statement is the 'boke of his accownt' which he delivered to Armstrong 'after the Cristymes'. Since, moreover, Armstrong states in the letter that Wethers's fraud occurred 'the last yere', and Wethers's account is made up to the end of September 1535, the account must have been delivered shortly after Christmas 1535.

part of the month of October.¹) His subsequent request for the return of the two books in order to write more in them suggests that he was using the word in its modern sense of bound volumes, and not in the sense of separate treatises. One such volume has survived, the volume of sermons and declarations; the other, from which the three separate treatises may have been copied, has disappeared. Perhaps Armstrong did succeed in recovering this one and so denied it the safe custody which has preserved its fellow. Armstrong had not long to live when he sent this letter to Cromwell, so that most, if not all, of his writing was probably done before the end of 1535; and since it is equally likely that he did not begin writing until about 1533,² it is to within this period of two or three years that we can confidently assign the production of the first and third treatises. More closely than that we cannot at present narrow the limits, although we might hazard a guess that the group of economic writings to which they belong is of later origin than those on politico-religious topics.

One result of the closer dating of these two treatises is that their various allusions to the past gain in chronological precision. Without attaching too literal a significance to the dates thus obtained,³ we may say that their general agreement, where they can be tested, with what is otherwise known not only endorses the suggested dating of the treatises but also testifies to the reliability of the author's memory or sources of information. Most noteworthy, perhaps, is his view of the closing years of the fourteenth century as a time of prosperity, a view supported by recent study of the customs accounts of that period.⁴ Again, when he recommends an inquiry into the price of wool 180 years ago, that is, about 1354, it is reasonable to suppose, in view of his declared hostility to the Calais staple, that he has in mind the Ordinance of 1353; he is, in any case, choosing the years in which the export of wool reached its maximum.⁵

Two of these allusions have to do with the movement of prices. Armstrong illustrates the rise in grocery prices by giving a list of these 'not thirty years ago', say in the decade 1505-15. His prices are all much lower than those collected by Rogers for these years, the difference in some cases being as much as 100 or 150 per cent.⁶ It may, of course, have been the wholesale prices which Armstrong is remembering here, although he states them in retail terms. Then again, with scarcely an exception, Rogers's prices relate to the provinces, where spices may have been dearer than in London. But Armstrong's conclusion that spice prices are now '3 parte more derer' than they were then, where Rogers's figures show them to have scarcely doubled, suggests that he was guilty of some exaggeration. The same criticism would apply to his assertion that the price of wool had doubled in the sixty years since 1474.

It would be of little value to confirm Armstrong's authorship of the first and

¹ *L.P.* ix, 615, 662; R. B. Merriman, *Life and Letters of Thomas Cromwell* (Oxford, 1902), II, 280.

² See below, p. 71.

³ The chief of these are as follows: in the first treatise, 'so as upon a fourty four yere ago Spain was callid a farre adventure' relates to about 1490; 'and about a thirty six yere agoe was first occupieing to Turkye, Scio, and to all thos partes', to about 1498; the price of various groceries 'not 30th yere agoe' to sometime after 1504; and 'abowt a fourteen yers past was but a sleyt fantasy devised in Kent' to about 1520; and in the third treatise, the opening sentence (quoted above, p. 66) refers to about 1390-1400; 'what prices all sortes of woles bought and sold in Englonde but 180 yeres passed' to about 1354; and 'that all sortes of wolles in Englonde may be bought and solde for half price now like as they were but 60 yeres paste' to about 1474. (Pauli, *op. cit.* pp. 17-18, 31-2, 60, 64, 70; *Tudor Economic Documents*, III, 92, 105, 115, 117, 123.)

⁴ H. L. Gray, 'The Production and Exportation of English Woollens in the Fourteenth Century', *English Historical Review*, xxxix, 13-35, especially pp. 26 ff.

⁵ Miss A. Beardwood's table of wool exports 1350-1375/6 (*Alien Merchants in England, 1350-1377* (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), p. 160) gives a record figure of 44,501 sacks for the year 1353-4.

⁶ J. E. Thorold Rogers, *History of Agriculture and Prices* (Oxford, 1866-1902), III, 521-2, 533-4; IV, 656 ff.

third treatises and to suggest what share he may have had in the second unless it were possible to add something about the author. If Pauli found no trace of Armstrong in contemporary documents, it must have been because he did not recognize other forms of the name, notably Armeston, Ormeston and Urmeston. From the fact that both in the entry of his admission to the freedom of the Grocers' Company and in his will his name is spelt Armeston it might be inferred that this was the form he habitually used; in the *Letters and Papers*, however, he is more often Urmeston. Only once does he appear as Armstrong, in the near-contemporary title of the volume of sermons; but it was from this that Pauli took the name.¹

The earliest fact which can at present be established about Armstrong is that he was admitted a freeman of the Grocers' Company in 1502, having served his apprenticeship with Thomas Hardy.² His membership of that company does not appear, however, to have played much part in his career. He did not rise to office in it, and if, as the reference in the first treatise to grocery prices after about 1504 suggests, he for a time followed the grocer's trade, he later forsook it for another. Nor has his membership left much trace in his writings. The criticism of the haberdashers voiced in the first treatise³ is reminiscent of the traditional feud between them and the grocers, and one or two references elsewhere reflect an interest in the grocers' early history,⁴ but these are the only hints of the author's company allegiance. In an ordinance of 1496 the grocers had laid it down that apprentices should not be presented to the freedom before the age of 25 or 26,⁵ so that Armstrong was probably born about 1477. The date is of importance because of its bearing on the problem of his parentage. We are tempted to seek his father among the several Ormestons in the London mercantile community at the close of the fifteenth century, and especially in Ralph Ormeston the elder, mercer and stapler.⁶ First appearing in the mercers' records in 1475, Ralph Ormeston was for some years a leading liveryman and in 1493 became a warden.⁷ His will is dated 1 February 1496 and was proved a fortnight later. He directed that he should be buried in the Lady Chapel of St Michael Bassishaw (of which he had been churchwarden⁸) and left five shillings for oblations; the residue he bequeathed to his wife Joan to dispose of among their children, whom, by a regrettable omission, he did not name. Two points favour the supposition that Clement Armstrong was one of these children. If he had been born about 1477 he would still have been a minor in 1496, which might explain the omission of his name. More important, we know that his mother's name was Joan. She was born Joan Middleton and was

¹ Dr A. F. Pollard, whose recent reference to Armstrong is mentioned below (p. 70), and Professor A. W. Reed, who mentions him in connexion with John Rastell in his *Early Tudor Drama* (1926), pp. 13, 26, are the only authorities I have met with who recognize the same man beneath the different names.

² Modern MS. Index of Freemen of the Company, 1345-1645. I gratefully acknowledge the courtesy of Mr L. Hickman Barnes, Clerk of the Company, and of Mr W. T. Barton, its Beadle, in allowing me to consult this volume and in answering my questions. The Company's records, which might throw more light on Armstrong's parentage and early life, are not accessible during the war.

³ Pauli, *op. cit.* p. 39; *Tudor Economic Documents*, III, III.

⁴ For example, the reference to John Donote, the foreign 'peperer' buried in Austin Friars. Pauli, *op. cit.* pp. 47-8.

⁵ S. Thrupp, 'The Grocers of London, A Study of Distributive Trade', in *Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Eileen Power and M. M. Postan (1933), p. 255.

⁶ See his will, P.C.C. 8 Horne.

⁷ *Acts of Court of the Mercers' Company, 1453-1527*, ed. L. Lyell and F. D. Watney (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 90, 147, 184, 191, 244, 291, 572-93 *passim*.

⁸ *Calendar of Letter Books of the City of London. Letter Book L*, ed. R. R. Sharpe (1912), p. 189 (11 Dec. 1481).

probably of Suffolk origin, for she brought with her the land in South Elmham in that county which Clement inherited, brought a Chancery suit about (whence appears his mother's name and lineage)¹ and finally bequeathed to his wife. On his mother's side his ancestry seems to have lain in the small-farming stock of East Anglia, which may help to explain his later preoccupation with the agrarian problem. But it would be far more significant if Ralph Ormeston had been his father, for then his description of the mechanism of foreign trade and especially of the changes of the previous half-century could be held to reflect, not the spontaneous yet perhaps ill-informed interest of the inquiring layman, but an interest rooted in family tradition and fed by first-hand knowledge. His father's death while he was still under age need not have interrupted this part of his education, for there were other Ormestons, notably Ralph the younger, who witnessed the will of 1496 and died in 1504,² and his brother Thomas, probably the Thomas Ormeston included in a list of staplers in 1505,³ with whom he could have continued it.

Among contemporary Ormestons there are two with whom it would be interesting, in view of his writings, to connect Clement. One is Robert Ormeston, under-clerk of parliament from 1515 to about 1547, whose career Dr A. F. Pollard has recently elucidated.⁴ Robert Ormeston's parentage seems as difficult to establish as Clement's, but the influential connexions which he early enjoyed certainly tell against a close relationship between them. If, however, their relationship could be established, it would give added point to Clement's realistic criticism, especially in the third treatise, of the personnel of the 'common howse' of the Reformation Parliament.⁵ In the same way, his attack on the London clergy,⁶ while it probably does no more than voice the prevailing opinion of Londoners, would gain in interest if the John Ormeston who was perpetual curate of St Botolph, Aldgate, from 1525 (?) to his death in 1543⁷ belonged to the family.

Apart from these genealogical hints the treatises themselves leave little doubt that Armstrong was born and bred in London or that he spent most of his life there. But between 1502 and 1516, when he reappears as a provider of building materials for royal establishments,⁸ nothing is known of him. From 1516, however, his business career can be followed in the *Letters and Papers*. In the spring of 1520 he was engaged on the buildings at the Field of the Cloth of Gold, his principal task being the garnishing of the roofs;⁹ he had previously carried out similar work for the Duke of Suffolk.¹⁰ It is at Guisnes that he is first mentioned in association with John Rastell.¹¹ As this was Rastell's earliest engagement with the royal household, the association probably originated there. In 1527 they again worked together at Greenwich on the occasion of the French ambassadors' visit; Rastell devised the pageant and Armstrong provided fur-

¹ P.R.O. List of *Early Chancery Proceedings*, IV, 114.

² See his will, P.C.C. 20 Holgrave.

³ *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1494-1509, p. 449.

⁴ 'The Under-Clerks and the Commons' Journals (1509-1558)', in *Bull. Inst. Hist. Research*, xvi, 145-50. This article includes a footnote on Clement Armstrong, p. 150, n. 3, which gives the first summary account of his career, and which was the starting-point of my own inquiries about him.

⁵ Pauli, *op. cit.* pp. 68-9; *Tudor Economic Documents*, III, 121-2.

⁶ *L.P.* VIII, 453. See below, p. 71.

⁷ G. Hennessy, *Novum Repertorium Ecclesiasticum Parochiale Londinense* (1898), pp. 106, 393. A Gilbert Ormeston had been rector of St Leonard, Foster Lane, from 1493 till his death the following year. *Ibid.* p. 127.

⁸ *L.P.* II.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* III, i, 750.

⁹ *L.P.* III, i, 737, 750, 825-6; III, II, p. 1540.

¹¹ The fullest account of Rastell's career is given by Professor A. W. Reed, in his *Early Tudor Drama*, chap. I and appendices i-viii.

nishings for the banqueting hall.¹ Armstrong's next recorded engagements were at two of Wolsey's houses, Esher and York Place, for which, after joining others in 'exclamation' at non-payment, he was paid in May 1530.² His last contract with the royal household appears to have been for garnishing the roof and other decoration of the new gallery at Westminster Palace in 1532.³

So far the only unusual feature of Armstrong's career is his exchange of grocery for high-class interior decorating; there is certainly nothing to explain the much more striking metamorphosis which he was to undergo in his closing years. But an elderly business man of indifferent education and few literary gifts does not neglect his trade and devote himself to the writing of tracts for the times unless moved to it by some strong emotion. Whence sprang the impulse which turned Clement Armstrong, citizen and roof garnisher, into Clement Armstrong, social critic and pamphleteer, is a question not to be answered out of the state papers, but it is reasonable to suppose that religion had something to do with the transformation. Writing early in 1536 Armstrong said that he had been Cromwell's 'servaunt in my mynd this three yers taking tyme labour and payne to help to sett forth the knoledge of the right order of comen weale of all peple in the realme'.⁴ This suggests that he had begun his ponderings and writings about the beginning of 1533; the fact that some of his 'sermons and declarations' appear to have been written before the divorce of Queen Catherine was pronounced⁵ supports such a date, and his appointment of Wethers to take charge of the timber clearance at Billingbear later the same year may mean that he was warming to his task. While some of the items in this volume deal with the divorce and related issues, others appear to be economic in character. If any link were needed between the two interests it might well have been provided by the London tithe question, which called forth a four-page tract from him.⁶ With its proposal that in place of the current rate of 14*d.* a noble the London clergy should receive twenty marks a year, raised by a 2*s.* rate, this tract can hardly have been written after the award, made shortly before Easter 1534, authorising a rate of 2*s.* 9*d.* in the pound.⁷

If the tithe dispute appears a subject after Armstrong's own heart, it was also of burning interest to his former colleague, John Rastell, and so forms one of the points of contact between the two men during their last years. During these years Armstrong seems to have followed where Rastell led. Rastell had become a client of Cromwell's as early as 1532.⁸ Although Armstrong later claimed to have become Cromwell's 'servant in mind' about the same time, there is nothing to show that he made any advances in that direction before the autumn of 1535; on the contrary, the fact that when he wrote to Cromwell early in 1536 Wriothesley, the Secretary's clerk, did not know from whom the letter came⁹ suggests that he was still an unfamiliar figure in the Cromwell entourage. Was he, then, acting on his own initiative when he thus brought his work to Cromwell's notice, or did Rastell act as his sponsor?

This depends upon whether Rastell was still in a position to do so. If his three well-known letters to Cromwell, which different authorities have assigned to 1534 and 1536,¹⁰ were in fact written, as seems more likely, in the autumn or

¹ *L.P.* iv, ii, p. 1395; Reed, *op. cit.* pp. 17-20.

² *L.P.* iv, iii, 6390.

³ *Ibid.* v, p. 448.

⁴ Pauli, *op. cit.* p. 48.

⁵ *L.P.* vii, 1689.

⁶ *L.P.* viii, 453.

⁷ *L.P.* suggests 'a year or two' before 1535, the date under which the tract is calendared. The award of 1534 is calendared in *L.P.* vii, 425, and the proclamation on the subject a year later in viii, 453 (2).

⁸ Reed, *op. cit.* p. 22.

⁹ Wriothesley endorsed it: 'A letter to my master, I cannot tell from whom.' *L.P.* vii, 1689.

¹⁰ In *L.P.* they are calendared under 1534 (vii, 1071-3); the *D.N.B.*, following H. Ellis, *Original Letters Illustrative of English History* (1825-46), 3rd series, II, 309, adopts 1536.

early winter of 1535,¹ then they and the unsigned set of notes on the reformation of the church which Professor Reed has shown to be in his hand² would provide a most appropriate setting for this episode in Armstrong's literary career. The notes would be of particular interest in this connexion as they include suggestions for pamphlets against celibacy, images and the efficacy of prayers for the dead, to be printed before parliament meets, and a list of five bills on these subjects and on legal reforms, to be drafted against that meeting. (The session of parliament envisaged here would be the session announced for 3 November 1535, but postponed until 4 February 1536 on account of plague.) If Rastell were still active in preparing government propaganda in the autumn of 1535, then it is indeed probable that he had a share in bringing Armstrong's 'two books' to Cromwell's notice that October. He may even have recommended them as containing likely 'copy' either for the pamphlets which he had in view or for the sermons he wanted to have printed and circulated to the clergy for compulsory use on Sundays.³ The 'Examinat' written in a contemporary hand (but not Armstrong's) against one of the items in the volume of sermons and declarations⁴ presumably means that someone gave it an official reading, possibly with an eye to its publication.

But it was not only the 'two books' he had already written that Armstrong offered to Cromwell, it was also his services as a diagnostician of the country's ills who, received into Cromwell's household and given the help of a 'faire writer' (did Armstrong recognize his own shortcomings?), would 'sett forthe the knowledge of all thynges, apperteynyng to the right order of comen weale'. This offer was either declined or ignored, and shortly before Christmas 1535 Armstrong asked for his two books to be returned so that he could continue his writing. This request passing unheeded, he wrote the letter quoted above. As it was about this time that he made his will (13 January 1536),⁵ he was perhaps already a sick man. The will is disappointingly meagre. Armstrong bequeathed all his property, including his lands in Poplar, in the parish of Stepney, where presumably he had his home, and in Suffolk to his wife Joan; he mentions no children. He appointed his wife executrix and Sir Thomas Spert, clerk of the king's ships and a neighbour of his in Stepney,⁶ overseer of his will. There were three witnesses: William Carkeke, scrivener, who doubtless wrote the will, Thomas Gybson, grocer, and John Lowde. The dates of the will, 13 January,

¹ Only one of the letters bears a date (17 August), but their internal evidence suggests that they were written within a short time of one another. The fact that Rastell was dead by 25 June 1536 makes it impossible that the first, and improbable that the others, should belong to that year. The only other possibilities are 1534 and 1535, for all three letters are addressed to Cromwell as Secretary. The chief objection to 1534 is that in the third letter Rastell says that he has spent four or five years compiling books supporting the king against the Pope, and that over the same period he has leaned more towards Cromwell than to any other councillor, two claims which he could hardly make in 1534 seeing that he had been championing the old faith in his controversy with John Frith as late as the end of 1532 and that his change of allegiance from More to Cromwell seems to have taken place at about the same time. This objection would have less force if the letters had been written in 1535. As Stephen Vaughan was in London in August and September of that year (*L.P.* ix, 154, 275, 330), the second letter's reference to him may be a point in its favour; but if this letter does belong to 1535, Rastell's remark about departing to the court again seems to point to its having been written later than August, when Cromwell was in attendance on the king, possibly not before the middle of October, when he was at Stepney (*L.P.* ix, 615).

² *L.P.* vii, 1043; Reed, *op. cit.* p. 24.

³ Reed, *op. cit.* p. 25 and n. 2. Professor Reed also hints at a connexion between Armstrong's sermons and Rastell's proposal.

⁴ I owe this piece of information to Mr R. L. Atkinson.

⁵ P.C.C. 36 Hogen.

⁶ He has a monument in St Dunstan's, Stepney. (M. Oppenheim, *History of the Administration of the Navy* (1896), p. 84.)

and of probate, 4 May 1536, are the nearest we can get to the date of Armstrong's death. As Rastell's executor reported his death on 25 June 1536, the two men died within a short time of one another. There is nothing to suggest, however, that Armstrong was involved in the trouble which caused Rastell to die a prisoner.

Their early accessibility in Pauli's edition has probably led economic historians to set a higher value on Armstrong's treatises than is warranted by their intrinsic merits. Even if it could be shown that parts of his work are entitled to more credit than has sometimes been given them, Armstrong would still compare unfavourably as an analyst of social problems with more famous members of the 'commonwealth school'. His writings are none the less worthy of a better edition than Pauli's, which, while it has done sixty years' service, leaves a good deal to be desired both in accuracy of transcription and in editorial comment. For Armstrong had something to say: and if he could not say it with More's art or Latimer's verve, that is because he was a more typical Englishman. Indeed, it might with some justice be claimed that in him Everyman was made ungracefully, yet sincerely, articulate.

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A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RADICAL

BY WILHELM SCHENK

AMONG the radicals of the Puritan Revolution moved an enigmatic figure: the London merchant and Leveller, William Walwyn. Contemporary accounts of him run into extremes of praise and blame. His enemies held him responsible for all the Levellers' alleged intentions against property and order, and denounced him as a most dangerous underminer of all religion. An anonymous pamphleteer compared him to Thomas Münzer, 'that Arch-Anabaptist', and Edwards, the author of *Gangraena*, called him a 'dangerous man, a stronghead'.¹ John Lilburne, on the other hand, referred to him as his 'most choice and honest Comrade and Fellow-sufferer' and as a man 'as able in parts, as any is in England', and Walwyn's son-in-law, the physician Dr Humphrey Brooke, praised the 'Innocency and reall Goodnesse that is so visible in his Life and conversation'.² Some modern historians have shown great interest in Walwyn, especially in his radical views on social problems. T. C. Pease believes that 'his part in the Leveller movement is easier underestimated than overestimated'. He regards him, together with other Levellers, as a forerunner of the Liberal Democrats and Rationalists of later days, and, therefore, as 'strangely modern' against the background of his age.³ This view is substantially shared by W. Haller, who calls Walwyn one of 'the first great democrats of modern times' and counts him among those who paved the way for 'political and economic individualism'.⁴ In view, therefore, of the interest which Walwyn has been able to arouse both among contemporaries and later historians,⁵ it may be worth while to inquire what manner of man he was. Perhaps we can discover on what grounds he based his social criticism; what, in fact, was in his mind when he was making his short appearance on the political stage.

William Walwyn was born in 1600, the second son of a Worcestershire country gentleman and the grandson of a bishop of Hereford.⁶ He was sent to London and apprenticed to a silkman in Paternoster Row. In due course he became a member of the Merchant Adventurers' Company and was able to maintain a large family 'from the profits of his Trade... in a middle and moderate but contentful condition'.⁷ In the Civil War he took the side of Parliament against what he thought to be 'arbitrary power'; to him, as to so many of his contemporaries, the Long Parliament seemed to usher in a new age and to fore-

¹ W. Kiffin and others, *Walwins Wiles* (1649); Anon., *Some Observations on the late dangerous Petition* (19 Sept. 1648), p. 25; *Gangraena*, I, 96.

² J. Lilburne, *Legall Fundamentall Liberties* (1649), p. 20; *Apologeticall Narration* (1652), p. 13; H. B. Med. (=Humphrey, not Henry, Brooke), *Charity of Churchmen* (1649), p. 1. For Brooke, cf. *D.N.B.* His family relation to Walwyn: H. Brooke, *The Durable Legacy* (1681), p. 115.

³ T. C. Pease, *The Leveller Movement* (1916), pp. 253, 217.

⁴ W. Haller, *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution* (New York, 1934), I, 28, 88. Cf. also A. S. P. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty* (1938), Introduction, p. 55.

⁵ W. K. Jordan calls him 'one of the most interesting and stimulating of the numerous lay thinkers of the age' (*The Development of Religious Toleration*, IV (1940), 181).

⁶ Cf. the pedigree and the coat of arms of his family in *Visitation of the County of Worcester, 1682-83*, ed. W. C. Metcalfe (Exeter, 1883), p. 100. (Mr G. Parsloe of the Institute of Historical Research kindly drew my attention to this pedigree.) His elder brother Herbert, who became an M.A. of Lincoln College, Oxford, was described as 'armiger' in the University Register (Foster, *Alumni Oxonienses*). Walwyn's father, it was stated, was worth £300-400 p.a. (Brooke, *Charity*, p. 10.)

⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 10, 11.

shadow the removal of all grievances.¹ When these hopes were not fulfilled disappointment was all the keener. After 1645 Walwyn became increasingly connected with those who attacked Parliament for not having persisted in the work of political, religious and social reform. By March 1647 he had become so prominent among the Levellers (as they came to be called in the course of that year) that he drew up their petition, which Parliament ordered to be burnt by the hangman.² He also seems to have had a share in the important liaison work between the London Levellers and the Army Agitators.³ When the second Agreement of the People was debated in November 1648, Walwyn was one of the four representatives of the Levellers until one of the Independents, who had 'a prejudice against him', forced his withdrawal.⁴ In March 1649 he was sent to the Tower together with Lilburne, Overton and Prince. The charge brought against him (his suspected authorship of *England's New Chains Discovered*) was probably not justified, but it seems that Cromwell was anxious to have the Leveller leaders under lock and key in view of the army mutinies then threatening. On 1 May 1649 the four imprisoned Leveller leaders jointly issued the final and most radical version of the Agreement of the People. After Lilburne's spectacular trial and acquittal Walwyn too was released, in November 1649, and here his active participation in politics seems to have practically come to an end.⁵ He may still have worked behind the scenes,⁶ for as late as 1659 James Harrington included him among the members of a suggested committee which was to discuss Harrington's proposition for 'a Commonwealth or Democracie'.⁷

Walwyn must have survived many of his friends and opponents: he died in 1680 at the age of 80. He did not, however, end his days as a merchant. It may be conjectured that the Merchant Adventurers retaliated in some way or other against a man who had asked Parliament to dissolve their 'oppressive company'.⁸ However that may be, Walwyn became what he chose to call a 'physician' and what amounted in practice to being an apothecary; he may have been helped in this by his son-in-law, Dr Brooke, who eventually became a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians in London. Walwyn advertised the principles guiding him in his new calling and the effectiveness of his medicines in a book called *Physick for Families* (published posthumously and perhaps commemoratively in 1681) which also contains the only picture we have of him. In this book he stated that he had tried some of his own remedies during the 'last great Mortality' (p. 144; if, as seems probable, this refers to the Great Plague of 1665 then he must already have adopted his new profession by that date. His last will suggests that in his later days he must have been fairly well off: he made four bequests of £200 each and left the rest to a son-in-law to whom he had also 'Communicated all his Secrets'.⁹

¹ *Petition* (1647), p. 2. Printed in Haller, *op. cit.* III. A list of Walwyn's writings will be found in Haller, I, 120. (Unless stated expressly, works quoted are by Walwyn.)

² For Walwyn's authorship, see Haller, *op. cit.* I, 116.

³ Brooke, *Charity*, p. 10; *Fountain of Slander* (1649), p. 17.

⁴ Woodhouse, *op. cit.* p. 343.

⁵ Apart from a pamphlet vindicating juries against Henry Robinson's attacks (1651), and a memorandum directed against the Levant Company (1652); (cf. M. James, *Social Problems and Policy during the Puritan Revolution* (1930), pp. 155-7).

⁶ Perhaps even in his native county: there was a group of 'Levellers' in Worcestershire as late as the 1670's. (*Victoria County History, Worcester*, IV, 192, 456; I am indebted for this reference to Professor R. H. Tawney, who kindly drew my attention to it.)

⁷ James Harrington, *A Proposition In Order to the Proposing of a Commonwealth or Democracie* (1659). The account of Walwyn in the *D.N.B.* ends in 1651.

⁸ *Petition* (1647), p. 5.

⁹ *Physick for Families*, Advertisement. The identity of Walwyn the Leveller and Walwyn the Physician can be established in the following way: We know from Walwyn the Leveller's writings that he was born in Newland (Worcs.) in the year 1600 (*Fountain*, pp. 1, 2). The parish

Although we have no account of Walwyn's education, it is clear from incidental references and from his writings generally that he was exceptionally well-read. He seems to have been in possession of a private library,¹ and he had accustomed himself 'to all kinds of good reading, and to the consideration of all things'. He also loved 'an honest and discoursing Friend'; it was, indeed, mainly to his Socratic powers of discussion that his enemies ascribed his evil influence on other people.² Small wonder then that this thoughtful and studious man came to share the interest in religion so strongly prevailing at this time. At some unknown date before 1640 he passed through a deep spiritual crisis during which he was apparently in grave doubts as to the possibility of his salvation, 'the Law and Gospel', as he put it, 'fighting for victory in me'.³ It was probably Luther's problem which troubled him: how could a constant violator of God's commandments be justified in His sight? After 'great uncertainty and at last extream affliction of mind' he arrived at an Antinomian interpretation of the Bible: the Old Testament had been invalidated by the New; the Law had lost its force through Grace. 'By the deeds of the law', he wrote, 'shall no flesh be justified', but, he went on, 'I am not a preacher of the law but of the gospell; nor are you under the law but under grace. . . . Yee are all justified freely . . . through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ'⁴ (Rom. iii, 20; vi, 14; iii, 24).

Having learnt the value of an independent inquiry in the search for truth he became a generous advocate of religious liberty, although he was not himself a member of a sect and remained in communion with his 'parochial congregation'.⁵ It should not be forgotten that all his pamphlets before 1647 have religious toleration for their main theme. 'Of all liberty,' he maintained, 'liberty of Conscience is the greatest: and where that is not a true Christian findeth none.'⁶ But this was not the only result of his newly found faith. He now felt 'a real thankfulness . . . towards Christ, which increased with the increasings of faith: insomuch as I set my self daily more and more to do his will: and that in a more publick way than formerly'.⁷ He evidently regarded his entry into politics as the carrying out of a religious duty. There was something, moreover, which he now felt an urge to proclaim: he had learnt to see the Gospel in a new light and he had thus rediscovered for himself certain aspects of the Christian religion which Protestantism in general and Puritanism in particular had tended to neglect.

Among these, the most outstanding was the teaching of what he called practical Christianity.⁸ God's love and goodness towards mankind should, he thought, engender a similar love and goodness among men: 'We should love as Christ hath loved, Who gave himself an Offering and a Sacrifice for us: so that

register of Newland notes the baptism of 'William Walweyne the sonne of Robt Walweyne gent' on 17 August 1600. (I owe this entry to the kindness of Canon F. E. Hutchinson.) Now in the family pedigree mentioned above, the entry for 'William, son of Robert, runs thus: 'William Walwyn of London, M.D., ob. circa 1680, mar. and had issue several dau's.' (The 'M.D.' is, I suggest, an excusable embellishment in the interests of family prestige.) The last will of Walwyn the Physician (now at Somerset House) is really dated 1680 and was proved on 14 January 1681 (New Style). Moreover, the picture in *Physick* (1681) bears the inscription: 'Aetatis suae 80', which tallies with the date of his birth if we assume that it refers to the year of his death, immediately preceding the publication of *Physick for Families*.

¹ Kiffin, *op. cit.* p. 9.

² *A Whisper in the Eare of Mr T. Edwards* (1646), printed in Haller, *op. cit.* iii, 3; *Fountain*, p. 22. Kiffin, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³ *Whisper*, p. 3.

⁴ *The Power of Love* (1643); printed in Haller, *op. cit.* ii, pp. 21, 20. There can be little doubt that Haller's ascription of this tract to Walwyn is correct.

⁵ *Whisper*, p. 5; Brooke, *Charity*, p. 11.

⁶ *A Word More to Mr T. Edwards* (1646), p. 5.

⁷ *Whisper*, p. 3.

⁸ *Fountain*, p. 1.

if we would try each other's Faith, we are to consider each other's love; so much faith, so much love; so much love, so much pure and undefiled Religion.'¹ On another occasion he wrote: 'If you would be esteemed a disciple of Christ, it must be knowne by love';² and then went on to quote at length from Paul's panegyric on Love (I Cor. xiii).

How were Christians to show their love to one another? There was, he believed, no lack of opportunity. 'He that hath this world's goods, and seeth his brother lack, how dwelleth the love of God in him? Judge then by this rule who are of God's family; looke about and you will finde in these woefull dayes thousands of miserable, distressed, starved, imprisoned Christians: see how pale and wan they looke: how coldly, raggedly, and unwholsomely they are cloathed. Live one weeke with them in their poore houses, lodge as they lodge, eate as they eate, and no oftener, and bee at the same passe to get that wretched food for a sickly wife and hunger-starved children; (if you dare doe this for feare of death or diseases) then walke abroad, and observe the generall plenty of all necessities, observe the gallant bravery of multitudes of men and women abounding in all things that can be imagined: observe likewise the innumerable numbers of those that have more than sufficeth.'³ It was the duty of Christians to relieve this poverty in the midst of plenty, and to 'help the distressed and any waies afflicted' was the 'intent and substantiall scope' of religion.⁴ In enumerating the works of practical Christianity he followed, of course, mainly the Gospel catalogue of Matthew xxv, 35, but made characteristic additions. Christians, he thought, 'should be employed to feed the hungry, cloath the naked, or in visiting the fatherlesse and widdow, or in delivering the Captive, and setting the oppressed free (all which are workes so fully and plainly set forth in Scripture, as most pleasing to God)'⁵ The nearest scripture parallels to 'delivering the Captive, and setting the oppressed free' are actually contained in Isaiah lviii, 6 and i, 17, and in Psalm lxxxii, 4, but it is clear that Walwyn considered these demands to be in perfect harmony with the spirit of the Gospel. He believed, indeed, that Christians could show their 'universal love to all mankind' by 'freeing a Commonwealth from all Tyrants, oppressors and deceivers'.⁶

Most of Walwyn's views on social and economic matters were derived from his conception of practical Christianity. In his imaginary sermon, *The Power of Love*, he answered the question: 'Would you have all things common?' by a reference to the communism of the Apostles (Acts ii, 44): 'You may remember the multitude of believers had all things common.'⁷ This practice of the early Christians was the effect of their 'Charity and heavenly mindednesse, which the blessed Apostles begot in them'. He added, however, that this arrangement among them had been 'Voluntary, not Coactive'; it was not an obligation laid on all Christians and could, therefore, only be reintroduced by 'universall assent thereunto from all and every one of the People'.⁸ Walwyn's enemies reported him as having said in private conversation 'that it would never be well untill all things were common, and it being replied, Will that ever be? Answered, We must endeavour it'.⁹ This may well represent his view fairly accurately: there

¹ *The Vanitie of the Present Churches* (1649), p. 30.

² *Whisper*, p. 9.

³ *Power of Love*, Preface.

⁴ *Vanitie*, p. 43.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 23.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 43.

⁷ *Power of Love*, Preface.

⁸ Lilburne, Walwyn, Prince and Overton, *A Manifestation of those unjustly styled Levellers* (1649). (The authors of *Walwins Wiles* believed that the *Manifestation* was written by Walwyn alone and Dr Brooke seems to have shared this view.)

⁹ Kiffin, *op. cit.* p. 16. Walwyn's apologist, Dr Brooke, had to admit that Walwyn had at times expressed communist views 'in heat of Discourse' (*Charity*, p. 2). Walwyn himself maintained that he was no more for 'Levelling' than could be deduced from his petition of 1647 (*Fountain*, p. 7), and thus subtly evaded the issue, as this petition, unlike other Leveller documents, did not deal with the question at all.

can be little doubt that he did think communism a desirable aim and that he said so at times, but he may not have regarded it as being within the range of contemporary politics. It should be noted, too, that he never defended the institution of private property in the manner of John Lilburne, who proclaimed that 'Levelling of propriety... would destroy... not only all industry in the world, but raze the very foundation of generation and of subsistence... of one man by another'.¹ It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the official Leveller rejection of communism was mainly due to Lilburne's influence.

Walwyn was at any rate strongly opposed to inequality of wealth. He did not refute the charge brought against him that he was 'very frequent and diligent in fomenting the consideration of the disproportion and inequality of the distribution of the things of this life. What an inequitable thing it is for one man to have thousands, and another want bread, and that the pleasure of God is, that all men should have enough, and not that one man should abound in this world's goods, spending it upon his lusts, and another man of far better deserts, not to be worth twopence.'² This is also borne out by Walwyn's attitude to the specific social evils and the economic changes of his time. 'Usury' seemed to him to be 'contrary to all example of the Apostles and first Christians', equivalent to a denial of God.³ Hardly less important was the enclosure problem, concerning which he did not deny having said that 'he could wish with all his heart that there was neither Pale, Hedg nor Ditch in the whole Nation'.⁴ As regards his attitude towards the poor we have already noticed his repeated emphasis on works of charity; accordingly he asked Parliament in his petition that they should 'provide some powerful means to keep men, women and children from begging and wickedness, that this nation may be no longer a shame to Christianity therein'.⁵ On another work of charity, the relief of prisoners, all the Leveller leaders, having first-hand experience in this matter, were very outspoken. Demanding redress, Walwyn wrote: 'Prison-keepers or gaolers are as presumptuous as ever they were both in receiving and detaining of prisoners illegally committed, [and are] as cruel and inhumane to all... as oppressive and extorting in their fees, and are attended with under-officers of such vile and unchristian demeanour as is most abominable.' Finally, we should mention Walwyn's concern for the reform of criminal law, of the law of contract with regard to both debtors and creditors; in short, of all laws which, he boldly proclaimed, ought to be reduced 'to the nearest agreement with Christianity'.⁶ An anonymous opponent of the 1647 petition drew particular attention to this phrase and ascribed to it a subtle meaning which would probably have eluded a modern reader. Behind the words 'the nearest agreement' he saw lurking the doctrine of Christian anarchy: 'as if Political Lawes could not quite agree... [with Christianity], or we be other than mongrell Christians while we retained any;' and in suggesting this he may not have been wide of the mark.⁷

We have said that the traditional social teaching of the churches (to some extent corresponding to Walwyn's 'practical Christianity') had tended to fall into neglect even amongst professing Christians. In England, as R. H. Tawney has shown, this was especially marked from the end of the sixteenth century onwards. Walwyn was fully aware of this change and its implications: 'Time was', he said, 'that it was otherwise in England...; but then Godliness was esteemed the greatest gain.' 'But our times, though we call them times of light,

¹ Lilburne, *Apologeticall Narration* (1652), p. 68.

² Kiffin, *op. cit.* p. 14.

³ Kiffin, *op. cit.* p. 16.

⁴ *Petition* (1647), Preface, pp. 5, 6.

⁵ Anon., *Some Observations*, p. 26. For supporting evidence concerning Christian anarchy, cf. below.

⁶ *Vanitie*, p. 25; *Fountain*, p. 5.

⁷ *Petition* (1647), p. 6.

yet do abound with gluttony, usury, pride, oppression, and all kinds of wickednesse.¹ He was heard to insist 'upon the unworthynesse of our times, in making riches and estates, and the things of this world, the great badge of distinction between man and man'.² This was evidently opposed to the practice of Christ, for 'were not the poor and unlearned Fishermen and Tent-makers... made choyce of for Christ's Disciples and Apostles?'.³ Moreover, it was not only the economic development and the acquisitive spirit of his time that Walwyn deplored. He maintained also that those of his contemporaries who regarded themselves, and were regarded by the world, as most religious, took a leading share in the growth of commercialism; he asserted, in fact, a connexion between the spirit of capitalism and Puritanism. The Independents, Walwyn found in 1649, 'are increased in numbers and have, as it were, scummed the Parish Congregations of most of their wealthy and zealous members'.⁴ He attacked the Puritans for their unchristian business practices and lack of charity, which compared unfavourably with those of non-Christians or even Catholics. He was, so we are told, 'ever and anon harping upon the hardheartednesse and uncharitableness of Professors... and those that are religious men, how grinding they are in bargains, how penurious, base and backward in works of charity and mercy, how undermining and overreaching they are in buying, in selling, how having and craving in the things of this life, ... how they let their brethren starve, and dye, and perish, rather than help them, and how bountifull, free and liberall the very Heathens have been, and how beneficiall even Papists, and many that doe not so much as pretend to Religion, are to the Poore'.⁵ 'Nay, so impudent are some of these proud boasting Churchers (who glory to follow precisely the pattern shewed in the mount) that contrary to all example of the Apostles and first Christians, they can content themselves to be known usurers, and those that are not such themselves, can allow it in their fellow-Members, their Pastors, Elders and Deacons can tolerate it'.⁶ The conclusion which Walwyn drew was bitter: 'Observe them well, and you shall see Christ and Belial, God and Mammon in one and the same person: Christ in shew, the other in reality'.⁷

Walwyn laid a great deal of responsibility for this state of affairs at the door of the ministers of religion whose interest it was, instead of promoting the common brotherhood of men, 'to make themselves a peculiar Tribe of a nearer relation to God than other men'. They were like the Pharisees of the Gospel; they 'love to sit uppermost at feasts, and to be revered in publicke places'.⁸ In order to keep and increase their dominion they had 'in processe of time... confounded... the cleare streames of the Scripture, and perverted the true Gospel of Jesus Christ, and by politicke Glosses and Comments introduced an other Gospell sutable to the covetous, ambitious, and persecuting spirit of the Clergie... They then began to scorne the simplicity and meannesse of the Apostles... and to engrosse great Livings, Lordships, Territories and Dominions'.⁹ Or, as Dr Brooke put it, 'upon the plain and innocent basis of the Christian Religion, instituted by him who thought fit to appear in the World as the Son of a Carpenter... hath been erected... a stately Scene of external pomp and splendor'.¹⁰ If one wanted to be a 'substantial Christian' one had to penetrate, beyond all these accretions, to the Scriptures, 'the only true infallible teacher of spiritual things in our time';¹¹ everything that was necessary 'either for the enlightning

¹ *Vanitie*, p. 19; *Power of Love*, p. 33.

² Kiffin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

³ *The Compassionate Samaritane* (1644); printed in Haller, *op. cit.* III, 33. Here again, I think, Haller's ascription can safely be followed.

⁴ *Vanitie*, p. 11.

⁵ Kiffin, *op. cit.* p. 13.

⁶ *Vanitie*, p. 25.

⁷ *Fountain*, p. 25.

⁸ *Samaritane*, pp. 27, 41.

⁹ *Vanitie*, pp. 33-4.

¹⁰ Brooke, *Legacy* (1681), p. 39.

¹¹ *Vanitie*, pp. 4, 42.

of our understandings, or the peace of our mindes'¹ was contained in God's Word.

This Christian primitivism is, of course, in one form or another, a common feature of Protestant thought, but in Walwyn's case it was linked with a wider primitivism derived from ancient and Renaissance sources, especially from Seneca, Lucian and Montaigne.² It is this, in fact, which constitutes the second main element of Walwyn's thought.

As a measuring rod for the social reality around him he used not only the ethics of Christianity but also the classical conception of the state of nature when man, 'judging rightly of all things, and desiring only what was necessary, and so being exempt from all labour, and care of obtaining things superfluous, . . . passed his dayes with abundance of delight and contentment'.³ The traditional description of this state of nature included communal ownership and the absence of law and government; communism and anarchy were among its outstanding features.⁴ It is more than likely that Walwyn was led to accept communism in this way, too, especially as Dr Brooke, who faithfully echoed Walwyn on most points, mentioned explicitly that 'in the world's infancy and innocency, there was no need of any reserves, every man's breast was and might safely be open to all: till propriety . . . made us all draw several wayes, and every man labour to fill his own Barn'.⁵ The problem of anarchy was raised by Walwyn's supposed answer to a suggestion that communism would destroy all government. He is reported to have said 'that there would be less need of Government, for then there would be no thieves, no covetous persons, no deceiving and abusing of one another. . . . But if in such a case they have a form and rule of government to determine cases, as may fall out, yet there will be no need of standing Officers in a Common Wealth. . . . Take a Cobler from his Seat, or a Butcher from his Shop, . . . and let him heare the case, and determine the same, and then betake himself to his work again'.⁶ It seems that this conception underlies the characteristic Leveller demand for annual local juries to decide all judicial cases arising in a particular district to the exclusion of all professional officials or lawyers.⁷ In Walwyn's mind this idea may have received additional support from his tendency towards Christian anarchy. Nothing, he thought, was more unchristian than 'mastery', and he reminded his readers of Christ's injunction to his followers that they should not 'propose dominion and the sway over . . . their Brethren'.⁸

In establishing this state of nature God had shown his love to mankind no less than in revealing the Scriptures, and Walwyn had to ask himself why this should not have been 'sufficient to keep mankind in order and the world in quiet'.⁹ The answer was grave but clear: the world had fallen from its state of integrity and the consequences were necessarily disastrous.¹⁰ Man lost his original state when he 'sought out unto himself many inventions. . . of superfluous subtilities

¹ *Power of Love*, p. 7.

² These authors are included in his reading list (quoted by Haller, *op. cit.* I, 39). He gives a clearly primitivistic reason for finding Lucian enjoyable: 'for his good ends in discovering the vanity of things in worldly esteem' (Haller, *loc. cit.*).

³ *Power of Love*, p. 3.

⁴ Cf. *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*, ed. A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas (1935).

⁵ Brooke, *Legacy*, p. 137.

⁶ Kiffin, *op. cit.* p. 16.

⁷ Cf. the final Agreement of the People (published by Lilburne, Walwyn, Prince and Overton on 1 May 1649): 'The people . . . shall chuse all their publicke Officers that are in any kinde to administer the Law for their respective places, for one whole year, and no longer, and so from year to year.'

⁸ *Whisper*, p. 6; *Samaritane*, p. 64.

⁹ *Fountain*, p. 1.

¹⁰ A. O. Lovejoy rightly emphasizes that primitivism, contrary to some modern interpretations of it, nearly always implies 'what may, in theological language, be called a Doctrine of the Fall' (*op. cit.* Introduction, p. 17).

and artificial things, which have been multiplied with the ages of the world'. Now everything has become 'totally corrupted: our first instructions, and all after discourses have beene indulgent flatterers to our darling superfluities'.¹ Here again it would be impossible to separate the secular from the religious: the 'superfluities', seen from another angle, were the 'unnecessary cares that choake the Word' (Matth. xiii. 22);² the world was opposed both to a natural life and to the Word; in Walwyn's mind the state of nature and the *status innocentiae*, Golden Age and Paradise, seem to have merged into one.

It would be a mistake to regard Walwyn's reference to the Golden Age as merely a literary echo. Together with Christian ethics it enabled him to see the things around him more sharply, and it was in its turn reinforced by acute observation. Most men, he found, were 'engaged in one kind of corrupt interest or other' and were 'meere worldlings'.³ He rarely failed to compare clergymen to those silversmiths of Ephesus who cried 'Great is Diana of the Ephesians', lest they should lose their trade.⁴ All their theological subtleties were entirely superfluous and used by them only to make men believe that the necessary doctrines were hard to understand.⁵ University men generally he accused of using their learning 'as an Art to deceive and abuse the understandings of men'.⁶ Politicians, however, he detested above all; they were 'Satan's chief Agents' and were necessarily bound up with corrupt interests, 'for a just course of life... needs no crafts or policies to support it'.⁷ In May 1649, he compiled an extensive catalogue of those who, dressed in a little brief authority, were opposing the Levellers and pursuing unnatural aims under the corrupting influence of power: 'Either he hath two or three offices or trusts upon him, by which he is enriched and made powerfull; or he hath an office in the excise, or customs; or is of some monopolizing company; or interested in the corruption of the laws; or is an encloser of fens, or other commons, or hath charge of publique monies in his hands, for which he would not willingly be accomptable; or hath kept some trust, authority or command in hand longer than commission and time intended; or being in power, hath done something that cannot well be answered; or that hath money upon usury in the excise; or that makes title of tythes, and the like burthenous grievances; or else such as have changed their principles with their condition; and of pleaders for liberty of Conscience, whilst they were under restraint, ... [have] now become persecutors, so soon as they are freed from disturbance; or some that have been projectors, still fearing an after-reckoning; or that have received gifts, or purchased the publicke lands at undervalues'.⁸

We have quoted this passage at such length to show how comprehensive was Walwyn's suspicion of the 'most active, prosperous and successful persons of the Nation',⁹ and how keen was his insight into contemporary affairs. Whatever view one may take of the men whom Walwyn attacked, it is certain that they were the principal sharers in the benefits of the Puritan Revolution. This, he thought, was unjust also in view of the fact that 'the great things that have been done for the Parliament, have been done by the meaner sort of men'.¹⁰ So far

¹ *Power of Love*, pp. 3, 12-13. It is perhaps worth noting that Walwyn uses the word 'natural' mainly in two senses: (1) sometimes as contrasted with 'supernatural' (e.g. 'very heathen and meere natural men', p. 5); (2) more often, as contrasted with 'artificial' or 'superfluous'.

² *Power of Love*, p. 7.

⁴ *Power of Love*, pp. 48-9.

⁶ *Power of Love*, p. 44.

⁸ *Fountain*, p. 22. For some of these points, cf. M. James, *op. cit.* and 'The Political Importance of the Tithes Controversy... 1640-60', *History*, N.S. xxvi; E. Hughes, 'The Development of Excise', in *Studies in Administration and Finance* (1934); C. Hill, 'The Agrarian Legislation of the Interregnum', *English Historical Review*, Lv.

⁹ *Kiffin, op. cit.* p. 15.

³ *Fountain*, p. 22; *Vanitie*, p. 25.

⁵ *Vanitie*, p. 21.

⁷ *Fountain*, pp. 25, 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 10.

from advancing the rich, a Commonwealth ought to use 'all friendliness... towards the meanest of the people especially'¹ (Walwyn's italics).

Enough has been said to illustrate Walwyn's radical criticism of contemporary society. He was, however, like some other primitivists, quite hopeful of mankind's ability to regain the state of nature. Natural things were, after all, 'ready at hand, or easily to be had'. They were, moreover, 'to be understood easily without study', and God had made man 'naturally a rational creature' so that he should be able to grasp them.² (Here it becomes obvious that Walwyn's conception of reason was closely bound up with his primitivism: it was a remnant of man's unfallen state, not a result of his progressive development.³) It was because of natural reason that even the 'very heathen and meere naturall men' arrived at a true idea of a life *secundum naturam*.⁴ But a Christian was helped in other ways as well to see the light. In addition to his conscience planted in him by God, he could rely on the Gospel, which was 'so sweet and delectable as cannot but be embraced, so certain as cannot be doubted, so powerfull to dissolve man into love'.⁵ Its necessary doctrines were few and could be easily taught, and by God's grace the 'meanest capacity' was fully capable of understanding them.⁶ Once these doctrines were properly preached 'people would soone... fall to practice' (Walwyn's italics). Walwyn was, in fact, like so many of his contemporaries, a believer in the approach of the millennium. He did not, indeed, anticipate the Second Coming of Christ, but he did expect the rule of practical Christianity on earth. Christian love in conjunction with human reason, so his equable temperament and the events of the 1640's made him believe, would heal the world's corruption.

These wider hopes did not, of course, prevent him from sharing many of the political doctrines of the other Levellers. He, too, believed that any power Parliament had was entrusted to it by the people, and that if this trust was broken the people were entitled to resume their power and to establish their fundamental rights by concluding an agreement among themselves.⁷ Like other Levellers, especially John Lilburne, he was certain 'that true Christians are of all men the most valiant defenders of the just liberties of their Country'.⁸ But it should be noted that Walwyn hardly ever appealed to Magna Carta, to the supposed Anglo-Saxon liberties or to the law of nature. In this respect he was quite unlike Lilburne, whose legal mind was dominated by these juristic conceptions. Bearing in mind Walwyn's thought as a whole, we cannot but conclude that it outran the 'Legall Fundamentall Liberties' and even the Agreement the People.

It is clear then that Walwyn derived his social radicalism mainly from two sources: from his interpretation of the Gospel and from classical primitivism. As to the latter, its tradition in England and its strength in the seventeenth century are still insufficiently explored. It could probably be shown that it underlies a good deal of social thought bound up with a certain conception of 'nature' (as implied, for example, in More's *Utopia*). In reading Seneca, Lucian and Montaigne, Walwyn was, of course, sharing a widespread contemporary

¹ *Fountain*, p. 18.

² *Power of Love*, pp. 2, 3.

³ Walwyn's 'rationalism' was further distinguished from that of a later age by his belief that 'things divine... could never have been perceived by the light of nature and reason' (*A Prediction of Mr Edwards His Conversion* (1646), p. 3; printed in Haller, *op. cit.* III) and that reason had to yield when it seemed to contradict the gospel (Brooke, *Charity*, p. 4).

⁴ *Power of Love*, p. 5. It is characteristic of Walwyn's medical practice that he relied on his medicines 'solely from their powerfull friendliness to Humane Nature'. He strongly deprecated such 'artificial' procedures as blood-letting or purging (*Physick*, pp. 4, 21, 29).

⁵ *Fountain*, pp. 1, 6.

⁶ *Vanitie*, p. 21; *Power of Love*, p. 7.

⁷ *Petition* (1647), pp. 1, 4; cf. his share in the various Agreements of the People.

⁸ *Power of Love*, p. 41.

taste. With regard to his practical Christianity the line of tradition is clearer. He could rely on widely accepted ideas embodied, for example, in the works of the Tudor preachers and moralists and their seventeenth-century successors. Condemnation of usury and enclosures, concern for the relief of the poor, emphasis on the works of Christian charity and profound suspicion of the growing commercialism were all contained in the works of these writers, who based themselves largely on the social teaching of the medieval church. With even more justification can we regard Walwyn as the heir of the Christian sect tradition, with its bitter attacks on the clergy, its claims of Christian equality and its denunciation of the unbrotherly social institutions of this world. This tradition may have reached him in various ways. He knew a good deal about the German Anabaptists of the sixteenth century and professed not to believe the books which had been written to discredit them.¹ He was also well acquainted with the sectaries of his own time, among whom these ideas were reappearing during the 1640's. And it should not be forgotten that this Christian radicalism had its firm roots in the Gospel. Walwyn clearly belonged to the long and distinguished line of those who had protested against the Christian compromise with the world and, latterly, against the growth of the 'acquisitive society'.

The reference to the sectarian tradition is relevant for yet another reason. Ernst Troeltsch has suggested that the medieval sects owed their picture of the millennium to the stoic doctrine of the state of nature which had been introduced into Christian thought by the early Fathers.² Whether Troeltsch is right or not (and his theory is still the subject of controversy) in Walwyn's case at any rate this combination takes place under our very eyes. It is an interesting example of a recurring feature of our history: of the successful blending of classical and Christian elements (to which Renaissance influences lent themselves more readily than some of their interpreters would lead one to believe).

All this complex background has to be borne in mind in discussing Walwyn as a 'forerunner' of later movements. He was an early democrat, communist or rationalist only to the limited extent that these later currents of thought owed something to earlier ideas. Their whole background, however, (the secularized world of the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century) is altogether so different from Walwyn's that it seems hardly justifiable to establish such a direct relationship. Nothing, in fact, is gained by removing William Walwyn from the context of the seventeenth century. There he serves to illustrate a significant feature of seventeenth-century civilization: that the two most powerful elements of its inheritance, Christianity and classical culture, provided at the same time the standards by which its shortcomings could be measured and condemned. In this way it was possible to create cultural values of all kinds and yet to be aware of the inescapable limitation of all human endeavour; an awareness which has since tended to diminish, and which may be a prerequisite of civilized life. Social radicalism such as Walwyn's could thus grow out of the strongest cultural roots of its age. Its material was, of course, furnished by the political and economic tensions of the time, but one should not underestimate the importance of the spirit informing it. When this spirit had disappeared, together with a great many complex traditions, there was to be no social radicalism for a considerable time, although combustible material in the realms of politics and economics was by no means lacking.

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¹ *Samaritane*, p. 66.

² E. Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1931), I, 328-30.

ESSAYS IN BIBLIOGRAPHY AND CRITICISM

II. IMPERIAL ECONOMICS¹

By J. H. CLAPHAM

PROFESSOR HANCOCK apologizes for work hurried by war. He is owed a counter-apology for a notice delayed by it. There was little need for his apology. At times, it is true, there are traces of that looseness of treatment, that over-fullness, which goes with hurry and with a structure based on drafts submitted to others for criticism and then revised. But these traces are only petty defects in a great piece of work. More serious (but this no doubt is also due to war) is a shortage of maps, especially African. The writer of this article is vain of his knowledge of African geography: he can place the Manganja, the Nyam-nyam and the Tuaregs; can discuss the desiccation of Ngami and the outlet problem of Tanganyika. But he cannot say how far 'south of the Benue' the 'vigorous Tiv people' dwell; (II, 261) he cannot—more discreditable—locate Baro from memory; (II, 220) and 'the career of Ja-Ja of Opobo', with which familiarity is assumed (II, 206, n. 1), is as dark to him as the site of Opobo is obscure.

A historian with economic equipment ample for every turn of his story, Professor Hancock feels called to express to economists of the narrow way regret for what may seem to them the story's slow, encumbered movement. As historian he may not 'foreshorten' it 'by leaving out emotions or interests or vulgar errors which are part of [the] . . . situations and therefore determinants of policy' (I, ix-x). To loose users of terms, he states, as an historian should and partisans will not, that 'imperialism is no word for a scholar' (I, 1). Turning again to the economists, he ends 'this book is historical work. It has reached its conclusions by recording an ideal of great potential force', that of 'the welfare of nations'. He prescribes no short cuts. Every kind of problem has to be solved before 'the ideal can make itself effective in history. Here is a challenge from an economic historian to economists' (II, 329). To a number of other types and castes also, one might add; priests clerical and lay, men of letters and all public talkers, ordinary prejudiced men in clubs and public-houses and snack-bars.

The historian shows himself best perhaps in Professor Hancock's 'perspective view' of 110 pages, with which Vol. I begins. This volume was written in 1937-8. War brought enforced modifications. India is left out. So are the West Indies and Malaya. The Survey, then, is of the Dominions and of Africa. Its author was born and has taught in a Dominion; has visited the other Dominions; and has travelled widely in Africa. He reminds us that (I, 4 n.) he had used the conception of the frontier of settlement in Australia before he had met that American 'frontier' literature which began with F. J. Turner; and he has things to say about Australia which a mere visitor could hardly have said. Looking backward, he touches cautiously on the land-frontier problem of medieval Germany and, most admirably, on the maritime frontier of trading

¹ W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*. Vol. II (2 parts). *Problems of Economic Policy*, 1918-39. (Oxford University Press. 1940 and 1942. pp. 324 and xii + 355, 15s. and 16s.)

A review of Part I of this Volume was published in this *Review* in 1941, before Part 2 had appeared. The present essay deals comprehensively with Professor Hancock's economic volume as a whole.

posts of medieval Venice, which had so much in common with the nineteenth-century 'traders' frontiers' of the British. Britain, like Venice, had aimed at an empire of trade. In emigration for empire she only believed at intervals or half-heartedly, as a Malthusian safety-valve. And yet what came of it all!

There are frontiers of traders, of missionaries and planters, of settlers, perhaps of investors. Adam Smith understood the economics of the frontier of settlement when he discussed the effects of free land in America (I, 41-6). The same imperialism which was his was also Shelburne's and Pitt's, but it was overborne. The 'mercantilist' policies 'of provision, of staple and of protection' survived until that 'episode of free trade' which colonial self-government soon closed.

While early nineteenth-century statesmen were for narrowing frontiers, missionaries were drawing theirs wide. (But were the New Zealand missionaries 'Calvinists'? (I, 60.) The Low Churchmen perhaps, the Methodists hardly. 'Calvinism' loosely used is like 'imperialism', 'no word for a scholar'.) The political merit of the missionary was that he believed in a world society of equal, if fallen spirits. This freed him of racial superstitions.

Professor Hancock's 'perspective view' moves next over nineteenth-century commercial policies—with a little too much List, whom few British subjects read: their 'Listism' was instinctive, not learned. Perhaps also a little too much Most Favoured Nation and Fair Trade, dead issues. So to the Dominions' tariff preferences for Britain; to Joseph Chamberlain and the Empire as it was thirty years ago. Last viewed in perspective are the wartime 'economics of siege' and that Dominions Royal Commission which 'did not doubt that this confederate Commonwealth was willing to pursue permanently... the power policy of a unitary empire' (pp. 103-4).

With the greedy dreams and myopic policies of 1918-20 Hancock deals severely, but not too severely, the ignorant advocacy of a self-sufficing empire; the element of humbug in the mandate system; the disastrous schemes for upholding monopoly prices of palm-kernels or of rubber. As believer in the welfare of nations, he dislikes self-contained empires; as economist he knows that they do not work. Australia was constrained to sell wool to Japan, Britain to buy many things from the United States and to let most of her emigrants go there. Empire settlement was, as they say, a flop; and protection made slow headway here before 1932. Hancock blesses the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation because it did good work for British Africa and made no attempt to make African growers sell only in Lancashire.

Chapter III on the 'Autonomous Nations of the Commonwealth' works out the notions put forward in the Survey. 'Men': they did not go enough to British territories to suit a narrow imperial policy; from 1930 they began to come back; on the Canadian prairies too much wheat was grown and no more men were wanted; and with a falling birth-rate in Britain and the Dominions (except among the French Canadians) the millions to fill the 'empty spaces' were, even if wanted, not forthcoming. 'Money': investors looked more to the Empire, partly by instinct for gain, partly by suggestion and direction; but Canada was outgrowing her debtor status; Australia was beginning to repay; so was New Zealand. The Australian and New Zealand pounds deserted the pound sterling, before sterling finally became fiduciary; the South African and the Canadian currencies remained 'sound' in 1932. The Commonwealth had no longer automatic-working exchanges. Then (1934-6) a new, and newly nationalized, Central Bank in New Zealand began a deliberate financial boosting of New Zealand industries, especially the dairy industry. 'Markets': one Dominion after another realized—Australia with her wool, Canada with her wheat, New Zealand with her butter—that the British market was not, as had often been assumed, bottomless; the Empire Marketing Board (1926-32)

did some excellent work, but had a theory of sheltered markets, and was allowed to die because Dominions who had got tariff and quota preferences at Ottawa in 1932 did not think the Board's work worth a subscription. But, in judging all the Ottawa tariff and quota policies, few of which Hancock likes, we are to bear in mind the 'brutal egoism' (p. 229) of the American Hawley-Smoot tariff and a world full of quotas, bilateral agreements and exchange controls. There were bigger fools and greater sinners than the collected Empire negotiators.

Some of their follies deepened after Ottawa. New Zealand butter was unwelcome in Australia and Canada; measures of protection had been and were taken: Australian manufactures were suspect in New Zealand: New Zealand even 'protected the bad wine of Auckland province' (p. 237). Lancashire boycotted Australian stuff in revenge for a tariff on drills and jeans. And quotas for meat and butter had to be accepted, as it was painfully realized that the British market had a bottom, that British farmers claimed consideration, and that, even in 1936, 60 per cent of British imports were still extra-imperial. Happily folly had its limits. From 1932 to 1938 the Australian Tariff Board judiciously pruned Australia's 'slump' tariff, to her undoubted advantage; and in 1937 Menzies was discreetly asking whether too full a measure of Empire preference might not rob the British countries of their share in a peace-encouraging revival of world trade. Finally, in 1938, Britain and Australia 'confessed the insufficiency of imperial preference for their separate trading needs, and agreed to support each other in their attempts to make trade agreements with foreign countries' (p. 257). The 'Ottawa spirit' had learnt by experience.

Its learning was manifested in those British-American-Canadian agreements of November 1938, which were generally forgotten, though never repudiated, when the lights again went out. 'Both Canada and the United Kingdom sacrificed real preferential advantages in each others' markets and gained real compensation in the United States market' (p. 265). *The Economist* called the two treaties 'the largest operation in trade liberalization that has ever been undertaken'—strong words from the journal whose editors have included James Wilson, Walter Bagehot, Hirst and Layton.

With a remarkable discussion of the respective claims of 'wealth, welfare and power' on the statesmen of the future, when called to handle Commonwealth or international relations, a discussion which covers the not too successful internal welfare experiments of New Zealand in 1935-9, and with a summary of the general argument and an introduction to the theme of Vol. 1, the welfare needs of Africa, this first Part ends.

Among the Appendices is an illuminating and scholarly discussion of 'The Communist Doctrines of Empire' by Mr W. H. B. Court, for the appreciation of which there is not here the space that it deserves.

It is in the African volume that most use is made of the various frontiers. (Sometimes perhaps matters are dealt with under a frontier heading with which frontiersmen were not much concerned, but let that pass.) Behind all Hancock's thought lies the riddle—could the Empire, especially the dependent Empire, of 1918-39 justify its existence because it harmonized 'its own special interests with those of the other nations', as the dependent Empire of the free trade era confidently could? But many, perhaps most, of his African conclusions are of separate validity and have only indirect bearing on the riddle. The section headed 'The Evolution of the Settlers' Frontier, South Africa' contains (p. 44) a thesis which dominates the whole discussion of the Union of South Africa and its racial policies. 'The economist perceives co-operation between white man and black man [on the land, in the mines, in the towns], conflict between

white man and white man [“labour and capital”; skilled or propertied white man and “poor white”]. To a policy which tries to ground itself upon racial distinction [as, in one way or another, all Union policy does] the economist’s analysis is a challenge and an affront.’ The challenge is sustained, the affront risked, throughout a long discussion of shifting Union labour policies; shifting, but never to the black or coloured man’s advantage, as some figures on p. 52 demonstrate: ‘Non-Europeans’ form a declining percentage of railway, harbour and factory staffs. And ‘can it be said with confidence that the class of poor whites is in process of liquidation? Can it even be said that it has been permanently reduced as a proportion of the people?’ (p. 64). The answers must be vague and are not encouraging. The ‘organized minority of workers’ remains privileged against the ‘unorganized masses’, white and black.

The overstocked native reserves were described as in an ‘appalling’ state in 1932, moving at a ‘rapid pace towards desert conditions’. No law or administrative act had, or has, done much to help them, certainly not the Land Act of 1936 (p. 88). Meanwhile Hertzog’s policy had reduced the franchised coloured community of the Cape ‘to a lower order of citizenship’ (p. 81). ‘Partly owing to a more severe administration of the financial and educational tests’ [compare the U.S.A.] the ‘non-European’ Cape vote was only 36,098 in 1933, the Europeans 886,592.

South Africa’s racial policies can be analysed under the two concepts of domination and trusteeship. But that racial economic collaboration on which Hancock insists makes him doubt whether these two concepts ‘will remain in the future a sufficient guide to the forces which determine social movement’ (p. 89). He evidently hopes for some revival of the spirit which, under the old liberal Cape franchise led through political to economic collaboration.

Discussing ‘South Africa’s Northern Neighbours’ (pp. 90–127) he buttresses his point by indicating how the need for native labour in non-reserved areas is always undermining reservation policies. He is able, incidentally, to point to something like an ‘agricultural revolution’ on native land in Southern Rhodesia, due to the ingenious and economical policies of devoted European experts. ‘Contour-ridging’ retains and disperses the otherwise eroding rainfall, and proper rotations avert that other curse of the overstocked native reserve, soil exhaustion. Similar policies, it should be noted, have led to a ‘new era’ further south, in Basutoland (p. 145). But against the good done in Southern Rhodesia must be set evidence which goes to show that ‘the white farmers . . . have begun to aim at a system of agricultural protectionism from whose benefits the Natives shall be altogether excluded’ (p. 111).

Into Nyasaland we cross a ‘missionaries’ frontier’, which means education, and enter a land where whites have never been numerous and now tend to decline. We meet native teachers and clerks and hospital dressers and office-workers. The native goes into government service as he never can in South Africa and ‘there are Native postmasters who handle more money than a European district commissioner’ (p. 120). But Northern Rhodesia, with its handful of directing whites, pioneered by the Chartered Company and the copper-miners, is ‘South Africa’ spiritually. ‘There is in the two Rhodesias a single railwaymen’s union, and the traveller must wait for the Congo frontier before he will see Native engine-drivers or Native guards’ (p. 122).

‘Mr Mother-Country’, still responsible for these regions, does not come too well out of the story, nor out of that of the ‘imperial retreat’ in the Bechuanaland and Basutoland protectorates. But the controversy about the transfer of the protectorates has done good. It has stimulated the British administration to transform native agriculture; ‘it has challenged the South African administration to emulate that policy’ (p. 145).

Revising his South African chapter after two years of war (it was written in 1939) Hancock sums up in the words 'but "economic segregation" is a dream which cannot be realized, for its realization would mean ruin to all the races of South Africa.'

We pass to the 'Traders' Frontier, West Africa', of all the sections the most fascinating and most suggestive of queer parallels to the historian, who fancies that it has also fascinated Hancock most. The historian sees a West African chief 'booking' his 'stoollands' and speculates about African 'folk-right'. At Kano he meets Mr Raccah, a 'Syrian', who by mere industry and business acumen snatched trade in ground-nuts from an expensively run African Company: his mind flits to other Syrians far from Syria in Merovingian Orleans. He is reminded how missionary views on slavery were the same as those of Adam Smith; yet how it declined more because transport on men's heads was in course of supersession, and because Sir George Goldie saw that to kill it you must hit at slave-raiding in its home, the Sudanese belt from Senegal to the Nile, than because Christianity or humane philosophy prevailed.

Become contemporary, the historian meets again Mary Kingsley defending various 'indefensible' things, including the West African trader of dubious repute, and his gin, not bad stuff, less harmful than palm wine, and drunk mainly on ritual occasions. He also meets, in a footnote, Ja-Ja of Opobo—that subject for Edward Lear. He crosses, and recrosses, 'The Abortive Planters' Frontier', which withdrew into the Congo Free State because the British frowned on a plantation economy. It was the fight between Hugh Clifford and Lord Leverhulme that made this frontier abortive—on British African territory; for the plantation economy beat peasant economics by sheer efficiency, in Sumatra and Malaya as well as in the Congo; and British African peasant subjects suffered for it. The problem of raising peasant competitive efficiency meets us all along the line—ground-nuts, cocoa, palm products, ginger. The government of Nigeria, we learn, 'has adopted a sound programme . . . but . . . has failed to provide the finance and the resolute drive' needed to carry it out (p. 245).

Yet the Colonial Development Fund of 1929 and, above all, the 'white man's burden' State-Paper of 1940, with its hope of £5,000,000 a year for ten years to be given by the white to the black, raise Hancock's hopes. His hopes for general progress, however, require not only £5,000,000 a year and crude security against enemy action, but land-law reform, political reform, above all education. The West African, broken from his tribal life and sanctions and his craft rituals, is apt to become, very naturally but too readily, *homo economicus purus*: there must be counter-actions.

The *summa summarum* on pp. 299 sqq. is perhaps a little too diffuse in places, and a shade too intimate in others. But we see the book and its notions in the making; and there is not a page without an interesting, and to this reviewer new, fact, or a proposition that induces thought. An historian's training makes Hancock visualize palm-oil and cocoa and more cheap rubber shoes, not 'commodities' and 'increments of commodities': that is a great relief to the concrete-minded. His gift of practical economic analysis enables him to see such things in their real relations to other things, to general trends of fact and of economic public opinion. His concluding—is it dream or prophecy?—of international welfare policies has already been quoted. These two volumes of his Survey are among the best of our troubled time.

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REVIEWS

B. H. SUMNER. *Survey of Russian History*. (Duckworth. 1944. pp. 464. 16s.)

Mr Sumner's remarkable book bears every superficial sign of a popular work. It is unencumbered by footnotes or appendices, and is written with the obvious intention of attracting the ordinary reader. The very arrangement of the material, starting from the present day and working backwards to the dawn of Russian history, is adapted to the needs of the man in the street, who cannot be expected to be interested in Russia's past except in so far as it links up with the immediate problems of the U.S.S.R. This popular appeal may or may not come off. It is possible that public taste will for once rise to the fare offered to it, though it is equally possible that Mr Sumner's special qualities will, not inappropriately, remain caviare to the general. But whatever its success as a best-seller, the book is bound to take a foremost place—I am inclined to say the foremost place—in the recent writings on Russian history. In fact it looks as if Mr Sumner has written a classic without intending it.

What gives the book its place in Russian historiography is its learning and its point of view. The learning is remarkable indeed. Adept as Mr Sumner obviously is at keeping his light under a bushel, he cannot conceal that kind of *expertise* which comes from the knowledge and the understanding of infinite detail. He constantly reaches and illuminates not only the major problems of Russian history but its very nooks and crannies, and the fact that he often does it imperceptibly, almost on the sly, detracts little from the general effect of massive scholarship. Generations of controversy are sometimes compressed in a few paragraphs, and almost every clause or qualifying adjective harks back to a book, an article or a document. No recent work on Russian history known to me compresses so much erudition in so little space. Were the book provided (as I hope one day it will be) with footnotes and bibliographical lists, it would easily take its place in historical literature as the most learned and the best balanced compendium of Russian history produced since 1917 in any language, not excluding Russian, and by any hand, not excluding Pokrovsky's.

The other exceptional feature of the book is its point of view. It is dominated by the idea of the continuity of Russian history. The impression of continuity is no doubt accentuated by the author's method of tracking each problem of contemporary Russia back to its ancient precedents and roots. But it is not entirely a matter of arrangement. The continuity of Russian history is not a mere literary fiction, but a hard historical fact rooted in inescapable conditions of Russian geography, settlement, frontiers and culture contacts. Mr Sumner clearly shows how this combination of permanent causes accounted for the part which the western provinces played in Russia's relations with Poland. It imposed the same policy on John the Terrible as on Catherine and Stalin. Causes similarly continuous pushed Russian political expansion towards her three seas, and directed her diplomacy and war in the Baltic regions, the Balkans and eastern Asia. The abiding necessities of Russian life also account for the unchanging substance of the state; its absolute power based upon the bureaucratic class of 'serving men'; the subordination of its social policy to the need of political stability, and of its economic policy to military defence.

Indeed, so striking is the identity of the main lines of Soviet policy with those of other Russian regimes that Mr Sumner is able to create a sense of unbroken

continuity without doing violence to historical facts, and without neglecting the modern features of the regime: its socialism, its materialism, its scientific display and its Marxist verbiage. Nowhere is this record of continuity more striking than in the story of industrialization. Mr Sumner brings out the remarkable progress of industry in the last decade or two of Czarist Russia. But he could have gone even further, and have brought out even more than he has done the extent to which the initial steps of Russian industry were dominated by the needs of defence and by the very Stalinesque conviction that unless Russia provided her own instruments of war she would inevitably fall victim to foreign aggression. A more intensive analysis of the later stages of the same process, i.e. after 1892, and especially after 1908, would have revealed further similarities with the Five-Year Plan. Strategic purposes were then as much in evidence as ever, for one of the principal objects of Witte's and Vishnegradsky's economic policy was the building of strategic railways and the development of heavy industries. But equally significant, though less known, was the similarity of methods. The rapid industrialization under Witte would have been impossible without a drastic policy of forced saving. By a series of financial measures (heavy taxation of the peasants and forced exports) a much larger proportion of national income was diverted to the formation of capital than would have been available for the purpose had the government allowed consumption to absorb a larger and a growing proportion of national income. In this, as in most other fields, the economic policy of the Soviets was more thorough and more efficient and correspondingly more painful, but its objects and methods were little different.

Viewed superficially the agricultural policy of the Soviets does not link up quite so obviously with earlier precedents. But a hidden link there doubtless is. The drive for collectivization and the network of collective and state farms may bear little superficial resemblance to anything the country had previously known. But the purposes which the system now serves and the problems which it has tried to solve are the same as, since the sixteenth century, preoccupied the successive governments of the country. An inescapable dilemma has always dominated the agrarian policies of the Russian state. For political and administrative reasons serfdom was allowed to grow up and a communal organization was preserved. But on economic grounds a free and individualistic structure of agriculture was to be preferred. The political causes were much older and, for a very long time, much stronger than the economic ones. The stability of the state depended upon the prosperity of the land-owning bureaucracy, and this led the government, by a series of successive measures, to tie the peasant to the soil. Similarly the commune was bolstered up for a variety of political and administrative reasons, such as the administration of taxes and of military service, the fear of a proletarian revolution, and the wish to arrest the growth of landless peasantry and the concentration of land in the hands of the more substantial peasants. On the other hand, after 1860, and more especially after 1892, the problem of agricultural production and food supplies was becoming more and more pressing and demanded a solution contrary to serfdom and the commune. Neither the abolition of serfdom in 1865 nor the reforms of 1906-8 were purely economic in object, for both were actuated by a quest for social stability. But there is no doubt that both were attempts to resolve the dilemma of Russian agriculture in accordance with the purely economic needs of the Russian society.

This dilemma the Soviets inherited in full. They began in the opening years of their regime with a somewhat disorderly scheme of village socialism by which the previous movement of enclosures and of individualistic farming was checked, if not altogether stopped. With the New Economic Policy came the interest in

rural prosperity and the revival of 'kulak' farming and enclosures. Then came the Five-Year Plan with its overwhelming emphasis on socialist industry and its determination to wring from the country the food which the growing towns so badly needed. The problem was not unlike that which the Czarist government had faced in organizing its taxation, and a solution was similarly found in collective organization and collective responsibility. There was also the purely political intention of breaking down the class of prosperous peasants which the Stolypin reforms and the New Economic Policy had fostered.

No doubt hopes of higher productivity were entertained. True to their Marxist heritage the communists believed in the greater efficiency of the large-scale unit in agriculture. Great expectations were also placed on additional investment and on new technical methods. Yet on the whole the economic gains were much less spectacular than the political and social changes. Even the Communist Party could not have failed to notice the remarkable growth of output and of agricultural prosperity which had taken place in Russian agriculture before the collectivization, *i.e.* between 1908 and 1915, and again between 1924 and 1928. More recently, they have had every opportunity for noticing that in spite of immense investment and collective agriculture, its wholesale mechanization and the general progress of agricultural science and technique, the production of food-stuffs grew little in comparison with the other branches of the national economy. Output per acre may have grown somewhat in response to lavish investment and to concentration of food production on suitable soils. But the total output rose relatively little, certainly less than the output of English and German agriculture in comparable periods. If so, we are not yet in a position to say that the inherited dilemma of Russian agriculture has been permanently resolved, or that Stalin's policy will not add yet another stage to the continuous evolution of Russia's agriculture problem.

All these observations are meant to supplement and to reinforce and not to amend Mr Sumner's own story. As it is, Mr Sumner has gone further in underlining the 'oneness' of Russian history than any other writer before him.

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R. A. L. SMITH. *Canterbury Cathedral Priory: A Study in Monastic Administration*. (Cambridge University Press. 1943. pp. xii + 237. 15s.)

Dr Smith's limitation of his theme to the Kentish estates of the Priory in no way detracts from its general interest. He does not at any time lose sight of the broad picture of the estate as a whole; but he concentrates our attention upon the way in which a great feudal landowner adapted his system to the peculiar conditions of Kent; to the division between inland and outland, to the formidable traditions of freedom amongst the peasantry, to the factors of extensive marshland and sea-erosion, to the pull of the London food market and the position of the county astride the trade routes to Europe.

Indeed, one of the most interesting impressions remaining from Dr Smith's book is the extent to which even these recalcitrant conditions were moulded towards the norm of medieval estate organization. This was due not least to the efforts of the monastic administrative machinery, which conforms closely to the normal pattern and follows the normal evolution. A period of growing complexity and centralization marks the age of high farming and intensive demesne cultivation; decentralization is the concomitant of demesne leasehold and rentier landlordism. This parallel development of administration and the estate economy should not surprise us. Monastic administration was a matter

of practical men doing a practical job, and they worked upon the material at their hand.

Equally important is Dr Smith's sketch of the economic evolution of the estate. The period of 'estate-building' was more or less completed by the time of Domesday Book. This stage was followed in the twelfth century by the letting out of considerable portions of the demesnes to *firmarii* and small tenants, and the tendency towards disintegration was only checked by the great rise in prices beginning in the later part of that century. The thirteenth century is marked by the resumption of demesnes, expansion of cultivation and pastoral farming, assarting and embanking, marling and manuring. The whole estate was reorganized in 1288 for a more efficient participation in a market economy, supply manors being concentrated in Kent, while the outlying manors became revenue manors pure and simple. Parallel with this concentration upon high farming, however, was a vast increase in rents, from leasing of newly reclaimed lands, increased land values, and the placing of labour services *ad denarios*.

The period of expansion, Dr Smith shows, came to an abrupt halt more or less contemporaneously with the accession of Edward III. Demesne farming and wool production declined sharply; there was even a considerable 'reaction' to labour services. (May a connexion with the Peasant Revolt of 1381 be seen here?) In fact, the Priory Church reacted in much the way that an 'economic man' ought to react to the facts implicit in Thorold Rogers's price data. In this crisis of the fourteenth century, the Black Death is but an incident, however disastrous, in sixty years of depression.

The solution of the crisis on the Canterbury estates, normal in its method, is far less normal in its results. In the 1390's, Prior Thomas of Chillenden leased out practically the whole of the monastic demesnes; and from that date to the Dissolution the Priory remained a rentier landlord. Elsewhere, this procedure produced stabilization in a period of violent price fluctuations; furthermore, the reduction of gross revenue in a period of high production costs did not necessarily involve a comparable reduction in net revenue. On the Canterbury estate, however, the immediate result in the early fifteenth century was a rise in gross revenue to the highest point ever attained. True, the middle decades saw a heavy fall, but a new recovery in the last quarter of the century amply vindicated Chillenden's wisdom. Perhaps no satisfactory explanation of these vicissitudes will be possible until the history of the London food market in the fifteenth century is at last available.

No doubt there are many other matters that are noteworthy if space permitted, but perhaps at this stage a minor criticism, of method rather than of fact, may be allowed. Dr Smith has mustered a formidable body of evidence to show that the years 1306-24 were 'the high farming period par excellence'. Not least impressive are his statistics of increased revenue from sales of corn and dairy produce during these years. In themselves, however, these figures imply a good deal less than the good round sums in which they are stated. High agricultural price levels in this period would lead us to overrate the extent of increased production if we took these figures at their face value; and the parallel, if less violent, rise in labour and other costs implies a far less spectacular rise in net revenue than is implied by them.

Still, while this cavil may modify it does not undermine Dr Smith's main contention. And students of the medieval agrarian scene will be grateful for a scholarly work which at last does justice to one of the greatest of medieval farmer-landowners, Prior Thomas of Eastry, who dominates those pages of this book dealing with the great days of farming in the estates of Canterbury Cathedral Priory.

E. MILLER

ARTHUR REDFORD, assisted by INA STAFFORD RUSSELL. *The History of Local Government in Manchester*. (Longmans Green and Co. 3 vols. 1940. pp. xvi + 392; viii + 467; viii + 432. 21s.)

Active collaboration between the local authority and its regional university is the mark of a progressive area. Dr Redford's work, which has already become a standard document of the history of local government, is an example of this kind of collaboration which we may hope to see extended into many other fields. The historian and the student of public administration alike must commend the enterprise and public spirit which inspired the Manchester City Council to invite the Reader in Economic History in the University of Manchester to undertake this heavy task, and to supply the 'generous financial aid' necessary for its achievement. The charter of Manchester's incorporation as a municipal borough was dated October 1838 and this work was intended to commemorate the centenary. The sometimes critical analysis made by Dr Redford of recent as well as of more distant events in the history he describes is proof enough that the essential condition of all such collaboration was wisely recognized, and that he was left complete discretion: 'no attempt has been made,' he says, 'either by the City Council or by any servant of the Corporation, to influence my judgment or to censor my work.'

With the publication of this work Manchester can claim to be one of the best-documented authorities in the country. Sir Ernest Simon has already furnished us with a valuable critique from direct experience of the City Council from within. We now have a history in three volumes. The first, entitled 'Manor and Township', devotes half of its space to medieval Manchester under manorial rule, and to the difficult account of the operations of the Court Leet. The other half covers the period of the Police Commissioners, from 1788 until the incorporation. But it was to the later period, which the second and third volumes describe, that, as Dr Redford observes, most attention needed to be paid. Here there were two difficulties. 'There was no substantial and modern book about the administrative history of any other town which could be used as a model. Most of the historical works on English local government, especially those which dealt with the history of particular towns, stopped rather abruptly at 1835'. And a second difficulty was the quantity of printed documentary evidence available, to read and digest which 'would have taken the best part of a lifetime', apart entirely from 'vast accumulations of manuscript'. It is a real service to have provided out of this material a readable and consecutive story of a fairly consistent development. The second volume, 'Borough and City', carries the story forward, from the early struggles of the new borough to survive against the violent hostility of the interests it supplanted, to the emergence of the city; and describes some of the considerable strides made during the latter half of the century, with the expansion both of area and of services which placed Manchester among the half-dozen most progressive authorities. Development in this period may well be placed alongside the unfortunate flounderings of the capital. Comparison, for example, with Dr Robson's *Government and Misgovernment of London* reminds us that the conflicts of interest, however acute, were not complicated by a City Corporation preventing a unitary expansion or by the jealousy of a central government politically hostile to local trends. Thus the third volume, dealing with the last half century, becomes in the main an account of the development of civic services for an area which, if larger than that directly controlled by the City Corporation, is, nevertheless, based on a large and solid nucleus of unitary self-government, unhampered within its boundaries by rival general authorities, although, of course, still retaining special authorities until the abolition of the Board of Guardians. It may be hoped that similar enterprise

will be shewn by other local authorities now that a valuable model has been supplied.

The story of Manchester's civic services has many characteristics of a romance, with speculation mysteries to intrigue and scandals to amuse the reader, with bitter battles of persons and interests to excite him, with entrancing studies in human inconsistency to enliven by touching his sense of the ridiculous, the whole being leavened by a spirit of communal pride and even of a certain idealism productive of fairly steady improvement. Yet this home of Cobdenite liberalism is content to take handsome dividends from its municipal socialism. It enjoys, for instance, the proud heritage from its period of government by the Police Commissioners of a communal gas-works, erected as early as 1817 during the reign of Thomas Fleming, and most profitably run, despite the keen eye to personal profit at the public expense of tradesmen representatives, against the background of Tory highhandedness in conflict with radical hostility. It receives from this enterprise an increasing income which it is able to devote to civic improvements and to the early development of its water supply, even while it pronounces on principle against collective enterprise. This Manchester, not generous, as Dr Redford says, to the fine arts, yet can be most generous to the interests of retail traders at the expense of the ratepayers and the consumer, as the history of its milk supply reveals.

This same Manchester, however, has pursued a liberal educational and housing policy. It has taken the lead in many matters of local government policy for the kingdom. It is the owner of many large undertakings, markets, transport, electricity, etc. These have brought new problems, in particular its relations with labour, where its record places it among the more advanced authorities. But its experience with electricity, especially because of the success of its gas enterprise, is of peculiar interest. The possibilities of electricity it recognized early, and its failure to reproduce in this service the advantages which it won by its early start as a gas-producer was less its own fault than the responsibility of a short-sighted central government policy, the reasons for which would make an interesting footnote. And the blame would seem to lie mainly in the same direction for that financial stringency which in the last two decades has stood in the way of so much desirable (and possible) improvement.

In a work covering so much ground it is natural that those who specialize in any particular plot may feel that less than due attention has been paid to it. That complaint would not be reasonable if it were made by a specialist in any of the services dealt with in the last volume. The whole is produced in admirable proportion, and it provides a comprehensive picture of local government at work within the limits set. But it is impossible to feel that the chapter on the machinery of civic government, 1918-35, is as satisfying as the rest of the work, or that it quite rises to the occasion. It is perhaps in what Professor Tawney has called 'the misty no-man's land between yesterday and to-day', and in the sections dealing with administrative machinery and its development that the work is not quite as strong as elsewhere, particularly its earlier economic history. But the political scientist as much as the historian will be grateful to Dr Redford for the light that he throws, even though there may be a wish that he had gone further and thrown more. Topics that suggest themselves are his treatment of the conflicting tendencies within the Council of separatism and co-ordination, the problem of the best co-ordinating authority (Finance Committee or a General Policy Committee), the opposition by the City Council to the tendencies towards development of regional authority. True we find a record of the initiation of the Council's pensions scheme for its staff, in which it was in advance of all other authorities; of its provision of competitive examinations for the recruitment of its staff; of its efforts to simplify and consolidate rating machinery where

'Manchester not Liverpool' took the initiative. Perhaps it would be ungrateful to a really valuable contribution to murmur a wish that we could have been helped a little more to gauge from it how to-day is leading on from yesterday to tomorrow, and to see the perspective that includes Thomas Fleming, Cobden and Sir Ernest Simon.

H. R. G. GREAVES

London School of Economics

T. F. REDDAWAY. *The Rebuilding of London after the Great Fire*. (Jonathan Cape. 1940. New edition, 1943. pp. 333. 18s.)

In his brief new introduction the author of this original and important work discusses the lessons which modern planners may learn from the experience of 1666 when they come to face the problem of rebuilding London after the destruction which has taken place since the book was actually written. The reviewer is, therefore, free to concentrate upon the contribution made by Mr Reddaway's researches to the knowledge of the period with which he deals. The contribution is a very considerable one. London's archives have been used to a less extent than one might expect to illuminate the economic and administrative history of the Stuart period, and have for the most part remained in manuscript. It was, therefore, to be anticipated that a thorough and patient investigator, and one not to be put off by English handwriting at its most illegible period, would reap a rich harvest, and Mr Reddaway has not been disappointed.

In the first place he disposes with complete finality of the idea that Christopher Wren produced an acceptable plan for a new and grandly designed London, which unenlightened property owners sabotaged for selfish and factional reasons, to the great loss of future generations. He shows that Wren's was one of half a dozen new ground plans submitted to the City and the king, but that none were adopted because of the impossibility of delaying all action until a total survey could be made of the land of the burned-out area, the sites of 13,200 houses and of all the great buildings, secular and ecclesiastic, with which the life of the capital was inextricably bound up. Once the enormous administrative and technical difficulties of making a complete survey had caused the idea to be abandoned it was necessary to accept existing property rights as the basis for rebuilding and to envisage only those improvements for which the City could afford to buy the land, or set the rise in the value of what was left to individual holders against what they had lost.

There was no question of letting the old state of affairs which had led to the fire (and to the plague) reappear. The fire was brought under control on 4 September, the Royal Proclamation of 13 September laid down the basic principles of the rebuilding and the Act of Parliament of 8 February 1667 (the first of the two 'rebuilding Acts') was sufficiently comprehensive for work to begin on the lines which were clearly the most practical from the national point of view as well as from that of the private citizen. Mr Reddaway points out that many of the critics of the new plan have had in mind the unforeseeable traffic developments of a later date, and that much was actually done by the widening of streets and the removal of markets to make the city more convenient. In addition, the stringent and successful control, amounting to a very considerable degree of enforced uniformity, over both design and materials created a veritable new city of brick in place of the lath-and-plaster slums of the old London.

Equally creditable was the machinery devised for administering the whole scheme, the more so when it is remembered that the bulk of the rebuilding was done by individual private citizens through private contractors (as Mr Redda-

way deliberately styles them). The City and other corporations did their rebuilding more slowly. The main point was to get the citizens to come and live in London again before they were too well-settled in the suburbs and other places of refuge, where the inflated rents charged to 'evacuees' were to some extent compensated for by freedom from the burdensome and expensive domination of the City Companies.

Parliament, having laid the foundations, took little further part. The Privy Council and the Common Council of the City through the Rebuilding Commissioners, and then the City authorities alone working through committees and a very few paid officials, did the bulk of the work. The most successful improvisation was the 'fire-court' for sorting out the liabilities of landlords and tenants, a matter of great difficulty in view of the almost inextricable complications of property rights in the old city. Here yeoman work was done by the judges. But disputes about the actual location of boundaries and so on were dealt with as expeditiously by the City surveyors and aldermen. Equal flexibility was shown in making the changes in a still highly regulated economy which were necessary if the work were not to be held up for want of materials and labour. The only detail in the whole picture of the progress of the rebuilding which might be questioned is the very large personal share in the credit for what was done which Mr Reddaway gives to the king himself, often on the basis of actions of the Privy Council formulated as royal commands. (Charles II had not spent 'many years in Holland with ample leisure' to appreciate its urban amenities. His five visits to Holland total just under two years and most of them were at moments of crisis in his career.)

On the administrative side, then, the dominant impression left by Mr Reddaway is the astonishing flexibility and success of the City, when one considers its lack of coercive powers, and the contrast which this represents to its insistence, after the rebuilding, upon continuing, with regard to the suburbs and other problems, policies of exclusiveness and monopoly which had been out of date before the fire, and were more so than ever afterwards. It was this among other things which caused the glories of the rebuilding to be followed by the ignominies of financial collapse. Mr Reddaway's study of the City finances is here limited by his exclusion of matter not more or less directly related to the fire. The future work which he promises on the whole subject will be eagerly awaited and one must hope that the essential materials survive. He does show here how the great wealth of the citizens, which enabled the costs of private rebuilding to be met so easily, was not matched by any corresponding resources in the hands of the corporation. Thus he does on the local scale something of what Dr W. A. Shaw's researches have done towards elucidation of the national position. He also explodes another legend, namely that the City's financial difficulties were directly connected with those of the Crown. The 'stop of the exchequer' did not, as an earlier historian of London put it, inflict 'great hardship on the city's fatherless children'.

A large map and a short glossary would have helped readers to whom London's topography and antiquities are not familiar ground, for the interest of Mr Reddaway's work is by no means a merely local one.

University of Manchester

MAX BELOFF

JEAN O. McLACHLAN. *Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750. A study of the influence of commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the first half of the eighteenth century.* (Cambridge University Press. 1940. pp. xvi. + 249. 15s.)

The volume before us adds another welcome contribution to the elucidation of commercial relations between England and the Spanish Empire during the crucial

period from the restoration of the Stuart monarchy to the emergence of Britain as Spain's foremost rival in the New World. Earlier studies, such as those by Harold Temperley, Vera Lee Brown, Richard Pares and Curtis Nettels (not Nettles, as it appears in the bibliography), rely chiefly if not wholly on manuscript sources in British archives. Most of them deal with the years before the accession of the Bourbons to the Spanish throne, or with the War of Jenkins's Ear and its aftermath. Miss McLachlan's study fills the intervening period. Pares, in his volume *War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-63*, covers some of the same ground but with emphasis upon the American scene. Miss McLachlan, however, pays greater attention to the diplomatic setting. She also leans heavily upon the great Spanish archival repositories in Simancas, Seville and Madrid. This is as it should be if diplomatic history is to be intelligently construed.

The book opens with a chapter on Anglo-Spanish trade in the years before the Asiento Contract, as regulated by the commercial treaty of 1667, including an illuminating description of the general commercial system as envisaged at that time and of Spain's place in it. Following chapters discuss events leading to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Commercial and Asiento treaties of 1713, the 'depredations crisis' in the West Indies in 1737-9 and the negotiations resulting in the extinction of the Asiento in 1750. There is an appendix of 9 pages on the public career of that very able Spanish statesman, Josef Patiño, and an excellent bibliography.

The argument of the book may be summarized as follows. The Tory ministers at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, intent on obtaining by means of the Asiento a foothold in the coveted direct trade with the Spanish Indies, neglected the interests of the more important commerce with Old Spain. So long as the British were prepared to satisfy their desire for American bullion indirectly through this latter trade relations between the two powers had been good. The attempt to obtain direct trade with the Indies under cover of the Asiento led to continual discord. Yet in 1739, although contraband trade with the Spanish colonies provoked the crisis, it was the financial policy of the directors of the South Sea Company and the long-standing friction between the Company and the Spanish government, not the Company's illicit trade in America, which defeated all the efforts of both governments to maintain the peace. 'The Company hardly ever smuggled corporately or officially' (p. 79) and the importance of that traffic was commonly exaggerated. With the extinction of the Asiento in 1750 the thirty-seven years' attempt to secure a legal trade directly with the Spanish-American empire was abandoned, and English policy contented itself with protecting the more lucrative commerce by way of Cadiz and other ports of Spain. Servants of the Company had profited by the clandestine traffic, but for the shareholders the Asiento had been a dismal failure. Whatever small benefits may have accrued to England from the mercantilist standpoint were counterbalanced by the international friction which the Asiento caused.

Miss McLachlan's volume reveals a more intimate knowledge of British trade and diplomacy than the reviewer can ever aspire to. In matters relating to the Spanish Indies the touch is sometimes less sure. Reference is repeatedly made to the 'annual' Spanish merchant fleets, meaning the galleons and flotas that since the sixteenth century had been dispatched to Portobello and Vera Cruz. As a matter of fact only the galleons, or Portobello fleet, were of great significance for the South Sea Company; the latter's trade with Vera Cruz was of little importance. Between 1713 and 1737 the galleons sailed only five times, and after that date were abolished. It is questionable whether the 'Spanish colonists... preferred to pay the high Spanish prices, since the silver fleets and galleons were more regular than the South Sea Company's misnamed 'annual' ships' (p. 24). The history of foreign clandestine trade would seem to refute it. The

general statement that 'the annual Spanish merchant fleets took off most of the ready money of the colonists, and much of the rest went in taxes to Old Spain' (p. 25, repeated in other words on p. 127) is somewhat misleading, in spite of the shortage of coin encountered by the South Sea Company in the poorer agricultural colonies. New Spain, the largest, wealthiest and most populous kingdom in the Indies, may at that time have remitted several million pesos yearly to Spain on account of the royal exchequer or in exchange for Spanish imports, but many more millions remained in America to support a rich and extravagant creole society, and to build the churches and private palaces admired by visitors to-day. The same remark applies to Peru. That the Company had to accept fruits instead of coin or bullion at a place like Havana is not surprising. To single out 'the cold climate in the mountainous regions of Chile' as a reason for the demand for woollens in the Spanish colonies might deceive an unwary reader, unfamiliar with that delectable country. The Chilean colonists lived exclusively in a central valley which is one of the garden spots of the New World. The 'Gulf of Florida' (p. 65) evidently refers either to the Mexican Gulf or to the narrow Florida Channel. One suspects that the author was sometimes led astray by too close repetition of the wording of her eighteenth-century English sources.

These are picayune matters which in no way detract from the excellence of Miss McLachlan's monograph. The story is meticulously documented. It makes it abundantly clear that commercial considerations throughout the period under review exercised a more considerable influence on diplomatic relations between England and Spain than was commonly supposed, and that trade with the Peninsula was always more important than that with the Spanish colonies overseas. It also serves to illuminate for English readers many details of the economic relations between Old Spain and its far-flung American empire.

Harvard

C. H. HARING

E. PARMALEE PRENTICE. *American Dairy Cattle: their Past and Future*. (New York. 1942. pp. xix + 453.)

Since Mr Hitler's claim for the 'Herrenvolk' it has become very doubtful whether there is such a thing as a pure breed of human beings; now Mr Parmalee Prentice has cast the same stone into the quiet waters of the cattle breeding world. He does not believe that there is a pure breed of dairy cattle.

Cows, whose generations are briefer than those of human beings, have even less claim to be pure bred. Even the definition of breeds by selected external characters which have been accepted as an indication of their internal glandular secretions is very modern. To prove his thesis Mr Prentice traces the travels of cattle in Europe during some thousands of years, and effectively disposes of the claims of any breed to continued similarity of external characters. Such characters changed, as the predominant colour of the Holstein (Friesian) did from red and white to black and white in the past few centuries.

The development of the external characters by which the numerous breeds of Great Britain are defined is remarkably recent. The white face of the Hereford, for instance, was only developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the thirteen breeds recognized by the writers of breeding textbooks at the end of the eighteenth century could be classified into three types of long, short and middle horn. The breeds named by Culley in 1786 were Devon, Hereford and Sussex (all red or red-brown middle horn beef cattle with small milk yields), the Holderness or Dutch (shorthorn, a big beast with large milk yield, the term covering all the animals subsequently known as Teeswater or

Durham breed, the Lancashire longhorn on which Bakewell did his work (usually black and widespread over all the midland counties). The rest were variations on these themes or Highland stots (a very mixed lot ranging from the size of large dogs upwards, the black Welsh and the Red Glamorgan (kin of the Hereford), the Suffolk Duns, the Galloway (polled) and Yorkshire Polls.

By the time this classification was made the old open field system was disappearing, and the grazing of all the village beasts together on the wastes or on the stubbles at agreed times was changing to an economy of enclosed farms with their own grazing land where animals could be kept away from the common herd; but for at least ten centuries 'stock breeding, as applied to both cattle and sheep, was the haphazard union of nobody's son with everybody's daughter'. This does not mean that the males roamed over a wide extent of country, but they were not confined to a field and each village had a pound to imprison strays, so that the chance of limiting the beast's choice of mate was non-existent, and there must have been a good deal of mixed blood produced in those places where apparently different types bordered upon one another. Again there was a large transit of animals from Scotland and Ireland and Wales into England both for fattening and for the supply of the London market. Many stopped on the way for a year or more to graze in Cumberland and the northern counties, in the midlands, or in Norfolk. They were not all steers, and it is inconceivable that all the females were kept from contact with local bulls: indeed Erle (*English Farming, Past and Present*) states categorically that the polled Norfolks were founded on imported Galloways.

During the great 'improving age of the eighteenth century and the high farming' (1840-80) of the nineteenth century, cattle breeding was in the ascendant amongst great and wealthy landowners as well as rich tenant farmers, and an infinity of crosses was tried. A very large number of herds had one or two Channel Island cows introduced in order to improve the quality of the milk by mixing. They were doubtless mated with the local bull. The Shorthorn cross needs no comment. Almost every so-called breed was crossed with almost every other. Devon with Hereford, Hereford with Shorthorn, Devon with Sussex and so on *ad infinitum*. Few if any breeds, indeed, could claim that its contemporary external characters are more than 150 years old: most are much less than a century.

The standards, although they have varied from time to time, by which judges of show cattle assessed their merits have been challenged more than once; and the variation of these standards demonstrates the uncertainty both of the breeders and their critics as to what precisely they should aim at. Now Mr Parmelee Prentice maintains that whatever they have aimed at has been based on erroneous assumptions. This contention is supported by Mr Robert Bouffleur whose expressed opinion is that not 1% of the cows used for dairy production in England are as productive as they should be, the average yield being under 700 gallons of milk a year, and under 250 lb. of butter fat a year. It may be that this is because often enough bulls are used about whose breeding little or nothing is known, and a recent writer in the *Estate Magazine* adds that the indiscriminate crossing practised in many commercial herds has placed Great Britain in the Gilbertian position of having a low average milk yield and at the same time possessing pedigree bulls universally acknowledged as champion milk getters.

The governing principle adopted by breeders is that type and pedigree will produce good dairy cattle, the basis being that 'like begets like', but this is an ancient fallacy, for brothers and sisters vary so widely that a very little contemplation of human families shows that this is not a rule that is a safe guide to breed by. Again, the progeny system of breeding has been accepted in recent

decades. It rules that if a high producer is mated with the son of a high producer, equally high producers will be the result, but it has not worked out in practice, as the working breeder has found.

Destructive criticizing, piquant as it is, is not enough and Mr Parmalee Prentice, though he obviously delights in sabotaging accepted fallacies, does not fail to suggest something to put in their place. It is the Mount Hope index, the result of some 15 years of investigations carried out on his farm at Mount Hope. The index is based upon performance, not upon type and pedigree, and clearly performance is the final criterion. Mr Prentice's book should cause a great and wholesome fluttering in the dovecots of theory and, if its lessons are assimilated, be a happy example of the use of history, a stimulating discourse for the practical breeder.

G. E. FUSSELL

Ministry of Agriculture

E. VICTOR MORGAN. *The Theory and Practice of Central Banking, 1797-1913.* (Cambridge University Press. 1943. pp. xi+252. 15s.)

As Professor Postan notes in his Editorial Preface, this is an essay of grand design. Mr Morgan has attempted to tell the story of central banking in the nineteenth century by interweaving three strands: an economist's account of business cycles and trends; an historian's narrative of institutional development and practices in the banking system; and a theorist's critique of the immediate and remote *rationales* for particular lines of policy. The author's aim is to catch the interplay of events, practices and theories, when he finds that it exists, but to give as well considerable range to the narrative on each of the three levels, when they are, in his view, independent.

A considerable measure of *ad hoc* unity is achieved by dividing the whole period into tractable intervals: the Bank Restriction period and the problem of resumption; the decades leading to the Bank Charter Act; the boom of the fifties and of the sixties; the period of the Great Depression; the final years of the Gold Standard. Within each of these intervals the main developments within the economic system are described and related both to the Bank's action and the debate that followed in its train.

This is a formidable, almost an artistic, conception. It requires for its consummation that the author have under control a unified structure of theory capable of informing equally the body of historical fact, the institutional narrative and the various theories woven around them; a structure supple and powerful which can give shape to the material, whether in the form of detailed statistics or pamphlets for the times. Current economic theory does not come ready-made as such a flexible instrument; and at times the dilemma of hard fact and clumsy theory has led some social scientists into the Teutonic realm of over-simple master theories. This Mr Morgan avoids, choosing when pressed a conventional and often lively narrative. Where this essay can be said to have failed is in the irregular grasp of its theoretical substructure, and in the consequent loosening of the ties among the three levels of its discourse.

On the level of conventional history, and of particular as opposed to general analysis, the volume is of considerable value, compressing a vast amount of detail around its main themes. The account of the Bank Restriction period is limited to monetary terms, and does not directly deal with the great developments in foreign trade and the domestic economy which underlay the surface. But at the same time Mr Morgan comes down strongly on the side of Tooke in his interpretation of the Bank's role, and thus introduces vicariously the prime forces in foreign trade and domestic expansion which the Bank reflected, but refused to control. On the monetary controversies of the day he looks with little

sympathy, finding in the rigid soundness of the Bullion Report and the badly articulated realism of its opponents nothing attractive. Thornton alone is praised.

In its account of the cycles and of the continuing trends in the economy, the narrative from 1815 to 1844 is weak, but it is compensated for by a chapter of great interest (vi, on the *Currency and Banking Controversy*). It may appear to miss the essential link between the history and the theoretical controversy; namely, the inflationary intent of the Banking School, reacting to the long secular pull on the price level from 1815. Nevertheless, Mr Morgan's view of the irrelevance of the Bank Charter Act to the problems of cyclical control is clearly done; and it catches well the frustration of what was, given the balance of power among credit institutions and the political limits of economic policy, inevitably a *beau geste*.

From 1844 to the end of the Great Boom in 1873 the essay is full of valuable passages. It is good, for example, to see introduced some of the implications of the longer period of gestation of railway construction than the types of investment which dominated previous cyclical expansions; and to have Newmarch invoked on the mechanism by which Australian and Californian gold had its impact on the British economy. On the other hand, Chapter ix, on the Great Depression, 1873-96, is rather unsatisfactory, largely because the author finds himself initially committed to a view of those years similar to that put forward in Lord Keynes's *Treatise on Money*; namely, that the 'gold shortage' operated on the economy through the mechanism of the Bank reserve and the Bank rate. But as a conscientious reader of the *Economist's* files Mr Morgan finds this thesis runs point-blank into the hard fact of the Bank's impotence in controlling the market throughout this period; and the analysis trails off into a mere chronicle.

The account of the years to 1913 is brief, covering much the same ground as Mr Sayers's *Bank of England Operations, 1890-1914*.¹ As in the other chapters, the statement of changing Bank techniques is cogent, and drawn into a useful short-term picture of the easy monetary setting.

The minimum task which this volume sets for itself is, undoubtedly, completed with some success; namely, a chronicle of the stages by which the Bank of England moved from its relatively parochial setting late in the eighteenth century to the limited self-consciousness, as Britain's and the world's central banker, in the years before the first World War. To the modern student, brought up in an analysis and a doctrine that leads to elaborate efforts to guide the economy through the interest rates, and more directly through various controls over incomes and their distribution, the story is one of frustration. From beginning to end the Bank successfully resisted, or was forced to forgo, policies that might have shaped the course of industrial fluctuations or the large trends in prices and interest rates. The Bank began and ended as the discount house of last resort; its position of partial monopoly in the credit structure was only rarely exercised either to accelerate the coming of easy money after a crisis, or to check the course of a dangerous expansion. And never were its powers used decisively. To put it in extreme terms, the Bank's action on the forces which determined the course of the British economy was confined to their periphery; and the modifications in Bank technique are largely a matter of institutional rather than economic interest.

¹ The reviewer may, perhaps, be permitted to point out that the author's use of unemployment averages to dramatize the 'Great Depression' is unsound, although it follows distinguished precedents. He contrasts (p. 209) the 4.7 % average unemployment for 1897-1913 with the 5.3 % for 1873-96. The difference between these averages derives largely from a bias of definition, having nothing to do with secular trends. 1873-96 contains three cyclical slumps and only two booms, since the initial date chosen is a peak, the terminal date a trough. On the other hand, 1897-1913 contains three cyclical booms and only two slumps, for the obverse reason.

Mr Morgan does not face the full implications of this position. Although on occasion he uses the vocabulary of current general or income theory, his choice of data and his view of the Bank's operations show the influence, rather, of the economic thinking of the decade that followed 1919, of Hawtrey and the early Keynes. In his analysis this is shown in his use of the distinction between 'monetary' and 'non-monetary' factors; in history in the choice of his data. Business cycles, for example, are followed essentially by means of the Bank's discounts, the Bank rate and an index of the price level, all of which are misleading throughout the nineteenth century. The directions of domestic investment (excepting the railway boom of the forties) are rarely referred to; and the implications of foreign investment are in no case thoroughly pursued. The character and direction of foreign trade, perhaps the largest single influence on the state of the money market throughout the century, are not subjected to systematic analysis even in their most direct relation to Bank problems.

Mr Morgan's concentration on monetary theories also affects his *critique* of contemporary theories, and his frequent failure to relate them to their exact and full context, which often transcends the money market. This is notable in the case of Ricardo and Bagehot. The jaundiced view of nineteenth century monetary thought, upon which Professor Postan comments, can be explained as much by the limitation of the author's historical framework as by the intrinsic quality of the theoretical thought. Thus despite the scope of the essay's conception and the freshness of its approach, the analysis often falls back to the conventional level of its component parts. On each of these levels Mr Morgan has a useful contribution to make, of greater or lesser originality, to which can be added a considerable gift for compression and summary. And whatever its limitations his volume is a valuable addition to the growing literature of what might be called economist's history.

W. W. ROSTOW

Nale

G. FINDLAY SHIRRAS and L. ROSTAS. *The Burden of British Taxation*. (Cambridge University Press. 1942. pp. xiii + 240. 15s.)

The National Institute of Social and Economic Research has every reason to be satisfied with this book, the second in a series of economic and social studies prepared and published under its auspices. A new inquiry into the amount paid in taxation from incomes of different sizes was in any case overdue, but the time chosen happens to have been particularly appropriate. For between the two taxation years which were selected for comparison in this study, 1937-8 and 1941-2, very far-reaching changes were introduced into the British taxation system. During the inter-war period the system did not alter fundamentally, and in 1937-8, as this book shows, very much the same structure existed as in 1925, when the Colwyn Committee conducted the last important and comprehensive enquiry of this kind. But by 1941-2 we had moved into a different world; and though the change was brought about by the war and though some modification will certainly be made before and after the end of the war, it is safe to predict that we shall not return to the pre-war structure. We shall stay on our new plateau, even if, while on it, we climb and descend gentler slopes.

The inquiry has been conducted with great care and thoroughness. It is more comprehensive than its predecessors and the technique employed is superior in various ways. At the same time the authors are at pains not to claim too much for their estimates, and emphasise at the start the many assumptions which have had to be made. For all these reasons the book will be accepted as a standard work of reference.

The essential conclusions of the inquiry are set out in thirty pages of tables and diagrams (the latter are especially illuminating) in the middle of the book.

These are preceded by two 'background' chapters and followed by a series of studies on different taxes and the way in which the burden of each has been calculated. The authors have interpreted the term 'tax' squarely as 'any compulsory contribution to public funds, raised from the public'. Thus, they include social insurance contributions and war damage premiums as part of the total 'burden'. They have also included the 'concealed' taxes, such as the levy on flour milling, where identification is possible.

The only important omissions are local rates and taxes on profits. The latter may very well be ephemeral, and the introduction of the former is very unlikely to alter materially the general conclusions reached. On this basis, the authors have managed to include in their estimates 82 % of the total burden in 1937-8 and some 70 % for 1941-2.

The conclusions, though not surprising, are certainly interesting. The huge increase in taxation on higher incomes, where the proportionate burden from indirect taxation is negligible, is indeed familiar. At the other end of the scale, however, taxation was still regressive in 1941-2 up to about £250 a year as compared with about £350 a year in 1937-8. And whereas in 1937-8 the proportion of income taken in taxation was no higher on an income of £1000 a year than on the lowest income of all, this point in 1941-2 had shifted back to rather less than £500 a year. The middle incomes have, therefore, lost the favourable position they occupied before the war, and though the dip in the curve still exists where the fraction of income paid in tax declines, it has become concentrated nearer the beginning of the scale.

Technically, the most interesting chapter in the book is that on death duties. It is shown conclusively that the older method of measuring the burden of these by the life insurance premiums which have to be paid during the lifetime of the owner to cover the duties at his death rests on very unreal assumptions and leads in the case of the very wealthy to absurd results. In place of this, Mr Kaldor has worked out a more scientific technique, under which the present value of income derived from the property if there were no death duties is compared with the present value of this income if death duties are paid once every generation.

The authors of the book are exceedingly careful not to draw unwarranted conclusions from their figures. Yet one cannot help wondering at times whether the whole treatment of taxation as a burden, a vexatious and tiresome imposition on the citizen who starts by being entitled to his gross income, is not becoming rather artificial. To be sure, most people still regard it in this light, though their feelings differ greatly according to the type of tax and the manner in which it is levied. But when the state directly or indirectly influences gross income so much, and deduction at source in the form of 'Pay As You Earn' is being extended, when death duties are not merely a means of raising money, but also and perhaps primarily a method of restricting the right of inheritance, when a section of the community can impose monopoly prices on the rest (though this cannot be called a tax), have we not to be rather careful about the implications of that word 'burden'? The authors speak of 'the necessity for ascertaining the burden of taxation on different incomes, as a preliminary to forming a judgment on the equity of the existing system of taxes'. But is there really much point in trying to judge the equity of different forms of taxation without considering the equity of gross income distribution?

These comments are not, however, intended to reflect in any way on the value of the book, which is not concerned with the methodological problems of public finance.

H. T. N. GAITSKELL

University College, London

SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES

P. H. REANEY. *The Place-Names of Cambridgeshire and the Isle of Ely*. (English Place Name Society. Vol. xix. Cambridge University Press. 23s. 6d.) A book on Cambridgeshire, that curiously neglected county, is always something of an event. Dr Reaney's work, however, has its own intrinsic value besides. He has gone through the county parish by parish, and for each parish has also dealt with a large number of field and other minor names. He has set an impressive standard for other workers in this field; for students of Cambridgeshire history his book will be an invaluable guide. No doubt too its value will increase as we learn more of the history of the county. Many interesting speculations arise from the place-name data which no doubt will one day be tested against other evidence; for example, in regard to a strong pastoral element in south-west Cambridgeshire as well as in the Fenland, the importance of flax-growing from an early date and customary allotment and usage of the fen, and reclaimed lands in particular. More than this, however, Dr Reaney's work does throw additional light on matters of which we know something from other sources. The occurrence of ancient words, names and forms fully bears out the archaeological evidence for very early Anglo-Saxon settlement in the Cambridge region. Moreover, tribal stem names are found in Swaffham and Saxon Street; in the names of Wisbech and the River Ouse the tribal name of the *Wisse* seems to have survived. This last point is interesting; for the group of dependent hamlets surrounding Wisbech in the fourteenth-century court and bailiff rolls, owing centralized suit, rents and labour dues, seem to fit well into the framework of an ancient *provincia* or *regio*. The terminal *-gē* element in Ely, combined with Bede's use of the word *regio* in describing it and its social and economic structure in the late Middle Ages, would not be incompatible with a similar settlement type in this area. Of the numerous illustrations of later history it is impossible to make a selection that will give a coherent story. The Danes, of course, leave their mark, especially along the river-ways; but the place names do not point to intensive settlement. In medieval times the many 'hithes' of the Fenland fully corroborate the important role of water transport in the Ely account rolls. We can see too the growth of Cambridge as a local market centre in the thirteenth century, with the corresponding growth of industry, as streets appear bearing the names of loriners, woolcombers and potters. In the same period Fenland assarts were giving rise to a host of names as well as swelling the rent roll and augmenting the desmesnes of the church of St Etheldreda. These names are even more numerous, indeed, than the many plots of Adventurers' and Undertakers' land of the seventeenth century: high tribute to the patient endeavour of the landlords and peasants of the medieval Fenland. It might finally be added that the production of this work in war-time, when so many difficulties beset the student, is in itself a considerable achievement.

E. MILLER

St John's College, Cambridge

JOSÉ LARRAZ LÓPEZ. *La época del mercantilismo en Castilla, 1500-1700*. (Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, Madrid. 1943.) This is an address of Señor Larraz on the occasion of his being admitted to the Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, and in it the author tries to present a picture of Castilian economics during the mercantilist period. To summarize Castilian 'mercantilism' (whatever that may mean) from 1500 to 1700 in a speech, even a speech over 130 pages long, is no easy task. According to Señor Larraz's

interpretation, in 1500 Castile still held a strong position as regards 'mass-factors' (population, area, colonies), and was ill-equipped with 'intensity-factors' (technique, capitalist form of production, export industries, etc.), while by 1700 her relative position had become worse in comparison with England and Holland, both in mass- and intensity-factors (pp. 11-20). During the second half of the sixteenth century Castilian prosperity came to an end. This Señor Larraz attributes to some ill-advised legislative measures and especially to the fact that owing to their industrial superiority foreign countries dominated Spanish trade with the West Indies (pp. 54-8). He also adheres to Bermudez Cañete's view that Spain's economic decline during the mercantilist period should be traced to the 'feeble development of our pre-capitalist era', that is to say, to the Middle Ages. Chapter III is of a controversial nature. Señor Larraz sets out to find early Spanish statements of the quantity theory of money. He examines Professor Hamilton's too cautious appraisal of Tomás de Mercado (1569); he repeats the unnecessary platitude that the quantity theory found in Hale's work is to be attributed to William Stafford, and also states Baudin's theory, and then makes a very good case for crediting Mercado with a quantity theory contemporary with and far more developed than Baudin's, coupled with a purchasing power parity theory (pp. 74-7). Furthermore, Señor Larraz contends that Mercado merely drew from earlier Spanish *jus-naturalist* writers who have been entirely ignored by other historians of economic thought. He finds a quantity theory in the writings of Azpilcueta (1556), Andrea de Portonariis (1553), Juan de Medina (1546), and others. Mercado thus forms part of a Spanish school of economists of the sixteenth century who knew the quantity theory of money. This he calls the 'School of Salamanca'. He discusses further the writings of some contemporary critics of Spanish economic policy. He considers Cellorigo (1600), Pedro de Valencia (undated), Fernández de Navarrete (1626) and Caxa de Leruela (1627) as critics of the policy of accumulation of treasure. The reviewer believes that Navarrete at least should not be included in this list. The passages which Señor Larraz quotes from his work are mere exceptions, and though Navarrete should not be considered as an ordinary bullionist, his interest in treasure is apparent throughout his book. He points to Mercado as a critic of Spanish commercial policy as regards Spanish America; to Struzzi (1624) as a critic of protectionism. Then he examines the views of several authors on Spanish intervention in European countries, and of those who wanted to strengthen Spanish policy of treasure accumulation and industrialization; of these he gives a lengthy appraisal of Luis Ortiz (1558) and Sancho de Moncada (who was influenced by the Italian Botero). Chapter V presents a picture of European economic development together with European economic thought. Señor Larraz misses at least one opportunity of pointing out a Spanish precedence over English mercantilists when (p. 108) he states that in the second half of the seventeenth century Petty and other writers introduced the idea of a due proportion of money. A Spanish political writer, Saavedra Fajardo, expressly stated the same idea before Petty. Finally, the work closes with a chapter on the policy which Castile should have followed from the national economic point of view; a chapter with a strong eighteenth-century mercantilistic flavour. Señor Larraz has tried to cover too wide a field in too few pages, without giving a balanced picture of Castilian economic history and thought. His most important contribution is to be found in Chapter III, where he convincingly shows that Tomás de Mercado had stated the quantity theory independently and at the same time, or nearly, as Baudin. But this chapter is almost out of place within the general framework of the book, which deals solely with economic policy and contemporary opinion on economic policy. Only passing remarks are made on taxes, agriculture, population, wages, luxury, shipping, etc. There are too many commonplaces on English, French and Dutch economic history or thought. It is apparent that Señor Larraz is unfamiliar with Heckscher's work. He attributes to Mun the idea that a prince should accumulate 'treasure' (p. 121), whereas this English mercantilist thought of a

state treasure not in gold and silver but in goods. On several occasions Montchrétien is presented as opposed to the accumulation of money, which at best cannot be proved merely by quoting two or three passages from the *Traicté*. Inconsistency is no charge when applied to mercantilists (p. 108), for if it were the whole body of mercantilist literature would be sheer rubbish. The expulsion of the *moriscos* is not even mentioned, and though the book deals only with Castile (a Castile which includes Galicia, Asturias, León, Castilla la Vieja, Extremadura, Castilla la Nueva, Murcia and Andalucía), and though the economic significance of the expulsion has recently been questioned by Professor Hamilton (from whom Señor Larraz draws heavily), it is still too important a fact not to be mentioned in a general survey of 'Castilian' economics, however brief, whether for refutation or acceptance of its importance. The general verdict on the book is thus a mixed one. One cannot but welcome every effort to give Spanish economic thought its proper place in the history of economic ideas; a place which has been consistently denied to it. Señor Larraz has done a good job and has not exaggerated the Spanish contribution to economic thought. It is only to be regretted that he has not gone deep enough into the economics of Spanish mercantilists.

JAVIER MÁRQUEZ

Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico

The Kenmare Manuscripts. Edited by EDWARD MACLYSAGHT. Irish MSS. Commission. (Dublin: Stationery Office. 1942. 30s.) The papers and manuscripts here edited from the collection of the Earl of Kenmare are of a varied and miscellaneous character. They include family correspondence, estate accounts and rentals, legal documents relating to the ownership of the Kenmare property during the period 1691-1768, and a collection of Wills, Patents, Surveys, Funeral Entries and Pedigrees. Students of economic history will be interested mainly in the estate accounts and rentals. These show, for example, that from about the year 1730 onwards tenants' arrears were practically unknown on the vast Kenmare estate of 120,000 acres, and that the annual value of the estate increased from £3000 to nearly £12,000. There is also a most valuable series of observations and 'remarks' on the tenants and on estate management drawn up between the years 1755 and 1757 by Thomas, the 4th Viscount. From the account books we learn that in the twenties of the eighteenth century butter fetched 26s. 1d. per firkin, oats from 8s. to 10s. per barrel, 40 sheep were bought for £11, a barrel of potatoes sold for 9s., while wheat ranged from 22s. to 24s. per barrel. A labouring man was paid at the rate of 5d. per day, a sawyer at 1s., and 5s. 5d. was the remuneration of one Thomas Roche, a huntsman, for 'searching for Leader, a hound that went astray'. There is no doubt that these papers furnish a clear and first-hand account of economic conditions in eighteenth-century Ireland. Apart from some few instances of careless proof-reading they have in the main been competently edited, with many explanatory footnotes. In addition, each section of the papers is preceded by a short introduction dealing with the documents contained in the section. The volume concludes with Indices of Persons and Places.

S. PENDER

University College, Cork

British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, 1824-1826. Edited for the Royal Historical Society by R. A. HUMPHREYS. Camden Third Series, Volume LXIII. (London. 1940.) Great Britain's recognition of the independent republics in Latin America was prompted as much by economic as by political motives. To be sure, it was designed as a bid for political prestige in Latin America and as an answer to the bid which the United States had made through President Monroe's declarations; but it was also intended to strengthen the commercial leadership which British enterprise had already won. By 1825,

when recognition of three of the new nations was accorded, British capitalists had already invested twenty million pounds sterling in loans, mines and trade, and British merchants had established themselves in every important sector of Spain's once formidable empire. As early as October 1823, the British government had sent to Latin America a score of consuls who were to ascertain and report upon the actual state of affairs. The information thus obtained was to be used by the ministry in determining which of the new states should be recognized, but it was also intended to satisfy entrepreneurs who were demanding fuller knowledge about the new El Dorado they envisaged. Sixteen of the general reports received from these consuls are brought together in the volume under review. Most of the consuls recounted with little restraint the bounteous returns which awaited those who would develop Latin America. 'The trade of the River Plate will be found susceptible of an immense extension' (p. 54). 'The trade of Chile... will indisputably increase' (p. 93). 'No part of this continent presents so fair a prospect of important advantages to British interests' (p. 299) as Guatemala. 'If this immense country (Mexico) was governed by an enlightened and liberal policy its capabilities are infinitely superior to any other of the American states' (p. 342). On the other hand, several of the consuls, impressed by the handicaps under which the nascent republics were labouring, emphasized the obstacles to quick profits. Fullest and most realistic of the reports are those prepared by Charles Milner Ricketts in Lima and the well-known Woodbine Parish in Buenos Aires. Considered collectively, the reports clearly indicate that a period of Anglo-American rivalry in Spanish America was to be the sequel to a century and a half of Anglo-French rivalry. The American statesmen who had vied with British leaders in promoting Latin American independence were in no mood to refuse Britain's commercial challenge. Thus they evolved the American System as a means of countering England's plans to tie the new nations to Europe. Through emphasis on the carrying trade and on products of the farm if not on products of the factory, the United States became a commercial rival whose influence British leaders could not disregard. The editorial work of Dr Humphreys sustains the high standard which the Royal Historical Society has preserved through the long chain of the Camden Series. By brief historical elaborations he clarifies obscure passages. By terse biographical sketches he illumines those personalities who receive only passing mention. By the frequent use of population estimates, shipping statistics and extensive tables of exports he refines the crude ore contained in the reports. The reference citations which enrich every chapter constitute an exhaustive working bibliography for the economic history of the period. All students of early national development in Spanish America will regret that war-time duties denied Dr Humphreys opportunity to prepare the fuller introduction he had planned. All will be grateful that he was able to complete the checking of text and notes. All will hope that he may one day complete the larger study to which this collection was intended to be preliminary.

HAROLD F. PETERSON

Buffalo, N.Y.

ALAN F. HATTERSLEY. *Portrait of a Colony. The Story of Natal*. (Cambridge University Press. 1940. 8s. 6d.) Professor Hattersley has provided us with as full and well-balanced an account of the development of this colony during the nineteenth century as his space allows. Although his book is not, as he writes, 'overloaded with the apparatus of criticism', it is obviously based on a thorough exploration of the relevant material, and it is a pity that this is not more fully set out. He is telling a relatively unfamiliar story, but it is one which any student of early Victorian colonial policy will find illuminating. For this reason one is tempted to be ungracious and regret that the author did not devote more space to the questions of emigration and settlement discussed in Chapters I and II or of the native in Chapter VIII. The general impression of colonial policy during

this period of the Second Empire's history is substantially borne out by these pages. It is surprising how little interest was, after all, displayed by the government in either the strategic or the economic potentialities of Natal; although it is true that the presence of coal at a time when steam communication was coming on the Indian route was one of the reasons for its annexation in 1843. It is again astonishing to notice the extraordinary lack of system in British emigration policy as late as the middle of the century and the fertile field which this offered, in consequence, to the swindler. The experiences related here of farming emigrants from Yorkshire are one more testimonial to the qualities of the settler and the part he played in building the new empire. J. E. TYLER

University of Sheffield

M. RUTHNASWAMY. *Some Influences that made the British Administration in India.* Being the Sir William Meyer lectures for 1936-37. (Luzac and Co. n.d. 215.) The author of the present work has striven to throw light on some of the influences which have affected the growth of the British administrative system in India and which, through that system, have helped to mould the development of the country and its peoples. For this purpose he has chosen four major influences: the Commercial Origins, the Army, Land Revenue and the Frontier. The final chapters deal with the reaction of the administrative machine upon the growth of the state and upon social and political ideas. Each of the factors chosen is of great though differing importance. All have a romance and fascination which make them interesting in themselves. Under 'Commercial Origins' the author deals with the beginnings of British rule in India, and shows a commercial company with a commercial outlook being changed into a territorial power with a limited imagination as to the urgency and extent of its new and growing responsibilities and duties. He shows how at first the commercial view warped the sense of political responsibility, the more so because 'the investment' loomed so large: he shows a period of gross corruption for which it is no defence to plead that the new masters were no more corrupt than the old, but one which soon called forth vigorous protest and reform. In trying to administer the country the Company enjoyed certain advantages not known to-day, the chief of which was the complete indifference of ordinary people. Against this must be set a territory or territories with a babel of languages, with totally different religions, with social customs completely alien to the new rulers, with different and complex systems of land ownership, revenue administration and police. It may seem obvious to-day that the only way was to employ Indians themselves not only in the lower posts but in the intermediate and higher ones. This was not so obvious then, especially as corruption among the Indian peoples was very gross. The line of least resistance was to rule by British officials. The author shows how this administration developed, and as we read we see it becoming ever more elaborate, though only partially successful in achieving an honest administration. Even where it succeeded it sacrificed elasticity and vitality and was strangled by a multitude of checks. The chapter on land revenue, while developing its own theme, serves mightily to illustrate this same fact. The land revenue system, while no more unique to India than the monsoon, is unique in its extraordinary development and ramifications. It is still the most important item in the Indian revenue, though it is less important now than formerly. But its importance is not merely an affair of revenue. Here is something which touches intimately the life of each cultivator and is so intricate that it has engrossed a very large share of the government's attention and absorbed much of the best talent of its servants. Sir Thomas Munro's saying 'whoever regulates the assessment of the land rent holds in his hands the peace of the country' is still largely true. Land revenue takes one into a fascinating though intricate world with an elaborate jargon of its own which, fortunately, is not confined to one language. It also takes one into the Indian village, in which the Collector acted not only as a revenue official. He acted also as a magistrate, and as such

was in charge of the police. Here again the author shows us the evolution of an elaborate system, the fumbblings of the administration as it felt its way towards a police system which should be honest and effective. The police bring us to the army. The army in the past played an active part in the making of British India, for it was very largely the instrument by which the country was brought together. True to the British tradition, the army was never allowed to dominate the country, but war was for a very long time almost chronic. Constantly increasing expenditure raised increasing demands on a slowly growing revenue. What was, for such a vast territory, a very small army, and one always inadequately armed, was always an upsetting factor for the Finance Member. From this came inevitable friction. The author has much to say on the army's influence for war, a point which he is inclined to over-emphasize. Under the title 'The Supreme Folly of the Army in India', the author touches on the Mutiny, which 'forms the Great Divide in British Indian history'. Considerable space is also devoted to the services and influence of the army in and on civil activities and administration, such as, on the political side, the police, to the Survey; and to its effect upon road and railway development. These non-military activities were partly due to a shortage of personnel on the civil side; partly it was a way of building up a reserve of officers. The army leads naturally to the 'Frontier', by which the author means the North-West Frontier. From the Frontier we come to the influence exerted by the administration itself with its great secretariats. Here is the tragedy of British rule. That there should be such organizations was inevitable and is not peculiar to India. That they should crush the human element and stifle initiative was inevitable in the absence of a well-directed public opinion. The author writes: 'the regrets over the passing of personal rule in British administration are not vain but founded on ideas of true statesmanship... The easy accessibility of the district official to the people of the district was the sheet-anchor of British administration in the days of its foundation. It built up the administrative fame of a Malcolm, a Munro, an Edwardes, an Elphinstone, a Henry Lawrence and a John Lawrence.' The final chapter on social and political ideas is the least satisfying in the book. It is largely devoted to the history of the development of certain political ideas such as that of Lapse, of Paramountcy and the Agency system. The reference to social ideas is much slighter and deals chiefly with the abolition of Sati, infanticide and slavery, and with education. On the whole this book is well worth reading.

W. S. THATCHER

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PAUL KNAPLUND. *The British Empire, 1815-1939*. (Hamish Hamilton. 1942. 18s.) This clear, impartial and instructive study of the British Empire is the work of an American scholar who emigrated as a young man from Norway to the United States. Birth, upbringing and environment, Professor Knaplund states in his foreword, made him a strong believer in political democracy. The history of England and the British Empire attracted him because in it he found 'the best modern exemplification of attempts to apply the basic principles of freedom on a scale not only national but world embracing'. The purpose of his book is to provide a series of short surveys of imperial history from 1815 (with occasional backward glances to earlier times) to the outbreak of war in 1939. In them he stresses those aspects which he considers to be the more salient features of imperial expansion and policy, and it is one of the many merits of his work that, while dealing primarily with the political and constitutional aspects of the Empire he is concerned to show that the British Empire, in the course of the nineteenth century, came to represent 'not so much a political system as a way of life'. 'The international system of commerce' which the adoption of free trade made possible is not ignored, as it too commonly is in histories of the Empire, though its importance could with advantage be given

greater emphasis, for free trade, as Professor Brogan points out in the Preface, gave economic interests in all parts of the world 'a stake in the stability and prosperity of the Empire' and contributed in no small degree to its increasing power. It is perhaps ungrateful to a book so fair and balanced to regret the stress on matters legal, political and commercial to the detriment of the administrative side of imperial history, which demands and deserves greater consideration than is here given to it, and to deplore the disproportionate amount of space given to the Dominions to the neglect of the colonial empire in general and the African colonies in particular. Moreover, the division of the book into four periods, 1815-37, 1837-70, 1870-1901, 1901-39 with descriptive headings, though of help in presenting a systematic survey of imperial development, introduces a rigid and at times an artificial chronology into a subject which does not readily lend itself to such treatment. Movement towards the common end of self-government is clearly discernible throughout the century, but the pace and character of the movement has lacked uniformity.

M. G. JONES

Girton College, Cambridge

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ. *England's Road to Social Security*. (University of Pennsylvania Press and Oxford University Press. 1943. 15s.) This book deals with the problems of social security in England, such as public relief and assistance, social insurance, charity and voluntary social services, from the Statute of Labourers in 1349 up to our times. It may be regarded as a useful and welcome introduction for laymen and beginners in the study of economic history, but it is certainly not more than that. The author seems to believe that there was a continuous trend towards greater social security from the Middle Ages until the arrival of the Beveridge Report. He ignores entirely that wide difference, both in the aspect of social security and in its administrative machinery, before and after the Puritan Revolution. This is not surprising as he has taken no notice of the fundamental and valuable sociological factors brought to light by the diligent socio-religious research of Max Weber, Troeltsch, R. H. Tawney, Amintore Fanfani, v. Kostanecki and many others. Even works preceding this modern trend of research, such as those by Brentano or Aschrott, have not been utilized. The factual description is full of regrettable deficiencies. The author does not deal with the pauper funeral nor with the early scandalous history of Industrial Assurance, which he wrongly calls industrial insurance. He does not mention the evils of the first Friendly Societies and the criticism of them, from Sir Frederic Eden to Sir Stafford Northcote's commission. He does not seem to have a very complete conception of what Approved Societies are and why they were so sharply criticized by the Royal Commission on National Health Insurance in 1926. In order to understand 'England's Road to Social Security' one must, surely, acquaint oneself with the findings of the more important advisory bodies. The author has not even informed his readers about the fundamental changes of attitude towards 'employers' liability' which have taken place since the middle of the nineteenth century, and which paved the way for industrial accident insurance. Even his contention that his own country has derived 'everything' in respect of greater social security from the experience of English statutes is far from correct. The development of workmen's compensation schemes in the U.S.A. was influenced fundamentally by the German pattern (not unlike the famous scheme in Ontario) and most American workmen's compensation schemes bear far more resemblance to other and better types of administration than to that existing in Britain. He thinks that the Beveridge plan will lead the English masses 'to the top of the hill called Clear', but he omits to instruct his readers that a study of the publications of the International Labour Office would reveal to them that many of the proposed benefits of the plan represent as a maximum what other countries have long since adopted as a minimum. These

and other deficiencies make Mr de Schweinitz's book an instrument of rudimentary reference rather than a source of enlightenment.

HERMANN LEVY

Richmond, Surrey

RALPH M. HOWER. *History of Macy's of New York, 1858-1919. Chapters in the Evolution of the Department Store.* (Harvard University Press. 1943. pp. xxviii + 500. \$3.75.) The latest volume in 'Harvard Studies in Business History' breaks new ground. There has not until now been any satisfactory history of the growth and functioning of the department store. G. d'Avenel did useful pioneer work for the Paris shops, and there are lives of English pioneers like William Whiteley and of Americans like John Wanamaker. But these are unsatisfactory for a basic reason; they are not made intelligible by figures, by accounting. As Professor Hower points out, even so great and up-to-date an establishment as Macy's did not bring its own cost-accounting up to any reasonably efficient standard till fifty odd years after its foundation. And the early records are inadequate for the usual reason, that business records were badly kept at the time and rapidly lost altogether. So there are a number of important questions about the early history of Macy's to which we can have no adequate answer. And as there is no study comparable to this for any other store, we have to assume that what was true of Macy's was true of Wanamaker's or Marshall Field's and the other great stores as well. The assumption is probably justified, but Professor Hower warns us that it is an assumption. And because it has to be an assumption, we have to hedge a little in assessing the share good and bad management had in the growth of Macy's as compared with such outside influences as the trend of the general price level.

The great merit, the pioneering aspect of this book, is to be found in its analysis of the figures of the business. They illustrate a great many things, from the price of horses to the level of female wages. But they also illustrate some economic truths or plausible guesses about retail trade. It is evident that Professor Hower has some scepticism about the economic merits of much modern department store practice. Far from thinking that the customer is always right, he describes him (it is nearly always her) as a 'spoiled brat'. It is evident, too, that Professor Hower regards much of the service aspect of the modern store as quite as much a 'loss leader' as below cost articles are. The general policy of Macy's has been to concentrate on low prices. 'It's smart to be thrifty.' They have, until very recent times, refused to allow charge accounts and even now make credit customers pay for the credit. Their refusal to support minimum prices for branded goods has got them into much generally successful litigation and has involved them in some awkward rows. Professor Hower hesitates between the advantages of limiting the 'anarchy of the market' and the classical merits of competition by price.

There is naturally a good deal of social as apart from economic history in this book, and there is a good deal of entertainment too, for Professor Hower does not neglect the personal aspects of the history of the store. His style is occasionally agreeably bland, as when he disposes of the rumour that the marriage of one of the Macy partners, Webster, to the widow of another was purely mercenary. 'Mrs Webster's subsequent conduct, according to a number of persons who knew her, strongly indicated that she was not one to be willingly deprived of male companionship, and the initiative may well have been hers.' Such a marriage played a part in the last years of A. T. Stewart's, and romance seems to bud naturally enough in these emporia, as the movies have pointed out. The difficulty of eliminating open or disguised bribery among the buyers was too much for the older generation. 'It was hard enough to find buyers who possessed executive ability and a sense of merchandise values, without adding strict honesty to the list of qualifications.' The great development of Macy's under the second and third generation of the Straus family is to be discussed in the

next volume, in which Macy's becomes the greatest department store in the world. It should be first-class. Since Professor Hower expresses natural surprise at such public-spirited citizens as the Strauses being tolerant of Tammany Hall, it is worth noting that the name 'Hugh Grant' given by Nathan to one of his sons was that of a Tammany mayor. And should not the objection to negro elevator operators noted on p. 383 be attributed to southern rather than northern customers?

D. W. BROGAN

Peterhouse, Cambridge.

JOSEF HANČ, *Eastern Europe* (Museum Press, London. 1943. 12s. 6d.). This book deals briefly with the development since the war of 1914 of the Balkan, Central European and Baltic states which lie between Germany and Soviet Russia. The survey is mainly political in character but economic factors are not ignored. The author points out that in eastern Europe before 1914 'the struggle for social opportunities and economic freedom was inseparably connected with the fight for national liberation'. 'While resisting political oppressors, the submerged nations were at the same time struggling against their economic exploiters, whether they were holders of land monopoly or owners of the means of industrial production.' Between the two wars these states for the most part adopted policies of economic nationalism. The world economic crisis struck them with special violence. Little success attended negotiations in 1929-32 between Danubian countries concerning the possibility of improving matters by lowering tariffs. The author gives some account of Germany's economic penetration of eastern Europe both before and after the outbreak of war in 1939.

W. O. HENDERSON

University of Leeds

LIST OF BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA¹

*The place of publication is New York and the date is 1942 unless
otherwise stated*

BY HENRIETTA M. LARSON

I. BOOKS

- ALBION, R. G. and POPE, J. B. *Sea Lanes in Wartime: The American Experience (1775-1942)*. Pp. 288. \$3. Norton.
- ALLEN, RUTH A. *Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas*. University of Texas, Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences, Publication No. 4143. Pp. 258. Gratis. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1941.
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- BOGART, ERNEST L. *Economic History of Europe, 1760-1939*. Pp. 734. \$4.50. Longmans, Green and Co.
- BOGART, ERNEST L. and KEMMERER, DONALD L. *Economic History of the American People*. Pp. 909. \$3.75. Longmans, Green and Co.
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- BOYDEN, ALBERT. *Ropes-Gray, 1865-1940*. Pp. 215. Boston: Privately printed by the author.
- BURLINGAME, MERRILL G. *The Montana Frontier*. Pp. xiii + 418. \$2.50. Helena: State Publishing Co.
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¹ This list also includes a number of American books and articles on the economic history of countries other than the United States and Canada.

- BURTON, E. MILBY. *South Carolina Silversmiths, 1690-1860*. Pp. xviii + 311. Cloth, \$3.50, paper, \$2.50. Charleston: Charleston Museum Press.
- CALDWELL, NORMAN WARD. *The French in the Mississippi Valley, 1740-1750*. Pp. 113. \$2. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1941.
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- DALE, EDWARD E. *Cow Country*. Pp. ix + 265. \$2.75. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- DAY, CLIVE. *Economic Development in Europe*. Pp. 745. \$4. Macmillan.
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- HAFEN, LEROY F. (editor). *Overland Routes to the Gold Fields, 1859. From Contemporary Diaries*. Pp. 320. \$6. Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark Co.
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- HECK, EARL L. W. *Augustine Herrmann, Beginner of the Virginia Tobacco Trade, Merchant of New Amsterdam, and First Lord of Bohemia Manor*. Pp. 123. \$2. Englewood, Ohio: The Author. 1941.
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- LANDON, FRED. *Western Ontario and the American Frontier*. Pp. xvi + 305. \$3.50. Toronto: Ryerson Press. 1941.
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- TRACHTENBERG, ALEXANDER. *The History of Legislation for the Protection of Coal Miners in Pennsylvania, 1824-1915*. Pp. 239. \$2.75. International Publishers.
- U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. *Changes in Distribution of Manufacturing Wage Earners, 1899-1939*. Pp. 268. 30 cents. Washington: Government Printing Office.
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THE RISE OF A MONEY ECONOMY

By M. M. POSTAN

I

THE 'rise of a money economy' is one of the residuary hypotheses of economic history; a *deus ex machina* to be called upon when no other explanation is available. The subject of economic history is sufficiently new to contain problems which economic historians have not yet had time to resolve, and problems which have not yet been resolved lend themselves only too easily to generalized explanations. These stop-gap generalities have not so far been described or catalogued. But a critical reader would probably recognize them without the aid of a cautionary table. For most of them are little more than invocations of sociological theories underlying the Victorian idea of progress.

One such invocation is the so-called 'rise of the middle classes'. Eileen Power and others have already pointed out how frequently the middle-class formula has been used to bridge gaps in historical knowledge. The recipe has been to credit the rising middle classes with almost every revolutionary event of European culture to which a more specific cause has not yet been assigned. If towns grew in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, this was due to the rise of the middle classes; if lay culture and religious dissent flourished in the late twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries, this was also due to the rise of the middle classes. So, if we are to believe some writers, was the consolidation of national monarchies in England and France in the later Middle Ages, the dissolution of feudal power in the fifteenth century, the Reformation, the Tudor despotism, the Elizabethan renaissance, the scientific development of the seventeenth century, the Puritan revolution, the economic liberalism and the sentimental novel of the eighteenth century. In fact the martyrdom of Poland and the Russian revolution are very nearly the only historical phenomena which nobody has yet thought fit to lay at the door of the newly born bourgeoisie.

The very range of the occasions on which the formula has been employed is sufficient to warn us against its employment. Yet *au fond* its applications are not as absurd as they appear when strung together. Like

most current sociological generalizations, the middle-class formula contains a modicum of truth without which it would not have found its way into otherwise creditable writings. At one time or another the middle classes must have risen; at some time or other they must have grown; and from their rise or their growth historical consequences were bound to follow. There is, therefore, nothing *a priori* wrong in an attempt to consider the rising middle classes as an important historical event. What is wrong is the frequent assumption that the middle classes rose suddenly at a clearly recognizable point in the past, and that, having risen, they went on growing in number and strength all through subsequent history. Equally erroneous is the notion that the most significant feature in the history of the middle classes was their increase. Eileen Power has shown that in the English Middle Ages the birthday of the bourgeoisie, the precise century or year when it first made its appearance, is impossible to discover. The English middle classes are as old as English history, and their record is not one of continuous and uninterrupted growth. Gauged by their power and wealth they were more prominent in the early fourteenth century than in the fifteenth, and were more 'capitalistic' in the free conditions of the early Middle Ages than they were to become in the more rigidly regulated economy of the later Middle Ages.¹ Indeed, students will find that the changes in the structure, outlook and behaviour of the middle classes are much more significant than the mere swelling of their numbers or the inflation of their power through consecutive centuries of English history.

II

Another such formula is the 'rise of money economy'. Ever since the days of Cunningham and Thorold Rogers money economy has been repeatedly called in to help in dealing with recalcitrant problems of economic history—sometimes the same kind of problems as those which had elsewhere been 'palmed off' on the middle classes.² Historians have frequently taken it for granted that a money economy, like the bourgeoisie, arose at a single point of English history, usually at a point best suited to their argument. They have thus been able to ascribe to the rising money economy an infinite variety of phenomena: the transformation of the Anglo-Saxon society in the tenth and the eleventh centuries, the rise of towns in the eleventh and twelfth, the development of royal taxation in the twelfth and thirteenth, the commutation of services in the thirteenth and fourteenth, and several features of the English renaissance in the sixteenth. All these and many other events, widely separated in time and space, have been explained as due to the rise of money economy.

¹ Eileen Power, *The Wool Trade in English Medieval History* (Oxford, 1941), chap. vi.

² E.g. W. Cunningham, *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 1 (5th ed. Cambridge, 1910), 22, 242, 458, 546, etc.; E. Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, 1 (7th ed. 1937), 94, 102, 105, 608. On the other hand, Ashley, when he wrote his famous text-book, refused to be drawn into the prejudices of his time, and did not even mention money economy by name.

Needless to say, in some contexts the formula is more convincing than in others. Its terms—the words money economy and more still the word rise—have been used in many different senses; but it is only in one of its many connotations that it has a meaning sufficiently clear, and some foundation in fact. In all its other senses it is more or less untrue, and from the point of view of European and English history more or less irrelevant.

It is least relevant when it happens to be used in its simplest and most direct sense. If the word rise is taken to mean the birth or the first appearance, and the term money economy is employed to point the contrast with economies in which trade is altogether absent or else is conducted without money, the formula cannot be of much importance. It could mean nothing to medieval historians, who have used it most often, even if it might mean something to archaeologists, who have hardly used it at all.

I do not want to deny that a money economy in this sense must have appeared at one time or another on the continent of Europe, and that at some primitive stage in their development the European peoples were innocent of trade, or at least unfamiliar with the use of money. But this condition, if it ever existed, must have disappeared earlier than the earliest point at which European history can be said to begin. Have not the archaeologists traced interregional trade into neolithic days and was not at least one pre-historic civilization—the Bronze Age—dependent on international exchanges for the very metal from which it derived its name?¹ The use of money in trade may have been more recent than trade itself, but, however recent, it goes far beyond the beginnings of European civilization and is probably older than the oldest of the written records.

Money had apparently been current on this island long before the Romans came, and had been known to Angles, Saxons and Jutes before they invaded this country. Since then their institutions, their pattern of obligations and their economic life never ceased to reflect their familiarity with money. The oldest Anglo-Saxon laws, those of the sixth-century kings of Kent, fix murder fines in money terms, and so do the Anglo-Saxon laws of the subsequent centuries. And blood fines were not the only payments and obligations to be expressed in Anglo-Saxon documents in money terms. Professor Stenton has recently reminded us that one of the earliest payments to the Church, the plough-penny, may date back to as early as the seventh century.² The most important Anglo-Saxon payment to the Church, that of churchscot, may have been paid in kind, for it was similar to the tithe

¹ The only comprehensive account of prehistoric trade in all its aspects is that given by W. Stein in Ebert's *Reallexikon der Altertumskunde*. But since Stein wrote, very numerous studies of a prehistoric trade in different regions of northern Europe have appeared in various archaeological publications. In these studies the vital importance of long-distance trade in the Bronze Age has been brought out very clearly. On the part played in this trade by the British Isles see S. Pigott, 'The Early Bronze Age in Wessex', *Proc. Prehist. Soc.* (1938).

² F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford, 1943), p. 152. Here, as elsewhere in his book, Professor Stenton has shown that it is possible to deal with the economic phenomena of the distant past without invoking the money economy in general.

of later centuries. But this was not a mark of natural economy, for failure to pay churchscot was apparently punished by a money fine. The principal agricultural imposts payable to the king were food rents from his estates and were, therefore, for a long time paid in kind. But long before the Conquest some of these rents had been paid in money.¹ Revenues, such as the gelds for specific purposes, and above all the Danegeld, were expressed in money units: so also were various payments between private persons. Men buying estates paid for them with lump sums of money. A payment of a thousand shillings for an estate has been recorded as early as Offa's reign.² The innumerable customary payments of ancient origin listed by Miss Neilson³ appear for the first time in English records as 'pennies' of one kind or another, or in other words, as cash payments. There were numerous public payments, or to be more exact royal dues, which had become assimilated to feudal rent; the hidage, the cornage, the sheriff-silver, the wardpenny. And there were also payments in lieu of obligations more purely manorial; the heddornwerch, the woodpenny, the shernsilver, the hedgingsilver, the bedripsilver, the averpenny, and numerous other pennies and silvers in lieu of ancient labour services on land. Few of them are mentioned in documents before the twelfth century, but their character as well as their etymology are clearly Anglo-Saxon.

All this evidence of pre-medieval money payments has been known to historians since the very beginnings of medieval scholarship: yet it has not prevented them from placing the rise of a money economy centuries later than the recorded dates of Anglo-Saxon money transactions. This inconsistency has sometimes been justified on theoretical grounds. In accordance with the terminological distinctions of modern economics, some historians have been inclined to explain away the early references to money on the ground that in the Anglo-Saxon period, as in the early centuries of the Middle Ages, money units were employed to measure obligations and not to make payments. In the jargon of the economist, money was a unit of account and not a medium of exchange.

For this distinction no historical proof has so far been adduced. What the facts tell us is that certain payments were reckoned in money, and unless the contrary is proved the conclusion must be that payments would not be thus reckoned unless they were also thus discharged. Other facts tell us that in this country gold was coined and circulated before the Roman conquest. Anglo-Saxon money was coined at least as early as the sixth century and was received, exported and hoarded by foreigners trading with

¹ The story of the commutation of the royal farms into money derives from the author of *Dialogus de Scaccario*, Bishop Richard, who himself got it from hearsay. But his dates, if not his other details, are somewhat doubtful. Cf. R. L. Poole, *Exchequer in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford, 1912), p. 27. In fact, as Professor Stenton points out, the traces of an organized financial system in England are 'unexpectedly remote'. There were rudiments of a national treasury in the ninth century (*op. cit.* p. 635). See also E. Lipson, *op. cit.* p. 602.

² W. de G. Birch, *Cartularium Saxonicum*, I (1885), no. 271.

³ N. Neilson, *Customary Rents* (Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, vol. II, 1910), pp. 50 seq. and 114 seq.

England at least as early as the eighth century.¹ There can thus be no doubt that money was in fact employed in payment, and was not an abstract standard of value.

The whole argument that the use of money and coins for reckoning came sooner or easier to the primitive man than the handing over of coins in payment is not borne out by either archaeological or anthropological evidence, and is a pure piece of *a priori* reasoning. And until a better argument is found or better evidence is adduced, references in early documents to money payments must be understood in their literal sense. The onus of proof belongs to those who believe that obligations, though expressed in money, were discharged in other ways.

Thus, from the point of view of English history, and even from that of medieval and Anglo-Saxon history, the rise of a money economy in the sense of its first appearance has no historical meaning. Money was in use when documented history begins, and its rise cannot be adduced as an explanation of any later phenomenon.

III

The formula means more when used in its vaguer and more general sense. The expression 'money economy' can be taken to mean the relative frequency of money payments, while the word 'rise' can be used to denote not their birthday but their general expansion. In this sense the growth of a money economy means merely an increase in the relative volume of money payments and is something economists can understand and historians can test. For in this sense the process is historically not very different from what other historians prefer to describe as the rise of exchange economy and the decline of a natural economy.

Recently historians have cast some doubt and even a little aspersion upon the notion of a natural economy. It is now usual to argue that in all periods of recorded history men depended upon trade and markets, and that 'pure' natural economy was never known in Europe. Nevertheless, the fundamental principle underlying the distinction has not been wholly destroyed. Even if economies wholly natural never existed, economies partly natural did. The economic condition of European societies at every stage of their existence was more or less natural and more or less self-sufficient; sometimes more and sometimes less. And it is in these changes towards or away from natural economy that the real meaning of the rise of a money economy will be found.

Indeed, the history of mankind, and still more the history of Europe, is marked by recurrent phases of active exchanges. No student of the thirteenth century will fail to notice not only an over-all increase in agricultural and industrial production, but also a greater emphasis on produc-

¹ Though in Professor Stenton's words 'the continuous history of English currency begins with Offa' (*op. cit.* p. 220), some Anglo-Saxon coins are much older. C. F. Keary, *A Catalogue of English Coins in the British Museum*, 1 (1887), p. vi. See also H. A. Grueber, *Handbook of the Coins of Great Britain and Ireland in the British Museum* (1889), pp. i-x.

tion for sale and the spread of more or less capitalistic agriculture on large estates, and the consequent growth of towns, markets and mercantile classes. Similar changes in the sixteenth or the eighteenth centuries are so familiar that some historians find them too trivial even to be worth mentioning. Used in this sense, the formula of the rise of money economy points to a real social process, easy to identify and dangerous to miss.

Yet even in this sense the formula is sometimes wrapped up in a great deal of theory and mysticism, or else hitched to irrelevant facts. The most irrelevant of the facts with which it is sometimes identified is the so-called increase of money. How often are we told that the rise of money economy followed the influx of precious metals from this and that corner of the world? And yet how seldom are we told how and why this should have happened. The growth of money economy, if it is to mean anything at all, signifies an increase in payments, not an increase in bullion or paper money. Needless to say, a growing quantity of money can have and has had important consequences. Historians and economists will easily find instances of social transformations brought about by additions to the mere volume of the circulating medium. Situations of this kind recurred several times in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There was the well-known and much publicized increase in bullion in the sixteenth century, and a similar influx may also have occurred in the late twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. Yet by no means all these events necessarily led to any of the consequences with which the rise of money economy is commonly credited.

The influx of bullion could have different effects at different times. In periods and societies unaccustomed to money but otherwise fond of gold, an increase in the supply of precious metals would only make plate and gold buckles more abundant. In periods when gold and silver were mainly used as mediums of exchange, the chief effect of their increase would be to raise the level of prices.¹ As prices rose and fell, social relations—and money economy with them—were bound to change. Yet at the cost of a little pedantry historians will do well to consider such changes as products of price revolutions, not as consequences of more abundant bullion.

To say, therefore, (as it is sometimes said) that in the thirteenth century commerce grew because the money economy was rising, and then to proceed to account for the latter by the influx of gold and bullion from the east, is to be wrong not only in fact (throughout the Middle Ages trade with the east set up bullion movements flowing from west to east, not from east to west) but also in logic. Prices were apparently buoyant all through that period, and as they rose some people may have felt inclined to use their money more frequently or else to produce for sale more than they would otherwise have done. But it is not at all certain that the rise in prices was due to an influx of precious metals, and it is certain that the expansion of trade was not solely due to the rise in prices. Peace, the

¹ Even that was by no means inevitable, for new bullion was sometimes absorbed without raising prices, and conversely, prices could rise independently of supplies of gold and silver.

growth of population, the expansion of settlement, the improvements in commercial and financial technique, all played their part in breaking up the self-sufficiency of local markets and in commercializing the economic activities of men.

What is true of the thirteenth century is also true of many other periods. Some of the best-known instances of commutation, i.e. of transition from payments in kind to payments in money, occurred at the time when prices were falling and the quantity of circulating medium presumably declined. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries substitution of money payments for labour services followed from the falling agricultural prices and from the general agricultural depression of the times. A still earlier wave of commutations, that of the early twelfth century, was not, apparently, preceded by any clearly defined movements of prices and possibly 'straddled' across two contrary cycles—a fall followed by a rise. Its explanation will probably be found in the general economic and political insecurity of the age, which made it difficult for landlords to control production in their outlying estates, to exact labour services and to move large quantities of agricultural produce across the country.

In short, the rise of a money economy in the sense of greater preponderance of money payments is not identical with the greater abundance of money itself. More gold and silver could sometimes result in higher prices; higher prices could sometimes raise the relative volume of money transactions. But in general the volume of money transactions was an historical phenomenon of composite origin and reflecting an infinite variety of causes, social, economic and political.

IV

Thus the rise of a money economy has a meaning wider and more general than that of mere currency inflation. Yet it is also possible to view it in too broad and too diffuse a light, or, as I have said elsewhere, to wrap it in too much sublimity and metaphysics. Now and again it has been interpreted as one of those inexorable tendencies of human progress of which the nineteenth century sociologists—Spencer, Buckle, Marx and Comte—were inordinately fond. In some writings, and especially in some German writings, the rise of money economy figures as a permanent tendency of historical development and as an ever-unfolding manifestation of the progressive destinies of humanity.

In reality it is none of these things. It is certainly not uninterrupted, and in that sense not progressive. Until the Industrial Revolution it was nothing more than a recurrent economic phenomenon unconnected with any elemental and mystical tendencies of human history, or with secular changes of human behaviour. The history of western Europe, and for that matter the history of the world, is not a continuous record of expanding exchanges. The unbroken growth of world trade between the beginning of the eighteenth century and the end of the nineteenth has misled historians into believing that the growth of world trade had been equally

unbroken in the past. Medievalists and historians of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries should be guilty of no such delusion. In so far as growing money economy depended on growing production, it could not possibly be continuous, for the simple reason that world production itself did not grow progressively or continuously. In this country there was a protracted slump in the late fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries; possibly also a slump at the turn of the Anglo-Saxon and Norman periods. I do not know whether anything in the nature of an economic recession intervened in the middle decades of the seventeenth century, but there is no doubt that the rate of growth, if growth there was, was at that time much retarded. Abroad, the history of the last twelve hundred years was repeatedly punctuated by local falls in production and incomes. In short, cumulative increases in world production, now taken for granted by economists and politicians, are all too recent to be considered eternal, still less primeval.

It will, of course, be argued (and this also happens to be my view) that a money economy in the true sense of the term depended for its development, not so much on a general increase in production as on those subtler historical changes which led men away from domestic self-sufficiency and directed them towards shops and market places. But changes of this character were even less continuous and less progressive than the purely material record of world output. No historian will be unhistorical enough to lump together all the occasions when humanity forsook the habits of natural economy and showed a preference for buying and selling. This may have happened in the twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries because peace reigned, because law was observed, because prices were buoyant, population was rising and more mouths had to be fed. This may have happened in the sixteenth century because prices were rising, but also because new riches were brought in by English merchants from abroad, and because new needs were following in the wake of the renaissance. Commercial production may have expanded in the eighteenth century because population was growing, because international trade was bringing in new wealth, while human ingenuity was finding new and profitable ways for employing capital in commercial production. American farmers may have gone over to cash crops in the second half of the nineteenth century because the very condition of their settlements in the middle west forced them to produce for sale; also because the virgin prairie made it possible for them to produce cheaply, while the new railways made it possible for the produce to be carried away; but chiefly because for political and social reasons the cash nexus had begun to penetrate the entire social fabric of the United States. The African natives may be producing for the market because of the incidence of colonial taxation; the Russian peasants because of the state policy of capital accumulation. From this point of view there was not one rise of money economy but several rises of several money economies. There was a series of independent peaks with a different road to each, and no peak except the last ever opened the prospect of continuous rises unbroken by descents.

For descents there doubtless were, and I have already mentioned some of them. In France at the end of the eighteenth century, in Germany during and after the Thirty Years' War, all over the continent during the religious wars, during the troubles of the fifteenth century, during the conquests and migrations of the ninth and tenth centuries; at all these places and times economic activity declined or remained stagnant, and material life became more local and self-sufficient. These were times of a more or less general retreat from a money economy.

V

'More or less general': the reason why I am reluctant to commit myself to a more sweeping statement is that movements towards greater money economy, as well as movements away from it, were not only less continuous than people imagine but also less general. General recessions or general expansions of economic activity affecting every branch of agriculture, industry and trade were common enough, but general changes in the relative volume of money transactions were much less common. I doubt whether history could show a single example of the use of money expanding, so to speak, all along the line, unchecked and unbroken by local retreats. Let us look again at the English medieval examples which I have already mentioned. I have cited the fifteenth century as a period of declining trade, of growing self-sufficiency and, therefore, a good example of declining money economy. But while this generalization holds good of most departments of fifteenth-century life and justifies my general verdict on the epoch, it does not apply to the labour market. For, as I have already pointed out, and as every schoolboy knows, the fifteenth century was also the time when labour services were being commuted and money payments were being substituted for labour dues. No wonder the economic historians who approached the period entirely from the point of view of agricultural labour jumped to the conclusion that the age was one of a rising money economy.¹ A clear contrast to the fifteenth century was presented by the thirteenth. At that time the general movement was towards bigger and better trade; more was produced and a greater share of what was produced went to the market. Yet in the employment of labour a contrary tendency prevailed. The lords endeavoured to enforce labour services to their legal maximum, to exact them in kind wherever their sales were optional, and to impose new services wherever the legal position was vague enough to permit it.² To an historian looking at the period from the point of view of labour it might well appear as one of a declining money economy.

Similar examples could be found in other periods and other countries. They all suggest that the changes in the so-called 'money economy' have been less uniform than the formula of money economy would suggest to

¹ E.g. A. E. Levett, *The Black Death on the Estates of the See of Winchester* (Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, vol. v, 1916), *passim*, but esp. pp. 154-8.

² M. Postan, 'The Chronology of Labour Services', in *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.* Fourth Series, xx (1937), 169-93.

the uninitiated. But nothing reveals the complexity of the process and the dangers of the formula better than the so-called 'farm'.

In present-day language the word 'farm' connotes the typical English unit of agricultural enterprise, but it derives from the more restricted term which was used in the later Middle Ages and in the early centuries of the modern era to denote a common type of contractual tenancy. It was a form of lease established on land (usually on his demesne) which had previously yielded to the lord a fluctuating income, in order to provide him with a stable, i.e. 'firm', annual income. In this sense a 'farm' was not a purely agricultural term, but applied to all transactions of 'farming out', i.e. letting out a fluctuating source of income for a fixed annual sum. There was a sheriff's farm, whereby a fixed annual sum was substituted for the hitherto variable revenues from royal villis and from other miscellaneous sources; the *firma burghi*, by which boroughs undertook to discharge their many and various payments to their overlord, usually the king, in a fixed annual sum; 'farms' of customs and so forth. Thus, on the whole, the creation of a 'farm' indicated a desire on the part of the owner to stabilize his income; a desire which would be most acutely felt at times when the revenues fluctuated unduly or else showed a tendency to fall. And this would, as a rule, suggest conditions of an economic slump and could be interpreted as a superficial symptom of an economic depression. But it cannot be safely used as a symptom of either a rising or a declining money economy.

On some manors of the late fourteenth and the early fifteenth centuries, farms were created on demesnes which had previously provided the lord's household with its provisions. These farms clearly meant a change towards a money economy and a further step towards the commercialization of agriculture. But they meant nothing of the sort wherever and whenever they were introduced, as they were now and again throughout the Middle Ages, in outlying manors in substitution for fluctuating rents and money payments. And they may mean all sorts of things when they appear in the garb in which we meet them in the eleventh and the early twelfth centuries—that of manorial and monastic *feorms*.

In the earliest manorial surveys available to us, mostly those of the twelfth century, and in all other documents dealing with the financial organization of large estates in the closing century of the Anglo-Saxon era and the first century of the Norman rule, we invariably find some if not most manors held by *firmarii* for a payment of a time-farm, i.e. a fixed payment representing the landlord's sustenance for a definite period—a month, a week, a day. This might be a *firma unius nocti* on royal manors or a week's *feorm* in a manor belonging to the canons of St Paul's or the monks of Christchurch, Canterbury. But in each case the arrangement would be roughly the same: a fixed payment, largely in kind, but often also in money, would be due from the manor at a fixed date.

This arrangement has been known to historians ever since the days of Spelman and Dugdale; more recently it was described by E. H. Hale in his introduction to the Domesday of St Paul's; and more recently still by several

students of early monasticism.¹ Yet I doubt whether the historical and economic meaning of the transaction has always been understood. Historians have sometimes been misled by the deliveries in kind which characterize the Benedictine method of estate management into believing that what they are dealing with is a primitive stage in manorial economy; a stage still characterized by direct payments in produce. The end of this stage is usually described as a 'commutation' of direct deliveries of produce, and as a substitution of a money economy for payments in kind.

This interpretation of the *feorm* is not wholly wrong, but it is certainly out of focus. The fact that some or most monastic *feorms* were fixed in kind was not the only element of the transaction. In fact many of them were paid in money, or at least in both produce and money. The Benedictine landlords always ran their 'headquarter estates' for the sake of their produce. But on all other estates the characteristic feature of the payments was not that they were made in kind but that they were fixed and firm. At the time when they were established they denoted not so much a choice between produce and money as a choice between fluctuating income and fixed income; and the historical situation they represented was not that of natural economy but that in which landlords happened to prefer fixed yield to fluctuating profits from rent and cultivation.

From this point of view the *feorm* of the eleventh century is not fundamentally different from the 'farm' of the fifteenth.² Neither can be represented as in any way primitive or in any way concerned with the general development of a money economy. Both are natural reactions of landlords to a combination of circumstances unfavourable to direct exploitation of estates: political unsettlement, difficulties of transport and communications, falling prices. And both could be followed and preceded by periods of direct exploitation for fluctuating income. That in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries direct exploitation as a rule followed the *feorms* of the eleventh century is now generally regarded as certain. Historians are not so certain about what condition preceded the *feorm*. But then, nothing is certain about the large estates in the Anglo-Saxon era, least of all their economic organization. In the absence of proofs we are all thrown back on probabilities, and, to my mind, the probability of an earlier agricultural boom—a time when estates were managed by speculative landlords in expectation of rising incomes—is very high indeed. Without an earlier phase of this kind most features of the eleventh- and twelfth-century manor would be impossible to explain. For how could we otherwise explain the juxtaposition on so many manors of 'old demesne' and 'new demesne', of

¹ E.g. N. Neilson, *Economic Conditions on the Manors of Ramsey Abbey* (Philadelphia, 1899), and R. A. L. Smith, *Canterbury Cathedral Priory* (Cambridge, 1943). More synoptic accounts, both free from economic preconceptions, will be found in D. Knowles, *The Monastic Order in England* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 441-4; and in F. M. Stenton, *op. cit.* pp. 476-8.

² Compare the early and the late references to farms in R. A. L. Smith, *op. cit.* pp. 128-33, 201-3.

new holdings with old, of ancient holdings and new ones; and how can we account for the innumerable signs of an earlier expansion and colonization?

To conclude. The rise of a money economy does not mean the rise of money. It may mean an increase in the relative volume of money payments, as distinct from the increase in money itself. Yet even in this sense it is not a continuous process of human evolution. Increases in the relative volume of money transactions could reflect a whole variety of economic changes and were little more than passing, and sometimes recurrent, historical phenomena, which combined with other phenomena to create unique and unrepeatable historical situations.

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THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SICKNESS AND MEDICAL BENEFIT SINCE THE PURITAN REVOLUTION

By HERMANN LEVY

I

Your object is, indeed, great; nothing less than the happiness and respectability of the honest and laborious workmen—in comparison with this all other ends of Government are mean, for this is the great end of all.

SIR FRANCIS BURDETT (1770-1844)

THE economic and political changes in the second half of the seventeenth century destroyed a system which during the previous hundred years had been built up to make provision for the able-bodied, unemployed poor and the sick workers among them. Yet the social service legislation and administration inaugurated between 1550 and 1640 might have coped with the greater part of the increasing social difficulties, if the will had been present to deal with them on the principles already accepted. But it was just this will which was in abeyance. It was replaced by an attitude towards the labouring poor which was the opposite of that which had dictated the measures of the Tudors and first Stuarts.¹ The 'poor' man or 'pauper' had now quite lost the medieval attributes which clung to the victim of misfortune. The religious justification of wealth (where honourably acquired) had now placed a growing stigma upon the non-possessing class, their condition being held to be attributable to God's visible disfavour and their own inabilities; their thriftless, immoral and even deceitful habits of life:

The Lab'ring Poor in sight of Double Pay
Are saucy, mutinous, and beggarly;
So lavish of their money and their time,
That want of forecast is the Nation's Crime;
Good drunken Company is their delight,
And what they earn by day they spend by night.²

A social philosophy of this kind could find no room for weekly pensions in time of temporary sickness, nor for supplements to wages by allowances for contingencies; nor would it recognize a legal right to medical treatment for able-bodied workers who became disabled or met with occupational injuries. The only remedy was to compel such people to save in good days for bad ones to come: to encourage thrift and, as Defoe actually did, to organize thrift itself. In 1648 John Cooke, who had been a member of

¹ Cf. for many details Hermann Levy, *Economic Liberalism* (1913), the whole chapter 'Poverty and Unemployment'.

² D. Defoe, *The True-Born Englishman* (1701), p. 15.

Charles I's Poor Law Commission, had given the following picture of the poor worker's fate: 'There is the needy, labouring, mechanical man that is oppressed with a great charge, and many times does not make his own wants knowne. He wrestles with poverty, but it comes like an armed man upon him, he cannot resist it; the truest charity is to relieve such a man, to lend this man money, to buy him a cow, a sheep, and a hog, or some such necessities.'¹ Yet only twenty years later Manley wrote: 'A labourer may fall into "extreme poverty" by abundance of children, long sickness, and the like, in which sense only these are God Almighty's poor. The rest, which is three times the number are of their own making...by idle, irregular and wicked courses.'² All exhortation to set the able-bodied poor to work, to rehabilitate them economically and socially, had disappeared. Sickness as a cause of poverty could not remain unacknowledged, but it only called for action when it was 'long'; presumably, that is to say, when the sufferer was found to be permanently disabled.

Nobody would think of underrating the scope of Puritan charity. This impulse declares itself in both the early and later chapters in the history of nonconformity. Thomas Lawson in 1660 addressed his 'appeal' to 'Parliament' concerning the poor, that 'there may not be a beggar in England'; John Bellers was constantly concerned with helping the poor.³ But such 'charity' had little in common with that which had inspired the social policy of medieval Catholicism or the Anglican kings of a later epoch. It had no source in that inner dissatisfaction with social facts which underlay Cooke's suggestions; 'ridiculous', he said, that 'one man should have 3000 to 4000 sheep and sit rent free, and his neighbour go all tattered and not a coat to put on.' There was no consideration of this kind in Puritan thinking. As Tawney has shown, the social provisions made by the 'papists' were actually criticized by others as being a 'bribe' to 'dissoluteness' and 'demoralization'.⁴

Poverty through sickness was apt, we may think, to be associated with malingering. When after 1640 occupational care for the poor fell into abeyance, the desire to secure cash payments must have increased in equal measure.⁵ It is only too easy to see how, in the period following the Puritan Revolution, all the administrative methods upon which the beginning of a social service era had been based came to be reversed. Poor Law legislation reverts to the spirit of its primitive stage in English history, when the government of Edward III prohibited the giving of alms to

¹ John Cooke, *The Poor Man's Case* (1648), pp. 49-50.

² T. Manley, *Usury at Six percent* (1669), p. 24.

³ For an interesting description, cf. Paul H. Emden, *Quakers in Commerce* (1940), pp. 22-4.

⁴ R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (Pelican edition, 1938), pp. 237-8.

⁵ Cf. Tawney, *op. cit.* p. 242: 'Tudor divines and statesmen had little mercy for idle rogues. But the former always, and the latter ultimately, regarded pauperism primarily as a social phenomenon produced by economic dislocation... Their successors after the Restoration were apparently quite unconscious that it was even conceivable that there might be any other cause of poverty than the moral failings of the poor.'

'valiant beggars', a phase which seemed to have closed with Elizabeth's great statute.¹ The first period had been repressive; the second attempted to be remedial; the third, beginning with the Puritan Revolution, went back to repression.² The decay of the former poor law administration began during the Civil War. In striking contrast to the observations made by the duke of Stettin at the beginning of the century, a pamphleteer of 1646 wrote that the general rule of all England was to whip and punish the wandering beggars, 'and so many justices execute one branch of the good Statute (which is the point of justice), but as for the point of charitie, they leave (it) undone, which is to provide houses and convenient places to set the poore at work'.³

Two institutions which have thrown their shadows on our times emerge from the new turn of social policy; the workhouse and the pauper funeral. Both are closely linked with the problems of our investigation; for the decay of the Elizabethan policy to 'set the poore at worke' meant for centuries to come the eclipse of the first attempt to provide more than cash benefits for those unfortunate people who, by illness, were prevented from finding adequate employment. The pauper funeral meant indirectly the separation of burial provisions from sickness benefit, as even poor people were now expected to provide their funeral, if they wanted to avoid burial as paupers.

Workhouses had existed before the Civil War as houses of occupation. According to Miss Leonard, it may not have been uncommon in earlier times, where stocks were raised, for the work to be performed in public buildings. But it was not intended by the statute of Elizabeth that a building of this kind must be provided.⁴ Workhouses were then fairly numerous and varied greatly in size. They cannot, however, be compared with the workhouses of the second half of the seventeenth century and later, for they were primarily 'places where people who could work were sent that they might be trained and employed'.⁵ That the workhouse of the later Puritan period was a novelty is obvious from the way in which some writers proclaimed it to be a special innovation designed to solve the problem of unemployment. The workhouse was to teach the unemployed the unpleasantness, degradation and constraint of their condition and to inspire them to improve it. Thomas Firmin had made great efforts to persuade public opinion of the usefulness of such institutions. He had actually founded one in 1676, and the first Act dealing with workhouses in 1723 was probably influenced by the pattern he had created.⁶ The workhouses

¹ R. Whateley Cooke Taylor, *Introduction to a History of the Factory System* (1886), p. 328.

² Cf. Tawney, *op. cit.* p. 242: '... The grand discovery of a commercial age, that relief might be so administered as not merely to relieve, but also to deter ...'

³ Tawney, *op. cit.* p. 236.

⁴ E. M. Leonard, *Early History of the English Poor Law* (Cambridge, 1900), p. 223.

⁵ Leonard, *op. cit.* p. 226.

⁶ For further details and sources, cf. *A Vindication of the Memory of the most excellent and charitable Mr Thomas Firmin* (1699). See also Levy, *Economic Liberalism*, pp. 80-1.

had originally been planned as a measure which might possibly combine profit with philanthropy, and Parliament had actually passed an Act in 1649 by which a company was to be formed with power to apprehend vagrants, to offer them the choice between work and whipping, and to set to compulsory work all other poor persons, including children, without means of maintenance.¹ Even the Quakers took the same attitude of combining 'profit' with 'charity' when in 1701 they took over a workhouse in Clerkenwell and put thirty inmates into it; but apparently these commercial hopes were not realized.² In the hands of the local authorities the workhouse became merely the cheapest way of avoiding heavier expenditure. It had been felt by Elizabeth and her advisers that supervision was needed to secure the welfare of the labourer, both as regards the conditions of his work and the periods when he was unemployed. Cunningham has stated that 'assiduous efforts were made' in that direction 'until the time of the Civil War'.³ After that supervision fell into abeyance. As separate areas of local government were no longer subject to constant centralized control, they could now pursue the course of greatest advantage to their own neighbourhood. It became inevitable that the administration of poor relief should be conducted with primary regard to local convenience, so that there was 'danger of insufficient care for the needs of the poor, and of scant attention to the National Interest', as the same writer has put it. This being so, it is not surprising that the care of the sick workers deteriorated greatly after the Civil War. While the workhouse became a receptacle for the sick, there were no provisions which could claim to offer serious medical aid,⁴ a lack which was felt during the whole lifetime of the workhouse system.

It became the common practice in nearly every case to deal with the sick poor by outdoor relief, with or without medical attendance. When the Commissioners in their famous Report of 1834 sketched out the classification of their proposed workhouse institutions, they did not include anything in the nature of a hospital. The Report did not contain any suggestions for altering the existing arrangements for sick relief. This explains why no mention was made of any provision for indoor medical officers. 'Down to 1847', observe the Webbs in their classic study, 'it is not too much to say that what may be called "the hospital branch of the poor law administration" was ignored alike by Parliament, public opinion and the central authority.' Few and far between are the incidental references to the 'sick wards' of the workhouses. While between 1871 and about 1885 the outstanding feature of the central authority was the steady pressure

¹ Tawney, *op. cit.* p. 237.

² P. H. Emden, *op. cit.* p. 24.

³ W. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce* (4th edition, Cambridge, 1907), pp. 403-4 and 563-4.

⁴ P. F. Aschrott, *The English Poor Law System* (1888), p. 239: 'The workhouses, owing to their not being erected and designed as infirmaries, there is no accommodation for inmates requiring medical care, while proper administration is made much more difficult by the large numbers of inmates requiring special treatment.'

exercised through inspectors with the object of reducing out-door relief, yet when in 1871 a circular on outdoor relief was issued, no new policy as regards the aged infirm and sick was announced, although these formed three quarters of the total outdoor relief cases. What the central authority had been concerned about was not the system of outdoor relief, but the extent to which the sick poor took advantage of the services of the parish doctor. There was, apparently, strong opposition to anything approaching 'medical' benefit. It was specifically laid down that people who were in receipt of payments by Friendly Societies should not be allowed the services of a parish doctor. The first attempt to grant some 'medical' benefit in the form of institutional treatment by special hospitals in sick asylum districts came in the sixties, but it was later abandoned in favour of the principle of the 1834 Act, and the Poor Law Infirmary was evolved instead. So, after all, workhouses originally designed mainly as a test for the able-bodied became, as a Report in 1869-70 stated, 'of necessity' infirmaries for the sick. It is now that a continuous progress is noticeable.¹ But, however this might be, the fact remained that the poor dreaded to be ill in a workhouse.

We have tried to explain how far the Elizabethan Poor Law had encouraged the setting the poor to work, and that probably this provision meant some sort of training for the sick poor in their state of convalescence. Although the Poor Law Report of 1834 had been emphatic in recommending that all pauper employment should be in accordance with the Act of 1602, there was in fact very little opportunity provided for such outdoor employment, and in 1842 the central authority suggested as the kind of work which would be available for the able-bodied men in the workhouse that of stone-breaking under proper superintendence. The horrors revealed in the inquiry into the Andover workhouse, however, led to a summary prohibition of this and similar forms of employment. The guilds had tried to set the poor at work on their own land. Acts of 1819 and 1830 had authorized the local poor-law authorities to purchase or hire land up to 50 acres on which to set the poor to work at reasonable wages, but the central authority persistently ignored those statutes; they were in fact held to be obsolete.²

The workhouses, far from being a remedy in the medical sense, were dreaded by the poor for their dirt and disease.³ Reviewing the conditions from a medical viewpoint, Delmege remarks of such conditions at the end of the eighteenth century,⁴ that 'the parish workhouses were very bad'. He draws particular attention to the most unhygienic conditions prevailing for children in workhouses. In the London workhouse, for instance, the children lived crowded together, thirty or forty in a ward, sleeping in tiers

¹ Cf. for much more detail, which has had to be omitted here, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *English Poor Law Policy* (1910), pp. 8, 17, 48, 67, 115, 117, 123 and *passim*.

² *Ibid.* pp. 74 and 168.

³ J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Village Labourer* (1911), pp. 146-7.

⁴ J. A. Delmege, *Towards National Health* (1931), p. 190.

and bunks: and this was an especially endowed institution. Six or eight children sometimes were packed into a bed. The workhouses, in point of fact, showed not the slightest regard for medical welfare.

Medico-social conditions would perhaps have reached a still greater state of neglect after 1640 had there not been two factors operating to offset the effects of the decline of public provision for the health of the poor. With the seventeenth century we enter an epoch of rapidly expanding progress in medical science. The eighteenth century saw the rise of preventive medicine. Occupational disease began to attract attention after it had first been dealt with by Ramazzini, whose work was soon translated into English. Medical science appears to have taken a greater interest in the social aspect of its problems. In James II's reign the question of better provision for the indigent sick came into some prominence, and the College of Physicians established a dispensary in London where free treatment could be obtained by those who brought a letter from the parish clergyman. The opposition of the apothecaries, however, whose pockets were touched, brought the scheme to naught, and except for the building by public subscription of Greenwich hospital for wounded and disabled seamen, little or nothing was done until the wave of philanthropy which arose in the eighteenth century.¹ In view of the utter inadequacy of the poor relief for sick people which became evident during the eighteenth century, there arose 'in accordance with the growing spirit of scientific philanthropy a widespread movement to provide proper medical treatment for the sick poor, born not only out of pity and a sense of social responsibility, but of a desire that everyone should share the increasing medical knowledge'.² Infirmaries and dispensaries for the sick poor, erected and supported by voluntary donations (now, in contrast to the seventeenth century, on associative schemes of charitable societies and not by private individuals only), were founded; and later on, in the towns, medical centres sprang up in the poorest quarters and visits of the physicians in charge of such institutions to the homes of the sick became more frequent.³

In the second half of the eighteenth century a small lying-in hospital was opened in connexion with the Westminster workhouse. Yet all such progress should not be over-estimated in its general social effects. It is notable that Delmege writes that 'the religious nursing orders had almost entirely disappeared, and no importance was attached to such work. The eighteenth-century nurse was drawn from the lowest class of women, and, untrained, badly fed, badly housed and poorly paid for long hours of labour, it is no wonder that she was callous and inefficient, or that discipline in the wards was lax and that drink and immorality abounded'. This observation is characteristic of other aspects of the measures which had been taken and the institutions which had been formed to fill in some

¹ Delmege, *op. cit.* pp. 125 and 164 sqq.

² *Ibid.* p. 165.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 167-8. These conflicts between the apothecaries and the physicians were hardly favourable to the interest of the poor. Cf. A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The Professions* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 72-3.

way, though insufficiently, the gaps which the destruction of a centralized and state-supervised system of relief of the sick poor had tragically opened. The point was stressed by John Howard, the great prison reformer of the eighteenth century, when he pointed to the fact that the lack of convalescent homes or other places for patients to go on discharge was bitterly felt, as those 'who are now turned out' were 'very unfit for work or the common mode of living'.¹

The counterpart of the workhouse as it developed after the second half of the seventeenth century was the pauper funeral. Gilds and village communities had included a decent burial in the provision made for poor and sick members. It was left to the Puritan Revolution 'and after' to proclaim that the poor should be stigmatized beyond their lifetime for misfortune which, apparently, was due to their lack of proper foresight and thrift. The time had come when the pauper funeral became distinct from any other funeral:

Rattle his bones over the stones;
He's only a pauper, whom nobody owns.²

How deeply the eclipse of a free burial by the gild or local community was felt by the poor becomes obvious from the attempts, beginning in the second half of the seventeenth century, to fill the gap by mutual efforts of the working class communities. The pauper funeral as 'common interment' very much resembled the *commune sepulchrum* which served in the Roman times for the burial of slaves and aliens.³ 'We had a burial-ground for what we call paupers', the Rev. J. C. Abdy, a former curate of St George's, Southwark, told a Committee in 1842, 'the Lock burial-ground, in the Dover Road. I was obliged, as curate, to see coffins heaped one upon another, and bones lying about; and graves come so near the surface of the earth, that nothing but the fact of my being curate, having no authority, the rector being resident, would have induced me to perform the service.'⁴ It was Dr Chadwick's merit that he put the proper emphasis upon the existence of these conditions in one of his classic reports.⁵ The 'poor holes', large pits into which pauper coffins were thrown, which might remain uncovered for a long time, gave rise to much complaint in the eighteenth century, though such complaint was far more directed to their nauseous effects and the danger of ill-health in the neighbourhood than against the social indignity.⁶

A last blow dealt by the Puritan Revolution to the 'labouring poor' was the Act of Settlement of 1662. This undoubtedly had a profound effect upon the fortunes of those seeking relief in sickness and disablement. The

¹ Delmege, *op. cit.* p. 165.

² Thomas Noel, *Rymes and Roundelayes* (1841).

³ Sir Arnold Wilson and Professor Hermann Levy, *Burial Reform and Funeral Costs* (1938), p. 6.

⁴ *Report on the Health of Towns; Effect of Interment of Bodies*, 14 June 1842, Q. 1320.

⁵ *Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain* (1843), p. 137.

⁶ Delmege, *op. cit.* p. 135.

Act made relief dependent on settlement within 40 days. The relief by residence granted in Elizabeth's time was thereby shaken. The new Act led to the expulsion of persons without means; to the placing of obstacles in the way of migration, while the places in which the poor, again including sick people, were entitled by birth to get relief became sometimes so over-filled that such relief had to be reduced to a minimum.¹ It is doubtful whether a traveller in England during the period of the passing of the Act of Settlement and its amendment, more than a hundred years later (1782), by Gilbert's Act (22 Geo. III, c. 83), would have been able to give so satisfactory an account of the treatment of sick people in their migration from parish to parish as the duke of Stettin had been able to give in 1603. Gilbert's Act, followed in 1795 by another piece of legislation (35 Geo. III, c. 101), was an improvement, as it protected workers from the cruelty of a sudden and injudicious removal if, through illness, they became dependent on parochial relief.² But the effect of Gilbert's Act upon the workhouse was to make it less of an industrial institution than ever. The principle that the able-bodied worker, if temporarily, or not fully (as the aged sick poor were) pauperized by sickness, should receive a money payment, i.e. 'sickness benefit', instead of medical benefit and treatment, was indirectly though not expressly perpetuated by this legislation.³

II

Almost all the advantages which man possesses above inferior animals, arise from his power of acting in combination with his fellows; and of accomplishing by the united efforts of members what could not be accomplished by the detached efforts of individuals.

J. S. MILL

The only practical and effective remedy against the utter destitution of the working-class family in the contingencies of sickness and death was destined to be the Friendly Society. With the decay of the Tudor and Stuart legislation and administration for the care of the disabled worker; with a rapidly increasing free labour market and the beginning of cycles of industrial prosperity and depression; with a charity unable to cope with the growing evils of poverty and ill-health; with a medical science, a medical organization and hospital arrangements not yet developed to serve effectively the wants of the poorer classes; with the vanishing prospects of aid from gild membership; with the growing lack of sympathy among the public for the victims of unemployment; with the fear of the new workhouse and the dread of the pauper funeral, the only remedy for those threatened by sickness and its consequences was now self-help. Traditional forms of assistance by public and half-public bodies had gone. The right of co-operation to ensure these benefits remained, and it required no great wisdom to discover that the fundamental principle of assurance,

¹ Levy, *Economic Liberalism*, p. 76.

² Cunningham, *op. cit.* vol. II, part I, pp. 578-9.

³ P. F. Aschrott, *Das Englische Armenwesen* (1886), p. 20.

already to some extent developed against other risks, could be applied, though at first in a primitive way, to cover the contingencies of a working man's life. The system of carrying the risks of a minority upon the shoulders of the majority was the solution which presented itself when the old system of public protection broke down.

There is hardly an economic historian, from Rogers onwards, who has not compared the Friendly Society system of relief with that of the craft guilds and fraternities and, indeed, called the one the predecessor of the other. Such comparison yields only a half truth. Certainly the Friendly Society tried to succeed the guild and fraternity in the help they had been giving to their poorer members. In the 'services' rendered there was certainly a resemblance and an analogy. It may well be that the guild arrangement, of which we have mentioned the weekly payment and the 'fund', was freely imitated by the later Friendly Societies. We even know of a Friendly Society existing in Bristol in the seventies calling itself the 'Guild of St Mary and St Joseph', which was said to be modelled on true guild principles.¹ But such likeness in the service rendered should not blind us to an essential difference between the two forms of administration. The one was essentially based upon the principle of public assistance (as understood in medieval days and compulsory contributions; the other upon self-help. The principle, even the routine, of 'insurance' may have been the same; the socio-political significance was entirely different. It is no accident that Daniel Defoe, the author of *Giving Alms no Charity*, was one of the first to suggest the general adoption of the Friendly Society idea. He devoted a whole chapter to 'Friendly Societies' in his famous *Essay on Projects* of 1697. He regarded the Friendly Society as a method of avoiding charity and as a palliative against 'beggars, parish poor, alms-houses and hospitals'. He proposed a 'pension office', with an entrance fee of 6*d.* and regular contributions of 1*s.* a quarter, for the benefit of the aged, and gave close consideration to the associative basis upon which the sick poor might be relieved. He was clever enough not to base his proposals merely on some sort of 'dividing' principle, which still forms the basis of the so-called slate clubs. He pointed to the experience of fire insurance, and he even made attempts to back his proposals by actuarial calculations based upon Sir William Petty's mortality tables.² Was Defoe aware that Friendly Societies already existed? Some we know were certainly formed in England by the Huguenots who, having no claim on the poor rate, started their own associations for mutual relief in sickness and old age.³ One of the oldest of the French benefit societies was the Norman Society of Bethnal Green, which only ceased to exist in 1863. But Friendly Societies were still rare things. They were dependent upon a local spirit

¹ *Friendly and Building Societies Commission* (1874), c. 998, p. 14.

² D. Defoe, *An Essay on Projects* (new edition, 1887), pp. 92-3 and 80 sqq. Cf. also William Chadwick, *The Life and Times of Daniel Defoe* (1888), pp. 67 and 225 sqq.

³ S. Smiles, *The Huguenots; their settlement, churches etc. in England and Ireland* (1880), pp. 113, 137 and 265.

of friendliness and common social and occupational interests. Such a spirit was more likely to develop among people bound together by a similar tragic fate, concentrated in specific towns (Colchester, Canterbury, Sandwich, Maidstone, Southampton, etc.) and trying to develop certain specialized branches of industry. In spite of this association with immigrants, the Friendly Societies in England were certainly not mere imitations, but had also an indigenous origin. According to Professor J. L. Myres, the earliest Friendly Societies were in Scotland; the Incorporation of Carters of Leigh of 1555, the United General Seabo-box at Borrostoness (Bo'ness) on the Firth of Forth of 1634 and the Fraternity of Dyers at Linlithgow of 1670 are still in existence.¹ The term 'box', just as in the days of the gild, had a special meaning. Regular contributions for fixed benefits were a later development: so also was the practice of investing funds, as distinct from keeping the assets locked up in the 'box' to which references are frequently found in the earlier rules of old-established societies.² Before the arrival of any generally accepted actuarial technique, these 'box' clubs were probably not bound by any regular rule of benefits, and were to some extent based on the dividing principle if they liquidated.³ By the middle of the eighteenth century the Friendly Society had become firmly established; the Friendly Society of Shipmasters of 1757, the Shipmasters Society of 1758, the Beneficial Society of 1781, are prominent prototypes. Sir Frederic Eden in 1798 devoted long observations to the subject of 'box' clubs and Friendly Societies.⁴ By the end of the century Friendly Societies had reached a remarkable figure. Sir Frederic Eden estimated their number at 7200. Between 1793 and 1828, 20,000 rules of societies were enrolled among the records of the courts of quarter sessions under the Act of 1793.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the legislature awoke to the importance of such societies. In 1757 an Act was passed (31 Geo. II, c. 76) 'for the relief of the coal heavers working upon the Thames; and for enabling them to make provisions for such of themselves as shall be sick, lame, or past their labour; and for their widows and orphans'. The workers had decided to 'set apart' 2s. in the pound of their earnings and 'to erect and keep a perpetual fund'. The Act was, however, repealed in 1770. A similar Act was passed in 1792 for the 'skippers and kealmen in the coal trade of the river Wear, in the county of Durham' (10 Geo. III, c. 53). The eighteenth century saw the rise of Freemasonry; secret orders and fraternities were expanding. While they were the outcome of the patriotic and convivial sentiments of the commercial rather than the labouring classes, there had developed by the end of the century Odd-fellows, Druids, Foresters and Comical Fellows, constituting the germ of

¹ J. L. Myres, *Saving through the Ages* (N.D.), p. 10.

² C. H. L. Brown and J. A. C. Taylor, *Friendly Societies* (Cambridge, 1933), p. 1.

³ E. W. Brabrook, *Provident Societies and Industrial Welfare* (1898), p. 57, and *passim*. Cf. also J. N. Baernreither, *English Associations of Working Men* (1893), p. 229.

⁴ Sir Frederic Eden, *State of the Poor* (1798), I, pp. 618 sqq.

the later Affiliated and Federated Friendly Societies, which still play an important part in the health insurance organization of the nation.¹ The Act of 1792, passed for the skippers and keelmen employed in the north-eastern coal trade,² was, as a matter of fact, some sort of pioneer health insurance legislation on a small and local scale. It was a piece of comprehensive social insurance and 'social security', for it was to cover the sick as well as those who had to meet the risks of 'other accidental misfortunes' (i.e., probably, injuries by accidents) and old age. The workers had to contribute to the fund what Eden calls a 'small sum out of their respective wages'. But the family of the worker was covered as well, 'in case of sickness, old age, or infirmity', and provision of some death benefit was made for the widows and children. Here, indeed, sickness insurance, old age pensions, workmen's compensation, industrial assurance (death benefit) and unemployment insurance were comprehensively united, and it is not surprising that Sir Frederic Eden compared this piece of legislation to the French Constitution of 1789.³ While here as in other cases the motive, as the preamble stated, was 'the reduction of the poor rate', it appears to be incorrect to explain the rise of Friendly Societies merely as the outcome of 'the iniquitous working of an over-liberal poor law, construed on every occasion in favour of the idle and shiftless and against the best interests of the self-respecting independent workman'.⁴ Whatever judgement may be passed on the poor laws of that epoch, it would be grossly misleading (though the argument is understandable if coming from representatives of vast so-called 'thrift' organizations) to assume that the Friendly Society was merely the outcome of poor law wastefulness. It was much more a response to the increasing pauperization brought about by the Industrial Revolution, with which even the 'liberal' poor law was not able to cope. For all those who regarded destitution as the outcome of self-caused poverty, such causes as sickness and disease, injury by accident or death, were, apparently, non-existent, and the 'over-liberal' poor law was their sole explanation of the fact that poor relief increased from 2s. 2d. per head of the population in 1750 to 12s. 2d. in 1820.⁵ Such notions should be rejected. It was none the less a fact that the legislature regarded the Friendly Society as a welcome check to the expansion of the poor rate.⁶

Some larger employers also tried to alleviate the evil of ill-health or injury for their workmen by establishing some form of associative organization, but they were in the minority. Sir Andrew Crowley and Son, iron-makers in the early eighteenth century at Swalwell and Winlaton, who worked out a sort of putting-out system, issued a 'law book' in which it was provided that 'the Masters are to receive of their Hammermen twopence

¹ J. Frome Wilkinson, *Mutual Thrift* (1893), p. 13.

² Eden, *op. cit.* p. 614.

³ *Ibid.* p. 614.

⁴ F. K. Hoffmann (3rd Vice-President of the Prudential Assurance Company of America), *National Health Insurance and Friendly Societies* (Chicago, 1920), p. 111.

⁵ John J. Clarke, *Social Administration, including the Poor Laws* (1922), p. 40.

⁶ William Pitt in the House of Commons on 12 February 1796; cf. also Baernreither, *op. cit.* p. 371.

per week, neither more nor less, and those Hammermen that have paid for two months time successively in health shall have relief in time of distress'.¹ The medical organization in this case appears very up-to-date, for a doctor was maintained jointly by the firm and its employees. So we meet here, for the first time,² the factory doctor, still urged as a necessary institution by the Industrial Welfare Society. At a much earlier date one of the oldest factories owned by the Mineral and Battery Works and located in 1575-1600 at Tintern (Monmouthshire), had assured its workers of maintenance in case of sickness.³ Another attempt, in the days of the Industrial Revolution, made by employers to cope with the problem of sick workers was that of the Soho Manufactory; here an insurance society with compulsory features was instituted by Matthew Boulton. It was arranged on the same principles as the Crowley experiment, with an entrance fee and weekly contributions which were increased within higher wage groups; compensation payments were made in case of illness by accidents, and sickness and funeral benefit given after the member had been 'in the Club three months'.⁴

All such attempts clearly show that the employers were aware that something had to be done to give the worker security against sickness and sudden death, and that these arrangements had to be made on a principle of mutual insurance. In the cases mentioned the employers may have felt a particular interest because the Crowleys, like Boulton, were apparently concerned to preserve and protect skilled workers on whom they were dependent. When later on much unskilled and casual work was required and fixity of employment declined, such a system lost its attraction for manufacturers. Moreover, it was thought to be unnecessary, as the rapid growth of Friendly Societies seemed to compensate for the absence of such schemes.

III

...the ordinances for relief and the ordinances for labour must go together; otherwise distress caused by misfortunes will always be confounded, as it is now with distress caused by idleness, thriftlessness and fraud. It is only when the state watches and guides the middle life of men, that it can, without disgrace to them, protect their old age, acknowledging in that protection that they have done their duty, or at least, some portion of their duty, in better days.

JOHN RUSKIN in 1858

The overwhelming tributes accorded to Friendly Societies for their services to the lower classes come in the main from people who have not had an opportunity to study in much detail the working of the system in its various

¹ T. S. Ashton, *Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution* (Manchester, 1924), pp. 193-6.

² This has been overlooked by the Report of the B.M.A. on *Industrial Health in Factories* (1941), p. 5.

³ Henry Hamilton, *The English Brass and Copper Industries to 1880* (1926), pp. 307 and 521.

⁴ Erich Roll, *An Early Experiment in Industrial Organisation* (1930), pp. 15, 225, 228 and 232.

aspects. Economic historians, concerned with the general development of social life, have, not less than the general public and many politicians, been influenced by the impressive figures of the growth of the movement; the annual sums accumulated by 'thrift' and 'saving', and the vast membership of such associations. Only now and again was a bitter flavour imparted to this flow of generous comment, when Reports related to the system of Friendly Societies (such as those of the Northcote Commission in the seventies on benefit and building societies, or those on the industrial assurance (collecting) societies and companies in a later period) darted a bright flash into a rather dark subject, difficult for the layman to understand because of its many complexities. But such reminders were generally soon forgotten, the grievances and evils laid open were, if mentioned at all, treated by economic writers as the unavoidable deficiencies existing in any system; deficiencies which could probably be easily remedied by amending legislation.

Historians and other writers have apparently overlooked the fact that the working classes were driven to mutual help by insurance not because it appeared to them the most dignified way of securing medical help and funeral benefit, but because there was no other way of avoiding pauperization. In fact, the administrators of the Poor Law saw fit to restrict even further their scanty medical assistance in order to drive the workers to rely upon the Friendly Society system. In 1836 it was laid down by an instructional letter that medical attendance could only be allowed in cases of destitution. As, however, illness quickly followed destitution, it was suggested that provident sick clubs should be promoted to provide for medical attendance when needed.¹ Medical assistance was apparently to be furnished in so insufficient a manner that workers without means would be forced to look for help in other directions. This consideration should be kept in mind before making generalizations about the wonderful 'independent' and 'voluntary' efforts of the working classes. Once the worker received his benefit from a Friendly Society or club, assistance out of the poor rate was denied him, a policy which won the approval of Mr (later Lord) Goschen who, when President of the Poor Law Board, had been much opposed to the combining of outdoor relief with any other source of income, even if it came out of Friendly Societies' benefits. It was not until 1894 (Outdoor Relief Friendly Societies Act, 57 and 58 Vic. c. 25) that boards of guardians were legally empowered to ignore, if they thought fit, the fact that applicants for relief had a Friendly Society allowance.²

What happens if, instead of following popular generalizations, we follow the testimony of those who from the end of the eighteenth century down to the arrival of National Health Insurance in 1911 had a specialized knowledge of the system of Friendly Societies, their administration and their shortcomings? It is surely proper to set informed criticism against some of the unrestrained approval we have noted.

We may begin with Sir Frederic Eden, who was the first to describe in some detail the working of Friendly Societies at a time when the first

¹ S. and B. Webb, *op. cit.* p. 48.

² *Ibid.* p. 254.

legislative measure (the so-called Rose Act of 1793) to deal comprehensively and exclusively with these societies had just been passed,¹ and William Pitt had made his speech in the Commons. Eden certainly supported the system which had just become the outstanding hope for a better relief of the labouring classes. His comments were partly directed against evils which may be regarded as early growing pains. For instance, he called attention to the fact that workers would migrate from one employment to another in a different parish and thereby forfeit payments made over several years to one Friendly Society and have to start again with another one.² This grievance was, of course, removed when Friendly Societies developed from local units to much larger, even nation-wide, associations. On the other hand, the conversion of the purely local society into centralized associations brought to an end the close association of the individual member with the administration of the society, a feature which had always been accounted one of the great advantages of these institutions. Another of Sir Frederic Eden's criticisms was of a much more serious kind. He drew attention to what we should call to-day the insecurity of the societies. The actuarial methods and the accountancy practice of the societies was at first both primitive and unsafe. Seldom was there any business-like control of a local fund. Levies were made and benefits distributed as necessity arose, and in most cases no principles of sound investment were observed. Eden gave some very interesting figures about the balances of sick and funeral clubs, and observed with regret 'that there are few clubs in which the accounts are kept up so methodically', as to enable members to check their payments with the allowances made.³ It was certainly a 'first stage' of development. But it should not be overlooked that this first stage involved an enormous loss to the working classes for a very long period. In 1867, Mr Tidd Pratt, famous for his work as the first Registrar of Friendly Societies, stated that between 1793 and 1867 out of 38,315 Friendly Societies in England and Wales no less than 13,935 had collapsed.⁴ It is remarkable that at so early a date Eden put his finger on this development of 'useless thrift'.⁵ But he also pointed out another distressing fact which characterized the era of the 'non-financial character' of Friendly Societies for almost a century longer.⁶ The whole business was conducted on the principle of a dividing club. When elderly people became sick and wanted their benefits from the club it was frequently found that funds had diminished, the association was liquidated, and the young members were the losers; they had made their contributions for the purpose of paying sick pay to the older men. This weakness was severely criticized by Eden,⁷ and his strictures were repeated, exactly one hundred years later, by Sir Edward Brabrook, a well-known Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, who remarked in 1898 that such clubs existed along-

¹ Brown and Taylor, *op. cit.* p. 16.

² *Ibid.* I, 621-3.

³ *Ibid.* p. 623.

⁴ Frome Wilkinson, *op. cit.* pp. 75 and 77, and *passim*.

⁵ *Op. cit.* I, 619.

⁶ Eden, *op. cit.* I, p. 623.

⁷ Baernreither, *op. cit.* p. 231.

side the financially sound and actuarially well administered Friendly Societies.¹

Sir Frederic Eden's doubts of the satisfactory administration of the friendly thrift agencies were sufficiently profound to cause him to ask whether the system should not be replaced by some other. For the first time in the history of these associations the idea of state insurance turns up, and it is surely remarkable that the question was raised at so early a stage of the development of Friendly Societies. However, Sir Frederic could not decide in its favour;² he rejected 'compulsory schemes' for erecting Friendly Societies, and put his faith in the improvement of their unsatisfactory conditions.

Such improvement came in the new century. The first Act regulating the administration of Friendly Societies in a more specialized way was the Friendly Societies Act of 1819. Further Acts for the promotion and the protection of 'mutual thrift' followed in 1829 (10 Geo. IV, c. 56) and in 1834 (4 and 5 William IV, c. 40). These statutes marked the transition from a system of local to one of central registration. The Act of 1819 ordered Justices of the Peace 'not to confirm tables unless they had been approved by two persons known to be professional actuaries or persons skilled in calculations'. The preamble went on to recite that the provisions of the preceding Acts had been found insufficient and that abuses prevailed in many societies established under their authority.

Further enactments followed in 1846 and 1850. The legislation so far discussed covered two of the most prominent features of the societies: sickness benefit and funeral benefit. A separation of these functions now appeared for the first time. The 'business' of industrial assurance was developing. A vain attempt to make state provision for the poor in times of emergency had been made in 1807, when a bill had been laid before the House for 'establishing a Fund and Assurance Office for investing the Savings of the Poor'.³ The preamble to the bill, which never reached the statute book, referred to the necessity of greater 'security' for the savings, clearly suggesting that there was little security to be found in the existing societies and clubs. But the legislature decided to restrict its attention to the most flagrant abuses. From 1828 to 1846 the legal supervision of Friendly Societies and similar institutions, so far as statute law went, was entrusted to a barrister appointed by the Commissioner for the Reduction of the National Debt. In 1829 he was charged with the duty of examining and certifying the rules of Friendly Societies.

To these legal duties was now added an actuarial function. As it was desirable in the interests of the members of Friendly Societies that correct information about the rates of sickness and mortality should be obtained, it was provided that every society should, once its rules were certified, send a quinquennial return of its mortality experience, an abstract of which was to be laid before Parliament. In 1846 the 'barrister' became Registrar of

¹ Brabrook, *op. cit.* p. 57.

² Eden, *op. cit.* I, 603 and 607.

³ Cf. for details Sir Arnold Wilson and Professor Hermann Levy, *Industrial Assurance* (Oxford, 1937), pp. 18 sqq.

Friendly Societies; in 1875 the Registrar was replaced by the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies.¹ After 1923 he held simultaneously the office of Industrial Assurance Commissioner. But the process of actuarial 'sanitation' was slow. As Baernreither pointed out in 1893, it was 'only by degrees' that the early Friendly Societies of the nineteenth century 'changed themselves into consolidated societies, based upon actuarial principles'. He added that 'this process of transition' had not yet been completed in all those societies and that 'the experience acquired had been dearly purchased',² a statement which is the more remarkable inasmuch as it gained the approval of that classic Registrar, J. M. Ludlow, who had written a preface to the book. The figures as to the number and the collapse of Friendly Societies given by Pratt in 1867 (quoted before) for a period of about seventy years, bear witness to the 'dearly purchased' experiences which the workers paying their contributions had to suffer. The complaints by competent observers of the gross deficiencies of Friendly Societies and sick clubs never ceased, even in face of the legal restrictions and measures of official control. There is a good deal of pamphlet literature on the subject in the thirties and forties, and it is to be hoped that economic historians will some day study it in detail.³ The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed important developments which remedied at least the grossest evils which had crept into the management of Friendly Societies. One important factor was the progress in actuarial technique. In 1867 James Spry, the chronicler of the Odd Fellows, held that the 'financial period' in the history of thrift associations began only in the Victorian era. He did not fail to mention the 'untimely end' to which 'thousands of societies' had been brought by the use of unreliable and deceptive tables 'recommended them by authority or passed in accordance

¹ For details of the early history of the Registrar, cf. Brabrook, *op. cit.* pp. 9-10 and 14-16.

² Baernreither, *op. cit.* p. 229.

³ Cf. for instance, *Some suggestions for the improvement of Benefit Clubs and Assurances for the lower classes founded on the reasoning of a petition presented by the late David Ricardo to the House of Commons for the Author* (1824). Cf. also N. Barou, *Co-operative Insurance* (1936), pp. 93-4. It is here asserted that 'much disappointment has been experienced and great injustice has been done' by Friendly Societies, which he attributed chiefly to administrative difficulties connected with the tasks of insurance taken over by such associations. We may further mention as of particular interest a pamphlet written by Mitchell in 1826, *A treatise on Benefit Friendly Societies in 1826*, and that by James Wright, written in 1834 and entitled *Practical Plan to protect honest against dishonest members and the redress of grievances of Benefit Societies*. The Royal Statistical Society possesses in its library an interesting collection of writings on the deficiencies of Friendly Societies in those days. Cf. *The Pamphleteer* (1823); J. W. Cunningham, *Observations on Friendly Societies*. An important contribution to the early criticism of Friendly Societies was made by Dr Edwin Chadwick. His very severe observations, however, relate more to the 'arbitrary proceedings' of burial societies, a matter in which he became interested in connexion with plans for sanitary reform. Cf. *Report on the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population in England. A supplementary Report on the results of a special enquiry into the practice of Common Interments in Towns, by Edwin Chadwick to both Houses of Parliament* (1843), pp. 55 sq.

with ratios of mortality and sickness supposed to be correct'.¹ The classic work by G. P. Neisson, *Contribution to Vital Statistics*, represented a great step forward in actuarial science, and Registrars of Friendly Societies such as Mr Tidd Pratt and Mr Ludlow were eager to see that this new study was put into practical effect.

Another factor was the progress made on the legal side of Friendly Society administration. The creation of the Registrar and the passing of further legislation in 1850 and 1855 meant that a greater amount of restriction was imposed upon the activities of Friendly Societies.

Yet it soon became evident that complaints about their shortcomings and evils remained unabated. In 1864 Mr Gladstone, in connexion with his Government Annuities Bill (which was a measure which could have been realized in 1807 if the bill of that year had become law), made some sensational remarks about Friendly Societies and industrial assurance institutions. On 7 March 1864 he laid before the House calculations of which his biographer, Lord Morley, remarked that they were 'of a kind as intelligible to most men as equations to London cabdrivers'. It was the first public attack on a system. 'I venture to tell the House', so he began his stirring speech, 'that this Bill has grown, not out of considerations of Assurance Societies, but of Friendly Societies, and of the whole error, deception, fraud and swindling, which are perpetrated upon the most helpless portion of the community, who find themselves without defence.'²

The Northcote Commission, appointed in 1871, was entrusted with the task of inquiring exhaustively into a whole range of questions relating to Friendly Societies, and it did so most carefully, under the chairmanship of Sir Stafford Northcote, later Lord Iddesleigh, and reported in many volumes.³ Before we deal briefly with its conclusions upon the conditions of Friendly Societies, which, as far as sickness benefit was concerned, only formed one part of their investigations, we must remember that fundamental changes in the nature of benefit had been going on in the later part of the first half of the century, and were rapidly expanding in the first decades after 1850.

The principal change was the final separation of funeral from sickness benefit. This, as we know, represented a decisive change from the conditions which had existed before the advent of Friendly Societies, and from the position of the sick clubs and pioneer Friendly Societies as well. With these it had been the custom always to have 'one death in hand' (as actuarial provision was still lacking), a procedure compatible with the purely local character of those societies. With the growing necessity to comply with actuarial regulations, with statistical tables and a much more complicated accountancy, the rather easy-going administration of the Friendly Societies had to be tightened up. Further, benefit provisions became more complicated and called for a far more businesslike adminis-

¹ James Spry, *The History of the Odd Fellowship* (1867), pp. 65 and 82.

² *Debates H.C.* 7 March 1864, p. 1555.

³ *Royal Commission on Friendly and Benefit Building Societies, Reports and Evidence* (1872-4).

tration, and technical progress, here as elsewhere, increased the financial range and forced the individual Friendly Society over its original local borders.

Here was the germ of a profitable business enterprise conducted over wide areas, embracing numbers of clients personally unknown to other members or clients. But these clients and members had somehow to be secured, by canvassing or otherwise, now that the 'friendly' local bonds were no longer active as a mutual agent. Thus there arose in the first half of the nineteenth century¹ the industrial assurance company on the one hand, and, so far as this new separate business was continued on Friendly Society lines, the friendly collecting society on the other. To-day industrial assurance is entirely separated as a business unit, economically, legally and administratively, from an ordinary life insurance business (in the language of the business, O.B. is to be distinguished from I.B.) while the latter is not concerned with sickness insurance. These developments are not, however, themselves proof of the necessity of separating sickness and burial benefit from all national health insurance schemes. On the contrary, the distinct separation is a feature of the English burial system on insurance which, at an early date, was developed for business purposes on a separate basis from sickness benefit; a course which for reasons of competition the Friendly Societies had to follow by forming the distinct unit of the collecting societies as an insurance carrier.

The development and expansion from local to district and national units was, of course, not limited to burial insurance as administered by Friendly Societies. It related to the whole complex of Friendly Society structure and development in the eighteenth century, and, therefore, relates as well to the administration of sickness benefit. This is the second change we have to record. It may be that the process of enlargement and centralization had not been quite so rapid with societies paying sick pay as with those merely concerned with funeral benefit,² but the final result was the same. The time of the great orders and societies with branches had arrived.

In general, a distinction must be made on the one hand between central societies, or general societies, as they were called; and on the other the large bodies (large, that is, in comparison with the older clubs), which, being branches, are called affiliated societies (formed at first for the manufacturing and mining population of the midlands and northern counties and Wales) and the country societies for the rural population. In his report Sir George Young remarked that wherever he had been investigating the matter on the spot he had heard the same story from members of the older clubs: 'We cannot stand against the great Orders.' He added, 'Wherever they penetrate, and they are penetrating year by year into the most remote corner of the field, the majority of existing clubs at once cease to exist and within half a generation die out or break up. In some towns they have made a clean sweep of the local societies.'

¹ Wilson and Levy, *Industrial Assurance*, pp. 23 sqq. and *passim*.

² Cf. Sir George Young in his *Report to the Northcote Commission* (1874), p. 1.

There can be no doubt that the movement towards larger units meant on the whole a vast improvement of the financial security on which Friendly Societies were built. The 'dividing-out system' of the smaller clubs and societies, as distinguished from that of accumulative funds and reserves on an actuarial basis, provided the greatest disappointments which the thrift movement experienced during the nineteenth century. This chapter in Friendly Society history has been exhaustively written by Comyns Carr, Garnett and Taylor.¹ It cannot, however, be said that after reading the *Reports and Evidence* of the Northcote Commission the conclusion is in any way inevitable that the development of Friendly Societies and insurance companies on sounder business methods was so effective as to prevent great disappointments. The Northcote Commission mentioned unduly high expenses of management, 'direct frauds' and 'embezzlement' of funds,² and unsound actuarial methods which led to loss of expectations. It is interesting to note that even the classic propagandist of 'thrift', Samuel Smiles, could not avoid making sharp criticisms of the soundness of many Friendly Societies.

Smiles, in spite of his praise of these thrift agencies, was objective enough to add that he 'believed' that 'time and experience will enable the leaders of Friendly Societies generally to improve them, and introduce new ameliorations. The best institutions are things of slow growth, and are shaped by experience, which includes failures as well as successes; and finally, they require age to strengthen them and to root them in habit.' Smiles, in agreement with the Northcote Commission, stressed the fact that Friendly Societies were 'established by working men',³ and that this self-help should not be discouraged. But the smaller societies were bound to fail when they tried to imitate large capitalist institutions; there is no intermediary stage between the old-fashioned artisan and the modern factory. The development from now onwards followed the lines which were later regarded as characteristic of Friendly Society finance; the great affiliated orders were sound because their numerous branches, although they possessed a considerable degree of autonomy, were under the general supervision and control of a central body which was acting as, and (as in the case of the Manchester Unity) was sometimes called, a Board of Directors. In contrast to them the single Friendly Societies which had no branches remained the object of criticism.⁴

The Northcote Commission could not entirely refuse to face a question of reform which suggested itself as a natural sequel to its many disappointing findings. Had not the time arrived to replace the system of voluntary thrift by some system of state administration? The Commission was of the opinion that such a system might well be advisable in the realm of industrial assurance. It pointed to the example, to be sure not very

¹ A. S. Comyns Carr, W. H. Stuart Garnett and J. H. Taylor, *National Insurance* (1912), pp. 96-9.

² Cf. 4th Report, *loc. cit.* para. 848; also paras. 523 and 785.

³ *Thrift* (1905 edition), p. 138, and *Northcote Commission Report*, *loc. cit.* paras. 841 and 838.

⁴ Leo Chiozza Money, *Insurance v. Poverty* (1912), p. 151 and *passim*.

successful, of government insurance through the Post Office for death and deferred annuities, which the Commission thought it advisable to extend.¹ But it expressly declared that it did not find itself in a position 'to advocate the introduction of a system of government sick pay'. Had the decision gone otherwise, Britain might have seen national health insurance some thirty years earlier. The idea of an establishment of a 'National Friendly Society' 'managed, and therefore virtually guaranteed, by the government, insuring all the various classes of benefits now granted by the societies, whether in the form of sick pay' or other benefits, had in fact been very definitely suggested to the Commission by 'a number of intelligent and philanthropic gentlemen who have devoted a great deal of time and thought to the subject of Friendly Societies', and supported their views by a memorial presented to the Commission in 1872.² The signatories could in some cases speak with authority. Among the names were those of Sir Seymour Tremenheere, the first factory inspector, who had a wide practical knowledge of social administration both in England and abroad, Lord Shaftesbury, A. J. Mundella and Harriet Martineau.

But the Northcote Commission rejected the idea of a state administration on other than merely administrative arguments. It was thought that such a system would 'render it distasteful to many most deserving classes', while it would rather tend to familiarize another class with the idea of looking to the state for support in time of need, and thus to break down the barrier of honourable pride which now deters many from claiming assistance from the poor rates'.³

The efforts of the Commission were directed towards a further strengthening of Friendly Society legislation and supervision, and there can be no doubt that this gave a valuable impulse to the movement. The classic Act of 1875 (38 and 39 Vic. c. 60) was due to them. A chief registrar, who now had assistants in England, Ireland and Scotland, replaced the registrar. Other Acts followed in quick succession; there were four more Friendly Societies Acts passed between 1886 and 1896, preceding the consolidating Act (50 and 60 Vic. c. 25) of the latter year. Public auditors were appointed by the Treasury under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893, and the Friendly Societies Act, 1896. One may well agree with Clapham when he observes that 'since the consolidating Act of 1875 the legal, one might almost say the constitutional, position of the societies had been perfectly secure'.⁴ But it would be a mistake to assume that the 'legal' position, so improved, offered a guarantee that losses to the working-class population arising out of the current system were avoided. There is much useful evidence to demonstrate the contrary.

This evidence begins with the writing of Canon Blackley, who laid stress⁵

¹ *Northcote Commission, loc. cit.* para. 849.

² *Memorial on Government Insurance, to the Right Hon. the Chairman of the Friendly Societies Commission* (December, 1872).

³ *Northcote Commission, loc. cit.* para. 848.

⁴ J. H. Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain*, III (Cambridge, 1938), p. 504.

⁵ W. L. Blackley, *National Insurance in the Nineteenth Century* (1878), pp. 834 sqq.

on the chances of reducing the poor rate, an argument which, as he was well aware, commanded the respect of people who were in general opposed to state interference. Blackley followed the path of the memorialists to the Northcote Commission, referring to the grave defects of the existing Friendly Societies. He gave illuminating examples of the 'other side' of purely voluntary exertions which manifested itself in the great number of withdrawals of memberships with total loss of savings.¹ His main conclusion appears to be that, in spite of the tremendous increase in the number of Friendly Societies, they had not been able to alleviate the burden of the poor law administration. His scheme, though widely discussed, was hardly taken seriously. Even as late as 1899 Thomas Mackay, the poor law chronicler, rejected his idea as impractical and lacking popular appeal.² But the list of critics of the Friendly Society system did not end with him. At the same time that Mackay was criticizing Blackley's ideas, a great authority on the subject of Friendly Societies, indeed the greatest in his time, Sir Edward Brabrook, published his treatise on *Provident Societies and Industrial Welfare*. He spoke with many years' experience as an official, having succeeded Pratt and Ludlow as registrars, the latter as Chief Registrar. His fame was considerable and he could lend weight to his criticisms of existing conditions. While admitting the progress made towards greater safety through valuation and other means,³ he pointed to the conflicts between large and small societies. He remarked that the small society, like the village club, resembled in its 'oldest and most simple form' the benefit system of the gilds. 'The assurance of sick pay', required 'brotherly visitation by members' to prevent malingering and to maintain good relations. Still, he had to recognize, just as Eden had done a hundred years earlier, that the small associations, having a mixed membership of old and young people, were liable to become a source of loss to some of their members.⁴ 'It will be seen', he writes (with perhaps the large collecting societies in his mind), 'that in the nature of things the individual must be of small account in the management of the Society. It becomes in fact an insurance company, without any capital or body of shareholders.' But Brabrook's ideal of the sickness society's unit encountered the greatest disappointments when the actual financial conditions of the different societies were brought under review.

When in 1910 the office which Sir Edward had controlled made its return on the financial position of the small Friendly Societies it showed the following result:

Financial position of some of the small Friendly Societies: summary returns made in 1910 (England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland)

	No. of members	Total surplus or deficit
Societies with surpluses	209,306	£356,738
Societies with deficiencies	538,231	£1,691,541

¹ *Ibid.* p. 836; experiences of the Hampshire Friendly Society.

² Thomas Mackay, *A History of the Poor Law* (1899), III, 590-2.

³ Brabrook, *op. cit.* p. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 57.

The figure of more than 500,000 members belonging to financially unsafe societies was certainly not a trifling matter.

Then there was sickness insurance by trade unions. Now whatever comparison may be made between trade unions and the fraternities and brotherhoods of earlier days, the former have never reached anything like the standard of social benefits which the latter provided. Brabrook fastened upon the strongest point of criticism. 'The members of Trade Unions, knowing what they want, disregard the teaching of the actuary. They do not accumulate large funds, and they do not earmark those funds for a special purpose.'¹ The point is still more definitely brought home by the Webbs. 'The Trade Union is a bad form of Friendly Society, and if it had to be considered exclusively as Friendly Society, its total lack of actuarial basis and absence of security would bring upon its servants the severest condemnation.'²

Economists and politicians had little to say about the medical treatment provided under Friendly Society administration. It is questionable whether the medical attention furnished was worth the price. Save in cases where Friendly Societies had combined to establish medical institutes of alliances, which employed practitioners at a fixed salary to attend to all members in a town or district, the usual practice of sickness institutions was to make a contract with a medical man to attend their members on a *per capita* basis, the contract almost invariably including the supply of medicines as well as attendance. In some cases an incredibly low rate was paid; not uncommonly it was no more than 2s. It is difficult to understand how a doctor could supply medicine and attend, even perfunctorily, to a circle of 500 patients for the inclusive sum of £50 a year. In 1905 the British Medical Association made an investigation, which became a classic of its kind, into the arrangements of contract medical practice.³ The worst paid doctors were certainly in the minority. Yet only 23.5 % received more than 5s. per member. The inquiry related to 1641 Friendly Societies and similar underwriters of sickness risks. The B.M.A. published the views of doctors; they showed an interesting but depressing medley of opinions. Many doctors appeared not dissatisfied with their scanty remuneration, having to face the hazards of an overcrowded profession. They were, to be sure, better paid by some societies than by the guardians for attendance on the paupers. Others spoke of the 'villainous system of contract medical practice', and of the remuneration as being degrading. One doctor from Lancashire wrote: 'For the last ten years I have refused to have anything to do whatever with the sick Friendly Society clubs or provident associations. They are a great detriment to the medical profession, and in no way benefit the poor.' The B.M.A. investigation as a whole supports the contention that a very large part of the

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 36-7.

² S. and B. Webb, *Industrial Democracy* (1920 edition), pp. 154 and 797.

³ *British Medical Journal*, 'Report into the Economic Conditions of Contract Medical Practice', 22 July 1905, Special number.

medical benefit as provided under the Friendly Society system was not only insufficient but actually a threat to the nation's health.¹

In 1897 the Foresters had 933 courts (i.e. branches) with an estimated surplus, and no less than 3038 with an estimated deficiency. By advice and insistence on proper valuations of the funds registrars toiled to improve the position. It improved only in part. In 1908, reports Clapham, two-thirds of the valuations received from societies without branches showed deficiencies.

At the time when the National Health Insurance scheme was first discussed it could be contended that not 'even as many as 4,000,000 of our great working population are insured in a businesslike way for sickness benefit'.² Social monographs confirm such general estimates. Lady Bell, who knew something about the life of the working classes, observed, however, that the relatively small number of people who insured against sickness was a matter for surprise. Out of the first 700 she interrogated for the purpose of her study on social conditions in a manufacturing town, 380 were in a club, 80 in two clubs even, but 270 in none.³

There was little evidence available to the legislator to show that the requirements of a social medical service were effectively met by voluntary mutual thrift, however good the work of some of the societies may have been. The position of cripples, so much the concern of medieval sick provisions, was an example of this insufficiency. Even the member of a solvent Friendly Society or club got little help. Mrs Bosanquet drew attention to the lack of surgical appliances for the poor, and though she appreciated the work done by charitable institutions, such as the Surgical Aid Society, she pointed out that only a small part of the actual needs could be satisfied by charitable help.⁴ In 1897 the first Workmen's Compensation Act had been passed, followed in 1906 by an improved measure. But Workmen's Compensation in Britain, even in our day, provides sickness benefit only, and no medical benefit whatever. Yet at least a certain proportion of the sick, i.e. those disabled by industrial accidents, to which later were added certain industrial diseases, were now safeguarded even if they were not members of Friendly Societies nor insured by unions, if they were for any other reason devoid of income during ill-health. But while under the German compensation law some very definite arrange-

¹ Mention must be made too of the so-called medical institutes of Friendly Societies. In these the medical officer had generally to devote his whole time to the club work in return for a fixed salary, with residence, allowance for horse hire, and sometimes extra payment for certain special services, drugs being provided by the club. In some of the institutes the medical officers were fairly remunerated and not overworked; elsewhere the salary was totally inadequate and the work far too heavy for good results. There were in 1911 about 100 medical institutes, about 30 of them having buildings of their own, and with a total membership of about 300,000. 'Many of them', so wrote Comyns Carr, Garnett and Taylor (*op. cit.* pp. 54-5 and 193) 'are boycotted by the local medical men for various reasons.'

² Chiozza Money, *op. cit.* p. 21.

³ Florence Bell, *At the Works* (1907), pp. 173 sqq.

⁴ Mrs Bosanquet, *Rich and Poor* (1896), pp. 210-13.

ments were made for the medical treatment of the injured by the semi-state *Berufsgenossenschaften* or *Krankenkassen* of the national health scheme, the injured English worker getting his cash payment compensation was still forced to rely upon the meagre doctoring provided by the benefit institutions—if, indeed, he belonged to one.

We have pointed out that from the beginning the argument with the biggest national appeal was that the system of Friendly Societies and self-help reduced the calls upon public assistance and the poor rate. To a certain extent, doubtless, the system had this result. It is evident that every million pounds paid by the workers for the insurance of such benefit could be considered as some sort of alleviation of the poor rate, and it was not a small matter that in 1905 the Friendly Societies in the United Kingdom paid out £4,079,022 in sick benefit, whilst their actuarially administered funds amounted to more than £40,000,000. But how far the assistance actually granted by the Poor Law authorities was influenced by Friendly Societies payments we cannot say. Substantial as the movement was, it was entirely insufficient to safeguard the majority of the humbler population from becoming pauperized by illness. The movement, as we have seen, covered only a fraction of the population, even in 1911. We do not know how many of the members of Friendly Societies actually received enough in benefit to carry them through in time of illness. We do not know exactly how many of the enumerated members were only marginal contributors and prospects for the lapse list. Chiozza Money speaks of 300,000–400,000 a year.¹ We do not know how many fell victims to public assistance through the insufficiency of Friendly Societies' medical benefits.

Relatively few members of Friendly Societies applied for public assistance. But this should not be taken as proving that the medical benefits offered by such bodies were sufficient. Evidence given before the Royal Commission on the Poor Law of 1905–6 fully confirms one's doubts. A Medical Officer of Health very aptly described the effect of such insufficiency upon the administration of public funds. 'It must be borne in mind', he declared, 'that the "self-supporting" character of a medical club is largely an illusion. There are many diseases which a club doctor does not attempt to treat. The vast majority of notifiable cases of infectious disease, lunacy, and an increasing number of cases of tuberculosis are treated in rate-supported institutions. Abdominal surgery, ophthalmic surgery, any surgical operation, except the most trivial, and many other conditions are treated in hospitals that are supported by private charity. If these institutions were not available, clubs and provident dispensaries could not be conducted on their present conditions, and, therefore, it is true to say that, in a sense, these so-called 'self-supporting' medical agencies are partly supported by the rates and partly by private charity.'² This argument does not appear in either the *Report of the Old Age Pensions Committee* of 1898 or the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor* of 1895.

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 142–3.

² Cf. S. and B. Webb, *The Break-up of the Poor Law* (1909), p. 258 for further details.

We must conclude that Friendly Societies did not become the agents of an effective system of social service. We may summarize the points which lead to this conclusion:

(i) No more than a minority of the humbler part of the population became beneficiaries.

(ii) An enormous part of the contributions produced by the toil, thrift and privations of the members was lost through financial insecurity, through the lack of compulsory payments, and as a result of unavoidable lapses under a voluntary system.

(iii) The medical treatment given by Friendly Societies, to say nothing of the lesser clubs, was admittedly insufficient. This was partly a necessary consequence of deficient financial resources. The great progress made during the Victorian age in medical science, surgery and therapy in no way found a satisfactory expression in the treatment of the poorer classes. Its benefits were restricted to the more well-to-do, who were able to afford doctors and secure treatment on their own account. The majority of the sick poor had, in all serious cases, to rely upon medical help and cure in hospitals or institutions outside their Friendly Society. It was the serious lapses from health which were most liable to lead, if left neglected, to utter destitution. Thus the positive effect of Friendly Societies on the nation's health must have been restricted. Doctors under the administration of Friendly Societies were in a great number of cases ill-paid, overworked and incapable, even if willing, of giving full attention to the treatment of club members. All this retarded the progress of the nation's health.

(iv) Under the regime of Friendly Societies, death benefit became more and more a separate function, though it had been originally included in the general scheme of sickness benefits. It was also included in most of the state sickness insurance schemes which were started since the eighties. In Britain the actuarial necessities and the difficulties of administration called for more application than the older societies could provide. Death benefit became the separate function of private assurance companies and the specially created friendly collecting societies. The voluntary associative principle gave way to exploitation by private interests, or collecting societies, on the pattern of their company competitors. The high administrative costs of the system have been fully described in *Industrial Assurance*. They have recently been restated with great force by Sir William Beveridge. Had the system of the ordinary Friendly Society come up to expectations the creation of so costly a system of thrift to secure safeguards against the pauper funeral would not have been necessary. But as a matter of fact Friendly Societies were not even in a position to meet easily the claims upon their medical services.

(v) The poor rate, as we have shown, became a beneficiary. But as the membership of Friendly Societies and trade unions only covered a part of those liable to become a social burden, whilst the insufficiency of the Friendly Society benefits actually appears to have promoted ill-health among the poorer classes, the system of Friendly Society relief cannot be said to have gone far to solve the problem of the sick poor.

(vi) Friendly Societies have been praised as agencies of self-help among co-operative groups. With the growing size of societies, their centralization and the increasing complication of their administrative machinery, the ideal of democratic control proved to be another fallacy. Self-government remained possible only where Friendly Societies retained their small, local field of action. But just those societies which maintained the primitive share-out principle became, in the face of modern developments of accountancy, the weakest part of the movement and that most open to inefficiency, if not to fraud. The 'friendly' principle of personal contact and active partnership of members in administrative matters vanished. The name Friendly Society became a misnomer.

One would have imagined that any attempt, such as the 1911 measure was, to revolutionize the system of sickness insurance would have been preceded by a detailed inquiry into these and other points connected with the working of the Friendly Society medical benefit system. Thirty years had passed since the Northcote Commission had reported. No further investigation of Friendly Societies was available. There were only the scanty observations of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor, or specialized Reports such as that by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Degeneration in 1904¹ and, of course, the most impressive revelations of the Poor Law Commission of 1905-6. There was no comprehensive or methodical criticism of the administration, of the deficiencies and shortcomings of sickness and medical benefit as administered by the 'thrift' institutions.² Perhaps this gap was felt, but nobody was prepared to undermine the reputation of institutions which were believed to be a dignified part of the fabric of British public life. Yet the lack of research and publicity in this matter had a far-reaching effect upon coming events. For, revolutionary as the system created in 1911 appeared to most people, it did not break away from certain traditional features of health administration which had been created and maintained by Friendly Societies. As insurance underwriters in a new cloak they reappeared in the Approved Society.

Richmond, Surrey

¹ W. A. Brend, *Health and the State* (1917), p. 212.

² Cf. Hermann Levy, *National Health Insurance* (Cambridge, 1944), Chapter 1.

SHORT ARTICLES AND MEMORANDA

MARC BLOCH: AN OBITUARY NOTE

By M. M. POSTAN

PROFESSOR MARC BLOCH died tragically and heroically at the hands of the Germans a few days after the Allies had landed in Normandy. He had been very active in the resistance movement, was caught by the Germans in May, taken to Lyons and shot there during the wave of reprisals which followed D day. Madame Bloch followed him a few weeks later. In the shy words of a semi-official report she 'died—presumably of a broken heart'.

Bloch's life was an amalgam of all the qualities and experiences of a scholar-republican. He was a *savant* of great fame, possibly the greatest French historian since the days of Michelet. At the same time he was a Frenchman dominated by a sense of duty to his country and deeply involved in the social and political issues of the day. In the first Great War he fought with very great distinction, was wounded, decorated and four times mentioned in despatches. When this war broke out he was approaching his middle fifties, and could easily have remained at the University or found a safe and useful position in the government. Instead, he rejoined his regiment on the Rhine. As he had told Sir John Clapham a few months earlier, his duty lay with the army: as a citizen of Strasbourg he could do nothing else. A few months before the collapse of France he was appointed to a military post in the north of France which brought him into contact with the British Army, and eventually he took part in the great retreat to the Channel coast. After the Armistice he went to live in Montpellier. In consideration of his brilliant military record the Vichy government exempted him from the anti-Jewish laws and allowed him to resume his duties at the Sorbonne. But he would not accept favours from Vichy or teach in German-occupied Paris. Nor would he emigrate to the United States, where he was invited to go by his American friends. He stayed in Montpellier, lectured there, and by degrees immersed himself in the resistance movement. Now and again he was able to communicate with his friends in this country through secret channels, and every note he wrote breathed hope and vigour. His last letter addressed to Sir John Clapham and me came over a year ago. He asked for books on economic history and on current social and economic problems of this country. These were sent to an accommodation address in Switzerland, but could not have reached him long before he went underground. The last news about him came in April 1944, since when all attempts to communicate with him have failed. His friends here began to fear the worst, for he was known to have been taking great risks.

These patriotic and republican preoccupations did not detract from the quality or magnitude of his academic achievement. Like so many distinguished Frenchmen of his generation, he sprang from the academic aristocracy of the Third Republic. His father was Georges Bloch of the *Histoire de la République Romaine*, and there were other distinguished scholars and scientists in the family. He entered the École Normale in 1904, passed the Concours d'Agrégation d'Histoire in 1908, received in 1909 the much-coveted bursary of the Fondation Thiers, and spent two years in the Universities of Berlin and Leipzig. By the time the World War broke out he had had the experience of two years' teaching

in the Lycées of Montpellier and Amiens. After the War he was appointed to a history chair in the University of Strasbourg, and in 1937 was translated to the chair of economic history at the Sorbonne.

Bloch's first full-sized book on the *Roi Thaumaturge* (Paris, 1924) was hardly on the fringes of economic and social history, which was to become his life work and the main foundation of his fame. But it was soon followed by studies of medieval peasantry and by a remarkable survey of French agrarian history, *Les Caractères Originaux d'Histoire Rurale Française* (Paris, 1928). Since then he published numerous studies of French and European economic history, mostly medieval and agrarian, but occasionally spreading to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to topics unconnected with agriculture.

Nowhere did his range and catholicity show themselves to better advantage than in the *Annales d'Histoire Économique et Sociale* which he founded and directed. As the readers of that journal will remember, it was the liveliest, most suggestive and original of all the historical journals in Europe. It promptly replaced the German *Vierteljahrsschrift* as the international clearing house of economic history. Unlike other scientific periodicals, it led and directed the interests of students instead of merely reflecting them.

The *Annales* were Marc Bloch. In every number his reviews and notes and articles formed a large part, and, as a rule, the most interesting part of the journal. His interests and his authority extended to every field of economic history, and he was almost equally sound and suggestive on Roman Gaul and on contemporary Britain as he was on the medieval *Seigneurie*.

Yet the *Annales* did not absorb or exhaust the rare fertility of his scholarship. He gave abundantly to other historical projects—especially to projects emanating from this country. English readers need not be told of his important and stimulating chapter in the first volume of the *Cambridge Economic History*, but they may not all know how greatly Sir John Clapham and Eileen Power depended on his advice and assistance in planning the series.

This assistance he gave in a manner which, we felt, he reserved for this country and its scholars. He came here at least once a year. In 1938 he came to Cambridge as a visiting lecturer, and made arrangements to come again in 1940 for a whole term as a guest of Eileen Power and myself. He recalled the plan in one of his last letters—the one and only nostalgic note he allowed himself in his wartime messages to friends in this country.

Peterhouse, Cambridge

THE FREE TENANTRY OF THE HUNDRED ROLLS

BY B. DODWELL

INCLUDED among the series of rolls known collectively as the *Rotuli Hundredorum* is an inquest of 7 Edward I. The value of these rolls as a source of economic history has already been demonstrated by Mr Kosminsky.¹ Unlike many other types of record, it is the village and not the manor which is the unit. Within this unit manor and submanor, estates of all kinds, both lay and ecclesiastical, are set out, thus enabling us to obtain a more complete picture of the social organization than is generally possible.

Although an extremely valuable source, the rolls are not without their limitations. There are gaps and mistakes, and those rolls which survive are but the fragments of the original survey. Those printed in the second volume of the *Rotuli Hundredorum* Record Commission,² cover only the whole of Huntingdonshire, about half of Cambridgeshire, the greater part of Oxfordshire and parts of Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire.³ This area, although limited, is not unimportant, since it lies on the fringe of those two great regions of Scandinavian settlement, namely, East Anglia and the Northern Danelaw. From the studies of Professor Stenton and of Professor Douglas the social organization of these areas has been revealed in detail. In neither were manorial tendencies predominant; in neither do manor and village commonly coincide; and in both the survival into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of large numbers of free peasants is an outstanding feature of the social organization. The term 'Danelaw' covered an area wider than that of the counties between the Welland and the Tees. To the south of the Welland lay the Southern Danelaw, comprising the eight counties of Northampton, Huntingdon, Cambridge, Bedford, Buckingham, Hertford, Middlesex and Essex.⁴ Here, though in a minor degree, Scandinavian influence is likewise to be traced. In the eleventh century the outstanding features of large parts of this region are the occurrence of free men of peasant rank and the existence of villages, divided between a number of small landowners, side by side with those in which manor and village coincide. Of the counties covered either wholly or partially by the Hundred Rolls, four formed part of the Southern Danelaw, while the fifth, Oxfordshire, lay just outside that region. Between Oxfordshire and the neighbouring counties there was, in the eleventh century, no sharp contrast, for Scandinavian influence can scarcely be perceived in the adjoining portions of Northamptonshire and Buckinghamshire. For the rest, those features which characterized the area in the eleventh century have survived into

¹ 'The Hundred Rolls of 1279-80 as a source of English agrarian history', *Economic History Review*, III, 16-44.

² In addition to the rolls printed here, there are the P.R.O. rolls, as yet unprinted, relating to Warwickshire and to a part of Cambridgeshire. Transcripts of portions of the Suffolk inquest also exist.

For Cambridgeshire, the Isle of Ely and certain hundreds of the south-east are missing; for Oxfordshire the hundreds of Binfield and Bloxham are lacking. The Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire sections cover about twenty-five and fifty villages respectively.

⁴ Of these counties Buckinghamshire, Middlesex and Huntingdonshire show very little trace of Scandinavian influence.

the thirteenth century. From the Hundred Rolls and other records the existence of villages divided into several estates, and the occurrence of large numbers of free tenants are evident, particularly in Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire.

The division of the village into manor and submanor has already been studied from the evidence of the Hundred Rolls by Mr Kosminsky.¹ He found a social organization that was largely unmanorialized. In two of the counties, Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire, the great majority of villages are divided into several estates. In Buckinghamshire and Huntingdonshire about half the villages coincide with manors in the late thirteenth century. In Oxfordshire the majority of villages are coterminous with manors. Moreover, as Mr Kosminsky points out, the manor does not always constitute a single tenurial unit. Within the framework of the manor there is the submanor, and in some places even a submanor within a submanor.

It is into this framework that one must fit the free tenantry of the region. The very division of the village into holdings and subholdings, and the existence of different types of holdings complicate the social organization. Moreover, there is no clear-cut division between holding and holding, for the tenantry, both free and villein, owe obligations to other estates. Both villeins and free tenants hold land of more than one lord, while the lords themselves appear as free tenants on other estates, or even seem to hold land of their own free tenants. Neither is there a sharp division between the classes, and these like the holdings tend to shade off into one another. There is no doubt that the men described as *libere tenentes* or as *liberi tenentes* comprised a group of persons of varying social grades, ranging from the military tenant of some importance to the humble peasant. Although the personal nomenclature is mainly French, and English or Scandinavian names seldom occur, it is highly probable that large numbers of free tenants are of native origin, especially in those districts in which many free tenants were recorded in the eleventh century. But along with the peasants are to be found greater men, the lords who also hold land as free tenants. An instance of the extent to which this occurs comes from the Cambridgeshire village of Cottenham.² Here there are six estates of which the largest, reckoned at eleven hides, belonged to the abbey of Crowland. The other landholders are Robert de Lisle (nine hides), Walter de Pelham (two hides), Gilbert de Cottenham (two hides), Simon le Waleis (one hide, a submanor) and the rector of Cottenham (two hides). With the exception of the abbot each of these landholders is the free tenant of one or more of his fellows. The most important of this group, Robert de Lisle, holds both of Walter de Pelham and the abbot of Crowland. He proved to be a most unruly tenant and the arrangement resulted, in the words of Miss Page, in 'a tangle of liabilities which filled the court rolls with pleas and the scribes with bitterness'.³ This village, in which both the holder of the submanor and each of the military tenants also figure among the free tenants, is admittedly an extreme example, but in a less extreme form this situation is repeated in many other villages. But though the inclusion of military tenants among the *libere tenentes* must not be overlooked, they form only a small proportion of that class and their importance should not, therefore, be exaggerated.

In the late thirteenth century the numbers of free tenants are often large. Exact figures and percentages are, however, not easy to compile, partly because of the difficulty of classification,⁴ and partly because the rolls do not always

¹ *Economic History Review*, III, 30-4.

² *Rot. Hund.* (Record Commission), II, 409-10.

³ F. M. Page, *The Estates of Crowland Abbey* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 22.

⁴ *Censarii* or *molmen* are seldom recorded, and unfortunately the bulk of the tenants of this type are probably included among the *libere tenentes*.

record in detail the names or numbers of the tenants. Care, moreover, has to be taken to ensure that a free tenant with several tenements in one village is not counted more than once. The following figures will, therefore, be only approximate. They will, nevertheless, demonstrate that in Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire, and to a lesser extent in the other counties, the free population is numerically important. The highest percentages come from Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire. Here the number of free tenants often exceeds that of the unfree tenants, while in some villages there is an astounding proportion of *libere tenentes*. In the Cambridgeshire section figures can be compiled for 108 villages and hamlets. In no fewer than eight of these, and possibly in another three places, *all* tenants appear to be free. No villeins are recorded. Some of these places are small, such as the hamlet of Northey, for which but seventeen tenants are recorded.¹ But others are larger, and at both Babraham and Fen Drayton² more than sixty persons are enumerated. In addition to these entirely 'free' villages, there are others in which the free tenants form an extremely large proportion, over 75%, of the whole. The number of places falling into this group totals seventeen. Taken together these two groups form a quarter of the whole. In another quarter at least half the recorded population is free. This group includes, moreover, several villages which fail to qualify for the higher group by only a small margin, for within it are eight villages in which the percentage of free tenants lies between 70 and 75. Of the remaining villages, nearly another quarter contain a free population of between 25 and 49%, while in less than a quarter the free element is under 25%. These figures show without doubt that the free peasantry formed an important part of the rural population of Cambridgeshire.

The high figures are not confined to that county alone, for in the twenty-five Bedfordshire villages surveyed in the rolls similar figures have been obtained.³ Of these twenty-five there is one in which no villeins are recorded and another in which there is only one villein to at least forty free tenants.⁴ In five other villages the free element comprises at least 75%, and in a further eight places between 50 and 74%. In Bedfordshire, therefore, the free population outnumbered the rest in fifteen of the twenty-five villages.⁵ These proportions are not less than those of Cambridgeshire, and it seems that the free tenantry here is equally important. Although it is not possible to determine definitely whether these twenty-five places are typical of the whole county, it is probable that they are in no way abnormal. Other evidence, principally that of charters, points to a large free peasant population.

But if the free population is large both in Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire, it is not so in the other counties surveyed in the Hundred Rolls. In about half the villages both of Huntingdonshire and Buckinghamshire the free tenants form less than a quarter of the recorded population. The number of free tenants exceeds that of the 'unfree' in only twelve out of a total of about eighty places in Huntingdonshire, and in only four out of a total of forty-six places in Buckinghamshire. In the latter county, however, the free tenantry may form a larger proportion than is here indicated. For roughly a third of the villages it is impossible to obtain an accurate total of free tenants, owing to the fact

¹ *Rot. Hund.* II, 428, one of which is the Earl of Oxford.

² *Ibid.* II, 413, 474-6.

³ These twenty-five villages do not lie on the Cambridgeshire side of the county but in the north-east, on the borders of Northamptonshire and Buckinghamshire.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 322, Riseley.

⁵ In some of the Bedfordshire villages the percentage of free tenantry is probably even larger than is here shown. Certain free tenants are stated to have an unspecified number of *co-tenentes* or *socii*, who may be assumed to be free.

that not all names are recorded and exact numbers are hidden by statements that certain persons and their co-tenants (*co-tenentes*, *socii*, or sometimes *parui tenentes*) hold a given piece of land. An examination of contemporary charters indicates that these co-tenants might be fairly numerous.¹

Finally, there is Oxfordshire, where the proportion of free tenants is, in some respects, even lower. Of the villages for which figures can be compiled, about one-fifth contain a free population of over 50%, a larger proportion than in either Huntingdonshire or Buckinghamshire. On the other hand, the free element forms less than a quarter of the whole in more than half the villages and, moreover, the number of villages containing no free tenants at all is larger than in the other counties. On the whole, therefore, it may be concluded that the free tenantry of this county is slightly smaller than in Huntingdonshire or Buckinghamshire. This summary reveals the difference between these three counties and those of Bedford and Cambridge. In the latter the proportion of free tenants is normally high, and in no less than half the villages it is larger than that of the villeins and cottars. In the three other counties, although there are occasional villages in which the proportion is high, it is on the whole very much lower, and in half the villages the free tenants form no more than a quarter of the manorial population.

Nevertheless, both sets of figures assign a more important place to the free tenants than is sometimes allowed. The statement made by Professor Powicke that even 'in the Midlands, the heart of England, the free tenants were the most important element',² adds weight to this conclusion. Before accepting these figures implicitly it would, however, be advisable to compare the evidence of the Hundred Rolls with that of other records. Some substantiation can be obtained from the evidence of charters, for from the many thirteenth-century charters which have survived it is possible to observe a large body of free peasants in these counties. Charters, however, give but shadowy support. On the other hand, the substantiation of independent surveys is not easy to obtain. There is no large survey comparable with that of the Hundred Rolls. The inquisitions post mortem, which might have supplied material with which to check the figures of the Hundred Rolls are, unfortunately, no longer available. Among the surveys of religious bodies the most important is the last of the three Ely surveys, that of 1277.³ This may be used to check the figures for the estates of the bishop of Ely in six villages in Cambridgeshire and in a group of villages known as the soke of Somersham in Huntingdonshire. Though there is but two years' difference between the two records, exact parallels cannot be expected. Classification was by no means uniform, and even in the Ely surveys themselves men assigned to a certain class at one date may be placed in a different one at a later time.⁴ Discrepancies are, therefore, only to be expected. A comparison between the figures compiled for the Ely estates from the Ely survey of 1277 and that of the Hundred Rolls of 1279-80 reveals some differences, the nature and extent of which can be gauged from the figures given in the following table.

¹ In particular charters of Snelshall Priory, transcripts of which I have been able to examine through the kindness of Mr J. G. Jenkins, Secretary of the Record Branch of the Buckinghamshire Archaeological Society, show grants of land in Tattenhoe and Shenley by more persons than are recorded in the Hundred Rolls survey of these places.

² F. M. Powicke, 'Observations on the English freeholder in the thirteenth century', *Wirtschaft und Kultur. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Alfons Dopsch* (Baden bei Wien, Leipzig, 1938), p. 382.

³ *Cott. Claud.* c. xi.

⁴ Some of the *censuarii* of the 1222 survey are found to be included among the free tenants of 1277. For in several of the 1277 manors no heading of *censuarii* is given, and these tenants, therefore, appear as free tenants. Such are Thriplow (*Cott. Claud.* c. xi, f. 133; *Cott. Tib.* b. ii, f. 219); Northwold (*Cott. Claud.* c. xi, f. 259; *Cott. Tib.* b. ii, f. 124b).

Manor	Ely Survey of 1277						Hundred Rolls of 1279-80						
	Free tenants	<i>Censuarii</i>	Villains	Cottars	Cottrells	Tofters	Free tenants	Free cottars	<i>Censuarii</i>	Villains	Cottars	Cottrells	Tofters
Ditton	.	.	30	22	47	.	.	41	.	29	18	24	.
Horningsea	.	.	16	9	10	.	.	21	.	17	18	.	.
Gransden	3	.	40	15	.	.	2	.	.	40	15	.	.
Hardwick	5	4	26	3	.	.	25	.	.	27	4	.	.
Shelford	5	20	26	11	.	.	5	.	14	24	18	.	.
Thriplow	28	.	25	4	.	.	24	.	.	26	4	.	.
Soke of Somersham	35	13	73	31	.	42	28	.	.	65	.	30	55

Although there is considerable resemblance between these two sets of figures there are also notable differences. The greatest discrepancies come from the figures relating to Ditton, Horningsea and Hardwick. For the first two manors the Ely survey records a large number of cottars and tofters who, in the absence of a statement to the contrary, are presumed to hold by villein tenure, although their dues consisted of money rents. In the Hundred Rolls, however, many of these are reckoned to be free and as such appear as free cottars in the table above. Moreover, it will be noticed that this latter record gives a larger manorial population. As for Hardwick, the Hundred Rolls record a number of additional free tenants who do not appear in the Ely survey, but who may possibly be subtenants. For the rest, although the figures do not exactly tally there is a sufficient resemblance. But if there is some approximation as regards numbers there is great difficulty in tracing the names, and in some instances the holdings, of individuals. Many of the names of the tenants, both bond and free, of the Ely survey cannot be found in the survey of the same manor in the Hundred Rolls. There is more than an absence of forenames, for even the surnames have to a large extent vanished. Medieval names are, admittedly, often difficult to trace and the importance of these differences in nomenclature should not, therefore, be overestimated.

There are other records with which the Hundred Rolls may be compared, but these are, unfortunately, further removed in point of time. Of the Ramsey extents of the mid-thirteenth century some, though not giving figures identical in all respects, on the whole support the totals compiled from the Hundred Rolls; others show greater differences. On the other hand, the Barnwell surveys of *circa* 1295 bear very little resemblance to those of the Hundred Rolls. Other records such as the printed subsidy lists for Bedfordshire of the early fourteenth century,¹ though they do not entirely tally with the lists of tenants given in the Hundred Rolls, are considerably dissimilar in only a few instances. These records certainly do not give figures exactly identical with those of the Hundred Rolls, yet they are of value in that they do not on balance contradict the evidence of 1279, but show a very similar type of social organization. It seems likely that the figures taken from the Hundred Rolls may be assumed to be approximately correct. That being so their significance may now be examined.

Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire are characterized by the existence of large numbers of free tenants, and, as Mr Kosminsky has already shown, by the division of the village into several estates. It is, therefore, interesting to note that within these two counties there is a tendency for the higher percentages to

¹ S. Hervey, *Two Bedfordshire Subsidy Lists* 1309, 1332 (Bury St Edmunds, 1925). Owing to wartime conditions I have been unable to examine the Lay Subsidy Rolls.

occur in the more divided villages. It was precisely these features of the division of the village and the occurrence of free peasantry which marked these counties in the eleventh century. The presence of large numbers of free tenants here in the thirteenth century is due in no small part to the survival of that social organization which seems to have resulted from earlier Scandinavian settlement.

But Huntingdonshire, although adjacent both to Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire, presents a different picture. In this county the villages are not commonly divided and the free population is small. Since the same features characterized this county in the eleventh century, the explanation must lie not in the post-Conquest period but in an earlier age. It is suggested that the peculiar conditions can be ascribed to a very large extent to the great number of estates held by religious houses. The abbot of Ramsey, although by far the largest landowner, was only one of a group which also included the bishop of Ely and the abbots of Thorney and Peterborough. Their estates tend to be more manorialized and to contain a smaller free element than those of lay holders. An examination of the distribution of free tenants bears out this suggestion. In the hundreds of Hurstingstone and Normancross, in both of which there were widespread ecclesiastical holdings, there is a marked difference in the size of the free element between those villages held by ecclesiastical bodies and those largely in lay hands. The difference can best be observed from the accompanying table, in which, moreover, these hundreds may be compared with that of Toseland, in which there was but one village held by a religious house.

Hundred	Free element of over 15 %		Free element under 15 %	
	Lay	Eccles.	Lay	Eccles.
Normancross and Hurstingstone	13	9	3	11
Toseland	18	1	1	0

Nevertheless, even on the lay estates the free element is considerably smaller than in either Cambridgeshire or Bedfordshire. This fact is borne out by figures from the fourth Huntingdonshire hundred, for here, although ecclesiastical estates are few, the free element is extremely small. Apart from this one hundred, however, the high proportion of ecclesiastical estates seems to have restricted the growth of a large free tenancy.

These conditions are, however, peculiar to Huntingdonshire and do not occur in the two remaining counties. A closer examination of the Buckinghamshire figures reveals that in one hundred, that of Bunsty, the free element is consistently larger than in the other hundreds. The four villages containing the highest percentages come from this hundred, where the lowest percentage was as high as twenty-one. Bunsty lies in the north-east of the county, on the borders of Northamptonshire and Bedfordshire, and alone of the Buckinghamshire hundreds covered by the Hundred Rolls it lies to the east of Watling Street. This position is probably the main reason for the higher percentages, for its social organization certainly seems to be more akin to that of Bedfordshire than to that of the other Buckinghamshire villages in the survey. The shading off of the free element is only to be expected in this county.

Oxfordshire, slightly more manorialized than Buckinghamshire, may perhaps be typical of the midland areas. The proportion of free tenants fluctuates; in some instances it is very large, in others low. There is, however, a tendency for the higher percentages to be grouped in the area formed by the hundreds of Ewelme, Pirton and Dorchester. The very appearance of these higher percentages in a county of this type is significant, for it indicates that the free element forms a more important group than is sometimes recognized. True as

this may be for Oxfordshire, it applies with even greater force to the other counties under review.

Many free peasants held their land not directly of the lord of the manor but, as the result of alienation, of mesne tenants. Rural society was not static; there was a constant interchanging of land between free tenants, and until the much needed statute of *Quia Emptores* of 1290, each alienation was likely to create a further mesne tenant. The process of alienation had not often given rise to more than one or two mesne tenants, but there was no limit to the creation of intermediate tenants by these means. An example, one among many, may be taken from the Cambridgeshire village of Whittlesford. It concerns a rood held by Richard Marescallus of Adam Cocus: '*idem* Adam tenet de Johanne Spaine & *idem* Johannes de Thoma le Draper & *idem* Thomas de Willelmo Algas & *idem* Willelmus tenet de domino Henrico de Lacy & *idem* dominus H. tenet de domino Johanne de Akyni.'¹ The number of free tenants to hold their land in this fashion is large, especially in Cambridgeshire.

The tenements themselves vary considerably. Many, particularly those held directly of the lord, are regular, that is based upon the virgate, and in some cases are equal in size to the villein tenement. Of the holdings thus held directly of the lord, those consisting of virgates and fractions thereof predominate in all the counties except Cambridgeshire. Here the use of the term virgate is less common and the size of the holding is usually expressed in acres. Free holdings in Cambridgeshire tend to be more irregular than in the other counties, but on more than a few estates free holdings equal in size to the villein tenement are recorded. A close relationship existed at Lolworth. Here the villein tenement is small, consisting of but 5 acres, and here free tenements of 15 acres (1), 10 acres (1), 5 acres (8), and 2½ acres (10) are recorded.² But although those tenements held of the lord of the manor tend to be regular, those held by the tenants of each other tend, except in Oxfordshire, to be irregular. These are generally smaller than the regular holdings and often consist of a few acres or even of fractions of an acre. A typical example, showing the difference between the two types of holding, comes from Elton in Huntingdonshire. Here Henry the miller holds of the abbot of Ramsey one virgate, on which he has four tenants, holding 3½ acres and 1 rood, 3 acres and 1 rood, 2½ and 3½ acres respectively. The two former hold in marriage, the two latter by charter.³ These small irregular holdings, the result of alienation, are common to the whole area but are more conspicuous in Cambridgeshire than in the other counties, though elsewhere they may be concealed by the phrase '*cum suis tenentibus*'. For Bedfordshire the most notable evidence for the prevalence of small irregular holdings comes, not from the Hundred Rolls, but from the many peasant charters which have survived. Many of these record the alienation of minute pieces of land, often of half acres and roods, and it seems certain that the small, irregular holding was common in this county. Though characteristic of Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire these irregular holdings are by no means confined to those counties, for they can be found in the surveys as well as in peasant charters of the other counties.

The holdings, both regular and irregular, vary greatly in size. Some consist of two or three virgates, a few are even larger, and many are of virgates and half virgates. Although no exact tabulation has been made, the bigger holdings appear to come largely from Oxfordshire and to a lesser extent from Huntingdonshire and Buckinghamshire. In contrast to the larger tenements there are many

¹ *Rot. Hund.* II, 572. It is interesting to note that while Adam Cocus, John Spaine and Thomas le Draper are all recorded as actual holders of land in Whittlesford, William Algas and Henry de Lacy appear only as mesne tenants.

² *Ibid.* II, 456-7.

³ *Ibid.* II, 657.

petty holdings, often of an acre or less in size, which, taken individually, appear insufficient for the support of even a peasant family. These small holdings occur in all the counties surveyed in the Hundred Rolls and are particularly numerous in Cambridgeshire. Their existence might indicate that the holdings of many of the free tenants were barely sufficient for their needs. Yet, since many persons held not one but several pieces of land, the total acreage is not necessarily insufficient. In the survey, tenants are seen to hold land not only on one estate, but, in the more divided villages, on several estates. At South Newington in Oxfordshire, John the miller holds lands totalling two and two-thirds virgates and two messuages on three of the larger estates.¹ This aggregate gives a fairly large holding, and many were smaller. There is in Cambridgeshire an instance of a tenant holding a total of 25 acres and $1\frac{1}{2}$ roods of no fewer than eleven different persons.² A number of similar examples drawn from each of the counties under review have been tabulated. These make it amply clear that the free tenant is not confined to a single holding and that, though each tenement might be small, the total, though rarely large, is often as big as, if not bigger than, the villein tenement.

County	Individual holdings								Total
Cams	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	2 a.	mes.	mes.	—	—	—	1 v. 2 a. 2 mes.
	5 a.	5 a.	4 a.	4 a.	2 a.	—	—	—	20 a.
	$3\frac{1}{2}$ a.	1 a.	$\frac{1}{2}$ a.*	$\frac{1}{2}$ a.	$\frac{1}{2}$ a.	1 r.	mes.	—	6 a. 1 r. 2 mes.
	5 a.	2 a.	2 a.	3 r.	$1\frac{1}{2}$ r.	$1\frac{1}{2}$ r.	1 r.	mes.	10 a. 3 r. mes.
	$1\frac{1}{2}$ a.	$1\frac{1}{2}$ a.	$1\frac{1}{2}$ a.	1 a.	3 r.	$\frac{1}{2}$ a.	1 r.	2 mes.	7 a. 2 mes.
	2 a.	2 a.	2 a.	1 a.*	3 r.	$\frac{1}{2}$ r.	—	—	7 a. $3\frac{1}{2}$ r. mes.
	15 a.	3 a.	5 r.	1 a.	$\frac{1}{2}$ a.	$\frac{1}{2}$ a.	—	—	21 a. 1 r.
	10 a. 3 r.	$8\frac{1}{2}$ a.	6 a.	5 a.	4 a. 3 r.	—	—	—	35 a.
	6 a.*	$\frac{1}{2}$ a.	—	—	—	—	—	—	$6\frac{1}{2}$ a. mes.
	$7\frac{1}{2}$ a.	2 a. 3 r.	—	—	—	—	—	—	10 a. 1 r.
	$7\frac{1}{2}$ a.	22 a.	—	—	—	—	—	—	$29\frac{1}{2}$ a.
	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	$\frac{1}{8}$ v.	5 a.	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. 5 a.
	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	8 a.	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. 8 a.
Beds†	1 v.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$ v.
	3 r.	3 r.	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$ a.
Bucks	15 a.	$10\frac{1}{2}$ a.	1 a.	—	—	—	—	—	$26\frac{1}{2}$ a.
	21 a.	10 a.	3 a.	3 a.	—	—	—	—	37 a.
	1 v.	1 v.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	—	—	—	—	—	$2\frac{1}{2}$ v.
	1 v.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v.	—	—	—	—	—	$1\frac{3}{4}$ v.
Hunts	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.	$\frac{1}{6}$ v.	$\frac{1}{6}$ v.	—	—	$2\frac{1}{3}$ v.
	12 a.	3 a.*	$\frac{1}{2}$ a.	—	—	—	—	—	$15\frac{1}{2}$ a. mes.
	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.*	5 a.*	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. 5 a. 2 mes.
	$5\frac{1}{2}$ a.*	2 a.	—	—	—	—	—	—	$7\frac{1}{2}$ a. mes.
Oxon	8 a.*	8 a.*	3 a.	—	—	—	—	—	19 a. 2 mes.
	$\frac{1}{2}$ v.*	5 a.	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. 5 a. mes.
	2 a.*	1 a.	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 a. mes.
	$1\frac{1}{2}$ v.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v.	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1\frac{3}{4}$ v.
	5 a.	5 a.	—	—	—	—	—	—	10 a.

* Indicates that a messuage is attached to the holding.

† See *supra*.

There are possibly yet other additions to the aggregate holding, for by the thirteenth century free tenants had taken up land in villeinage. In the Hundred Rolls there are among the lists of villeins the names of persons who have already been recorded as free tenants. It is debatable whether we have here free tenants holding land in villeinage, or villeins holding land at a money rent. Unfortunately, the wording of the Hundred Rolls leaves the issue in doubt, and

¹ *Ibid.* II, 848-9.

² *Ibid.* II, 571-5 (John Mille).

without further information it is impossible to pronounce judgement. At the same time, the possibility that free tenants occasionally added to their other tenements land held in villeinage should be borne in mind.

Taking everything into consideration, there is no doubt that many free tenants possessed fairly large holdings, either as a single tenement or made up of several tenements held of different persons. Certainly many of these holdings were larger than those of the villeins. Yet other free peasants had land which seems barely to suffice for their needs, for there are some whose sole recorded holding is less than an acre. There is, however, no suggestion that the free tenants as a class were poverty-stricken, for the bulk appear to have held tenements adequate for the support of a peasant family.

In view of the many differences in rank and possessions of those persons described as *libere tenentes*, it would be unwise to speak of them as a free class with uniform holdings and obligations. These free tenants range from important personages to very humble peasants, their holdings from several virgates (or even more) to a fraction of an acre. In all they form a large and heterogeneous group in a complex social organization.

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THE THAMES NAVIGATION AND THE CANALS, 1770-1830

By E. C. R. HADFIELD

THE Thames navigation is so old that its beginnings are unknown. In the eleventh century barges appear to have been taken to Abingdon, and throughout the following centuries a busy trade was carried on over the whole distance from Cricklade to the sea. At all times the interest of those who worked the barges and owned the goods they carried had to compete with those of the millowners, who had erected dams across the river, and those in search of fish, who had built weirs and laid nets in order to obtain a staple article of food.

Before the introduction of the canal-type or pound-lock into England, barges were worked through the weirs by a gap made by removing certain of the timbers. If the voyage were upstream, a line to a winch was used to haul the barge up against the rush of water; if downstream, the barge rode down on the 'flash'. The bed of the river was undredged, and the depth of water varied not only with the seasons but with the head of water the millers chose to maintain above their weirs. These men, noxious to the bargemasters, would often refuse to open the weirs, since the method was so wasteful of water that to do so might lower a long stretch of river by several inches. Should a barge ground in the river it was necessary either to remove part of the cargo or else to ask the miller next upstream to provide a flash that would increase the depth of water. For each flash a charge was made. Other, though relatively minor, sources of vexation were the narrow and awkward bridges, the winter floods and either the absence of a towpath or charges for its use.

Some time before 1632 three pound-locks were erected on the Thames at Iffley, Sandford and the Swift Ditch (near Abingdon) in order to improve the navigation to Oxford. Apart from these, the river remained in 1770 much as has been described.

From that year to the early 1830's the history of the Thames navigation is one of struggle between all those interested in the river highway on the one hand (the towns along its banks, the landowners who feared flooding of their property if pound-locks were built, and the Commissioners and weir owners who wished to preserve their tolls) and those who wished to by-pass the river by building canals, to the benefit of merchants and the public, and the profit of the speculator.

In the north of England many canals had been built or authorized by 1770; the Duke of Bridgewater's, the Trent and Mersey, the Coventry and others, among them the Oxford Canal,¹ to connect the industrial midlands with the Thames at Oxford. No other projected canal in the southern half of England had yet received an Act, however, and the future was open. The waterway of the Thames, for all its faults, existed and barges used it in large numbers. Great improvements to it were possible, but its whole length was obstructed by vested interests and established institutions, the owners of the weirs, of the bordering lands, of the bridges, of the towpaths; while in the days when the three pound-locks were built a bad precedent had been created by allowing the old weir owners still to collect their tolls, though they no longer provided any services. Additional tolls were payable to the Oxford-Burcot Commission, who built the locks.

¹ 9 Geo. III, c. 70, 1769.

The canal supporters held the view that though the construction of canals would be more expensive than the improvement of the river, yet the former were created by Act of Parliament, with adequate powers over landowners and without the vested interests of the millowners. Therefore, their tolls need not be higher, while they could offer a greater speed and certainty of navigation.

On 9 October 1770, the state of the river below Reading caused the folk of that town to meet at the Town Hall to support a projected canal (known as the London Canal, to be cut from Sonning to Monkey Island below Maidenhead (subsequently altered to Sonning-Boulter's Lock), having a length of 19 miles 3 furlongs, at an estimated cost of £47,885. It was proposed that the canal should be financed by the issue of life annuities, and that a repair fund should be instituted, so that in time, when the fund had been set up and the annuities paid off, the concern would become a free navigation. The canal was to admit the largest Thames barges, which would proceed upstream by canal and down by the river, the navigation of which between Sonning and Boulter's Lock would be improved at the canal's expense. Plans and estimates were prepared also for making a canal from Isleworth to Monkey Island as a continuation of the former line. Brindley made a survey and said that to take a barge from Isleworth to Sonning by canal and back by river would cost £16 as against £80 at present, with a great saving of time.¹ In spite of the support of the City of London, the authority responsible until 1751 for the greater part of the river, the project failed owing to the opposition of landowners on the lines both of the river and the canals, and of traders at Henley, Marlow and Maidenhead.²

In the next year, as a result of the general feeling in favour of canal navigation, an Act³ was passed which increased the already unwieldy number of Thames Commissioners set up in 1751 when the Commission was created,⁴ and including all persons living in the counties of Middlesex, Surrey, Berks, Bucks, Oxon, Glos and Wilts who were rated to the land-tax for an estate of £100 a year in value in those counties, and all persons resident in those counties who possessed an estate of £3000. Various official members, such as certain members of Parliament, heads of Oxford colleges, clergy, town officials and representatives of the Wey Navigation were added.

It was soon agreed that the Commission controlled the river from Cricklade to Staines, and the City of London the remainder, and the Commissioners began to build ten pound-locks in that part of the river which had been criticized by the supporters of the London Canal. Eight of these locks were opened by the end of 1773.⁵

The happy-go-lucky administration of the river that went on under the unwieldy number of Commissioners can be illustrated by three examples. The engineer Mylne in 1791 stated⁶ that there was no surveyor or engineer for the river as a whole; each of the five districts had its own. Colonel Tatham in 1803 remarked⁷ that there was no map of the navigation as a whole, while from the canal camp it was stated *circa* 1825⁸ that about 10,000 people were eligible as Commissioners. It is in the light of such loose management of a great river that the details of the story must be followed.

¹ J. Phillips, *A General History of Inland Navigation* (1795), pp. 231-8.

² William Vanderstegen, *The Present State of the Thames considered; and a comparative view of Canal and River Navigation* (1794). (Institution of Civil Engineers Library.)

³ 11 Geo. III, c. 45, 1771.

⁴ 24 Geo. II, c. 8, 1751.

⁵ Sonning, Shiplake, Marsh, Hambleden, Hurley, Temple, Marlow and Boulter's. The others were Mapledurham (1777) and Caversham (1778).

⁶ *Report the Second... on the Navigation... between Lechlade and Whitchurch* (1791). (I.C.E. Library.)

⁷ *Report on a View and Examination of certain Impediments and Obstructions in the Navigation of the River Thames* (1803). (I.C.E. Library.)

⁸ *Berks and Hants Canal*. (I.C.E. Library.)

The Act of 1771 unfortunately followed the former practice of allowing the owners of the old weirs still to have their tolls in those places where the flashlocks had been superseded by the new pound-locks. Moreover, the Commissioners had to collect both sets of tolls. At the same time the draft of barges was limited to 3 ft. in an effort to prevent delays, though this provision was afterwards modified. One welcome reform was the institution of a regular twice-weekly flash down the whole river from Oxford to Staines.

By 1784 the Commission had spent £28,900, and soon after raising an additional £10,000, they installed locks in the Oxford-Reading area.¹

Meanwhile, in 1783, the Thames and Severn Canal Company had obtained an Act² for a canal from the existing Stroudwater Canal at Wallbridge, near Stroud, to join the Thames at Lechlade, and immediately the state of the upper navigation took on a new importance. It was at once suggested that a canal should be cut from Lechlade to Abingdon, and Whitworth made a survey in 1784. Many years later, in 1793, Whitworth said before a parliamentary committee that he recollected making a plan, 'which was proposed in consequence of the bad state of the river navigation; that he took the soundings, and measured the length, and found it very shallow, and very bad in some places, and the towing path in bad order in some places. . .'³ though Mylne in his survey preferred the natural waterway if it should be improved to its fullest extent.⁴

Opposition from landowners and from the City and University of Oxford prevented the project, but some effort was made by the Commissioners to improve the upper river in order that traffic from the canal could be carried, and in the 1790's St John's, Buscot, Rushey, Pinkhill, Godstow and Osney locks were built. Much, however, remained to be done, and from 1789, when the Thames and Severn Canal was opened, onwards the navigation is the subject of ceaseless reports, resolutions and pamphlets, of proposals for canals and of defences of the river against them. Within a few years the position was aggravated by the passing of Acts for four canals which might be expected to pass goods into the Severn and through the canal towards London.⁵

Unfortunately, there was an equal balance of argument between the canal proprietors, who held that the Thames should be improved in order that the former could offer an efficient and rapid service, and the Commissioners, who maintained that the canals should show more evidence of the goods they were likely to carry before expensive improvements to the river were undertaken.

The first comprehensive survey of the river was made by Jessop the engineer in 1789, and others were made by Mylne over the next few years. Among the latter's recommendations were more pound-locks, a continuous towing path, a deeper channel and the buying by the Commissioners of all weirs and flashlocks. He says: 'I consider that the navigation across the island, from the Severn to the Thames, is totally barred and locked up, unless it is opened by the means herein recommended; or some other way, that may appear proper.'⁶

The House of Commons committee of 1793, after hearing the principal engineers and interested persons (amongst them James Black, a proprietor of the Thames and Severn Canal, who said that the trade available for a through

¹ Abingdon (replacing Swift Ditch), Day's, Benson, Cleeve, Goring, Whitchurch.

² 23 Geo. III, c. 38, 1783.

³ *Report from the Committee of the Hon. the House of Commons appointed to enquire into the progress made towards the amendment and improvement of the navigation of the Thames and Isis* (1793). (I.C.E. Library.)

⁴ *Op. cit.*

⁵ Hereford and Gloucester (1791), Leominster (1791), Worcester and Birmingham (1791), Gloucester and Berkeley (1793).

⁶ *A Report of the Committee of Commissioners . . . appointed to survey the Rivers from Lechlade to Whitchurch* (1791). (I.C.E. Library.)

navigation consisted of tin, iron from Coalbrookdale, cider, copper, lead, salt, cheese, and aqua fortis from Bewdley, all to be carried to London, and an uptrade of groceries, rags, ox-hides, tallow, dye-woods for the clothing manufacturers of Gloucester, and pot-ashes and oil for the clothiers) gave their judgement that the Commissioners had opposed every attempt at improvement by canals, though they had neglected to improve the river.

The trade brought to the river by the Thames and Severn Canal was then unimportant, for in its early years the receipts of the canal were small, being only £452. 16s. 6d. in 1797 for the whole canal.¹ The upper Thames navigation slowly improved, but it was still unsatisfactory from the canal's point of view. In 1813, therefore, the Thames and Severn Company joined with the Wilts and Berks Company (which operated from the Kennet and Avon Canal at Semington to the Thames at Abingdon, and, therefore, provided access to the River Avon and Bristol as well as to the Thames) to construct the North Wilts Canal² from Latton to Swindon, thereby providing a through canal line to Abingdon, though the Wilts and Berks was a shallow and small-scale canal compared to the Thames and Severn and, therefore, only small barges could be passed over the whole line.

Below Abingdon, to the limit of the Thames Commissioners' jurisdiction at Staines, where the river entered the control of the City of London, a more continuous activity went on, as it did also in the City's own area. The two proposals, for canals from Reading to Maidenhead, and from Maidenhead to Isleworth, were brought up again in 1789 and were exhaustively discussed, the upshot being the Thames Act of 1795, which gave certain powers to make a towing path and to construct more pound-locks. This Act, while comparatively ineffective, was enough to prevent the agitation for the London Canal from becoming a nuisance. We may note here the improvements that were subsequently made to the lower river by the construction of pound-locks:

Above Boulter's:	Culham	1809
	Clifton	1822
	Cookham	1830
Below Boulter's:	Romney	1797
	Old Windsor	1822
	Bell Weir	1817
	Penton Hook	1815
	Chertsey	1813
	Shepperton	1813
	Sunbury	1812
	Molesey	1815
	Teddington	1811

Boulter's itself was reconstructed in 1828.

Another interesting proposal for by-passing the Thames was the Hampton Gay or London and Western Canal project. In March 1792 a proposal was made to cut a canal from the Oxford Canal, six miles from the City of Oxford and near a place called Hampton Gay, to Isleworth in order that the coal and other trade from the midlands, having made use of the Oxford Canal as far as possible, might then avoid the Thames, passing by means of the new canal through Thame, Aylesbury, Wendover, Amersham and Uxbridge to Isleworth or to the City of London.

¹ *A Brief History of the Thames and Severn Canal*, by the Clerk to the Gloucestershire County Council (1901).

² 53 Geo. III, c. 182. (The North Wilts Canal was incorporated in the Wilts and Berks Canal in 1821 by 2 Geo. IV, c. 97.)

In July another group of speculators planned the Grand Junction Canal, also to run to the Thames at Isleworth and Brentford, and also to be cut from the Oxford Canal, but in this case at Braunston, towards the northern end of that canal, the line to reach Brentford via Watford and Harrow.

In addition to the midlands, the London and Western subscribers had their eye on the west country trade,¹ but since the lines of the two canals ran parallel for the latter part of their courses, they approached the Grand Junction and suggested that a junction might be effected. The unfortunate result was that while discussions were going on the Grand Junction, having asserted its right to cut the whole line and having offered the London and Western a 10% drawback on goods coming from that canal, appropriated the latter's line via Uxbridge instead of the original Grand Junction route via Watford and Harrow, and went ahead with their scheme.

The Hampton Gay Committee went to the Oxford Canal, whose line had only been completed to Oxford in 1789, and pointed out that if the Grand Junction were built there would be a large diversion of northern trade from that canal. The Oxford Canal Committee agreed,² and approached other northern canals for joint action against the Grand Junction Bill. At the same meeting, perhaps realizing the advantages possessed by an established canal over one merely projected, and ignoring the London and Western, it was suggested that the Oxford Company itself might cut a canal from Braunston or elsewhere to Isleworth or Brentford.

This suggestion and the proposed opposition caused an immediate reaction from the Grand Junction Company, whose Committee invited the Oxford representatives to a joint meeting on 7 February 1793. At this meeting an agreement was reached which stated, *inter alia*, that from the opening of the Grand Junction Canal that Company would guarantee to the Oxford Company £10,000 per annum produce from the Grand Junction Canal. This agreement was approved by the Oxford Canal subscribers at their meeting on 11 February, and the Hampton Gay project was doomed, though the same meeting approved an agreement with it for compensation for traffic carried down the Oxford Canal and along the Hampton Gay to London instead of to Oxford and down the Thames. From that date the project passes out of history.

The next proposal of interest concerns the Wilts and Berks Canal, which had originally been projected to carry coal from the Somersetshire coalfields into the agricultural areas of Wiltshire and Berkshire, but which was managed by a committee whose ambition outran the shallowness of their canal and the scarcity of its water. In 1809 this committee, desirous of obtaining through traffic to and from London and Bristol and also the north, began to publicize a grand project for increasing its competitive strength against the Kennet and Avon (a bigger canal with a more direct line between London and Bristol) and for by-passing the Thames at the same time. The first part of the plan eventually took shape as the North Wilts Canal, already mentioned: the second was for a junction with the Grand Junction Canal by means of a cut of 36½ miles from Abingdon to Marsworth, with, in the original proposal, an aqueduct over the Thames at Abingdon, in order that the cut could be supplied with water from the Wilts and Berks.

One hears no more of this plan, which caused the Thames Commissioners some perturbation, probably because the Wilts and Berks found it impossible

¹ A map issued by the Hampton Gay Committee shows a through canal route from Exeter via the Grand Western Canal to Taunton (partly built 1808-36), the Bristol-Taunton Canal (partly built 1824-6), the projected Bristol-Cirencester Canal, the Thames and Severn Canal, the River Thames to Oxford, the Oxford Canal, and the Hampton Gay Canal to London.

² Oxford Canal Company's Minute Book.

to raise the necessary money, and because the Company, while seeing an opportunity for taking trade from the Thames, were conscious that their more powerful rival, the Kennet and Avon, could easily shorten their line further than it was possible for the Wilts and Berks to do, and, therefore, regain what they were likely to lose. The means of doing this was the proposed cut from Maidenhead into the Grand Junction Canal at Cowley. The comparative distances would then have been:

Bristol to London via the Wilts and Berks

Avon River and Kennet and Avon Canal	29 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles
Wilts and Berks Canal	40
Abingdon-Marsworth cut	36 $\frac{1}{2}$
Grand Junction Canal	40 $\frac{1}{2}$
Thames River	14
	160 $\frac{1}{2}$

Bristol to London via the Kennet and Avon

Avon River	17 $\frac{1}{4}$ miles
Kennet and Avon Canal	57
Kennet River	18 $\frac{1}{2}$
Thames River	24 $\frac{3}{4}$
Maidenhead-Cowley cut	11
Grand Junction Canal	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
Thames River	14
	153

and while the Kennet and Avon would only be required to cut an 11 mile canal from Maidenhead to Cowley, costing some £70,000, the Wilts and Berks would have to cut 36 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Abingdon to Marsworth, costing some £252,000.

The Cowley-Maidenhead cut, or Western Union Canal, is mentioned first in 1810, when we are told that a notice was issued for a canal from Boulter's Lock to the Kennet mouth, and from Boulter's to Cowley on the Grand Junction Canal. The Kennet and Avon were at this time trying to extend their line in some way to London without using the Thames more than necessary, and were exploring different routes. They, as well as the Western Union, issued notices for a canal from the Kennet mouth to the Thames at Windsor, from the Thames at Datchet to Isleworth, and from the Kennet and Avon Canal near Newbury to the Basingstoke Canal at Old Basing.¹

The Kennet and Avon proprietors preferred the last-named plan, but the times were inauspicious and nothing was done. In 1815, however, the Canal Committee, reporting to the shareholders three reasons for the low dividend of that year, among them the 'circuitous course of the River Thames and the impediments on its navigation',² recommended the Western Union project as shortening the time to London and opening a communication to the north, but said that no estimates had yet been made. In July 1819 the Committee reported that plans were in preparation, and that a meeting would be called before the application to Parliament.³

Late in 1819 the indefatigable pamphleteer of the Commissioners, Mr Allnutt, wrote attacking the idea, and in answer the sponsors pointed out that only two

¹ *Report of the Committee of Management to the Subscribers to the expenses of making surveys to find out the best line of navigation from the Kennet and Avon Canal to London* (9 Oct. 1810). (Great Western Railway.)

² *Annual Report of Kennet and Avon Canal* (1815). (Great Western Railway.)

³ *Annual Report of Kennet and Avon Canal* (1819). (Great Western Railway.)

of the Commissioners' locks, Romney and Bell Weir, would be affected, and that if Mr Allnutt's statement that the carriage by the present Thames navigation was cheaper than that on the proposed canal by 20 % were true, the Thames had nothing to fear.¹ The canal was to be 11 miles in length, the cost being between £70,000 and £80,000, and it was stated that the Regent's Canal was interested in the scheme. In 1820 the Kennet and Avon shareholders were told that the bill had been withdrawn on second reading but that it would be reintroduced.² In the following year, however, they were told that the depressed state of the trade and commerce of the country for the present prevented such a measure being carried into effect.³ So the project disappears, though in 1828 an item of expense of £81. 11s. 3d. appears in the Kennet and Avon accounts, possibly due only to an unpaid solicitor's or surveyor's bill.

One last proposal remains to be considered, that from the Kennet and Avon Canal near Newbury to the Basingstoke Canal. It is probable that as early as 1778 this connexion had been suggested, though it was not until 1810 that the proposal was taken up seriously and the notice already referred to was issued. The project soon became known as the Hants and Berks Junction Canal, and the enthusiastic proprietors of the none too flourishing Basingstoke Canal estimated that 30,000 tons annually, at 4s. per ton yielding £6000, would come to the Basingstoke Canal, and that, after deducting £1500 for interest on money expended on making reservoirs and improving the navigation, there would be a profit of £4500 to the canal. Mr Page, the proprietor of the Kennet River (soon to be bought by the Kennet and Avon Canal) naturally opposed an idea which would divert traffic from his river, and in answer to a pamphlet by him it was stated that the estimate for the new canal was £300,000 and that if the Kennet were better, traffic would go by it, but that whereas the Basingstoke Canal carried a load of timber 37 miles for 6s. 2d., Mr Page carried it 18½ miles for 5s.; and whereas the former carried corn at 1¾d. per ton per mile, Mr Page charged 2½d.⁴

The Kennet and Avon Company was equally interested in the proposed junction canal; it was hoped to introduce a bill, but the times were unpropitious, and no further steps were taken till the canal revival of 1824-5. The initiative for renewal seems to have come from the Basingstoke Company. Co-operation with the Kennet and Avon was agreed upon, each making an initial subscription of £10,000 to the capital of the new concern. To pay the deposit, to advance money for the costs of the survey and to prepare their canal for the expected increase in traffic, the former company found it necessary to suspend payments on its bond interest.

A bill for the Hants and Berks Junction Canal was introduced in the session of 1824, but was dropped, owing to 'opposition founded on erroneous and unreasonable grounds'. The line surveyed by Giles, a comparatively untried canal engineer later concerned with the disastrous Portsmouth and Arundel Canal and the proposed London and Portsmouth Ship Canal, was 13 miles long, included a ½ mile tunnel, an inclined plane, a number of locks and much deep cutting and embanking.

The opposition to the bill was led by the landowners and the Thames Commissioners, the latter of whom issued a long pamphlet in support of their case.⁵

¹ *Western Union Canal. Replies to the Arguments of the Committee of the Thames Navigation Commissioners.* (I.C.E. Library.)

² *Annual Report of Kennet and Avon Canal* (1820). (Great Western Railway.)

³ *Annual Report of Kennet and Avon Canal* (1821). (Great Western Railway.)

⁴ *Remarks on a Letter from Mr Page, By A Friend to the Public* (1810). (Great Western Railway.)

⁵ *Thames Navigation: Observations upon the evidence adduced before the Committee of the House of Commons upon the late application to Parliament for a Bill for making a navigable canal... to be called the Hants and Berks Canal* (1825). (I.C.E. Library.)

It was argued that the canal has been insufficiently surveyed and that the estimates were too low (both almost universal faults of the time), that the Thames was adequate for all needs, and that the Basingstoke Canal was useless as a link owing to its unserviceable state. The authors remarked in passing that the £100 shares of this canal had risen on the hopes of the bill from a nominal £5 to an actual £12 to £15.

The anxiety of the Thames Commissioners was understandable because the Kennet and Avon was a large and important canal, forwarding to the Thames and receiving from it a considerable tonnage the diversion of which would mean a heavy loss to the river. The proportion of receipts attributable to tonnage passing on to the Thames cannot be ascertained, but the total receipts of the canal for 1825-6 were £42,648. 17s. 11d. It will be remembered that the Basingstoke Canal estimated in 1810 that they would receive an additional £6000 in tolls from new traffic, and since then traffic on the Kennet and Avon had increased $2\frac{1}{2}$ times.

The bill was re-presented in 1826, but the opposition proved too strong, and once again it failed to pass. The project was finally dropped in 1829,¹ but meanwhile the ever-hopeful Basingstoke Company had shifted its interest towards an old scheme for making a connexion with Salisbury.

An end was put to the quarrel between the Thames Navigation and the canals by an enemy hostile to them both and unhampered by the historical difficulties and vested interests of the water concerns. In 1831 an Extraordinary General Meeting of the Basingstoke Canal proprietors was called 'to adopt such measures as may be necessary for the interests of this company, in regard to the proposed railway from London to Southampton'.² Meanwhile, the Kennet and Avon Canal and the Thames Commissioners were together opposing the Great Western Railway Bill of 1833, and their opposition was successful. However, the Kennet and Avon, who seem not to have been sufficiently conscious of the danger from the railways (in 1832 they had stated that 'the income of the canal and the rivers connected with it appear to have assumed a permanent character'³), was placated with £10,000, less the value of some land wanted for the railway.

The Thames alone opposed the reintroduction of the Great Western Railway Bill in 1834, the Commissioners joining with the City of London for this purpose. The opposition was unsuccessful. In June of that year the two Thames authorities held a conference to discuss the abolition of flashing and the maintenance of the legal depth. It was too late, however, for reform. Within another 25 years the Thames authority was itself almost bankrupt, the Thames and Severn, Wilts and Berks, and Basingstoke Canals were moribund, and the Kennet and Avon had sold itself to the railway.

London

¹ The last date on which the Kennet and Avon Company subscribed any money for expenses.

² *Annual Report of Basingstoke Canal* (1831). (Great Western Railway.)

³ *Annual Report of Kennet and Avon Canal* (1832). (Great Western Railway.)

ESSAYS IN BIBLIOGRAPHY AND CRITICISM

III. THE NATIONAL INCOME¹

By E. A. RADICE

THE study of the national income has made such progress in the last twenty years that it is to-day perhaps the focus of all economic thought. This is no accident, but the inevitable result of the extension of the economic functions of the state and the consequent improvement in the collection of statistical data necessary for the carrying out of these functions, of the growth of economic nationalism, and last, but not least, of the need for mobilizing all the nation's resources for war purposes.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we find occasional attempts to formulate the concept of national income and even to measure it with a view to ascertaining the economic strength of nation states, but lack of statistical data prevented any systematic consideration of it. The rapid progress of economic science in the early nineteenth century was made at a time when the economy of an individual or firm or economic class was of greater interest than that of a nation, so that little progress was made in the study of national income. It was not till towards the turn of the century, when the thoughts of liberals were turning to the possibility of using taxation as a means of redistributing wealth, that the formulation of the concept and its measurement began in earnest. The urge to solve the problem of 'riches and poverty', on the one hand, demanded facts and figures on which concrete policies could be based, while the enactment of social legislation itself gave rise to the collection of statistics which enabled pioneers such as Bowley and Stamp to make the first really scientific estimates of wealth and income. In the period between the wars progress was rapid, and in a number of countries, notably Germany, official annual estimates of the National Income were made, but in this country it was not until 1941 that the Treasury, with the assistance of the Central Statistical Office, extended its consideration of the budget to cover the National Income as a whole and so produce the most complete summary of its various aspects which has ever been made.²

The stage is now set for the systematic introduction of the concept into the science of economics itself. Although Pigou's *Economics of Welfare* pointed the way, the average student of economics must have frequently found some difficulty in integrating his study of national income into the theories of value and money set out in the standard text-books. Professor Hicks has now³ made the radical suggestion that the study of economics might well start with what he calls 'social accounting', the central concept of which is national income.

¹ A. L. Bowley (ed.), *Studies in the National Income* (Cambridge University Press, 1942, pp. ix+255, 15s.); J. R. Hicks, *The Social Framework: An Introduction to Economics* (Oxford University Press, 1942, pp. vii+217, 7s. 6d.); *Studies in Income and Wealth*, vol. II (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938, pp. viii+328, \$3.00); M. Matolezy and S. Varga, *The National Income of Hungary* (P. S. King, 1938, pp. 116); Achille Loria, *The Economic Synthesis: A Study of the Laws of Income* (1914); L. R. Nienstaedt, *Economic Equilibrium, Employment and Natural Resources* (Principia Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1942, pp. viii+412, \$5.00); Cmd. 6261 (April 1941) and subsequent issues.

² Cmd. 6261 (April 1941) and subsequent issues.

³ *The Social Framework*.

Now social accounting, like ordinary business accounting, has two essential purposes. The first is to make the best estimates possible of the true values of the various items included in income, i.e. expenditure, investment, allocations to reserves (savings) and the like. In the field of social accounting these estimates taken separately fall essentially within the interest of the statistician, and it is right and proper for the student to familiarize himself with the various items and with the problems of entering them on the right side of the income-expenditure account. Taken together they make up the 'anatomy'—to use Hicks's analogy—of the economic system. Strictly speaking the statistician's work may be said to end here, at least for the present. One of the merits of the method of the official White Papers is that they give estimates of the various items in a very clear summary similar in form to an accountant's return.

The second purpose of accounting is to use these various items to arrive at a figure of 'true profit' or 'true national income' as the case may be. This is in order to obtain an idea of how the economic entity as a whole has progressed in the period considered. In order to arrive at this one figure representing the 'net result' of the various items certain important assumptions have to be made which depend on the accepted business practices, laws, tax regulations and economic doctrines of the society. This is particularly true of the all-embracing concept of national income, and Hicks may therefore be said to have anticipated his second volume on 'economic physiology' (value theory) by introducing this concept into a book on 'economic anatomy'. National income is essentially an economist's concept made up of various items estimated for him by the statistician, and it depends essentially on his views not merely of how the economic system works but also of what economic activities are more or less worth while.

A very useful summary of various views of what constitutes national income, i.e. how its various components should be treated in the account, is given in the first of a series of studies contained in a volume edited by Professor Bowley.¹ As a piece of systematic classification this is admirable, but the absence of a proper historical treatment of the subject is no doubt the reason why the author does not attempt to consider why it is that various concepts of national income are used in different countries at different times. And yet it is natural enough that different concepts of what constitutes national income should be used in socialist Russia, agricultural Hungary, urbanized Britain and an economy such as that of the United States, with its high accumulation of durable consumer goods and its quick turn-over of rapidly obsolescent capital plant.

Hicks's own economic theories come out quite clearly, however much he tries to restrict social accounting to its 'anatomical' aspects. His approach can, of course, be justified by saying that any teaching of economics must assume that the dominant economic forms of the country and period should for pedagogical purposes be regarded as most typical, but he does nevertheless introduce a definite economic philosophy into what is meant to be a *prolegomenon* to economic value theory. The essential fact about the economic system, according to Hicks, is that it is designed to satisfy 'consumers' *wants*' including 'collective wants'. Yet this apparently neutral definition is later seen to have quite far-reaching implications when he comes to the part played by the state in creating national income: 'The most notable awkwardness concerns the calculation of the national income in time of war. . . if we regard the public services as satisfying consumers' wants directly, we are obliged to regard the men who are in the armed forces or the munitions industries as producing things which consumers *are willing to* accept as substitute for the ordinary goods and services of peace time' (p. 135).

¹ *Studies in National Income.*

Hicks's underlying view seems to be that in calculating the national income the true determining factor is consumers' *choice*, and it is not at all surprising that difficulties are found in calculating the role of the state in a concept which is based on a fundamentally liberal and individualistic economic philosophy.

Indeed, the contribution of public services to the national income proves to be a stumbling-block to most writers in all 'capitalist' countries. Do the public services create an additional value by themselves, or are they more properly regarded simply as part of the 'costs of upkeep' of the economic system as a whole? An extreme view is taken by the Hungarian writers Matolcsy and Varga¹ who exclude the salaries of all state officials from the national income. Kuznets, in his calculations for the United States, treats the state more or less as if it were a business corporation, thus adhering to the fundamental accounting philosophy of his age and country, the value of public services being based fundamentally on their selling value, i.e. taxes. On the other hand some of his colleagues in the United States² have taken issue sharply with him on this point and think that the value of public services should be taken at their cost, and the state should be regarded as more like a co-operative association than a business corporation. This last view is the one generally adopted in this country, although Hicks, as we have seen, has certain qualms.

But, if the values created by the state cause difficulties in an economic approach based on consumers' choice, what of monopoly values in the national income? Hicks has nothing to say on this, as might be expected in an essentially elementary work. Clearly there is much to be said in theory for excluding from calculations of 'real' national income certain monopoly elements. This is recognized by Copeland and Martin: 'It seems clear that the introduction of a monopoly into an economic system will involve a curtailment of output and thus decrease deflated social income'. Indeed, from the point of view of the consumer it is often difficult to draw the line between some monopolies and the state. On the other hand since there is some degree of monopoly in every part of any economic system there is probably little theoretical justification for the separate treatment of monopolies, while the statistical difficulties of such a separation would be insuperable.

The exclusion of certain items from national income is justified by most writers partly because they are not regarded as making any real contribution to it, e.g. unemployment pay, and more often because they are regarded as part of the costs of upkeep. These two ideas tend to become confused, and although they are logically distinct it is often difficult to decide whether certain items should be regarded as part of costs or as contributing no value. So far as the latter class is concerned the practice in capitalist countries is generally to attribute some value contribution to any item in the account which creates a service, this service standing on its own if it is made direct to individuals, and counting as part of costs if made to a business organization. But the inclusion of any item in the account depends largely on tax regulations, availability of statistics and the like. Thus, in the case of durable consumer goods, it is only the services of houses to their owners that are reckoned as part of income. Lack of a financial yardstick is the main reason why the services of housewives are not included. On the other hand the principle of viewing the national income from the point of view of satisfaction of consumers' wants leads frequently to the inclusion of subsistence allowances as part of income rather than of costs. An illuminating example of this is the addition in the estimates of national income given in the official White Papers of amounts representing imputed food and lodging allowances of members of the armed forces. These would normally be

¹ *National Income of Hungary.*

² *Studies in Income and Wealth*, II.

regarded as costs, but, because enjoyed by individuals, should be added to their pay in order to arrive at their total income.

On the whole, the present tendency is to include more items in the national income than was the practice in the past. Under a slave economy it might well be considered that the cost of maintaining slaves should be counted merely as cost, since slaves are not strictly members of the community, but are, economically speaking, mere means of production who, therefore, enjoy no income. This may be compared with the doctrine of Achille Loria¹ who maintained that until subsistence is assured income does not arise. This doctrine has certain affinities to Marxism, but the official Marxist economists in the U.S.S.R. are perhaps closer to Adam Smith in their concepts of national income than to any modern economists. Professional services are excluded from Soviet national income, since these services are 'unproductive'. Yet it may well be questioned whether some of them do not in fact assist in maintaining the productive capacity of the economy, e.g. services of teachers, doctors, scientists, even though others, e.g. services of actors, speculators, do not.

On the whole, differences of view in including or excluding services, depending on whether or not they are regarded as creating value, lead to greater difficulties than differences of view whether these services are part of the national income in their own right or are merely costs of upkeep. In the former case some services may be excluded from national income altogether, and so make international comparison very difficult, e.g. between the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. In the latter case comparison is possible provided that all items appear in the accounts. Thus British economists regard advertising as part of costs, while one American at least (Kuznets) is not sure whether it should not be thought of as creating something on its own ('good will'). Similarly with the treatment of capital gains. Such differences in accounting procedure depend fundamentally on the social doctrines, laws and prevalent economic doctrines of the countries concerned, but can be reconciled provided that all the items in the account are shown.

When the economist has used the bricks consisting of the various items in the national accounts provided by the statistician to build up a measure of national income, the next step is to attempt to compare the amounts of the national income at different points of time. The first problem is naturally to deflate the national income values to take account of changes in prices. So long as most goods and services were exchanged at prices determined in a market, a sufficiently satisfactory deflator was obtained by using price indices compiled according to commonly accepted principles. Yet even the making of such indices raises difficult theoretical problems. Most of the indices used tend to introduce a bias, since, in an economy based on the satisfaction of wants freely chosen by consumers, a sum of money which in a later year will buy the same 'basket' of goods as in the base year will yield a larger real income, since changes in price relationships make it possible for consumers to buy a more desirable basket of goods in the later year with the same amount of money. On the other hand in a state-directed economy not based on consumers' choice it may be that such a bias is of a different kind, or even vanishes altogether. It is, indeed, often forgotten that the choice of an index number, like the choice of a definition of national income, depends on certain economic principles and assumptions which do not necessarily have universal validity. Milton Friedman has rightly emphasized this point,² in objecting to 'the construction of "an index of physical volume" without further analysis of the fundamental ends for which

¹ *The Economic Synthesis—A study of the Laws of Income.*

² *Studies in Income and Wealth*, II, Part 2.

such an index is desired' and in pointing out the arbitrariness of employing mechanical criteria.

Further complications have been introduced by the increasing importance of indirect taxes, although within the commonly accepted theory of index numbers Bowley¹ seems to have worked out the most satisfactory solution. Finally, there is the difficulty of varying degrees of monopoly in the economic system, to which reference has already been made.

Although these difficulties in measuring real national income need not stand in the way of reasonably satisfactory comparisons of national well being and national output at periods not too far distant from one another, the economic historian may well ask whether such estimates are of much value for periods even as short as two or three generations. Can there be some satisfactory measure of national output which is not dependent on current economic theories, accounting practices and price changes? Such a measure would clearly have to be based on something physical, perhaps after the suggestions of the physiocrats. In modern times there has been little thinking on these lines, but a recent substantial piece of work by L. R. Nienstaedt² may suggest a new line of approach with greater emphasis on productive capacity and less on money and markets. After a detailed theoretical analysis, Nienstaedt² uses as his main measures of output the total tonnage of the agricultural harvest and the total tonnage of raw materials used in all forms of production, and he checks his theories from statistical data relating to the United States during the period 1880-1929. The theoretical basis of such an approach will certainly need very careful examination, but it is in line with the increasing use of such concepts as calories as measures of food consumption, as horse power employed as a measure of industrialization, and as simple weight as a measure even of aircraft production. Measuring the national income in such purely physical units would clearly have great advantages for the economic historian.

London

¹ *Op. cit.* Chapter IV.

² *Economic Equilibrium, Employment and Natural Resources.*

IV. THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS

1915-1919

By DENYS HAY

IN the British Museum and certain other libraries¹ one may consult eight of the twelve volumes of the official *History of the Ministry of Munitions*. The existence and availability of this work is not as widely known as it should be. The following pages are intended to provide a brief account of the inception of the work and the difficulties experienced in its completion.

By way of background it is necessary to recall that the establishment of a Munitions Ministry in 1915 was a revolutionary step. Previously the War Office had been responsible for designing, ordering and inspecting the stores it required, while labour questions were dealt with by a number of government agencies and departments. A year of war on a scale never foreseen, the creation of armies larger than ever contemplated and a demand for unprecedented quantities of *matériel* showed the absolute necessity of providing centralized direction of war production. The Ministry of Munitions was made necessary by a war which in the field of labour was rapidly making nonsense of the distinction between 'soldiers and civilians', and which completely upset normal industrial conditions. It was plainly important that the implications should be carefully studied. On the one hand, the administration had learnt many lessons in the technique of organizing war production. On the other hand, society as a whole had developed new attributes, in the origins and character of which deep public interest might be expected. Thus, both from the necessity of preparing thoroughly for future emergencies and for understanding the problems of the post-war world, there was a need for a history of the activities of the Ministry of Munitions. The preparation of such a record, in the case of many departments of state, might well have been put off until after the end of the war, when a more detached approach and better facilities might have made the work simpler. In the case of the Ministry of Munitions there was, however, no certainty that it would survive the end of the war, and in any case there were arguments in favour of beginning while the officials concerned (many of whom were temporary) were still available for consultation, and while the questions with which the history would deal were vividly present in their minds. These motives and considerations are unequivocally stated in the discussions which led to the beginning of the work.

In March 1916, Mr M. V. Amos, then a member of the Foreign Orders Department of the Ministry, approached the head of the Department, Mr G. M. Booth, with a proposal to keep a record of the organization and executive activity of the Ministry. He based his proposal on two points:

(1) The experience should be recorded so that it would be available as part of preparation for a future war.

¹ All university libraries in Great Britain. The following special libraries: House of Commons, House of Lords, British Museum, Welsh National, Advocates (Edinburgh), Guildhall, London Library, London School of Economics, Royal Statistical Society, Imperial War Museum, Institute of Historical Research, Central Library for Students, Institute of Public Administration. The following public libraries: Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle, Liverpool; four libraries in each Dominion, including one in each legislature library; in U.S.A., the Hoover War Library (Stanford University, California) and New York Public Library.

(2) It might solve some problems of peace organization ('It is already being said in Germany that the war organization of industry is likely to be maintained after the war is over').

The need to start at once derived from the existing accessibility of materials. Delay would mean that files would be 'stacked in War Office cellars', and people would begin to disappear, taking with them their unrecorded reminiscences. Mr Booth heartily endorsed the proposal and passed it over to Mr G. I. H. Lloyd, who was at that time working in the Department of Requirements and Statistics under Mr (later Sir Walter) Layton. Mr Godfrey Lloyd pointed out the 'peculiar significance to the political and social history of the country' of the Ministry's work. 'The Ministry's...epoch-making experiments in the art of government...may profoundly modify accepted views of politics and economics.' He consequently supported Mr Amos 'on this broad ground', as was proper to the trained researcher and historian which he was.¹ Mr Lloyd's views are of great significance, since it was almost entirely through his efforts that the work was ultimately completed. But there undoubtedly existed, as Mr Layton pointed out, 'a slight difference between the immediate objects of Mr Amos and Mr Lloyd'. Mr Amos was concerned with the lessons in executive action to be derived from the proposed record, while Mr Lloyd was concerned with 'the political intelligence of the nation'.

While the Ministry of Munitions had spontaneously arrived at the idea of recording its own evolution, the Reconstruction Committee of the Cabinet had come to a conclusion which was directly relevant. In a letter to all government departments in July 1916, the Committee of Imperial Defence approved a plan to maintain a complete record of administrative action during the war for the future compilation of a War Book. A detailed programme of a strictly utilitarian nature was suggested. Each department was to provide an account of its origin and the originating authority, with suggestions for rapid re-establishment; an estimate of the extent of any necessary skeleton peace-time organization; proposals for the provision or maintenance of adequate legislation; and a full criticism of imperfections in existing machinery to avoid future mistakes. It was pointed out that the reports would not be required until the end of the war. Naturally enough, the Cabinet letter emphasized the Amos rather than the Lloyd view of the record. Its coincidence with the project formulated within the Ministry provided useful authority. Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith (Permanent Secretary), Dr (now Lord) Addison (Parliamentary Secretary and later Minister) and Mr (later Sir William) Beveridge (Assistant General Secretary), were all enthusiastic about Mr Amos's plan, and the Minister (Mr Montagu) and Mr Lloyd George² approved the proposal. Mr Layton prepared a draft covering the main topics to be covered, and the services of Professor W. G. S. Adams, who at the time held the Gladstone Chair of Political Theory and Institutions at Oxford, were secured. From July 1916 until the following January, Mr Adams spent two days a week at the Ministry of Munitions.

The organization of the history in this first period is described in a notice circulated to heads of branches at the time of Mr Adams's appointment. This postulated three uses for the 'systematic record': it would be 'the basis of any report to be eventually published, of any evidence to be laid before commissions

¹ Mr Lloyd had been Associate Professor of Political Science in the University of Toronto before he joined the Ministry of Munitions in 1915. In 1913 he published *Cutlery Trades: an historical essay in the economics of small-scale production*. On the dissolution of the Ministry of Munitions Mr Lloyd went to the Department of Overseas Trade, where he remained until his resignation in 1935. From then until his death two years later he worked in the Economic Section of the League of Nations.

² Then at the War Office; but the Ministry was, of course, very much his creation.

of enquiry and as a guide for any future action'. Heads of branches were accordingly requested to provide statements of their work based 'partly on personal recollections...partly on reports and memoranda recorded in the current papers of the department'. The committee of supervision consisted of the General Secretaries (Sir H. Llewellyn Smith and Mr E. B. Phipps), the Director of Requirements and Statistics (Mr Layton), Mr Beveridge and Mr Booth. Mr Adams was to be responsible for collecting and editing material. During Mr Adams's tenure the work was primarily in the hands of the branches concerned, who were left to decide themselves what topics should be dealt with and how the emphasis should fall. No general plan was worked to, and no attempt was made to cover large areas of ground which did not fall specifically to any single branch.

The necessity for this general conspectus was repeatedly put forward by Mr Layton. From the first he had questioned the wisdom of bringing in someone who was not intimately conversant with the Ministry.¹ He urged, therefore, that his deputy, Mr Godfrey Lloyd, should be closely associated with Mr Adams; that all sectional statements should pass through Mr Lloyd's hands; and that it should be the responsibility of a special department to direct other branches to specific topics. In effect this happened when Mr Adams in January 1917 was appointed a secretary to the Prime Minister. Mr Lloyd was then instructed to carry out the work and, as we have seen, his preferences were for a general account of the Ministry. The plans of Messrs Layton and Lloyd were, however, far from easily realized. The difficulties Mr Lloyd encountered were twofold: on the one hand, he found himself driven to do more and more actual writing, as he experienced the inadequacy of departmental accounts; on the other hand, he had to accumulate a staff for this very work, first during a war when skilled researchers were hard to come by, and later during the first years of the peace, when funds were ruthlessly cut. It is to his credit that he survived both tests.

The first sketch of the full work was the 'suggestion by Mr Layton of June 1916'. Broadly speaking, the topics were arranged in three groups: the establishment of the Ministry, its organization for its special tasks and its relations with the existing financial, labour, production and administrative authorities. The outline is important, for it placed in the forefront a purpose which was analytical and not chronological, and it produced broad definitions which clarified the schemes which were evolved later.

Mr Lloyd (with the committee of supervision) produced even more comprehensive outlines during the course of 1917 and the following years. Topics were relegated to broad groups, the perspective became truer and finally a plan emerged which was capable not only of covering the ground but also of prompting useful research. By 1919 the work was split up into ten volumes:

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| Vol. I. Pre-Ministry Events. | Vol. VI. Metals and Materials. |
| II. General Administration. | VII. Industrial Equipment. |
| III. Finance. | VIII. Munitions. |
| IV. Labour Supply and Regulation. | IX. Munitions (cont.). |
| V. Wages and Welfare. | X. Statistics. |

Mr Lloyd also proposed 'a final volume bringing together the results of the whole review'. With only minor modifications, this arrangement was the one actually carried out. A new volume was added on 'Man Power and Dilution'; the 'Supply of Munitions' was divided into three and not two volumes; and the final statistical summary, which was ultimately abandoned, was to become part of a preliminary survey of production. Thus the final work was in twelve volumes.

¹ Mr Adams had in fact worked at the Ministry for a short time in 1915.

The evolution of this plan would repay some analysis. In 1918, for example, the draft was largely based on a distinction between 'destructive' and 'non-destructive' munitions; due, no doubt, to Mr Lloyd's preoccupation with the economic structure of the post-war world. It is further instructive to notice the way in which the short-term preoccupations of the war and war production were reflected in successive schemes. Just as Mr Layton considered 'Trench Warfare Supplies' to be a pivotal topic in 1916, so in 1917 Mr Lloyd proposed to devote a whole volume to 'Storage'. The final division is into the broadest possible subjects, within which specific problems are dealt with not merely as they occur, but also according to the nature of the questions they provoke. The topics themselves, it will be noticed, cover far more than mere 'production'. The whole question of labour is involved; wages, welfare, efficiency and housing. Subjects which would now be shared between the Ministries of Health, Labour, and Works and Buildings as well as the production departments were then embraced by the Ministry of Munitions; and while this was fortunate from the point of view of coherence, it undoubtedly complicated and enlarged the scope of the official history. The history in 1920 was thus widely different from the projected history of 1916. Mr Lloyd's own views in 1919 are significant: 'The ultimate purpose is to interpret and make available the story of the industrial war effort of the nation during the last four years, so far as material is furnished by the records of the Ministry of Munitions... Its real importance and justification lie in the fact that the public policy of the next decade will be governed by the experience of war time administration. Consequently the true interpretation of these events is an object of high national significance.' Before briefly considering whether the work met these requirements, it is necessary to note the staff difficulties which Mr Lloyd experienced.

Apart from Mr Adams, all staff employed came on the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions. It will be recalled that Mr Adams, and after him Mr Godfrey Lloyd, had the responsibility of collecting and editing two groups of documents: the reminiscences communicated by important officers of the Ministry, and the memoranda based on documentary evidence compiled by each branch from its own records. How workable Mr Adams found this system is not recorded. Mr Lloyd criticized it directly and by implication. He made three points. The working officials had little time and no training for historical work. Their drafts when completed required editing so drastic as to involve in practice rewriting and redocumentation. Finally, there were many topics which could not properly be allocated to any single department. It was, therefore, inevitable that when put in charge of the history he should have tried to collect a number of trained historians and research workers to deal with the problem. His success in this effort was on the whole remarkable. He himself continued with his normal work in the Statistical Department, and most of his staff did some administrative work in addition to writing history. By the spring of 1917 he had a staff of 10, which rose to 15 in August of the same year and in August 1918 rose to 21. At its highest point in the spring of 1919 the number of persons employed on the Munitions History was 22. Thereafter it declined, although at the very end there were still four whole-timers working under Mr Lloyd's directions.

The work under Mr Lloyd was at first divided as follows. A specific topic was allotted to each assistant with experience, and a group of topics was allotted to some of the more senior workers. Thus Captain (as he then was) F. M. Cornford and Mr A. J. Jenkinson took Industrial Mobilization and Labour respectively, besides supervising the junior staff. Mrs Gladys Temperley edited Munitions and contributed to Industrial Equipment. The general plan remained Mr Lloyd's, and while departmental contributions, as well as the recollections

of past and present members of the staff, were still received, the scrutiny of such documents and the composition of narratives were entirely in the hands of the historical section. By January 1919 the staff had been rationalized. Three assistant editors, six senior assistants and six assistants were then recognized as working under Mr Lloyd as Director and Editor.¹

With the end of the war, however, changes in personnel became increasingly frequent. The Ministry was in process of dissolution and a rigorous attempt was made to cut all establishments. In addition, many of the staff were themselves wanting to leave: Captain Cornford was asked for by Trinity College, Cambridge, and Mr A. J. Jenkinson by Brasenose College, while Mrs Temperley wished to be able to spend more time in Cambridge. Further, it was by no means clear how much time would be available for the completion of the history, since there was no certainty about the fate of the Ministry itself. The continuance of a Supply Ministry was at first assumed, but after 1920 it was clear that the Ministry was to be wound up. In July 1919 Mr Lloyd agreed 'to carry through the scheme of the history this year while keeping the enrolled staff at a minimum', and although more and more time was ultimately allowed and the work was not finished until 1922, nevertheless the scramble to get the work into print clearly led to serious faults in the history. The printing itself was formidable, since over 3½ million words were involved, and only about two-thirds of the work was ready for the press by the summer of 1919. Nevertheless, by December 1919 Miss Redstone, who remained on the historical staff till the end, could report that approximately one-half of the work was printed.

In addition, all the gaps had to be filled in. In January 1920 agreement was reached with the Treasury for the employment of individual contributors on a 'piece-work' basis. While this involved all the disadvantages of complicated administration and uncoordinated effort, it did enable most topics to be written up. Mr Lloyd and his staff assessed the maximum length and invited the assistance of a writer who they thought might be interested. The work involved indexing and proof correction. Over thirty persons, some of them past members of the Munitions History team, were given subjects. In the end, in spite of being at the mercy of time and money, Mr Lloyd managed to secure the help of some first class scholars.

The responsibility for the history after the formal dissolution of the Ministry on 3 March 1921 was of particular importance, since occasion was taken to debate the issue in the House. Parliamentary interest in the project had not been large. A question in December 1919 and another in July 1920 elicited from successive Parliamentary Secretaries to the Ministry of Munitions² that the whole-time staff numbered four persons; that no decision on publication had been taken; and that volumes were 'a full record of the work of the Ministry' which 'might be of vital importance in some future emergency'. On 14 March 1921 the Commons were told that copies would not be sold to the public. A week later a sharp exchange in the House made it clear that any further expenditure on the work would be extremely unpopular, and its usefulness as an aid in any future war planning was questioned.

Behind all the financial difficulties there still remained the fundamental problem of who was to have access to the volumes. Although, as we have seen, some sort of public account was envisaged by one or two of the originators of

¹ *Assistant Editors*: Captain F. M. Cornford, Mr A. J. Jenkinson, Mrs Gladys Temperley; *Senior Assistants*: Mr Henry Clay (lent by Ministry of Labour), Mrs H. C. Jenkinson, Mr G. H. LeMaistre, Mr D. D. Murdoch, Miss L. J. Redstone, Mr D. C. Somervell; *Assistants*: Mr P. Ashworth, Miss V. M. Boulter, Mr S. P. Churchill, Miss R. M. Hutton, Miss E. S. Nicholas, Miss D. L. Winters.

² Lord Inverforth was the last Minister.

the scheme, it was the private endeavours of Mr G. A. B. Dewar¹ and his publishers, Messrs Constable, which raised the issue in an urgent way. While helping Mr Dewar in a semi-official capacity, Mr Lloyd naturally could not allow the history to be reproduced even partially in an unofficial volume. In January 1919 he approached Sir Graham Greene with the proposal that there should be 'an official record of the Ministry's work in a form suitable for general publication'. He instanced the semi-official books on naval and military war history published by Sir Julian Corbett and Sir John Fortescue, and suggested a similar solution for the story of the Ministry of Munitions.

The last four volumes, which covered the production of army stores, could clearly not be published on security grounds, but this was only a small proportion of the work. Sir Maurice Hankey and Sir Graham Greene were both sympathetic to Mr Lloyd's proposals, and in March 1920 the Cabinet formally approved the publication of the sections dealing with industrial labour, subject to the agreement of the Ministry of Labour. By 1922, however, it became clear that no publication for sale to the public would be sanctioned. Accordingly, Mr Lloyd produced a number of suggestions, two of which were accepted and matured. He succeeded in getting Professor Shotwell and the Economic and Historical Division of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to sponsor a volume on labour in their series. Written by Mr Humbert Wolfe, it appeared in 1923 and was largely based on materials in the Munitions History.² Secondly Mr Lloyd argued that, failing general publication, the simplest and most direct method of making the history available to the public was to issue some of the existing copies of the first eight volumes to the principal libraries. The scheme was not only simple and direct; it was most economical. For all these reasons it readily received official approval.

In pressing for early publication Mr Lloyd was, perhaps, influenced by the many calls made on him in the immediate post-war period. Practically every government department approached him with queries; many of the Dominions and some foreign governments had questions on British war production which only the Historical Section was in a position to answer. Further, many authors and publishers wrote requiring help for a variety of undertakings.³ But Mr Lloyd's prophecy that 'if it is not published in the near future, it will not be read by anyone' has happily been proved completely untrue. 250 copies of the various volumes of the history were available, some of which were bound and circulated to Ministries and other official bodies, and a further number sent to the selected libraries. There can be no doubt about its usefulness. It has been a standard reference work in the inter-war period, particularly in the departments which inherited some of the functions of the Munitions Ministry, such as the Board of Trade, the War Office and the Ministry of Labour. The approach of this war greatly increased the demand for it. The official libraries were in 1939 totally unable to cope with all the requests made for the volumes, and more recently, interest in post-war planning has stimulated interest in events at the end of the last war. Public interest would, no doubt, have been similarly continuous, had the availability of the work in the big libraries been more widely known.

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¹ Previously editor of *The Saturday Review*. He published *The Great Munition Feat 1914-1918* (1921).

² *Labour Supply and Regulation*.

³ In this way a good deal of official fact was made public, though the direct citation of documents is always forbidden and reference, therefore, is extremely limited.

REVIEWS

G. M. TREVELYAN. *English Social History. A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria.* (Longmans Green and Co. 1944. pp. xii+628. 28s.)

It is seventy years since the publication of J. R. Green's *Short History of the English People* opened up new horizons of scholarship and kindled in thousands an interest in what we now call social history. What Green did for his generation Trevelyan has done for ours. It is given to few to combine, as he does, insight into the lives of men and women of the past—their work and play, worship and superstition, family concerns and politics—with sensitive appreciation of what is best in English letters, from Chaucer to Meredith and beyond. The only other one can think of with the rare gifts of mind and spirit needed for an enterprise such as this has joined those of whom she wrote: it is fitting that Professor Trevelyan should have dedicated his book to the memory of Eileen Power.

Most of the present generation of economic historians look through eyes accustomed to the microscope rather than to the field-glasses which Professor Trevelyan employs with such skill. It is not easy for one of these to appraise a work which ranges over so many centuries and so many aspects of thought and action. The comments that follow are made with humility: they should not be read as an attempt to belittle what is acknowledged to be a masterpiece of both scholarship and literature.

In his introductory remarks Professor Trevelyan lays it down that 'the social scene grows out of economic conditions, to much the same extent that political events in their turn grow out of social conditions'. But in the text he sometimes forgets, so it seems to the reviewer, that he has committed himself to this economic interpretation of history. In the Introduction he defines social history 'negatively as the history of a people with the politics left out': politics are said to be the outcome rather than the cause of social change. But in the text, again and again, the political factor usurps the part assigned to the economic, and appears as principal actor in the social scene. The following are offered as examples. 'The tribute and plunder of France that had been poured into England during the earlier and more successful part of the Hundred Years' War, revolutionized the primitive economy of the English feudal household', and hence 'luxury increased, and with it commerce grew' (pp. 26-7). The younger economists, taught to revere Mandeville to the neglect of Adam Smith, may approve; but it is not easy to see in such a statement any demonstration of the primacy of economic over political forces. By asserting (on p. 36) that government action in the reigns of Edward II and Edward III was a cause of the development of the woollen industry, Professor Trevelyan takes his stand on ground which the studies of Unwin and Postan have shown to be untenable, and which even Cunningham, in his later years, had largely yielded. The early guilds are treated as subject to the general control of the municipality: there is no indication (again in spite of Unwin's work) of the part played by the crafts in building up the unit of local government. And the statement (on p. 191) that the craft guilds received their *coup de grâce* in the confiscatory legislation of Edward VI, is likely to lead the uninstructed to attribute to a political measure what was really due to a long process of economic transformation and decay.

When we reach the time of the Tudors the economic thread in the fabric shows up more clearly: full justice is done to the part played by the fall of the value of money in redistributing wealth and changing the relations between one agrarian class and another. But little is said about the corresponding changes among manufacturers and traders: one is left with the impression of a more or less stable industrial life proceeding under 'the wholesome supervision of a central authority thinking for the whole nation' (p. 170). Apprenticeship to crafts (as distinct from apprenticeship of the sons of the gentry to merchants) is barely mentioned in the earlier chapters: the reader might be pardoned if he came to the conclusion that it was the creation of an act of state in 1563. It may be added that there is no hint of the part that sectional interests played in the framing of the Statute of Artificers. If it is true that 'for centuries apprenticeship was the school of Englishmen', too much credit must not be given to a measure by which its benefits, in a number of well-paid trades, were expressly withheld from lads of low degree.

The same idea of the dominance of the state in economic development reappears in the treatment of succeeding centuries. It is true that Professor Trevelyan makes it abundantly clear that the British settlements overseas were not founded by any act of government, but by private individuals and voluntary bodies seeking to free themselves from political control—just as many who stayed in England moved from the towns into the countryside for the same reason. But he accepts the conventional view that, in Restoration England, 'national policy was already promoting increased production' (p. 270), and that 'a series of wars of commercial and colonial expansion... increased the English territories in America and pushed English commerce into the markets of Europe and the world' (p. 273). Nor is it only trade that follows the flag. In the nineteenth century the peopling of the Empire was, apparently, no longer mainly the outcome of individual initiative: it was 'systematized and aided emigration that founded modern Canada, Australia and New Zealand' (p. 548). Professor Trevelyan is, of course, entitled to stress the part played by policy in shaping economic development, even if, as in the last instance, there are statistics which might lead to a different view. The point of criticism is that his treatment hardly supports the thesis laid down in his opening sentences.

Economic history (as everyone who has tried to write it knows) shades off imperceptibly into the history of technique. One has no right to ask the social historian to traverse the field of technology, but if he chooses to do so he must beware of his steps. In the time of Elizabeth, Professor Trevelyan tells us, 'even the forests of the Weald, in Sussex, Surrey and Kent, which had supplied the iron furnaces with charcoal for thousands of years, were running short at last' (pp. 187-8). Thousands of years, perhaps. But furnaces, no. Some time in the reign of Elizabeth's grandfather a new method of producing iron had been devised: in place of the old bloomery came the blast-furnace, and the furnace was voracious of fuel. This is how 'at last' should be interpreted. Again, failure to distinguish between the production of iron in the charcoal-fed furnace and forge, and the working of it into finished products in coke-using smithies, is responsible for the misleading statement (on. p. 284) that 'in Stuart times, in spite of the rapid growth of iron trades in Birmingham and the Black Country to the west of it, coal or coke fires were not yet applied to iron'. It was not in Lancashire, though Lancashire benefited from the invention, that the science of engineers had devised in the year 1712 a machine for pumping water (p. 321). It is not true that the spinning jenny concentrated spinning in factories (p. 375 n.). And to say that under the domestic system 'the women and children were engaged in picking the cotton, the men in weaving it' (p. 389), is hardly to

do justice to the elaborate specialization of processes which had in fact been achieved. Finally—a matter of organization rather than of technique—what are we to make of the statement (on p. 399) that ‘the Joint-Stock Company was indeed admirably suited to the social structure of that aristocratic but commercially minded Century’—the eighteenth? Ought not the reader to be told that it was less admirably suited to the taste of legislators and lawyers, and that corporate enterprise did not expand greatly till after that aristocratic age had passed?

Perhaps the least satisfactory chapters are those that deal with the nineteenth century. Professor Trevelyan seems happier when he is helping us to appreciate the spacious life of the English gentry, on their broad estates, in the days before satanic mills and urban concentration marked the rise of a new industrial order. The earlier chapters are enlivened by vivid extracts from the journals or letters of cultivated families, like the Pastons, the Russells and the Verneys. But, though there are many biographies of manufacturers and even of working men to hand for Victorian times, no similar use is made of these. The exploits of the mosstroopers are vividly set forth, but there is no mention of the midnight meetings on the moors of the nineteenth-century weavers: not a single paragraph is given to the Chartist movement. There is a good deal about the rise and growth of Oxford and Cambridge, but nothing of the origins of the modern provincial universities. The changes in the face of London over the earlier centuries are traced with the aid of a dozen antiquarians and travellers, but there is no mention of the London as we know it through the great survey which Charles Booth set on foot in 1887.

Yet, despite all this, the feeling with which one reaches the last page is one of regret at parting. Every economic historian, busy with his task of disinterring the bones of past society, should return now and again to this work of creative imagination which brings flesh and blood and the breath of life to his subject-matter.

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MILDRED CAMPBELL. *The English Yeoman under Elizabeth and the Early Stuarts*. (Yale University Press and Oxford University Press. 1942. pp. xiii + 453. 25s.)

It is strange that the yeomen of England, the class which produced Shakespeare, Newton, Latimer, Harvey and Selden, and, on the American side, the Adams dynasty and Thomas Jefferson, should have had to wait so long for a full-length study. Miss Campbell's book is the latest addition to the series of the Yale Historical Publications and is a notable contribution to English social history. Not only has she absorbed an astonishing range and mass of sources, which are handled with ease and skill in the narrative, but she has spent two years in this country travelling into its remotest parts and learning from the landscape itself, so that her book throughout reveals a care for the detail of her theme that could only come from a first-hand acquaintance with the English countryside.

The sources of this book are manifold: every conceivable kind of material has been drawn upon, particularly good use being made of the proceedings in the Star Chamber and the Court of Requests and, to a lesser extent, the Courts of Chancery and the Exchequer. The very full use of local records is especially valuable: county archives, parish records, family papers, local wills and deeds, have all been explored. And Miss Campbell displays, in addition, an extensive acquaintance with the literary material of her period, particularly contemporary

plays, which are quoted to excellent effect throughout. A good critical Bibliographical Note at the end, running to twenty-five pages, gives some indication of the extent of Miss Campbell's searches.

In the face of this array of sources it may seem unnecessary to draw attention to two classes of records which, had they been used, would have yielded more good material. The papers of the Committee for Compounding at the Public Record Office contain details of the real estate of royalist yeomen compounding for their sins, their particular merit being that, unlike the inquisitions post-mortem with their wholly fictitious values, they give the actual contemporary values of real property. The other neglected class of records is local in origin: the voluminous proceedings of the ecclesiastical courts (e.g. the Bishop's Consistory Court at Exeter or the Archdeaconry Court at Leicester) contain much valuable material for a study of rural society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially the suits concerning disputed tithes or assessments to local rates. These records, which survive in great numbers in diocesan registries, are not as well known as they should be to the economic and social historian, possibly because they are usually in the hands of lawyers whose fees would make historical research a rich man's hobby.

Miss Campbell begins by discussing the origins of the Elizabethan yeoman. She shows that though it is profitless to look for a precise legal meaning for the term 'yeoman', which was purely descriptive by the sixteenth century, it is one of real significance. She finds the nucleus of the class in the free tenants of the medieval manor, though the majority were descended from enterprising or fortunate customary tenants who had profited from the economic changes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; changes which were vastly accelerated during the generation before her story begins. It is, however, a little sweeping to say (p. 51) that 'the number of free tenants on the medieval manor was actually quite small'. Such a statement is broadly true of some counties, but broadly untrue of others, and its truth also depends to a large degree on whether one is speaking of the thirteenth or the fifteenth century. This, indeed, illustrates what is perhaps Miss Campbell's basic difficulty in dealing with the yeomen as a class, and in taking England as a whole for her province: she is obliged to obscure sharp local differences which are really fundamental in regional economic history.

The same difficulty emerges in the discussion of the extent of the yeoman's lands and the scale of his activities. Miss Campbell is well aware of this when she puts her estimate of their estate at anything between 25 and 200 acres in chiefly arable regions, rising to 500-600 acres for well-to-do yeomen in grazing regions (p. 102). One feels, however, that this range is so wide as to be unhelpful, and that behind it lie concealed important regional differences which a number of local studies for selected areas would bring out. A yeoman in Devonshire was something very different from a yeoman in the east midlands or East Anglia. The yeoman in the east midland sense is hard to find in south-western England, for reasons that go back ultimately to the Scandinavian settlement in the ninth century. In the one area we have a marked class of peasant proprietors, who persist (in the main) up to the eve of parliamentary enclosure and even beyond it: in the other area the Elizabethan pattern of land ownership is entirely different. There were few free tenements on the typical Devonshire or Cornish manor, and such as there were belonged almost exclusively to the squirearchy. The lord of the typical manor was an esquire or a knight, as elsewhere; but in addition the three to six freehold estates lying within the average manor, though they were not of it, belonged to neighbouring esquires or gentry and it is most exceptional to find a yeoman name anywhere among the freeholders. Nor did the dismemberment and selling off of manors in parcels to

yeoman tenants in Elizabethan and Stuart times go on in this part of England to anything like the same extent as elsewhere, probably because the boorish west country squires were content not to stir outside their ancestral acres, never saw London and never wanted to, and so never overspent their incomes like so many of their class in less remote parts. Overspending was a potent cause of land-transference in Elizabethan times, and the yeomen benefited, for they systematically underspent.

Miss Campbell devotes a good deal of her space to the Devonshire yeoman in particular, but the difficulty of identifying him in the midland and East Anglian sense which is perhaps the truest sense) leads her astray at times. She speaks, for instance, of the Northcotes as yeomen (pp. 39, 165) who entered the ranks of the gentry in the early seventeenth century, having made a fortune in the local woollen trade. But they were in fact typical Devonshire squires in their origin, springing in the twelfth century from the substantial free tenement of Northcote which gave them their name, and their marriages clearly indicate their social status from early times: they were allied to some of the most distinguished families in the west and with the Plantagenets themselves. Similarly, the Furses, of whose 'family book' Miss Campbell makes such excellent use, were not yeomen as one understands the term at all, but minor gentry originating in the fourteenth century on the small estate from which they took their name, and pursuing through the centuries the same marriage policy as any other members of the landed class.

The chapter on 'Land Hunger' is excellent, illustrated as it is with new statistics compiled from the local records of widely separated areas. Miss Campbell shows the extent of the rise in land prices (pp. 75-6) and in rents (pp. 84-5, that took place during the century with which she is concerned, and she has made an analysis of more than 3100 local deeds for the period 1570-1640 which enables her to tabulate the scale of yeoman purchases (p. 78), though the accuracy of her percentages must be modified by the fact that during these seventy years the general price-level almost doubled, with a corresponding effect on the purchase price of land. Nevertheless, the table is a valuable one and enables us to form an idea of the order of magnitude of yeoman purchases. 37% of the purchases in this sample from twenty-seven counties were for less than £50, and 59% for less than £100, a useful corrective to the more spectacular examples of yeoman affluence, which are not typical of the class as a whole, where the purchase price ran into thousands.

There are, too, excellent tables (pp. 82-3) bringing out important regional differences in the nature of leases. In Sussex more than 80% of the leases were for 21 years or less; in south-western England practically 80% were for a term of 99 years or longer and only 10% were for 21 years or less. In general, high rents and short leases were characteristic of the country round the great food market of London: it would be interesting to discover whether the larger provincial cities like Bristol and Norwich exerted a similar influence on their hinterlands.

The discussion of yeoman farming in Chapter v is based essentially upon published material, but with fresh illustrations of detail from local and other records, including the inventories of personal estate attached to yeoman wills. One must confess to a slight sense of disappointment (though it is perhaps expecting too much) that the thousands of inventories which Miss Campbell has used all over England were not analysed to illustrate the precise nature of local farming practice in different regions. I have shown elsewhere that for the county of Leicestershire the inventories provide abundant material for this purpose and can be made to yield an accurate and detailed picture of local farming such as no other class of record or published material can provide.

Similar studies for Suffolk, Bedfordshire and Lincolnshire, to cite only three areas in which local inventories were extensively used by the author, would have been of the utmost interest.

These inventories have, however, been used by the author to admirable effect in all other directions in the succeeding chapter on 'Bed, Board, and Roof-Tree,' which will be of great value for the social historian. One may, perhaps, make a small criticism of Miss Campbell's figure on p. 238 as to the average personal estate of the yeoman. An analysis of 2172 yeoman inventories from Berkshire, Lincolnshire and Sussex for the period 1556-1650 yields an average of £160; but once more the rapidly rising price-level during these years should have been taken into account. A comparative analysis for, say, 1556-70 and 1640-50 would have been much more informative, particularly if contrasted with husbandmen's inventories for the same years. There were, too, great differences of personal wealth and standards of living between the greater yeoman and the lesser (as Miss Campbell admits); so great as to persuade one that one is not talking about the same kind of people, notwithstanding the fact that the same generic term embraces them all.

All this goes to emphasize the need for more regional studies: English local records are abundant enough to provide all the materials necessary, particularly if reinforced by a detailed local knowledge of the countryside, without which no good agrarian history can be written. Miss Campbell has courageously made the first attempt to write the general history of the English yeoman and has done it well. One feels sure that the local studies, when they come, will amply confirm most of her conclusions, but they will modify others. It is a measure of the excellence of her pioneering that one is provoked into seeing how much more now needs to be done.

One last comment: Miss Campbell's book paints, especially in its closing chapters, a picture of a fundamentally happy and integrated society, a result due in part, no doubt, (as she herself sees) to the fact that the records handled by the historian are by their nature mainly 'success stories' and the failures sink unrecorded into oblivion: but on the whole one feels that it is a true likeness of a real civilization, a peasant civilization, which is better than anything we can show to-day or are likely to show in this money-ridden, town-minded twentieth century.

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W. G. HOSKINS. *The Leicestershire Farmer in the Sixteenth Century*. (Reprinted from the *Transactions of the Leicestershire Archaeological Society*, 1941-2. W. Thornely and Son, Leicester. 1942. pp. 62.)

This paper is packed with precise information, illuminating statistics and vivid detail of representative examples. The statistics in particular are marshalled with great judgement and skill. It is to be hoped that Dr Hoskins's work will not be overlooked, pending the appearance of that larger study of Leicestershire in the sixteenth century which he hopes to give us, by English social and economic historians, to whom it is of more importance than to archaeologists or even to Leicestershire antiquaries. The inventories attached to wills in the probate records are Dr Hoskins's main source; but he compares them freely with such other documents as fines and subsidy lists. His figures and examples give a firm impression of the fortunes of the great yeomen and middling peasants of a region of agricultural England which was crucial in Tudor times. The classical depopulating enclosures, as Dr Hoskins points out, were more serious in Leicestershire than anywhere else in England; indeed, they were largely a

midland problem, and the agrarian troubles of Norfolk, for example, were largely different in kind. But the peasant agriculture of unenclosed Leicestershire was very different from the supposed uniform economy of the English plains. Already there was much grass. Only about 55 % of a representative peasant's holding was normally arable; and while every peasant, in the early part of the century, grew some wheat, peas and beans were the most important crop, and barley brought the predominance of spring corn above 4 to 1. By the end of the century this predominance was still more marked, and in 1620 William Lilly first saw and ate good white bread in London, 'contrary to our diet in Leicestershire'. The distribution of crops, says Dr Hoskins, was governed very largely by soil and climate; and soil and climate largely determined the peculiar shape of the sixteenth-century agrarian problem in the midlands.

But the peasant farmer and his fortunes are Dr Hoskins's main theme. Even at the beginning of his period there was marked economic inequality in Leicestershire. Most villages had no resident squire, but there were generally one or two yeomen whose wealth raised them far above their fellows. And even where there was no dominant yeoman, a quarter of the families might own half the personal property of a village, while the majority of the population had little personal property and no land. Among the farming peasants Dr Hoskins distinguishes two broad classes: the husbandman with up to and around 60 acres, and the yeoman farming 100 acres or more. Some of the yeomen were on their way to squirearchy. Thomas Bradgate, in 1524, was the second most highly assessed man on the county subsidy list, and in 1572 Richard Bradgate left some 3000 acres of land; while the Bales of Carlton rose from yeoman to baronet in four generations. Yet here again there was a gulf; most yeomen, while steadily improving their positions, remained yeomen to the end of the chapter. It is notable that the most thriving were those whose inventories show the greatest number of sheep; the heirs of the man who left few or none were not destined for a meteoric career. Dr Hoskins concludes that only the monastic houses in the earlier period, and later the squires, took part in enclosures for large-scale sheep-farming. Apart from the wealthiest yeomen, the ordinary peasant farmers had small flocks. The chief factor in the rising prosperity of the yeomen, says Dr Hoskins (and it is one that must have affected the fortunes of all land-owning peasants, great and small), was the rapid rise in the price of agricultural produce in contrast to fixed expenses. Expenses were fixed in coin of the realm, and it is unfortunate that Dr Hoskins uses Wiebe's index-number, which measures the purchasing power of pure silver, not of coin of the realm. In a period when the currency was first progressively debased and then partially restored, the two purchasing powers were very different; and Wiebe's index is inapplicable to this particular problem. On these and other grounds, such an index as that calculated by Knoop and Jones from Steffen's ten-year average prices of twelve articles of food (*Economic History*, II, 485) is preferable, though doubtless still better indices could be constructed for this purpose. Knoop and Jones's figures indicate a much greater general rise than Wiebe's, and one that begins earlier, from the decade 1521-30. Speaking of prices, Dr Hoskins suggests that the inventories attached to wills afford material for the study of prices in a particular locality, though, as he says, the evidence is difficult to interpret and full of pitfalls. But can we trust inventory prices to be true market prices? Experience of modern valuations for probate on the one hand and fire insurance on the other gives one pause.

Perhaps the most valuable part of Dr Hoskins's paper consists in his summaries of specimen inventories of the personal property, indoor and outdoor, of representative peasants of varying degrees of wealth. These merit detailed study and comparison. Dr Hoskins points out the modesty of the household furnish-

ings, not only of the lesser yeomen and husbandmen in Henry VIII's reign, but even of such a warm man as Thomas Bradgate himself. His riches were in his stock-in-trade, and he lived according to his degree; though such frugality and abstemious ploughing back of profits is not uncommon to-day, in the first generation up from shirt-sleeves. By the end of the century the Bradgates were squires in the land, or at least gents. What is more remarkable is the great rise in the standard of comfort of quite humble farmhouses; and Dr Hoskins gives chapter and verse for the well-known impressions of William Harrison. Robert Coulson, in 1596, left personal estate valued at less than half the average among Leicestershire peasants of his day; but 40 % of it was represented by household goods, as against an average of under 15 % among husbandmen in the reign of Henry VIII. And it is not a question of changing relative prices, for Coulson's furniture can be compared piece by piece with that of, say, Robert Smalley, who died in 1559. Where Smalley had two stools, Coulson had four; where Smalley had one form, Coulson had two forms and a bench; and Coulson had luxuries of which Smalley never dreamed; a cupboard, a chair, painted cloths hanging on the walls and a fine array of fire-irons. He was but a husbandman, but his house had five or six rooms; more than most yeomen's houses fifty years earlier. Cash values are sometimes misleading, but a room is a room and a chair is a chair. This evidence of a general rise in comfort seems entirely to outweigh Dr Hoskins's scruples about the declining acreage of wheat in Leicestershire, and its bearing on the prosperity of the husbandmen. For we must remember, as Dr Hoskins points out at the outset, that these inventories take account of few below the degree of husbandman; few cottagers and those not the poorest, for the poorest had little to leave and made no wills. The standard of life of the least wealthy is, therefore, not in question; of the evicted, for example, who were husbandmen no longer. And those who had no land could grow no corn; they might glean a little, but they must buy most of their beans and barley from their prosperous neighbours. A reduced output of wheat might suffice for a wheat-eating class reduced in numbers; an increased output of other corn might go to feed the new poor.

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JOHN G. B. HUTCHINS. *The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy, 1789-1914: an Economic History*. (Harvard University Press. 1941. pp. xxii + 627. \$5.00.)

Mr Hutchins has written an able, comprehensive and learned book on a subject much needing treatment. The British navigation laws have long been regarded as one of the most striking embodiments of mercantilist policy and have been studied by a regular succession of economists and historians. The influence of American independence in initiating the decline of the system has been well recognized. But the subsequent navigation policy of the United States has never received due attention.

A considerable part of the introductory chapters is devoted to an economic analysis of the problem of regulation in the shipping industry, which has unusual theoretical interest. States, unless indeed their economies are wholly self-sufficient, must inevitably be affected in their attempts at protection by the policies of other states with which their shipping may be in competition, and even if they were wholly self-sufficient they would still have to consider the needs of national defence. Governments never in fact leave shipping entirely alone, but they have often been inconsistent and ill-advised in their attempts to regulate it.

Though Mr Hutchins throws light at many points on the history of British shipping policy, his main contribution lies, of course, in his history of the American shipping and shipbuilding industries. These had begun to grow in New England quite early in the colonial period, and in the eighteenth century the growth proceeded at an accelerating pace. The fundamental reason lay in the seemingly inexhaustible timber resources of the American Atlantic coast. 'By the nineteenth century the Baltic seaboard was the only region in Europe where wooden ships could be economically built in large numbers': and the Baltic countries were not great maritime powers. But the movement overseas of the shipbuilding industry had been checked by 'the industrial backwardness of the colonies, the obstacles to the migration of capital and labour, and the laws governing the registry of vessels'. American independence gave a great new impetus to the industry—and incidentally dealt a severe blow to British shipowners—and during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars American shipping and shipbuilding had their first 'golden era'. Small shipyards were set up on almost every tidal waterway on the coast, above all in eastern New England, whereas British competition was hampered by the exhaustion of British timber resources (described, of course, in Professor Albion's *Forests and Sea Power*), by the poor quality of British North American ships, and by the limitations on the supply of Indian teak, the timber which most closely rivalled the white oak and live oak of the United States. In these circumstances the United States Government saw its interest in free navigation and its reciprocity policy was directed towards that end. Great Britain was very much on the defensive: American ships began to lead the world in design and in efficiency of operation.

Then the trends were suddenly reversed. The reasons for the change form perhaps the most interesting part of Mr Hutchins's study. The usual explanation of the decline of American shipping after the triumphs of the clipper ship is the Civil War: but Mr Hutchins shows that this is only part of the explanation, and not the most important part. The boom of 1847–57 was marked by an increasing scarcity of ship timber and sharply rising labour costs. The clipper ship owed much to the exceptional circumstances of the California gold rush. 'It was difficult... to find any normal employment in which the freight rates were high enough to meet the heavy operating expenses of these clippers.' Moreover, the rapidity with which their hulls loosened in the severe Cape Horn weather 'showed that the technical and economic limits of wood as a material were being approached'. Meanwhile the stimulus of competition, the reform of Lloyds' admeasurement rule in 1854, and the introduction of iron as a basic material enabled Britain again to challenge the technical leadership of the United States. In addition the British Government, throughout this so-called age of *laissez-faire*, adhered to a policy of mail contract subsidies which was in effect an intelligent protection of the infant steamship industry. Now wooden steamships were all very well on the Mississippi, but were not well adapted to ocean navigation, whereas United States iron supplies were not so convenient to her shipbuilding centres as those of Great Britain, and iron was a protected, high-cost industry. It was a difficult situation, and the wisdom of the American Government was unequal to it. Driven hither and thither by considerations of national prestige, by the vested interests of the shipping, wooden shipbuilding, iron and, later, steel industries, it quite failed, in spite of spending a good deal of public money, to arrest the decline of American shipping. After the Civil War the United States still had a large and efficiently conducted wooden sailing ship industry, square-rigged ships in the long-haul grain trade, schooners later on in the coastwise bulk trade; but so far as iron and steel ships were concerned, only the protected coastwise trade (itself increasingly in the hands of railway interests) enabled the country to cut a respectable figure in the shipping tonnage

of the world. Such is a brief summary of Mr Hutchins's argument, naturally in a highly simplified form.

In composition the book occasionally smells of the card-index, and it could with advantage be shorter. But these defects are more than outweighed by its clarity both in thought and expression. A man who handles a highly complicated subject so well in his first book is clearly destined to become a notable economic historian. The subject is of considerable topical interest. British economic historians should not leave it to specialists in American history but should read it themselves, and if they could bring the trend of its argument to the attention of those concerned with shipping policy they would render a valuable service.

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FRANCIS B. SAYRE. *The Protection of American Export Trade*. (University of Chicago Press. 1940. pp. 93. 9s.)

JOHN DAY LARKIN. *Trade Agreements. A Study in Democratic Methods*. (Columbia University Press. 1939. pp. 135. 6s. 6d.)

Alexander Hamilton was one of the earliest exponents of the infant industry case for import duties, and few would deny that it is a strong one on purely economic grounds. But political factors have intervened to prevent the recognition of the essential corollary to this policy, namely, that fully developed and mature industries should be required to stand on their own feet without more protection than (at most) import duties imposed primarily for revenue purposes. During the first half of the nineteenth century American tariffs were relatively moderate, mainly owing to the strong political pressure exerted by the agricultural states in the south. But after the Civil War the high protectionist party gained the upper hand, and thenceforward most tariff revisions were in an upward direction.

Prior to 1922, American tariff policy was based on the so-called 'conditional most-favoured nation principle', i.e. concessions granted to one country in return for some compensation were only extended to others provided that they in turn made an equivalent compensation to the United States. But in 1922 the United States went over to unconditional most-favoured nation treatment, without, however, modifying its general policy of encouraging exports and discouraging imports. So long as the export of capital continued the effects of this policy, on the part of the country which had become the world's greatest creditor nation, were concealed. But when the boom collapsed in 1929 the whole fabric of American export trade fell to pieces. Instead of recognizing the portents Congress passed in 1930 the Hawley Smoot Tariff Act, which levied the highest duties in American history. Other countries almost immediately retaliated and there was a tremendous rise in tariff barriers and other restrictions throughout the world. The value of American exports fell from \$5,200,000,000 in 1929 to \$1,600,000,000 in 1932, while in the latter year farm incomes were only two-fifths of what they had been in 1929. Actually in 1932 the existing duties were raised still higher by the device of attaching 'excise taxes' on the imports of an important group of commodities to ordinary bills, which the President could not very well veto.

Finally, however, under the Roosevelt administration and at the instance of Mr Cordell Hull, the Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934, under which the President is empowered by executive action to negotiate tariff agreements with unconditional most-favoured nation application, subject to two limitations:

(1) he may not modify an existing duty by more than 50 %; (2) he may not transfer any article between the dutiable and free lists. The Act was limited in duration for three years but was extended for further three-yearly periods till June 1943, when, after a very stiff fight in Congress, it was renewed, but only for two years, i.e. to June 1945.

The two books under review deal with the Trade Agreements Act, and both are by enthusiastic supporters of it. Dr Sayre, as Assistant Secretary of State, was in charge of the Trade Agreements scheme until his appointment in 1940 as High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. He gives an admirably lucid account of the principles behind the Act, and reveals a clear understanding of the importance of foreign trade for the economic well-being of the American people. He shows that, for the first time, the Act has enabled the United States to move from the old single-column tariff ('equality before the closed door') to the double-column tariff which makes possible the levying of lower rates on the products of all countries which do not discriminate against American goods. By 1939 twenty-one agreements had been concluded covering about 60 % of the total American foreign trade, and although the statistical evidence does not enable us to state definitely how much of the expansion in foreign trade after 1933 was the direct result of the agreements, it is clear that they must have helped, and that they were a step, albeit a modest one, in the right direction.

Mr J. D. Larkin is more concerned with the legal and constitutional aspects of the agreements made under the Act. The opponents of the Act, and they are many and powerful, argue that it is unconstitutional because the trade agreements are in effect treaties which require ratification by a two-thirds majority of the Senate to make them valid; and further, that the administrative procedure in connexion with the agreements is undemocratic because there is not adequate provision for the representation of the various interests affected. Mr Larkin's book is devoted to an examination and disproof of these two charges. He puts his case cogently and in the process disposes of many of the traditional arguments of the more extreme protectionists.

The tariff policy of the United States in the post-war period will be of vital importance for the rest of the world as well as for the United States herself; the Hawley Smoot tariff of 1930 was one of the worst blows that was dealt to international trade during the whole inter-war period. It remains to be seen whether the plans that are being worked out with regard to such matters as currency arrangements and other forms of international economic co-operation are going to serve a really useful purpose, or whether they are going to be deprived of a great part of their value by the return of the United States to a policy of insurmountable tariff walls.

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SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES

HELEN M. CAM. *Liberties and Communities in Medieval England*. (Cambridge University Press. 1944. 15s.) In this volume Miss Cam reprints sixteen separate papers published during the last twenty years. Its subtitle 'Studies in Local Administration and Topography' exactly defines its scope: but whether the author is dealing with the early history of Oxford and Cambridge, with early groups of hundreds or the community of the shire, the problems are always essentially general and the answers have much more than local significance. Taken, therefore, in conjunction with the same author's *The Hundred and the Hundred Rolls*, this new volume dovetails nicely with Tout's studies of the central administration and the recent spate of work about the medieval parliament, with which it is of equal and complementary importance. It is, moreover, essentially the book of a teacher, and reminds one that the time wasted in listening to pupils is not pure loss even from the point of view of scholarship. Indeed, no book published in recent years will help more to make sense of Stubbs's *Charters*; and while other teachers will find they need to own it, their pupils will be well advised at least to read it. The history of local administration, even when handled by Miss Cam, cannot, any more than Stubbs himself, be mastered without an effort. But the effort once made, the reader is well rewarded. Miss Cam, though very learned, is always clear, concise and intelligible. There is not a woolly page in the book, though almost every chapter raises those larger questions which are ultimately insoluble. Her first concern is to mark clearly the stage which sound opinion has reached on this or that, with many a sidelong glance at institutions abroad, and then not seldom to make her personal contribution. This is always sensible and generally safe, for Miss Cam, like most good medievalists, is profoundly conservative in outlook, and finds nothing but praise for the Englishman's obstinate preservation of the obsolete across the centuries. Yet the book is full of movement, and no one can fail to see that her study of the Hundredal Manor and her acute criticism of Maitland regarding the *Quo Warranto* inquiries (to take just two points) fit into that newer conception of Edward I's reign which is replacing the old Stubbsian picture. Moreover, in stressing the element of political responsibility which underlay feudal institutions, she is in line with and even advances the best contemporary thought. No one, I think, can read this book without a strong sense of obligation to the author both for fresh information and fresh stimulus to tackle the old problems. No doubt, too, the book is open to criticism: but it would take a braver, as well as a more learned reviewer to break a lance with Miss Cam on her own chosen ground. I will, however, venture, merely by way of appreciation, to mention two points. The first is this: on the admirable map which illustrates the distribution of the Hundredal Manor, I am at a loss to understand on what grounds she includes the eight and a half hundreds of the Liberty of St Edmund and the five hundreds of Ely as hundreds associated with a manor before 1066, or even after it. The second is a mere suggestion regarding the description of the Parliament of 1397 from *Richard the Redeless* (p. 230). Miss Cam (and Mr Richardson) are puzzled by the remark that some of the knights' speeches were so involved that 'no one, whether he sat on the bench or whether he was a burgess' could understand them. Unlike Miss Cam, I do not take a high view of this piece of incipient journalism which (after the manner of its kind) seems to confuse the full meeting of Parliament with the later meeting of the Commons. But the clue to this may perhaps be found in another contemporary chronicle (*Eulogium Historiarum*, III, 337) which describes the Black Prince and the Archbishop of Canterbury at a great Council held in 1374 as sitting *in medio*

scamni, i.e. on the middle of the bench, or as we should say, 'on the platform'. This suggests that the passage means 'no one from the greatest to the least could have understood the speeches of some of the knights in parliament', a fact which any one can still verify himself to-day if he wishes.

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Visitations in the Diocese of Lincoln, 1517-1531. Edited by A. HAMILTON THOMPSON. Vol. II. (Lincoln Record Society, vol. XXXV. 1944.) The second volume of these visitations equals vol. I in interest (cf. *ante*, XI, 109). After some 70 pages filled with visitations of the deaneries in 1530, come the enquiries in forty-one religious houses (1517-30 arranged alphabetically from Ankerwyke to Leicester Abbey. Vol. III will contain the rest of the monastic and collegiate visitations. The parochial visitations show much the same features as the series in vol. I, after the lapse of about ten years. One would be tempted to draw comparisons had not the editor rightly warned us in vol. I against arguing improvement or decline from the two sets of records, since the later visitor was less scrupulous than his predecessor in recording faults. We still find many rectors reported absent on one pretext or another, in the service of the queen (p. 15), the princess (p. 18), the Earl of Derby (p. 69), or one of the king's judges (p. 30), or in another living (p. 15), or 'in Parisia' (p. 45). Moreover, non-residence may sometimes be inferred where it is not stated: 'Magister doctor London vicarius' of Adderbury, for instance, was at this time Warden of New College, Oxford, and prebendary of Lincoln and York; presumably the curate looked after the church of Adderbury. Other cases of non-resident *vicars* in appropriated churches occur at Aldenham and Chipping Norton. At More, Oxon, the parish was served by an Irish curate (whose surname was too much for the registrar) and the parishioners could not understand him, 'quod periculosum est'. This section of the volume contains presentments of churchwardens (called in one place 'ediles') for offences within the bishop's cognizance. They must have led generally to proceedings in the Consistory court, of which the Lincoln diocesan archives contain some good samples, and there is a close resemblance between these cases of 1530 and those which came before the court of the archdeacon of Oxford in 1584, lately printed by Mr Brinkworth for the Oxfordshire Record Society. In most respects the business was the same before and after the Reformation. The power of the Church in 1530 to direct the movements of an individual by a Restriction Order recalls the modern war-time powers of the Home Secretary: Margery Bone, a woman of ill-fame at Daventry, is ordered to leave the town within four days and not to come within two miles of it under pain of excommunication. Turning to the monastic records, we often find that visitants make trivial complaints; the nuns of Gracedieu dislike cold beef and the monks of Croyland have been denied their favourite pudding; and many complaints suggest or definitely allege slander and backbiting. We may properly regard this as insignificant and inevitable under the system of visitation, but we shall also find matter for more serious thought. There is much evidence of financial slackness, and that was usually a symptom of neglect of the Rule. The system of account is unsatisfactory at Leicester Abbey, where the abbot acts as receiver for four of the obedientiaries (this is but one among the abbot's many faults). At Higham Ferrars College no register of muniments is kept. The lands and tenements of Huntingdon Priory are 'in great ruin'. The visitor to Fotheringhay in 1530 made some interesting jottings (in English) about the bailiff of the College, who neglected husbandry for the market, and the Master, who had let his pastures and 'hathe nother bevys nor muttons in store, but byythe from market day to merkett day, and byythe at the bochery his roasting byff'. So it goes on,

The impression is not of widespread, general depravity. The religious houses, in the decade of their dissolution, stick to their old customs and their customary softenings of the Rule. These records do not suggest a worse state of affairs than is revealed by visitations of the thirteenth or fifteenth century; from them nobody would guess that we are on the eve of a revolution. But, since we know what was coming, we note particularly the intrusion of lay influence at every point and the constant communication with the outside world; acquainting the laity with abuses which were dangerous, not because they were new but because they were the old, long-tolerated ones; and convincing the bishops that the inveteracy of the evil prevented any reform by traditional means. Dr Hamilton Thompson has enriched his excellent edition of these documents with a survey of other monastic visitations in the diocese. It supplements most usefully the admirable introduction in vol. I and should be read by all students of the period. Other appendices deal with the officials who went on visitation, and with the chronology of Bishop Longland's circuits.

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HERBERT HEATON. *Yorkshire Cloth Traders in the United States, 1770-1840*. Publications of the Thoresby Society. Vol. xxxvii, Part iii. (Leeds, 1943.) This is an article rather than a volume, the starting point of which is a collection of letters written by three generations of the Crowthers, a family of clothiers from Gomersall and Churwell near Leeds; but Professor Heaton has not confined himself to the history of one family only, and the result is a very lively picture of vigour and enterprise, not always crowned with success. Yorkshire emigrants were going to America as merchants well before the Revolution, but perhaps the chance which took young Benjamin Crowther there in 1772 to canvass orders for his family's cloth was not typical of any movement on the part of Yorkshire clothiers of that date to establish their own representatives abroad. Nevertheless, the efforts of the Crowthers to secure orders at home are thoroughly typical of the methods by which the clothier grew into the merchant, and the American venture was only an extension of what was happening in England; but it was happening, as Professor Heaton points out, at an earlier date than has generally been suspected for the Yorkshire cloth trade. After the Revolution there were many such representatives, some of whom became American citizens, and their vicissitudes in war and peace, booms and slumps, form an interesting contribution to the history of Anglo-American trade relations. A group of them, Thompsons, Wrights and Marshalls, deserves to be remembered as the first to institute, in 1817, a regular monthly service of packet ships between New York and Liverpool. Jeremiah Thompson became a shipowner and cotton dealer on a great scale as well as a cloth merchant, and his bankruptcy in 1827 created a stir on both sides of the Atlantic. Later emigrants, the 'Saddleworth group', made history in another way. Among the detailed information about methods of trade which is to be found in these pages the most important is the picture of the growth of the American tariff and of the methods of circumventing it. The tendency of a high tariff to encourage fraud on both sides can seldom have been more vividly exposed than in the proceedings of this group in the thirties. One wonders if it was these and similar proceedings which 'finished' the Yorkshire merchants in New York, or whether they only shared the fate of the majority of merchant houses in the vicissitudes of the period between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the middle of the century. By 1860 the trade was almost entirely in American hands and the Yorkshiremen had nearly all disappeared. The letters are full of personal details. There is a delightful picture of the Yorkshire exiles in 1810 ('all respectable young men or I should no longer know them', writes David Crowther) singing Methodist 'Hymns, sometimes Rule Britannia or some such good thing' in their boarding house,

accompanied by the landlady's daughter on the pianoforte and by Mr Lister of Leeds on the flute. When the tariff barrier began to rise their principles did not stand in the way of certain relatively mild deceptions to evade it; probably they would have reprobated the open bribery and fraud to which their successors resorted, but the tariff was a potent agent of corruption.

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B. H. BROWN. *The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain, 1881-1895*. (Columbia University Press and Humphrey Milford. 1943. 16s. 6d.) Mr Brown is a student of the 'twilight region between economic circumstances and the formation of political and social policies'; his purpose is to show the interaction of economic and political forces in this country during the 'Great Depression' of late-Victorian times. Drawing his material from an impressively wide range of sources, he traces the preliminary stages of the movement in favour of reviving tariff protectionism, from the foundation of the National Fair Trade League in 1881 to the appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary in 1895. The arrangement of the book is topical rather than chronological; four main chapters, each covering the whole period, show successively the relationship of the tariff reform movement to Labour, to the New Imperialism, to the Conservative Party, to Industry and Agriculture. This plan has tended to blur the outline of the story; but the separate chapters are clear in themselves, and on each of his main topics Mr Brown gives important new information. Tantalizingly, the book stops short just when the subject is becoming really interesting. It is to be hoped that Mr Brown, when he has finished his service with the U.S. Naval Air Force, may yet find time and energy to write a second volume on the colonial and tariff policy of Joseph Chamberlain. In the meantime, he has our gratitude for opening up an important new field of research.

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J. R. AND U. K. HICKS. *Standards of Local Expenditure*. (Cambridge University Press. 1943. 4s. 6d.) Professor and Mrs Hicks are mainly concerned with the question 'Why does the level of rates vary from place to place?' By place they mean county borough, mainly because of the shortage of published information about other authorities. They answer: 'The main reason for disparities in rates is disparities in wealth.' A poor town cannot get enough revenue to reach an average standard of expenditure without imposing a crushing rate poundage. Though the block grant and the elementary education grant give differential assistance to the poorer towns, this has redressed the balance only to a moderate extent. Domiciliary relief imposes the greatest relative burden on the poorer towns, and if this cost could be evened out it would go a long way towards reducing rate disparities. As the White Paper on Social Insurance proposes the transfer of domiciliary assistance to the state, this levelling is likely to come about. The main result of the study lies in the statistical analysis supporting the general argument. This analysis, though interesting and suggestive, is not completely satisfying, partly because of the imperfections of the original data. Thus 39 of the 83 county boroughs have been excluded from the main analysis partly because inspection proved their expenditure to be influenced by special considerations, making them unsuitable for the grouping method adopted. Though the analysis indicates certain important factors influencing local expenditure, it does not quite answer the important question: 'How far are differences between areas due to factors beyond the control of the local council, and how far are they the result of free choice?' Though many poor areas have been compelled to spend large sums on, say, poor relief, many have also, of their own free choice, been most willing to spend, say, on education. Again, in the

case of certain services, sewers and sewage disposal particularly, geographical situation largely determines cost. Thus in 1936-7 Stoke spent nearly 11s. per head of its population on this service, while Gateshead needed to spend less than 9d. per head, the difference being equivalent to a rate of 2s. 1d. in the £. Whilst, therefore, there are factors which are peculiar to rich or poor towns, there are others which cut across such a simple distinction, and these may or may not be within the council's control.

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CHARLES A. BLISS. *The Structure of Manufacturing Production. A Cross-Section View.* (National Bureau of Economic Research, New York. 1939. 12s.) This study represents an examination of the material collected in the U.S. Census of Manufactures of 1929, with occasional supplementation from other sources. In the main, the author is concerned with two aspects only. The distribution of productive resources among different classes of manufactured goods; and the interrelation of the elements of manufacturing costs. The former compares absolute totals of wage earners, wages paid, etc., between industries; the latter examines the interrelations of material costs, wages, salaries, overheads and profits within industries. There are, further, various measurements of the role of capital in manufacturing production, the estimates of capital being based upon capital assets reported by the manufacturing corporations to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Throughout, the individual industries of the census are classified in several groups: consumption and capital goods; types of consumption goods; durable, semi-durable and transient; and others. What emerges from it all is a cross-section of manufacturing industry in the U.S.A. in 1929. There are one or two comparisons with the data of other years, and a few sweeping generalizations. On the whole, however, the author is content to calculate medians and percentages patiently and mechanically and to leave it at that. This limited objective he reaches with skill and ease. Without comparisons with other years, however, or with other countries, and in the absence of more specific targets of enquiry, his results are not very illuminating.

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JOSEPH BORKIN and CHARLES A. WELSH. *Germany's Master Plan.* (John Long Ltd., London. 1943. 12s. 6d.) This book, based largely upon the official records of U.S. commissions of enquiry, is a brief examination of the part played by Germany in the growth of international cartels, especially in the period between the two wars. It indicts the policy pursued by German governments and industrial organizations which, by force and fraud, acquired control of the world production of most strategic materials as part of Germany's quest for world power. Always dependent on overseas supplies for the bulk of her raw materials, Germany had to face the continual menace of war-time scarcity through blockade. She had, therefore, to devote her best technical skill to the discovery of substitutes, especially from the chemical treatment of coal and wood. In these projects, however, Germany found the way to kill two birds with one stone. First, she was able increasingly to free herself from a large measure of her dependence on overseas sources for rubber, oil and many chemicals; and secondly, by the setting up of international cartels she endeavoured to prevent her potential enemies from creating capacity to supply themselves with these substitute materials. It is with this aspect of cartel policy that the book specifically deals. The activities of I.G. Farbenindustrie are selected for special consideration. This powerful body, whose interests cover a far wider range than dyestuffs, has been concerned with synthetic rubber, plastics and substitutes for metal,

cotton, wool, explosives, foodstuffs and pharmaceutical materials. To cope with the problem of the manufacture of these substitutes abroad, the German combine set up its own branches in competitor countries and, in addition, reached agreement with native firms to restrict output. This restriction, ostensibly for the maintenance of prices, ensured that the available productive capacity in the U.S. was kept to a minimum. In many cases, including dyestuffs and plastics, American firms gained a monopoly in the home market in return for giving Germany a free hand in the rest of the world. In the case of drugs and other materials, the Germans were able to achieve even more satisfactory terms: i.e. the American firms agreed to buy all their basic raw and intermediate materials from Germany, thus perpetuating their dependence upon Germany in the fulfilment of some of their essential needs. Wherever possible, I.G. itself imposed limitations upon the manufacture of certain products. Thus, as the Assistant Attorney-General put it: 'a single patent controlled by I.G. Farben dictated the terms by which this essential drug (atabrine, the substitute for quinine) could be manufactured in the U.S.' (p. 84). By comparable methods I.G. was able to impose restrictions on the manufacture of synthetic rubber in the U.S. through its relationship with Standard Oil. Similar accounts are provided for aluminium, magnesium, beryllium, steel and steel products, tungsten carbide, optical glass and other commodities. Agreements were also reached to exchange technical knowledge and trade secrets between firms in the two countries, agreements which the German firms only partially fulfilled. Indeed, the writers point out that some German patents registered in the U.S. withheld the 'know-how' information essential to the manufacture of the protected product, and were in fact bogus patents. By various measures of this sort German industrial organizations, in closest collaboration with their governments, were able to ensure that 'wherever there was a cartel before, in 1942 there was military shortage' (p. 15). The book is fully documented with official references which implicate both German and non-German participants in these international ventures; but it is written essentially from the American viewpoint, and the somewhat abridged British edition has only brief references to developments in which this country had a share. It covers ground familiar to contemporary historians, but it provides a useful short summary and reference book to some American sources, although it suffers sometimes from an over dramatic presentation of the facts. It does not come within the purview of the book to examine issues arising from the post-war reorganization of Europe, but it indicates in its accounts of the inter-war developments some of the pitfalls which face international statesmen.

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LIST OF BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

COMPILED BY J. DE L. MANN

*The list includes books and articles published since the compilation of the last list in 1942.
The place of publication is London unless otherwise stated. Works marked with an
asterisk are of wider scope but contain matter relating to Great Britain.*

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